An examination of board structures and firm performance in France: Is there a preferred board structure?
2013 (English)Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (Two Years)), 20 credits / 30 HE credits
Student thesis
Abstract [en]
The phenomenon of corporate governance is a relatively new field of research. This phenomenon comprises external and internal aspects that can contribute to firm performance. One internal aspect is a corporation’s board structure. Concerning the board structure, three forms may be identified. The first is the unitary board structure with CEO duality. The second is the unitary board structure without CEO duality and the final is the dual board structure. As France is one of few countries globally that offers corporations the possibility to select one of the three board structures, it is of interest to examine whether there is a preferred board structure when firm performance is considered.
In order to examine the relationship between implemented board structure and firm performance, a quantitative approach is applied. The listed corporations on the French stock market index, SBF 250, are taken into consideration. Firm performance is estimated and measured by three financial ratios namely return on equity (ROE), return on capital employed (ROCE) and net profit margin (NPM). The fiscal year of 2011 is the time frame for the examination of the relationship between board structure and firm performance.
The empirical findings suggest that there is no preferred board structure when firm performance is taken into account. This is based on the fact that there are no significant differences concerning the relationship between board structure and firm performance.
This study updates the existing literature on the relationship between board structure and firm performance, broadens and enriches the analysis of this relationship and assists practitioners.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2013. , p. 42
Keywords [en]
Board structure, firm performance, French listed corporations
National Category
Business Administration
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-21310OAI: oai:DiVA.org:hj-21310DiVA, id: diva2:624546
Subject / course
IHH, Business Administration
Supervisors
Examiners
2013-06-032013-06-012025-10-13Bibliographically approved