Non-Executive Directors' Remuneration: A European Banking Perspective
2017 (English)Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (One Year)), 20 credits / 30 HE credits
Student thesis
Abstract [en]
Purpose: While the role of the non-executive is frequently occurrent in the literature and European Commission’s recommendations, there is a lack of systematic studies conducted regarding thestructure of non-executive remuneration. The purpose of this study is to investigate the correlationbetween 30 large European banks’ performances, their board composition and remunerationcomponents in relation to the level of non-executive remuneration between 2011 and 2015.
Research design: A sample of 30 large European banks has been used for collecting data of paidremuneration to non-executive directors. To fulfil the purpose, firm’s performance in terms of ROA, board composition (total size, number of non-executives, and female directors), andremuneration components have been collected as control variables. Moreover, the controlvariables have been correlated to the paid remuneration to non-executives.
Findings: The study highlights ten remuneration components used in banks as building blocks fornon-executive remuneration. It offers insight concerning the correlation of these compensationcomponents to the non-executive remuneration level. The study found that banks using attendancefees generally had a lower level of remuneration to their non-executives than the banks using fixedfees for the separate roles of the board. Furthermore, the study found mixed correlations betweenthe level of non-executive remuneration, firm performance, and board composition.
Contribution: The study contributes to the debate of non-executive remuneration on a crosscountrybut single-industrial level, covering the banking industry in Europe. It attempts to improvethe understanding of the remuneration structure to non-executive directors, seen from a multinationalperspective.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2017. , p. 66
Keywords [en]
Banking, Board of Directors, Non-Executive Directors, Remuneration, Agency Theory, Corporate Governance
National Category
Business Administration
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-35750ISRN: JU-IHH-FÖA-2-20170478OAI: oai:DiVA.org:hj-35750DiVA, id: diva2:1105144
Supervisors
Examiners
2017-06-272017-06-022025-10-13Bibliographically approved