JÖNKÖPING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS SCHOOL
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Terrorism

And its connection to failed states

MASTER THESIS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

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Jönköping AUGUST 2008

Master thesis in Political Science

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Date: **28 August 2008**

Key Terms: **International terrorism, state failure, al Qaeda, Afghanistan, delegitimization of state, factionalized elites.**

Abstract

Through the increase in globalization over the last twenty years the world has become 'smaller'. The many positive aspects of the phenomenon sometimes make us overlook the negative aspects of globalization. Just as economic markets and communication has moved beyond national borders one of the most negative aspects of society has also become global, namely terrorism. As terrorism has moved on to the global spectrum so has the prevention of terrorism. National governments that are trying to combat terrorism have begun to realize that problems that other nations are facing in another continent could eventually affect their national security. Other nation states that are experiencing state failure may become a national security risk. The aim of this thesis is to examine if global terrorist organizations take advantage of the many problems that a nation faces when it is subject to state failure. It has not been to examine the phenomenon of global terrorism itself or why certain nation states fail. It has rather been to see if there is a connection between the two and if so, how do global terrorist organizations take advantage of these opportunities?

The most famous, or infamous, global terrorist organization al Qaeda has on many occasions used the fact that a state is experiencing failure to their advantage. Many of the more common problems that a failed state will face (loss of territorial control, disastrous domestic economy, and bad leadership) have been exploited by al Qaeda who have been able to build an effective infrastructure, build training cams and religious schools, and gain public support in two of the most troubled nations in the world; Afghanistan and Sudan.

The conclusion that can be drawn from this examination of the connection between global terrorism and failed states is that terrorist organizations have on several occasions taken advantage of the problems associated with state failure in order to become stronger and build a working infrastructure. It is, however, important to note that terrorism is very rarely the reason fore state failure. Furthermore, the fact that a sate is experiencing state failure does not automatically mean that it will be a breathing ground for global terrorism.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Problem

As a result of an increasing globalization the world has in a sense become 'smaller'. We can today, through great technological advancements, communicate freely with people all over the world. Goods and services have increased to flow into the global market and corporations that used to be a source of national pride and discussion now have employees all over the world, making them global rather than national corporations.

As much of society has evolved and joined the globalization movement taking advantaged of the positive aspects associated with it, certain negative aspects of society have also joined the movement. Just as drug trafficking and weapons smuggling as been incorporated in the globalization movement, terrorism has become a global phenomenon. Violence that used to be fairly restricted to national struggles has today become global problems. People far from the 'battle' are being targeted by terrorist networks in order to create maximum physical devastation, psychological pain and material damage. Terrorism has been removed from the domestic policy agenda of the state to the foreign policy agenda, with the 'war on terror' led by the United States of America as a prime example. Another effect of a more globalized, or 'smaller', world is the notion that problems in Asia or Africa can have an effect on the politics of the rest of the world.

Many of the nations that have been deemed as arming, harboring or even sponsoring terrorist organizations are considered as rogue or failed states. When viewing the Failed States Index of 2007, created by the journal Foreign Policy in a joint effort with the Fund for Peace, many of the nations that western political leaders have accused of harboring or supporting terrorism are among the top twenty nations that are close to becoming failed states. The Sudan is at the top of the list and Afghanistan is at number eight, just to name a few. As a result of international terrorism governments have started to concern themselves with the issues and problems that occur within other nation states. Failing states have become a security risk.

1.2 Purpose

The purpose of this thesis is to examine if there is a connection between the creation of international terrorist organizations and failed or weak states. Modern terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda have implemented their networks far different from the major terror networks of the last century. They have a much broader organization including financial projects and intelligence operations all over the world. One of the prerequisites for sustaining organizations of this kind is to be able to operate without intrusion from government controlled intelligence services and it is here that the failed or weak states come in.

It has been argued that a weak or failed state where the government does not have full control of their national territory will give terrorist networks the opportunity to create and sustain their organization without outside influence. Widespread corruption can further be used by terrorist networks to gain control over influential people in a position of power. If there is little respect for the rule of law or if the enforcement of existing laws is not executed terrorist networks might have the opportunity to move weapons and explosive freely to where it is needed. There are, furthermore, several examples where terrorist networks have used the weak or failed state in which they are situated to gain public support. Organizations such as al Qaeda and Hamas have filled the role of the government when it comes to the supply of health care and education to people in need. This has in turn led to rising popular support of the organization and their cause.

This thesis is not an attempt to identify the origins of terrorism, nor should it be seen as an attempt to explain why certain nation states fail. It is instead an investigatory thesis where I will examine a number of failed and weak (will be referred to as failing) states and their plausible connections to organized terrorism. Will a terrorist organization need a failed or weak state in order to develop a working infrastructure?

There are several nations in which this connection has been taken for granted and the policy applied by major players of the international scene has been that these failed states need to be rebuilt in order to eradicate certain terrorist networks. Since the American led invasion of Afghanistan al Qaeda's well organized network has been dealt a severe blow, but will it diminish the risk of future terrorist attacks on western societies? If a connection between terrorism and failed and failing states can be established, then foreign policy for the next decades can be planned and implemented.

1.3 Thesis question

Is there a connection between global terrorism and failed states?

Have global terrorist networks taken advantage of states that are experiencing state failure?

1.4 Method

In order to be able to answer the thesis question posed above there was firstly a need to define the two main concepts that would be used in this thesis, namely terrorism and failed or weak states.

In the case of terrorism a qualitative literary study was preformed. The main problem faced when attempting to define terrorism is the fact that there is no single definition of the term. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, while a clear distinction can be found between conventional warfare and terrorism the same cannot be found between terrorism and guerrilla warfare. This is because guerrilla groups and terrorist networks will on occasion use similar tactics. The distinctions between has instead been constructed, through the previously mentioned literary study, by separating the groups intention and execution of violent attacks. While terrorism is focused on devastation (material, physical, and psychological) guerrilla group's main aim is territorial control. The term global terrorism has been used on organizations that have created a structure of cells that are situated all over the world and attack targets that are not situated in the direct area of their struggle. Secondly, the term itself is connected to negative psychological aspects such as values and morals. This means that the term itself will have a different meaning and psychological reaction to different people. It has further been used as a political tool in order to smear political adversaries negatively. With the use of literature from important scholars in the field such as Crenshaw and Whittaker I have attempted to create a working definition. It is, however, not a perfect definition since such a definition is unattainable.

A qualitative literary study was also performed in order to define the concept of state failure. Through this review of literature key concepts such as internal and external features associated to state failure have been identified. In addition to this literary study the index (Failed States Index) created by the Fund for Peace and the journal Foreign Policy were used to create a working definition. The parameters used in the index have been

added and incorporated into the definition process. The problems associated with giving nations numerical points on an index have been taken into account and as a result I have opted not to use the exact numbers in this thesis.

In order to find an answer to the thesis question a case was chosen. I opted for examining the terrorist network of al Qaeda. The reasons for choosing this organization were several. Firstly, it is without comparison the most well known terrorist network that is still active today. Secondly, there is a wide arrange of high quality scholarly work on the subject, including specialized work on its history and its structure. The large number of information made it possible to (through the use of a qualitative literary study) attain a good understanding of the organization structure as well as evolution to the position it has today. Finally, it is perhaps the only truly global terrorist network in the world with active cells working on everything from finance operations to actual violent attacks in all parts of the world.

The information attained on al Qaeda was then viewed through the 'scope' of state failure in order to find an answer to the thesis questions. By using several of the concepts attained during the construction of a definition of state failure (such as internal and external features, delegitimization of state, factionalized elites, and the economy) the actions taken by al Qaeda in the nations where the organization has been most active was analyzed. Also this was in part done with a qualitative literary study.

1.5 Structure

This thesis is structured in the following manner. Firstly a chapter where a working definition of what constitutes terrorism and terrorist activity is discussed in detail. Key concepts such as violence and political goals are discussed. Furthermore the difference between a national army, a guerilla group and a terrorist organization is presented. The following chapter deals with the concept of state failure. Firstly the concept is presented and discussed and the external and internal features of the phenomenon presented. Following this section is a presentation of the Failed States Index that is constructed by the journal Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace Foundation. In addition the nations situated at the first five places in the ranking from 2007 are shown and briefly discussed. In the following chapter the two components of the case, al Qaeda and Afghanistan, are presented. A brief

introduction Afghanistan's history and position in international politics is given. Furthermore, the origin of al Qaeda and its chief ideologist Osama bin Laden is presented.

In the analysis several of the parameters used in the Failed States Index are applied to the case. The way in which the terrorist organization of al Qaeda took advantaged of several of the external and internal features associated with a failed state is presented and discussed. Following this chapter is a discussion where the problems for the international community that come as a consequence of failed states and terrorism are discussed. Furthermore, some problems with the association between terrorism and failed states are presented. In the final chapter a brief conclusion is presented. In addition to the bibliography an appendix is attached. In this appendix the full Failed States Index of 2007 can be found.

1.6 Limitations

This thesis will not be directly covering the origins of terrorist elements in today's modern society. As a result the origins of terrorism in general will not be dealt with in any grater detail. Neither will the reasons for the emergence of the phenomenon in general. It will, however, be briefly discussed when presenting the terrorist organization of al Qaeda.

Furthermore, it is important to note that this thesis does not set out to investigate if state failure is the only factor involved in the phenomenon of global terrorism. The reason for this has been that the full scope of global terrorism is too vast to discuss in an effective way. There are simply too many components and variables involved. This thesis will focus on terrorism in respect to one of many factors that may lay behind the phenomenon itself, state failure. It is not claiming that state failure is the sole reason for global terrorism; it is rather a part of it.

2 Terrorism

In September of 2001 the term terrorism took on a whole new meaning for most inhabitants of the so called western world. The phenomenon was, however, hardly a new one for the people of Europe who had in the 1960'ies through the late 1980'ies seen attacks from groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Great Britain and the Brigate Rosse in Italy. In South America groups such as Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path) had revolted against the government in Peru and similar movements had been created in Argentina and Mexico. What separates the attack in New York and Washington DC in 2001 from the above mentioned terrorist groups was that it was the start of a phenomenon that I in this thesis have chosen to refer to as global terrorism. While the terrorist activity, and consequences of these activities, that the world had seen prior to the entry of organizations such as al Qaeda had been limited to the national or domestic level it had now become an international problem. It is true that there had been several terrorist attacks previously in history that can be defined as being global but the magnitude and the effects of the attack on September 11th of 2001 were unprecedented.

2.1 Definition

There are several different definitions of the word terrorism. The United States State Department defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetuated against noncombatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience"[1]. The British government defines terrorism in a similar way; "The use or threat, for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause, of action which involves serious violence against any person or property"[2]. All definitions of terrorism contain certain specific parameters, of which the most important will be presented in this chapter

According to theorist Bruce Hoffman (Professor at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, USA) the main difficulty with defining what exactly constitutes as

[1] Whittaker 2003, p. 3

[2] Ibid, p. 3

an act of terrorisms is the fact that the concept has changed over the last centuries[3]. There has never been one single definition. As mentioned previously there are, however, a number of parameters that are directly linked with terrorism. The most essential is that a terrorist act is fundamentally political[4]. All terrorist organizations will have political goals at the core of their agenda. A terrorist organization will pursue these goals through the use of violence, a second important parameter. A violent action that is not connected to a political objective may not necessarily be an act of terrorism. To illustrate the necessary link between political agenda and violent acts of terrorism we can use two organizations with highly political goals. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland and the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)[5] in the Basque regions of northern Spain and southern France. Both of these organizations have used, and in the case of ETA still use, violence to achieve their political goals. The IRA is fighting for British withdrawal from Northern Ireland and the ETA is fighting for autonomy from the French and Spanish governments.

The main tool that a terrorist group has at their disposal is violence. Terrorist organizations use a variety of different violent activities such as high profile kidnappings, used by both the Rote Armee Fraktion[6] in West Germany and the Brigate Rosse[7] in Italy (both groups were mostly active during the 1970:ies). Other types of violence often used by terrorists are murder of high profile individuals such as the murder of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro by the Brigate Rosse in 1978[8]. Sabotage is a further tool in the arsenal of organizations of this kind. Perhaps the most well known form of violence used by terrorist networks is different kinds of explosives. In the last fifteen years the world has seen a number of attacks made by suicide bombers or bombs placed and detonated in public places. This kind of violence, in which innocent individuals are targeted, is the most detested kind of terrorism. Martha Crenshaw (Professor of Political Science and Senior Fellow at CISAC and FSI at Stanford University, USA) argues that terrorist organizations will predominantly target innocent victims, or non combatants, that are not prepared to defend themselves against the attack. The reason for this, according to Crenshaw, is that they are a

[3] Whittaker 2003, p. 7

[4] Ibid, p. 5

[5] Basque Homeland and Liberty, from www.britannica.com (visited the 24 April 2008)

[6] Red Army Faction, from Ibid (visited the 24 April 2008)

[7] Red Brigades, from Ibid (visited the 24 April 2008)

[8] Chaliand och Blin 2007, p.237

much easier target to hit[9]. It takes less planning to place a bomb in an unguarded trashcan in a subway station than attempting to assassinate a high profile political leader. Organizations such as al Qaeda have used this tactic on several occasions. The reason for targeting innocent people is not only to create human and material loss, but perhaps more importantly to create harm on a more psychological level. The attacks on September 11th 2001 had exactly this effect. The psychological harm created by the attacks may very well have been greater than the human and material losses that were the result of the terrorist attacks. The aim here is not to downplay the tragic losses that many families endured in the aftermath of the attacks, rather point to that the psychological aspects of the attacks hurt the United States on a much larger scale. The aspect of psychology can, furthermore, show the difference between ordinary criminals and terrorists. Bruce Hoffman argues that "…unlike terrorism, the ordinary criminal's violent act is not designed or intended to have consequences or create psychological repercussions beyond the act itself […] the fundamental aim of the terrorist's violence is ultimately to change 'the system' – about which the ordinary criminal, of course, couldn't care less"[10]. While a 'regular' criminal act using violence only focuses on the actual result a violent act of terrorism take the consequences of their actions into account. The psychological effects are an important part of any terrorist attack. Although victims and witnesses of a robbery will experience psychological pain it is not an intentional effect that the perpetrators have calculated with and plan to use to their advantage. The psychological warfare is one of the key aspects when it comes to defining a violent act as either a terrorist act or a 'regular' criminal act.

It is in this aspect where the media come into the sphere of terrorism. With a more globalized world pictures and, perhaps more importantly televised pictures, become a crucial part of a terrorist attack. Fear is portrayed far beyond the actual site of an attack and affects far more people on a psychological level. The attacks on the Twin Towers of September 11 is perhaps the most proficient example of this, with televised pictures of the second tower being hit and the eventual collapse of both towers on live television. The argument made here is not that the media are to blame, simply that terrorist organizations used them for creating as much psychological damage as possible. The use of media outlets by these groups is hardly a new phenomenon. Kidnappers have used the media in order to both

[9] Crenshaw 1989, p. 6

[10] Whittaker 2003, p. 11

show the captive/captives and to present their demands. It has, however, been taken to a much larger scale with the expansion of the television market and the internet.

Terrorist organizations seek attention and publicity for their cause. This can be one of the reasons for taking their struggle from the domestic to the international level. By attacking a neutral or third party target or population a terrorist organization will in turn generate much more publicity for their cause[11], although it can be presumed that most of it will of course be negative. Martha Crenshaw presents the following definition of what makes an act of terror to an international act of terror; "terrorism that qualifies as international or transnational involves actions in which the nationality of the victims is different from that of the perpetrator, or the operation in extraterritorial, located outside the boundaries of a contested area"[12].

The psychological effects associated with a terrorist act relates to a further aspect of the connections between violence and terrorism. Once a certain level of psychological tension is established, through a terrorist action that includes violence, a terrorist organization can use one of the most powerful weapons they have at their disposal namely the threat of more violence. The threat of violence is just as devastating to a nation as the actual act of violence itself. It can be just as effective for reaching political goals and objectives.

The most difficult aspect of defining terrorism lies in the fact that the term itself has a very negative association in peoples minds. This has led to that the term has been used in a more subjective way where it has been adopted to enemies or opposition organizations[13]. Hoffman argues that the term implies moral judgment which in turn leads it to be a question of personal preference. If your sympathies are on the side that has been attacked you will view the perpetrators as terrorist, but if your sympathies are on the other end of the spectrum you will not. Brian Jenkins argues that "What is called terrorism thus seems to depend on one's point of view"[14]. As a result of this an organization will never refer to themselves as terrorists, they will instead adhere to freedom fighters to name the most common example. Being referred to as a freedom fighter will be associated with a lot more positive connotations then being referred to as terrorist. This can be seen in many of the

[11] Whittaker 2003, p. 8

[12] Crenshaw 1989, p. 8

[13] Whittaker 2003, p. 8

[14] Ibid, p. 8

names which terrorist organizations have used over the years, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) is a good example of this phenomenon. "Terrorist organizations almost without exception now regularly select names for themselves that consciously eschew the word 'terrorism' in any of its forms"[15]. The people that are carrying out violent acts will never see them selves as terrorist, but the rest of the world might. This can, however, change depending on the outcome of their struggle. There are several examples from history where an organization has been seen as a terrorist organization but when they have seized power and become a political factor they are seen as a legitimate political player. We can again use the example of the PLO. The organization has in latter years been both seen and treated as a legitimate actor in world politics. Their main adversary Israel still see them as a terrorist organization but the rest of the international community have more or less accepted their role in world politics. It all depends on which 'side' you choose to adopt. There is also the obvious historical controversy that the winner of a struggle is usually the one that will write or re-write history.

Since terrorism is associated with predominately negative connotations it has been widely used as a political label. Crenshaw argues that the use of terrorism as a political label instead of an analytical term has increased the difficulty of finding one single definition of the term. The term is used to condemn your enemies instead of specifying what the term actually entails. She further argues that there is a need for knowing who called what terrorism, but also when and where they made these claims[16].

There is further a need to distinguish between terrorist activities and guerilla warfare. Hoffman argues that there are several factors that unite these two phenomenons. They have similar political goals that they try to achieve through similar methods (kidnapping, assassination, use of explosive etc). There are, Hoffman argues, fundamental differences between the two groups. Guerilla warfare will include a much larger number of warriors who act as military units. While guerilla groups have on occasion been known to use uniforms and insignias terrorist organizations will never wear this type of clothing since it might interfere with trying to blend in with the rest of the society where they operate. Guerilla groups, furthermore, try to attain and hold geographical territory. Some guerilla groups also attempt to form the areas they control into autonomous regions. Terrorist organiza-

[15] Whittaker 2003, p. 7

[16] Ibid, p. 11

tions will not attempt to hold or control a certain geographical area[17]. They may, however, use a certain geographical area for training camps and supplies but if these bases are detected the organization will simply move to a new area.

In table 1 Ariel Merari (Director of Political Violence Research Unit at Tel Aviv University, Israel) present clear distinctions between different modes of warfare used by terrorist groups, guerilla groups, and conventional state controlled armies.

Table 1 "Characteristics of Terrorism, Guerilla War, and Conventional War as Modes of Violent Struggle"[18]

	Conventional War	Guerilla War	Terrorism
Unit size in battle	Large (armies, corps, divisions)	Medium (platoons, companies, battalions)	Small (usually fewer then ten persons)
Weapons	Full range of military hardware (air force, armor, artillery, etc.)	Mostly infantry-type light weapons but sometimes artillery pieces as well	Hand guns, hand grenades, assault rifles, and specialized weapons (e.g. car bombs, remote-control bombs, barometric pressure bombs)
Tactics	Usually joint operations involving several military branches	Commando-type	Specialized: kidnapping, assassinations, car bombing, hijacking, barricade-hostage, etc.
Targets	Mostly military units, industrial and transportation infrastructure	Mostly military, police, and administrative staff, as well as political opponents	State symbols, political opponents, and the public at large
Intended impacts	Physical destruction	Mainly physical attrition of the enemy	Psychological coercion
Control of territory	Yes	Yes	No
Uniform	Wear uniform	Often wear uniform	Do not wear uniform
Recognition of war zones	War limited to recognized geographical area	War limited to the country in strife	No recognized war zones: operations carried out worldwide
International legality	Yes, if conducted by rules	Yes, if conducted by rules	No
Domestic legality	Yes	No	No

If we concentrate on the differences between guerilla warfare and acts of terrorism we can see that there are several of them. Firstly there is a difference in the size of the units used for violent attacks. Guerilla attacks will employ a larger number of men than a terror-

[17] Whittaker 2003, p. 8

[18] Ariel Merari, from Chaliand & Blin 2007, p. 26

ist attacks, and they often find strength in larger numbers while a large group of operatives can be a disadvantaged for a terrorist operation. A further aspect that separates the two types of warfare is the intended impact of a violent act. While a guerilla group main intention is to create a physical blow to their adversaries, e.g. infrastructure and military strength, an act of terrorism will have a different intent. A terror group will try to demoralize their opponents by psychological intimidation. There are, as can be seen in table 1, several areas where guerilla warfare differs from terrorist activities. The problem in defining terrorism is not the separation between what constitutes as a an act of terrorism and an act of guerilla warfare, the problem lies instead in the fact that guerilla groups will on occasion use terrorist tactics to achieve their goals. Furthermore, organizations such as al Qaeda were founded from a guerilla group and still employ guerilla fighters and tactics in Afghanistan. The difficulty does not lie in the theoretical separation of the two but in the fact that organizations such as al Qaeda can sometimes be viewed as a mix between the two.

A common denominator for all terrorist organizations is that they are non-state actors. A sovereign state should not be considered as terrorist. There, however, several cases of sovereign states sponsoring, through financial support or allowing terrorists to work and travel freely through their territory without interference from the state. Governments have also been known to use terrorist tactics on their own citizens (e.g. Sudan) but this does not make the state government a terrorist organization. This is one of the more important distinctions of a terrorist organization.

In his article from the book "the Terrorism Reader", by David J. Whittaker, Hoffman delivers the following definition of terrorism:

"We may therefore now attempt to define terrorism as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence. Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effect beyond the immediate victim or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instill fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider 'target audience' that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a national government or political party, or public opinion in general. Terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little"[19].

[19] Whittaker 2003, p. 9-10

This thesis will mainly use the definition provided above, but will try to incorporate the thoughts and ideas provided by theorist such as Martha Crenshaw and Ariel Merari.

3 State failure

In the aftermath of the attacks on September the 11th of 2001 the problem posed by failed or failing states became elevated in international politics. In the past state failure had been seen as devastating for the region in which the country was situated and not the global community as a whole, but this view was changed as a result of the terrorist attacks. The way in which national governments had dealt with the problem in the past by trying to isolate it and simply keep it distant has been modified quite substantially. The reason for this is that the problems that come when a state is failing will today become a global issue and as a result foreign governments see it in their own interest to take a more active role in addressing the problem[20].

3.1 Definition

There is a large difference between a failed state and a strong state. A strong state will control their territory in addition to deliver political goods to the people who inhabit the state. Furthermore, strong states will be placed high on many of the standard indicators such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and the UN Development Index just to name a few[21]. Strong states will also be able to deliver political freedom, strong economic growth as well as protecting the citizen's security from violence, both political and criminal.

Failed states are the complete opposite of strong states. They are not able to protect their citizen's security in a satisfactory way. State institution and infrastructure cannot be maintained in a proficient manner. The domestic economy suffers due to corruption in the government, resulting in a falling national GDP per capita. As a result of crumbling institutions and infrastructure the state will find it difficult to collect the taxes needed to support

[20] Rotberg, *Foreign Affairs*, Jul/Aug 2002, vol. 81, Issue 4, p. 2

[21] Ibid, p. 4

the health and educational systems. It can also, in certain extreme cases lead to shortages in food supplies and starvation. Factors such as corruption, a weakening state capacity, and a failing economy will eventually lead to major threats to the essential legitimacy needed by a government. With diminishing legitimacy the government will loose its power over the nation and different domestic rival factions will come and attempt to fill the void, leading to violent conflicts, civil war, and anarchy[22].

It is very important to mention there is not a single predetermined pattern that can be found in all failing states. All states that are either failed or failing will be doing so for reasons that will vary from state to state. There are, however, a number of variables that are common for all failed and failing states but the extent to which they are affecting the state can differ greatly from case to case.

Political scientist Gerard Kreijen presents two main features of state failure in his book *State Failure, Sovereignty and Effectiveness: Legal Lessons from the Decolonization of Sub Saharan Africa*. These two main features are internal and external features.

3.1.1 Internal features

According to Kreijen the most prominent characteristic of a failed state is the complete lack of a domestic government. This is not to say that the state does not have a government, but the official government's control is very limited. Most of the other internal characteristics of a state adhere from this problem. The government is not able to provide or enforce the rule of law within the state. As a direct consequence of this fact the actual control that the government has over the nation's territory is limited, in certain extreme cases the government only has de facto control over the nation's capital city[23]. This will in turn lead to that the government looses its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. In nations that are experiencing state failure the army is generally undisciplined and not working as a single unit. The most likely scenario is that the military will dissolve into smaller groups, where certain groups remain loyal to their old masters while other groups will swear allegiance to other political figures who claim to represent a legitimate government.

[22] Rotberg, *Foreign Affairs*, Jul/Aug 2002, vol. 81, Issue 4, p. 4

[23] Kreijen 2004, p. 86

The same scenario can be applied to a nation's police force. "The destruction of monopoly on the use of force brings with it country-wide factional strife"[24]. In many nations that have experienced state failure the actual control of the country's territory is in the hands of local warlords. These warlords might even go so far as to proclaim their controlled territory as an independent state, something that has happened in the Sudan just to name one example. The most worrying aspect of a state's lack of monopoly on the use of force is that there are no longer any institutions that are in place to protect the citizens. Warlords and armed gangs have de facto control over the people and treat them in whatever way they see fit. There are, furthermore, several examples from history were the government forces that are still loyal will be a major threat to the population. In many of these cases violence against the citizens will be based on ethnicity or tribal affiliation as in Rwanda in the early nineteen nineties. Lack of actual government control, due to loss of legitimate monopoly on the use of force, is one of the main characteristics of state failure. The government no longer has the control over the nation's territory.

A further internal feature of state failure is that essential public services that are supposed to be provided by the government are not working or are simply non-existing. The citizens of the country are left to take care of themselves as the economic infrastructure is destroyed[25]. As a result living standards rapidly decrease and services that were previously provided by the government such as education and health care disappear[26].

One internal aspect that can be found in almost all failed states is that they are plagued with bad leadership. "Destructive decisions by individual leaders have almost always paved the way to state failure"[27]. A crucial part of society that tends to be affected by bad leadership is the economy. Political leaders will use the states finances to increase their own and their supporter's personal wealth at the expense of the people. High levels of corruption are generally very common in failed or weak states. An additional area that will be affected by bad leadership is the political sphere. Corrupt leaders have a tendency for changing legislation and decrease judicial independence in order to gain more control over the country. Even if a nation once was a well working democracy with a strong economy, bad

[24] Kreijen 2004, p. 87

[25] Ibid, p. 88

[26] Rotberg, *Foreign Affairs*, Jul/Aug 2002, vol. 81, Issue 4, p. 2

[27] Ibid, p. 2

leadership can quickly alter a nation and leading it towards complete collapse. One very good example of this phenomenon is the country of Zimbabwe who after it gained independence was seen as one of the most stable nations in Africa but today, due to the appalling leadership of current president Robert Mugabe, is on the brink of complete collapse. Through corruption and authoritarian reforms bad leadership also has a tendency to increase racial and ethnical struggles within a country. There are many cases where members of the same tribe or clan as the leadership have been given advantages in society. "Governments that once appeared to operate for the benefit of all the nation's citizens are perceived to have become partisan"[28]. By patronizing a single tribe, clan or ethnic group large parts of a society will feel discriminated against and violent uprisings and conflicts often occur. The latest example of conflict related to ethnic and tribal divides occurred in Kenya earlier this year, as a result of an allegedly rigged election.

3.1.2 External features

According to Kreijen there are two dominant external features that need to be recognized in a failed state. Firstly the problems associated with "spill over"[29]. When a state is experiencing failure in its state apparatus the 'regular' citizen of the nation will be the ones too suffer most from it. Internal violence due to fighting rival factions and an inability to provide public goods can generate heavy migration form the territory. Large numbers of refugees will flee to the neighboring countries, seeking shelter and security. Heavy migration in a short time span will put tremendous strain on the receiving nation. A very illustrative example of this is the current situation in the horn of Africa. Due to the internal violence and power struggle in Sudan the neighboring nations of Chad and the Central African Republic have seen huge numbers of refugees settling in areas just across the border.

Kreijen further describes an additional problem associated with the spill over effect, spill over of violence. In many cases a state on the brink of failure will have internal violence as different factions fight for power of territory. This violence will often expand across the borders of the nation. This is exactly what has happened in Sudan where militant groups have gone on violent raids across the border in to Chad, to attack the temporary

[28] Rotberg, *Foreign Affairs*, Jul/Aug 2002, vol. 81, Issue 4, p. 2

[29] Kreijen 2004, p. 89

refugee camps that have been set up on the other side of the border. Kreijen argues that spill over of violence will have "…serious consequences for the humanitarian situation and regional stability in general"[30].

Secondly, a failed state will face problems when it comes to the sphere of international relations. The international community is based on the interaction between governments, state to state interaction. A system constructed on the basis of states will find it difficult to create and uphold communication if there is no state to interact with. "Both individual states and international organizations will as a rule find it very difficult, if not impossible, to identify a counterpart to deal with in the failed state"[31]. A further problem can be found in the fact that the international community is build upon the notion of sovereignty. One state should not violate the sovereignty of another state by 'meddling' in their affairs. As the government of a failed state looses its power to, in an effective way, speak and act for the entire nation they will also lose legitimacy on the international scene. This can in turn lead to that problems that could have been, in the earl stages, handled through international cooperation are allowed to grow to a level where the international community can no longer act without violating national sovereignty.

3.2 Failed States Index

The problems associated with state failure, especially for international security and politics, have during the last decade become a real concern for the international community. Security problems such as terrorism, religious extremism, money laundering, pandemics, organized crime, and drug trafficking can all be related to state failure are now closely watch by governments all over the world[32].

In 2005 the Fund for Peace, an independent research organization, and the journal Foreign Policy collaborated in crating the first Failed States Index. It has since become an annually presented index, with the latest one published in 2007. When the first index was published in 2005 it was discovered that almost two billion people inhabit nations which

[30] Kreijen 2004, p. 89

[31] Ibid, p. 89

[32] Baker, *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations,* Winter/Spring 2007, p. 86

could be considered as insecure states[33]. Furthermore, it was found that almost two thirds of the world's states are either at a high, likely or moderate risk of future violent conflicts. The majority of the states that have been ranked in the index are not failed states but they all illustrate tendency towards, if they continue on the same path, failing. The index is created by using twelve political, military, economic, and social indicators. These indicators are:

- Demographic Pressures
- Refugees and Displaced Persons
- Group Grievances
- Human Flight
- Uneven Development
- Economy
- Delegitimization of State
- Public Services
- Human Rights
- Security Apparatus
- Factionalized Elites
- External Intervention

By using these twelve indicators 177 nations are ranked. The more vulnerable to violent conflict and social deterioration a nation is the higher the rank. Nations which rank in the top 60 are then presented in the final published index. The ranking is based on data from over 12,000 different published sources that were collected under a six month period during the previous year, so for the 2007 index data from 2006 was used[34]. The table presented below is a small outtake from the Failed States Index of 2007. Each indicator is given a number between 0 and 10, the higher the number the greater the instability. An indicator that is marked in dark grey is the highest measured value attained for that indicator. It is not restricted to that nation; nations that have the same measured value for an indicator will have marked indicator values in table 2.

[33] Baker, *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations,* Winter/Spring 2007, p. 86

[34] Foreign Policy 2007, p. 56

Table 2: Failed States Index 2007, five highest ranked nations[35]

Rank	Total	Country	Demographic Pressure	Refugees and Displaced Persons	Group Grievance	Human Flight	Uneven Development	Economy	Delegitimization of State	Public Services	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention
1	113.7	Sudan	9.2	9.8	10.0	9.0	9.1	7.7	10.0	9.5	10.0	9.9	9.7	9.8
2	111.4	Iraq	9.0	9.0	10.0	9.5	8.5	8.0	9.4	8.5	9.7	10.0	9.8	10.0
3	111.1	Somalia	9.2	9.0	8.5	8.0	7.5	9.2	10.0	10.0	9.7	10.0	10.0	10.0
4	110.1	Zimbabwe	9.7	8.7	8.8	9.1	9.5	10.0	9.5	9.6	9.7	9.5	9.0	7.0
5	108.8	Chad	9.1	8.9	9.5	7.9	9.0	8.3	9.5	9.1	9.2	9.6	9.7	9.0

The nation with the highest risk of failure in 2007 is Sudan, mainly because of the instability and violence that have occurred in the Darfur region. The nation is also divided based on religion with a Christian uprising in the southern provinces of Sudan. The violence in Sudan has caused somewhere between 200,000 and 400,000 human lives, with an additional 2 million people who have fled to the neighboring countries[36]. Four out of the five highest ranked nations adhere from Africa and out of these four three are located in the north east section of the continent. The five nations presented in the table are the ones that, today, run the highest risk of state failure. There are several common denominators between the five. They all received high ratings when it comes to the delegitimization of the state. The state has no or very little actual power over the country. Furthermore, all five face problems associated with the security apparatus of the state; they are not able to provide adequate security to their citizens. An additional common denominator is the problems associated with factionalized elite. In Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe has been in power for almost thirty years, Chad's President Idriss Déby has held his position for over fifteen and President Omar Hassan al-Bashir has held the office for close to twenty years. In addition, Saddam Hussein held a tight control on power for an extended time before he was removed by an American led coalition in 2003. Moreover, human rights are constantly violated in all five of the above mentioned nations.

As mentioned previously not all nations presented on the Failed States Index will ever become failed, but it can provide us with a way to follow the progress or lack of progress that nations make during one year.

[35] Foreign Policy 2007, entire index can be found in the attached appendix.

[36] Baker, *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations,* Winter/Spring 2007, p. 86

4 Presentation of case

Ever since al Qaeda emerged on the global scene in the mid nineteen nineties the organization has been closely linked with the nation state of Afghanistan. The following chapter aims to give a brief background of the organization's history, including that of its leader Osama bin Laden. In addition to the presentation of perhaps the most infamous terrorist organization in the world, the nation in which the network has situated its main infrastructure is presented.

4.1 al Qaeda

The history of al Qaeda is in many aspects closely linked with the history of Osama bin Laden. The name of this infamous terrorist organization loosely translates as "the base", and the origin of the organization can be traced back to the armed struggle between the Soviet Union and Islamic mujahedeen during the Afghan War (1979-89[37]). One of the most prominent leaders of this movement was a highly influential Sunni theologian and scholar by the name of Abdallah Assam, a man who would become one of the founders of this terrorist group. When the Soviet Union started to withdraw its soldiers from Afghanistan in 1988 Assam decided not to disband the Islamic fighters on the ground. These volunteers would instead be used in the fight to retake the Muslim world[38]. In order to reach this goal Assam wanted to create what he called a vanguard of experienced Muslim fighters, he referred to this vanguard as a 'solid base'. "Every principle needs a vanguard to carry it forward that is willing, while interacting into society, to undertake difficult tasks and make tremendous sacrifice. No ideology, celestial or earthly, can do without such a vanguard, which gives its all to ensure victory"[39]. The vanguard was created by recruiting volunteers from the Afghan campaign. Assam also set out eight moral guidelines that all members of the vanguard should follow.

[37] www.britannica.com (visited the 6 of may 2008)

[38] Chaliand & Blin 2007, p. 314

- One must unhesitatingly face the hardest challenges and the worst difficulties.
- Leaders must endure, along with their men, the blood and sweat of grueling marches.
- The vanguard must abstain from base, worldly pleasures, and its distinguishing characteristics must be abstinence and frugality.
- The vanguard must translate into reality the great dream of victory.
- Will and determination are necessary for the march ahead, however long it will be.
- Three things are essential to this march: mediation, patience, and prayer.
- Two rules must be followed, loyalty and devotion.
- All anti-Islamic plots that are being hatched throughout the world must be foiled.[40]

4.1.1 Osama bin Laden and the evolution of al Qaeda

Osama bin Laden was born on the 30th of June 1957 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia[41]. He is the seventeenth son out of a total of 54 children. His father, Muhammad bin Laden, had children with four different wife's, as well as with several concubines[42]. Muhammad bin Laden was a self made man who started out as a dock worker in the city of Jeddah but eventually became one of the most influential and successful construction magnate in the Middle East. His company, the Saudi bin Laden Group, attained several high profile contracts in Saudi Arabia such as the renovations of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. The Saudi bin Laden Group also renovated the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem[43]. Even though Muhammad bin Laden did business with the Saudi royal family and regime he always tried to refrain from getting involved in politics. When he died in a helicopter crash in 1968 ten thousand people attended his funeral, including several members of the royal family. Through the success of the Saudi bin Laden Group the bin Laden family was highly respected in Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Middle East.

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[39] Chaliand & Blin 2007, p. 315

[40] Ibid, p. 315

[41] Ibid, p. 16

[42] Ibid, p. 16

[43] Ibid, p. 16

Even though his father had urged all his children to distance themselves form political and religious debate Osama was very interested in both of these fields[44]. While he was working for his fathers company Osama bin Laden supported religious uprisings all over the region, especially in Yemen[45]. When the Soviet army crossed the border into Afghanistan in 1979 Osama travelled to the country. It was here that he met the previously mentioned Abdallah Assam for the first time. These two men founded the Afghan Service Bureau (MAK) in 1984, an organization that would be crucial for the mujahedeen's fight against the Soviets. MAK recruited, trained and indoctrinated tens of thousands of Arab volunteers. In addition the organization was also responsible for the distribution of approximately 200 million dollars, money that came from Middle Eastern countries. In addition to this, funding also came from governmental agencies in the United States and Great Britain[46]. Bin Laden also donated and distributed large sums from his own personal wealth. By using his money to finance the mujahedeen in Afghanistan bin Laden raised his own credibility among the Jihadist movement. Bin Laden spent most of the decade in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan but did make shorter trips back to Saudi Arabia.

Abdallah Assam acted as a mentor for Osama bin Laden during his time in Afghanistan. Towards the end of the conflict the two men started to disagree on what course the newly created organization of al Qaeda was going to take. Although the two men never showed these grievances in public they had quite different opinions on how the organization should carry on in their struggle. While Assam wanted to focus on retaking Islamic territory from, what he regarded as, Christian and Jewish occupiers bin Laden wanted to concentrate on the many corrupt Muslim rulers of the region[47]. Many other terrorist networks shared the views of bin Laden, among them Egypt's al-Jihad group.

In 1989 Abdallah Assam was killed by a remote controlled car bomb in the Peshawar region of Pakistan. Even though Assam's murderers have never been identified many scholars believe that the above mention al-Jihad group out of Egypt was responsible for this advanced attack, an attack that had been planned by the groups newest mentor Osama

[44] Gunaratna 2002, p. 17

[45] Ibid, p. 17

[46] Ibid, p. 18

[47] Chaliand & Blin 2007

bin Laden[48]. This is, however, nothing more than sophisticated and speculative guesses. The attack would, nevertheless, have a crucial impact on both al Qaeda and the world as it made Osama bin Laden the new leader of the organization.

After Assam's death bin Laden decided to return to his native Saudi Arabia were he was greeted as an Islamic Hero[49]. His position at the top of Saudi Arabian society would, however, change when Saddam Hussein decided to send Iraqi troops into their neighboring country of Kuwait in 1991. Saudi Arabia, with their army being too small to defend the country, felt that they were under immediate threat. Osama bin Laden argued that he and his Arab mujahedeen would be able to defend the nation. He was strongly against allowing American troops on Saudi soil[50]. Bin Laden saw Christian troops on the soil of two of Islam's most holy sites (Mecca and Medina) as humiliating for all Muslims. During the First Gulf War approximately half a million soldiers from the international coalition were stationed in Saudi Arabia and most of them were American. Bin Laden argued that "… American presence represented a twofold act of aggression: the occupation of Saudi Arabia by infidel soldiers was also evidence of America's desire to plunder the country's wealth under the pretext of protecting it" [51]. As a result of American troops on Saudi Arabian territory, an action that had been requested by the Saudi regime, bin Laden and the terrorist network which he controlled had gained a new enemy. Al Qaeda an organization which had focused its efforts towards, according to the organization, corrupt Muslim states now had a new primary enemy, namely the United States of America.

American troops on Saudi Arabian soil had a direct effect on the organization and its leader. Osama bin Laden became a fierce critic of the Saudi royal family and was more or less forced out of the country. After spending some time in several of the camps and bases the organization had built in Afghanistan bin Laden moved to Sudan. It was during his time in Sudan that Osama bin Laden changed his way of thinking in regard to the way in which al Qaeda should continue their struggle. According to Rohan Gunaratna (Director of the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at Nanyang Technical University, Singapore), bin Laden became less interested in political and econom-

[48] Gunaratna 2002

[49] Chaliand & Blin 2007, p. 317

[50] Ibid, p. 318

[51] Ibid, p. 318

ical tactics and more interested in military options[52]. He also became interested in the use of weapons of mass destruction. With the help of the National Islamic Front and the Sudanese military al Qaeda set up a clandestine research team that would look into the possibility of acquiring chemical, radiological, nuclear, and biological weapons. According to the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Osama bin Laden also hired an Egyptian scientist and acquired one kilo of uranium from South Africa. There have been accusations made by American intelligence agencies that bin Laden wanted these weapons in order to attack US troops in Saudi Arabia[53]. Even if the organization has or had these weapons at their disposal they have never used them, at least not yet.

It was, furthermore, in Khartoum that bin Laden started to create his 'solid base'[54]. The organization was involved in road building as well as housing projects. To show their appreciation of the work that al Qaeda did the Sudanese state turned a blind eye towards the clandestine operations that the organization was involved with. During his time in Khartoum bin Laden kept in close contact with other militant Islamic groups, predominantly groups adhering to Somalia and Yemen. He continued his strong critique of the Saudi regime which eventually led to that his citizenship was revoked and personal accounts were frozen in 1994[55].

When the armed struggle against the Soviet Union came to an end Osama bin Laden had focused his anger on corrupt Muslim regimes that, according to him, did not rule in accordance with Islam. The two main targets were during this time Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Even though the organization had preformed several attacks on these two nations, including a failed attempt to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 1995[56], these two regimes had lost little influence or power. Osama bin Laden argued that there was time for a change in strategy, from now on America and Israel would be the main targets. There were several reasons for this change in targets. Firstly, it would expand the scale of Islamic activities. Secondly, Egyptian authorities had as a result of the attack on the presidents life arrested and jailed a large number of al Qaeda operatives in Egypt and the cost of caring

[52] Gunaratna 2002, p. 36

[53] Ibid, p. 36

[54] Chaliand & Blin 2007, p. 318

[55] Ibid, p. 319

[56] Gunaratna 2002, p. 38

for their families was a large financial burden for the organization[57]. Finally, as a result of civilian casualties al Qaeda was being heavily criticized by the media in the region.

A further consequence of the attack on President Mubarak in 1995 was the international pressure put on Sudan to stop harboring the organization on Sudanese territory. Initially Sudan ignored the pressure but when the United States increased their military assistance to Sudan's neighbors Uganda, Eritrea and Ethiopia the regime caved under the pressure. Osama bin Laden was not thrown out of the country but he was asked to leave. When the Sudanese government decided to extradite internationally known terrorist Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, more commonly referred to as Carlos the Jackal, to France in 1994 bin Laden started to feel that he was no longer safe in Khartoum[58]. He decided to return to what he felt was the last safe haven for him and his movement. A decision was made that it was time to move; the organization needed to return to Afghanistan and eventually did so in 1996. In Afghanistan they were welcomed by the Taliban and their leader Mullah Omar. Omar was, just as been bin Laden, a veteran of the armed struggle against the Soviet Union. The Taliban who controlled approximately 80 percent of Afghan territory were in dire need of economic capital as well as technical and administrative expertise. Since this was exactly what bin Laden had to offer it was a perfect match[59].

Less then a year after returning to Afghanistan al Qaeda, with authorization form the Taliban regime, re-opened their training camps, and Arab volunteers once again started to travel to the country. The training camps were run by a one of Osama bin Laden's most trusted associates Ayman al-Zawahiri[60].

Since the creation of the organization Osama bin Laden had, with the help of his closet advisers created one of the most determined terrorist networks in the world, and the operations that the network has preformed has had a tremendous effect on world politics.

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[57] Gunaratna 2002, p. 38

[58] Chaliand & Blin 2007, p. 320

[59] Ibid, p. 321

[60] Ibid, p. 321

4.1.2 Operational structure & tactics

The structure and tactics of al Qaeda differ greatly from the ones used by the terrorist networks that were active during the cold war. Al Qaeda has a highly developed intelligence organization that can be compared to the ones employed by national governments. The organization spies on and infiltrates companies, organizations, as well as governments in order to attain the best possible intelligence information.

There are, furthermore, certain aspects that set al Qaeda apart form the many other terrorist organizations that are still active today. Firstly, it is a truly transnational organization. Secondly, throughout its brief history al Qaeda has proven that is highly capable of regenerating itself whenever there are threats to the networks existents. Thirdly, the membership of the organization is highly diverse. Al Qaeda's message has cut through national, ethnic, and class boundaries. As a result it is very hard to pinpoint what a typical member is, there can only be simple generalizations made such as Muslim or male. Finally, al Qaeda inherited a highly sophisticated infrastructure, both training and organization, that was constructed for the mujahedeen. The United States and other governments invested in this infrastructure in order to support the armed struggle against the Soviet Army during the nineteen eighties and when the war was over al Qaeda could reap the benefits[61].

Al Qaeda uses agents in order to infiltrate Muslim communities all over the globe to attain the information they need for a pending operation. Agents will also recruit members for the organization and by infiltrating Muslim minority communities they can conduct their operations with a certain amount of cover. These communities will also play a crucial role for the organizations attack teams. When al Qaeda is attempting to attack a western targets these communities provide intelligence, financial capital and safe houses for the operatives.

Although al Qaeda has structured its intelligence operations in a similar fashion compared to national intelligence services they differ in certain aspects. Most intelligence agencies use sophisticated technology to communicate with their operatives in the field. Al Qaeda will, as much as possible refrain from using telecommunication or any other form of technology. They will instead use couriers to deliver messages since this type of delivering messages is much harder to detect.

[61] Gunaratna 2002, p. 55

In 1998 al Qaeda adopted a new structure to better organize the network, creating a better functioning and more effective organization. Four distinct but interlinked bodies were formed. The first out if these four operating bodies were in charge of strategic and tactical decisions. Secondly, there is the global terrorist network. The third body was created as a base for guerilla fighters in Afghanistan. The final entity consists of a loose coalition of transnational terror and guerilla groups[62].

At the top of the organizations structure is Osama bin Laden as the acting Emir-General[63]. Next in the structure is the Shura Majlis (consultative council)[64] which consist of the organizations most experienced members. Beneath the Shura Majlis in the al Qaeda structure are the four operational committees; military, finance and business, fatwa and Islamic law, and media and publicity[65]. These four committees are in charge of every day operations, making sure that the organization runs smoothly.

The way in which al Qaeda, and other modern terrorist networks, has organized their operational structure in the field differs from the way the terrorist organizations that tormented the world during the cold war. The traditional structure resembles the structure employed by most organizations through out the world. It is shaped like a pyramid where the higher you get in the organization the more power you will have.



Figure 1: Traditional pyramid shaped cell structure

[62] Gunaratna 2002, p. 56

[63] Emir=commander or prince, from www.britannica.com, (visited May 15, 2008)

[64] Gunaratna 2002, p. 57

The problem that terrorist organizations will face if they adhere to this traditional form of organizational structure is that they are very much dependent on the leader cell. If the leader cell is eliminated, either by being captured by law enforcement or by being assassinated, the other cells will no longer function. When the head is removed the body cannot function. Until a new leader cell has been created the terrorist cells below will or cannot act. They are dependent on orders from the cell directly above it in the structure. Furthermore, if a leader cell is blown by law enforcement it is very likely that the cells below it in the structure are blown as well.

It is suspected that the larger organizational structure of al Qaeda has this classical pyramid model with Osama bin Laden at the top. It is, however, important to mention that Osama bin Laden is not personally involved in all of the decisions that are made. But he is the networks leader and chief ideologist. The organization has, however, structured their operational cells in a different way applying a structure that is referred to as a cellular or cluster model[66]. Each cell with operate independently from each other. When one cell is detected or blown by intelligence organizations or law enforcement it does not affect the work of the other cells to any greater extent. Moreover, members of one cell that are caught cannot identify or inform their captures of the identity or location of other cells since they do not have any contact with each other. If the head is removed a new will appear and take its place. Further precautions are taken by the fact that cell members do not know each other and there is no common way of communication between the leader cell and the rest of the members.



Figure 2: Cluster or Cellular Structure

[65] Gunaratna 2002, p. 57

Although al Qaeda has applied this clustering model for the cell structure all of the major tactical and strategic decisions are taken by the organizations leadership. With the assistance of his deputy, Zawahiri, many decisions are taken by Osama bin Laden. These two individuals directly coordinated the attacks on New York's World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington DC on September 11th of 2001. Bin Laden also provided strategic leadership for the attacks on the American embassies in Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) in 1998 and the attack on the USS Cole two years later[67].

All al Qaeda operations will go through three phases before the actual attack can be preformed. Firstly, the organization will conduct a great deal of intelligence and surveillance on the chosen target or targets. Secondly, a target team will arrive on location and set up safe houses and attain the vehicles needed for the operation. The target team will also bring in the weapons and explosives needed for the attack. Finally a strike team arrives and performs the attack. The strike team is supposed to withdraw after the attack but since al Qaeda predominantly uses suicide bombers for their attacks the last phase is seldom completed[68].

After the attacks of September 11 the organization has been the main target for the American led 'war on terror'. One of the reasons that al Qaeda has survived this, and other attempts over the years, has been that the members strictly follow the principles of the operational structure. "To ensure Al Qaeda's operational effectiveness, the group stresses the need to maintain internal security, dividing its operatives into overt and covert members functioning under a single leader"[69]. In order to maintain this internal security certain rules have been implemented. An overt member should not be involved in matters or be concerned about certain parts of an operation that do not concern them. A covert, or undercover, member should always keep a low profile. The member should never be involved in discussions or debates concerning religion or the organizations. He should, furthermore, always respect the laws of the country where he is stationed, in order not to attract attention. If he is married he should not travel or be seen with his wife since the veil that she is

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[66] Gunaratna 2002, p. 76

[67] Ibid, p. 77

[68] Ibid, p. 77

[69] Ibid, p. 78

required to wear might attract unwanted attention. These are just a few of the many guidelines, presented by Rohan Gunaratna, which al Qaeda operatives are told to follow.

Al Qaeda has been very successful in creating a presence in nations all over the world. In 2001 it was reported that the terrorist network had established their organization in 76 different nations, including countries such as Japan that traditionally has a very small Muslim population[70].

4.1.3 Training

Over the last fifteen years al Qaeda has executed a number of terror operations. An important part of the organization's progression to the position of most feared terrorist network in the world is their extensive training and retraining of operatives. The training is based on a manual that is referred to as the "Encyclopaedia of the Afghan Jihad"[71]. This 7000 page document includes chapters on handguns, first aid, manufacturing of arms and explosives, and topography just to name a few. It was created with the purpose of training a new generation of Mujahedeen fighters who would take on the fight for Islam all over the world. It was, furthermore, a document where the tactics and experienced gained from fighting the Soviet Army in Afghanistan could be shared with the rest of the Muslim world. Initially the manual was constructed to train fighters for guerilla warfare similar to the one fought in Afghanistan. It was supposed to be implemented for armed struggles in places where a similar fight was to take place, e.g. Bosnia. Later when Osama bin Laden and the Egyptian terror networks gained influence over the organization terrorist tactics where incorporated into the manual.

In their training camps in Afghanistan al Qaeda taught three different courses in guerilla and terrorist tactics. The organization trained their recruits in basic, advanced, and specialized courses. The basic course focused on guerilla warfare and Sharia and Islamic law. In the advanced course the recruits were taught in using explosives, assassination techniques, as well as the use of heavy weapons. In the specialized course al Qaeda operatives instructed the recruits on surveillance and counter surveillance, forging identity doc-

[70] Gunaratna 2002, p. 79

[71] Ibid, p. 70

uments and how to conduct suicide attacks by using land or water machinery[72]. Not all of the recruits who complete training at one of the organizations camps will be selected to become members of al Qaeda. As a result of this selection process the organization only recruit the absolute best prospects.

The organization also developed an additional manual for terrorist activities. It was initially developed by an Egyptian terrorist network that was later incorporated into al Qaeda and the manual was adapted for al Qaeda's purposes. The manual is referred to as "Declaration of Jihad against the country's tyrants (military series)"[73].

Al Qaeda puts large emphasis on the importance of religion, both in their different manuals and during the training of new recruits. In order to become a member of the organization you have to be a Muslim although you can be a convert. Religion further plays a central role in the psychological training of the operatives. For al Qaeda, psychological training is more important than actual combat training[74]. For an operation to be successful it is crucial that the operatives involved are willing to die for Allah and become modern day martyrs. Readiness to "… do the work and undergo martyrdom for the purpose of achieving the goal and establishing the religion of majestic Allah on earth"[75] are crucial for being chosen for any mission.

Dedication to training and retraining recruits, through the use of the Encyclopaedia of the Afghan Jihad and the Declaration of Jihad against the country's tyrants (military series), combined with a strong commitment to the cause have been fundamental for the organization.

4.1.4 Financial structure

The financial network utilized by al Qaeda is by far the most advanced ever to be used by a terrorist organization. Areas such as financial training and management are crucial for the organization, as are other areas such as investment and the sustaining of eco-

[72] Gunaratna 2002, p. 71

[73] Ibid, p. 72

[74] Ibid, p. 73

[75] Ibid, p. 73

nomical funds. All of the organizations economical funds are under the supervision of the finance and business committee, a committee that is made up of bankers, accountants, and financiers[76]. This committee is in charge of moving funds for the organizations clandestine operations all over the world. The economical branch of the organization can be found in most countries where there is either an indigenous Muslim population or Muslim immigrants.

As an organization al Qaeda needs to generate vast sums of money to be able to finance their different clandestine operations. It has been estimated that to train and equip 3000 mujahedeen fighters in Afghanistan and operatives working undercover in several countries the organization needs 36 million US dollars (USD) on an annual basis. In addition to this there are the set-up cost associated with offices, weaponry, technology, vehicles, camps, and additional infrastructure. The cost of this has been estimated to roughly 50 million USD[77]. Furthermore, a great deal of financial capital is needed to guarantee safe passage for the members and goods of the organization. This is achieved through bribing law enforcements, customs officials etc. According to the CIA the organization uses a great deal of financial capital (approximately 100 million USD) to attain loyalty from different Islamic groups[78]. This is what was done in Afghanistan where al Qaeda used their economical resources to gain influence over the Taliban regime.

There is a common misperception that the personal wealth of Osama bin Laden is enough to finance all of al Qaeda's operations. Through his inheritance from his father, bin Laden gained control over somewhere between 25 and 30 million USD[79] and even though smart investments by him generates a healthy annual interest it is far from being enough money to finance an organization as large as al Qaeda. Additional funds needs to be attained from the outside.

Al Qaeda does not receive funding from any nation states, it is not an organization that is funded or controlled by any political regime. Their main source of capital is instead

[76] Gunaratna 2002, p. 61

[77] Ibid, p. 61

[78] Ibid, p. 61

[79] Ibid, p. 61

wealthy individuals, predominantly of Arab descent. Benefactors from the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar have been crucial for al Qaeda operations[80].

An additional way of funding the organization has been to infiltrate legitimate Islamic charities and NGO's. Once these types of organizations have been infiltrated al Qaeda operatives will tap the organizations funds and move financial capital to al Qaeda.

A further way of generating funds for clandestine operations is credit card fraud. This is used mainly by the organization's European operatives. Al Qaeda has even set up camps in Afghanistan where different techniques are taught to the operatives. It is believed that the credit card fraud operations utilized by al Qaeda in Europe generate as much as one million USD a month[81]. The organization has also developed a financial security principle for the groups that are involved in counterfeit and forgery operations.

- Funds should be divided between those investing for financial return and the balance – operational funds – that should be saved and spent only on operations
- Operational funds should not all be to put into one place
- Only a few of the organization's members should know the location of its funds
- While carrying large amounts of money precautions should be taken
- Money should be left with non-members and spent only when needed[82]

Al Qaeda has several legitimate businesses, predominantly in Sudan, and whenever possible they try to fund clandestine operations in this manner. The reason for this is to avoid detection. Al Qaeda is involved in everything from production of agricultural produce to overseas investment. The organization even has invested in a Swedish company that is in the hospital equipment industry[83]

One of the main tasks of the finance and business committee is to move funds from the organizations supporting cells all over the world to the operational cells. This is done through an intricate system where the funds will be moved through a large number of bank accounts in order to make sure that the transfers cannot be traced by foreign intelligence services. The starting account will belong to an al Qaeda run charity or company and will move trough several accounts until it reaches its final destination where the account

[80] Gunaratna 2002, p. 62

[81] Ibid, p. 65

[82] Entire table taken from Ibid ,p. 63

[83] Ibid, p. 68

will either be in a fake name or the name of an operative who has never been involved in operational missions before[84]. The organization also relies on the informal banking system of Hawala.

The financial structure of al Qaeda has suffered greatly since the attacks of September 11, but it has not been shattered.

4.1.5 September 11th 2001

The attack that made al Qaeda famous all over the world was the attack on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon building in Washington DC in September of 2001. These devastating attacks were conducted by al Qaeda operatives who had been working undercover. They managed to hijack four American commercial airlines, all of which had set out on long flights across the continent. Over three thousand people were killed in the attack. In addition to human casualties there was also material damage which has been estimated to 7 billion USD. This was the first time that the United States had been attacked on their home soil and al Qaeda had been the organization to perform it.

As has been discussed previously in this thesis, the United States was originally not al Qaeda's primary enemy. The organizations primary target, initially, had been corrupt Muslim leaders in the Middle Eats and North Africa. America, and several other western countries, only became targets after their involvement in the Gulf War of 1990-91. During the campaign America built military stations in Saudi Arabia, something Osama bin Laden was strongly against and the organization created a new primary enemy.

In February of 1998 Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa against the United States of America. In the fatwa he urged "Muslims to kill Americans, military and civilians, and plunder their money"[85]. This fatwa led to the creation of the World Islamic Front against Jews and Crusaders (FIMLJC), a group that would unite several Middle Eastern terrorist networks under a common goal.

[84] Gunaratna 2002, p. 63

[85] Chaliand & Blin 2007, p. 322

At the end of 2000 there were several meetings between al Qaeda leaders and highly influential mujahedeen warriors were a decision was made to attack the United States of America. It was not to be a joint effort between al Qaeda and the mujahedeen, but there was a decision made to make America the number one target. Everyone was free to pursue their own way of attacking the country and the others would lend their support for the mission[86].

Al Qaeda wanted to attack the United States on American territory, and further wanted to humiliate them. To do this they needed to choose targets that represented American strength and power. The Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York was seen as a perfect target. If the Twin Towers represented American wealth the other two targets were chosen for their political importance. The Pentagon (headquarters of the US Department of Defense) and the White House (home of the United States President) were the final two targets of the operation. To add to the American humiliation of being attacked on their own soil al Qaeda wanted to perform the attacks using their own equipment. This was fulfilled by using American owned and operated commercial jets as missiles.

The plans for this devastating attack took over a year to complete and were fined tuned by Osama bin Laden himself. It was furthermore, a truly global attack since specially selected al Qaeda cells all over the world were used for the planning and execution of the mission. Cells in Asia, Europe, and North America were chosen for their effectiveness and discretion[87].

Al Qaeda managed to achieve their goals for the operation. Three targets out of four were hit creating not only great human and material losses, but also instilled a large amount of fear in the American society. Phillip Migaux argues that "the extent of the destruction wrought by the four attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, was a testimony of al Qaeda's strategic skill. In the deadliest terrorist attack in history, it had scored a direct hit against highly symbolic targets"[88]. He further argues that the success of the attack can be traced back to three separate factors. The first one being that the terrorist who carried out the attack had a strong desire for martyrdom. Secondly the independent

[86] Chaliand & Blin 2007, p. 325

[87] Ibid, p. 328

[88] Ibid, p. 329

cell structure employed by the organization was of great importance. The final factor was the use of commercial airline jets as weapons of mass destruction. "…the planes it hijacked became mujahedeen-controlled missiles"[89].

The attacks of September 11th were to be the starting point of an all out war against western interests all over the world. In this regard the organization has failed; there have not been any new attacks of the same magnitude as the terrible events of almost seven years ago. There have been several attempts as well as actual attacks but the full scale war that both the leadership of al Qaeda and western governments predicted has not materialized[90].

One of the reasons for this might be that al Qaeda never had the financial resources to conduct a truly global war[91]. The organization does not have the financial muscles to inflict large causalities on their enemies, but they have been able to impose fear on them. In this aspect the organization has been very successful in reaching their goals.

Al Qaeda has as an organization been subject to international scrutiny; several of their accounts have been located and blocked. Several of their terrorist cells in Europe have been routed by western intelligence services. In addition the country in which the network housed a lot of its infrastructure, Afghanistan, has been invaded by an international coalition and their allies the Taliban have been removed from power. As a result of the September 11 attacks al Qaeda is not as strong as it was at the turn of the millennium, but to say that the organization has been eradicated is to go one step to far. Al Qaeda is still an active terrorist organization and their leader Osama bin Laden is, as far as we know, still alive and planning further attacks on the United States of America and its allies all over the world.

[89] Chaliand & Blin 2007, p. 330

[90] Ibid

[91] Ibid

4.2 Afghanistan

Afghanistan's current borders were decided during the political conflict between the British and Russian empires. The nation is completely landlocked, with no contact to the any of the great oceans[92]. The western border of Afghanistan is against the nation of Iran. To the south the country borders Pakistan. In the north Afghanistan shares its borders with the nations of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. In the east the nation borders the emerging superpower China.

Afghanistan, or the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, has throughout history been a part of the global politics. The superpowers of the world have tried to gain influence over the country. Initially several important trade routes between Asia and Europe ran through Afghanistan which in turn led to conflict over the control of these trade routes[93]. In the nineteenth century Afghanistan became an integral part of the ongoing political conflict between the British and Russian empires.

The cold war would once again drag Afghanistan into the international political arena. The political and ideological struggle over influence during this time can be found all over the world. The two superpowers of the time, the Unites States of America and the Soviet Union, competed for influence and most nations were forced to choose sides. In some extreme cases this struggle for influence even lead to armed conflict, as in Vietnam and later in Afghanistan. During the latter parts of 1979 Soviet troops moved into the country to provide military support for the pro-communist fighters in the ongoing civil war. Initially the support was contained to providing arms and military advice but would later escalate and the Soviet Union took a more active role in the conflict. Soviet military set out to crush the mujahedeen fighters that made up the bulk of the opposition. These fighters were in turn armed and trained by several foreign intelligence services, but mainly by the American CIA. Financial support also came from several Arabic nations, among them the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In addition to financial and military support the mujahedeen also received a large number of volunteers who joined the group from all over the Muslim world. After several years of violent encounters between the two 'camps' the Soviet Army started to withdraw from Afghanistan, and had completed this mission by 1989[94].

[92] www.britannica.com (visited the May 25th 2008).

[93] Ibid (visited the May 20th 2008).

[94] Ibid (visited the May 20th 2008).

The Soviet Army left a communist friendly 'puppet' regime in power, but the power vacuum created by Soviet withdrawal only instigated more violence as several different groups fought for control of the country. The communist friendly regime managed to keep their position of power for a couple of years before the country became completely leaderless. In this power struggle a new group emerged victorious. The now infamous Taliban regime gained control over Afghanistan in 1996[95] and created a theocratic rule with strict laws based on their interpretation of Islam. The Taliban also started a close collaboration with al Qaeda, a partnership that would have a very negative effect for the future of the Taliban. As a result of the al Qaeda initiated attack on American targets in September of 2001 a coalition led by the United States of America invaded Afghanistan and removed the Taliban from power.

Table 4: Failed States Index 2007. Afghanistan[96]

Rank	Total	Country	Demographic Pressure	Refugees and Displaced Persons	Group Grievance	Human Flight	Uneven Development	Economy	Delegitimization Of State	Public Services	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention
8	102.3	Afghanistan	8.5	8.9	9.1	7.0	8.0	8.3	8.8	8.0	8.2	9.0	8.5	10.0

In the aftermath of the American led invasion of the country Afghanistan got a democratic elected government who set out to restore and rebuild the nation. As a country there are still many problems that need to be dealt with before the order and the rule of law can be completely restored. Unfortunately the journal Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace had not started conducted their annual index prior the invasion of Afghanistan so there is little material to compare the above presented statistics. Some conclusion can however be drawn from it. Afghanistan has (in the Index from 2007) still many problems associated with state failure. The country achieved the highest measured rating for External Intervention since foreign troops from all over the world are still present on the nation's territory. Furthermore, high values were obtained in relation to the countries Security Apparatus as well as a high level of existing Group Grievances. The latter can be related to the many tribes that still fight for power all over the nation, with war lords attaining de facto

[95] www.britannica.com (visited the May 20th 2008).

[96] Foreign Policy Index 2007, entire index can be found in the attached appendix.

control in many areas of Afghanistan. One area were the country has seen some slight improvements in later years is in the category of Human Flight since people have begun returning to their homes after years as refugees[97]. In the last year it has been reported that al Qaeda and the Taliban have once again started to move into the country, trying to regain power. This has in turn led the international community to turn their heads towards Afghanistan and talks of increasing the already existing international forces on the ground in the country have amplified.

5 Analysis, al Qaeda and Afghanistan

In the following chapter several of the parameters presented in the Failed States Index will be applied to the nation of Afghanistan. In addition the country's connection to the terrorist organization of al Qaeda and its global operations will be examined. With the use of several of the parameters employed in the creation of the Failed States Index the connection between failed states and terrorism in general, and the connection between al Qaeda and Afghanistan in particular, is examined and discussed.

5.1 Delegitimization of state

As a result of the civil war that followed the conflict between the mujahedeen and the Soviet Army Afghanistan was left without a working nation state. Several different factions and tribal groups fought each other for domination and it was not until the mid nineteen nineties that the Taliban regime gained control over most parts of the war torn nation. In 1996 the regime controlled approximately 80 percent of the nation's territory[98].

During this time Osama bin Laden arrives in Afghanistan with a majority of his large family from Khartoum in Sudan. In May 1996 he sets up camp in the city of Jalalabad in the eastern parts of the country. After only a short time he is advised to move since the city is no longer considered safe enough for him and his entourage. The bin Laden family

[97] Burke 2003

[98] Chaliand och Blin 2007, p. 320

instead moves further south the now infamous Tora Bora cave complex[99]. This complex had been used by the mujahedeen for storing weapons and supplies during the war against the Soviet Union. The major bulk of the organizations training camps were camps that had been used by the mujahedeen several years earlier. These camps would become crucial for the organization's recruiting process in the region. They had originally been funded by foreign governments, such as the governments of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, as well as private donors[100]. Al Qaeda also had a number of camps and religious schools in the mountainous regions of Pakistan that borders Afghanistan.

Originally the Taliban regime under the leadership of Mullah Omar were not appreciative of the arrival of Osama bin Laden on Afghanistan territory but through persistent work by bin Laden the two movements finally accepted each other and al Qaeda could continue there work towards a global terrorist attack.

The fact that the regime in Afghanistan, as a result of the civil war, was weak or even non-existing made it possible for al Qaeda to once again set up their training camps and rebuild their structure in the country. Without complete governmental control over a nation's territory there will be small 'pockets' where the rule of law does not exist and land will be under the control of people who are not appointed by the state. In the case of Afghanistan most areas of the country were under the control of the Taliban but initially certain areas were under the control of al Qaeda and groups associated with the terrorist organization. Later when the Taliban had almost complete control of Afghanistan al Qaeda choose to approach the regime in order to secure the safety of the organization. In a state were the rule of law and territorial control is under the management of the government rogue organizations such as al Qaeda will find it much more difficult to settle down and build up the structure that they need in order to plan and execute violent terrorist attacks.

[99] Burke 2003, p.145

[100] Ibid, p. 151

5.2 Economy

In order to gain the acceptance and support from the Taliban regime Osama bin Laden took advantage of another of the parameters used in the Failed States Index, namely the economy. A weak or collapsed economy is a common denominator for a failed state. With the inner turmoil associated with several of the other parameters form the failed States Index (delegitimization of state, factionalized elites, human flight, demographic pressures etc.) it is very difficult to build and sustain a working economy. As a result the domestic economy of a failed state will be very weak and the country will most likely be very poor.

A weak domestic economy can be used by a terrorist organization. They will take advantage of the fact that the government can no longer provide social services for its citizens. Instead of the government paying for social services such as health care and infrastructure, the terror organization will. By providing the citizens with these services the organization will not only gain public support but also new recruits that they can later send on missions all over the world. This phenomenon can be found in several countries in the world today. The terrorist organization of Hamas has funded schools and hospitals in southern Lebanon, which has in turn led to large public support for the organization. In the case of Hamas it has further led to political power since the organization is now part of the government of Lebanon.

Al Qaeda has employed a similar tactic in two nations, namely the Sudan and Afghanistan. During the time of Osama bin Laden's time in the African country al Qaeda constructed housing as well as larger road projects in and around Khartoum[101]. When bin Laden and the leadership of al Qaeda returned to Afghanistan they once again employed the same tactics. In order to get the approval of the ruling Taliban bin Laden made many large economical donations to the regime and promised to fund several infrastructure project in the war-torn nation[102].

With a frail or completely obliterated economy the promise of economical funds and financing of infrastructure projects is a powerful tool that a terrorist organization has at their disposal. When a government is weak and in need of funding in order to keep its

[101] Chaliand och Blin 2007, p. 318

[102] Burke 2003, p. 165

citizens from turning against them it is very hard to decline financial assistance. From the terrorist organizations perspective it is a way of gaining influence over the government, making sure that they protect the organization if it is needed. In cases where a terrorist organization has opted for financing and building different projects on their own accord the goal has been to create a favorable public opinion. If this is secured it will be a lot easier for the organization to work and hide among the regular citizens of the community. The community will provide them with new recruits as well as protecting the members of the organization from both domestic and foreign law enforcement. Al Qaeda has used this aspect to their advantage both in the Sudan and Afghanistan.

5.3 Factionalized elite

When the power of a nation is under the control of a small and corrupt elite it will be easier for a terrorist organization to build up an effective structure. If support for their cause can be found in the leadership an organization can receive protection form the factionalized elite.

Both in the Sudan and Afghanistan al Qaeda had the support of the ruling elite of these nations. This support was, however, not unconditional and the organization needed to work in order to maintain the support given to them. In the Sudan the organization initially found shelter as a result of the Sudanese leadership's recognition of the importance of the struggle that al Qaeda had set out to start. The organization also funded several public works such as road constructions. When international pressure on the Sudanese government became too great the regime decided that it was time for bin Laden and his followers to leave the country.

Bin Laden moved the organization to Afghanistan were they still had a small infrastructure in place from the war against the Soviets. At the time of arrival large parts of the country was under the control of the Taliban and bin Laden set out to get their support in order to be able to build up his organization. Initially the Taliban were not appreciative of bin Laden's move to Afghanistan and did little to support him or his cause. Bin Laden tried to change this by making several large financial donations to the Taliban as an organization. He also attempted to get the support of the regimes highest leader Mullah Omar with more personalized gifts, Bin Laden funded the renovation of Mullah Omar's large residence in

Kandahar[103]. Although all gifts were accepted by the Taliban regime it did not cemented the relationship between the two groups. Several additional measures were taken by bin Laden, and eventually an alliance between the Taliban and al Qaeda was constructed in early 1997[104]. This alliance was created by (in addition to the previously mentioned financial support) marriage ties, honorary positions, and al Qaeda's involvement in trafficking businesses controlled by the Taliban[105]. To cement this alliance Mullah Omar was given an honorary position in al Qaeda's governing body the Shura Majlis and bin Laden became a member of the Taliban's council of elders[106].

Taking advantage of the factionalized and corrupt regime, by using bribes, is an effective way for a terrorist organization, such as al Qaeda, to gain support and protection from a government. If the government of a nation state protects and provide certain areas of their territory to a terrorist organization there is very little that the international community can do. In the case of the Sudan the international community managed to put pressure on the regime by using the threat of increased international sanctions but in the case of Afghanistan this had little effect. The invasion of the country as a result of the attacks on American on September 11th of 2001 signaled a shift in international politics. It had previously been very rare that foreign governments used military power to intervene in another sovereign state. It was however argued that not only was bin Laden and al Qaeda such a threat that it needed to be dealt with, the Taliban were also seen as a threat to international peace and as a result the sovereignty of Afghanistan was ignored and a coalition under the leadership of the United States entered the country and removed the Taliban from power and started the task of finding and arresting al Qaeda operatives in the nation.

[103] Burke 2003, p, 165

[104] Chaliand och Blin 2007, p. 321

[105] Ibid, p. 321

[106] Ibid, p. 321

6 Discussion

The international community has, as a result of the al Qaeda attack on America in 2001, started to see the threat posed by global terrorism as a real problem. The war on terror and increased cooperation between international intelligence services has shown that the fight against terrorism is now of high priority. As a result focus has been put on the many nations in the world that are considered failing or failed states. The notion of state failure is hardly a new one but in the past it has been seen as a national or in some extreme cases a regional problem. The spillover effects associated with state failure has in recent years been moved from the national level to the international level. Problems associated with state failure are now considered to have a possible effect on a nation situated on another continent.

The fact that terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda have located and taken advantages of several of the problems associated with state failure have also been identified and in some case, as in Afghanistan, the international community have taken a more active approach to deal of them.

There are several ways in which a terrorist organization can take advantage of the problems that we associate with state failure. Firstly state failure can lead to the government losing de facto control over their own territory. The national government looses their monopoly over the rule of law. This phenomenon can come in different shapes and forms. Internal conflict can lead to civil war where different rival groups fight for control which will in turn lead to that parts of the country are under the control of local warlords. This has been the case in several African nations over the last two decades, with nations such as Sudan as prime examples. In addition to this outcome, rebellion can lead to a similar situation. In some extreme cases the government's control is so marginalized that the government only controls a small area of the nation, as in Somalia in the early nineties where the governments barely controlled the capital of Mogadishu. A terrorist organization can take advantages of this phenomenon by settling down in the area where the government does not have de facto control, setting up an infrastructure and training camps.

Secondly, when a state is experiencing partial or complete failure the economy will suffer. When the government is struggling with the economy it will become increasingly difficult to provide public goods (education, health care, infrastructure etc.) for their citizens. The government's shortcomings are sometimes used by terrorist organizations. When

a government can no longer provide its citizens with the services they need, a terrorist network might come in and take the governments place. By funding road construction, hospitals, schools etc. the terrorist organization will gain popular support which can prove to be useful. When they get rooted in a community they can use their popular support to attain safe houses and protection. In addition to this they can also use the community for recruiting new members to the organization. Several terror networks adhering to the Middle East have used this tactic during the last decade. Hamas has provided public services to the inhabitants of southern Lebanon and Hezbollah have done the same in areas controlled by Palestinian authorities. In both cases the funding has resulted in the organizations having gained enough public support to move their activities into the open, entering the sphere of politics. Al Qaeda has also applied this tactic in both the Sudan and Afghanistan. It is, however, important to note that al Qaeda has very rarely used the above discussed measures in order to attain new recruits for the organization. Al Qaeda uses these measures to gain public support and protection.

Thirdly, in many of the world's failed states there is widespread corruption in place. This can be used by terrorist organization in order to attain protection from international intelligence services and law enforcement. By the use of personal bribes of members high up in a national government the organization can find a safe haven. Bribes are also used to gain the support from members of a lower rang in the bureaucratic chain such as customs official or police officers. By bribing these members of society terrorist organization can move weapons and material freely across national borders.

A further problem that terrorist network have exploited is one of the spill over effects associated with state failure. Violent conflicts will lead to a large number of refugees fleeing their homes in order to get out of harms way. There are many examples of violent conflicts that have led to the creation of massive refugee camps where people have had to live in dreadful conditions. In these camps terrorist organizations have one of the main recruiting bases. By taking advantage of the misery experienced by the people in the camps new members are recruited and taught how to carry out violent attacks on targets decided by the network.

Several important points must, however, be made on the subject of a connection between terrorism and failed states. Just because a state is experiencing complete or partial failure there will not be an influx of terrorist activity inside the nation's borders. State fail-

ure does not automatically generate terrorism. Similarly terrorism does not necessarily create state failure. Far from all nations that experience state failure do so as a result of an increased level of terrorist activity within its borders, at least not the type of terrorism (global terrorism) that has been at the focus of this thesis. Moreover, not all states that experiences states failure will support terrorist organizations that decide to settle on their territory. It is further important to mention that states will not experience failure just because a terrorist network has implemented an operating or support cell in the country. Al Qaeda had support cells in many European nations during the build up of the attacks on September 11th and it is quite a stretch to call nations such as Germany or Great Britain failed states. There is, however, evidence that suggest that organizations such as al Qaeda will choose to locate the major bulk of their infrastructure in nations that are either failed or failing, as exemplified by the organization's training camps and weapon storages in Afghanistan and the Sudan.

Terrorism is not the only problem that the international community will face as a result of state failure. There are several other issues that will affect the international community on just as large a scale. The spill over effect that we associate with state failure need, and must be, dealt with by the international community as a whole and not only by the neighboring states. The most common spill over effect is the large number of refugees that will flee the failing state for security in the neighboring nations. In most cases the nations surrounding a failed state have little or no capacity to handle large numbers of refugees, a problem that can in turn lead to state failure. The most prominent example is the events in Sudan with the neighboring countries having to deal with huge numbers of refugees and no resources to solve the problem, something that is especially apparent in Sudan's western neighbor Chad.

Furthermore, much of the violence that occur in a nation that is experiencing state failure is initiated by the government. Government sponsored or initiated violence will create the above discussed refuge problem. It will also create a spill over of violence into the neighboring states; this too can be observed in the case of Sudan and Chad.

Perhaps the most significant problem that is associated with state failure is the suffering of the people of the nation. In addition to the violence that will cause mass migration there is a further problem that can cause a far greater loss of human life. When the economy collapses as a result of state failure famine can hit the nation causing starvation

and mass death. This was the case in Somalia in the early nineties where famine in combination with a corrupt elite and internal violence created one of the worst humanitarian disasters of the last twenty years.

As mentioned previously failed or failing states provide terrorist networks with an opportunity to settle in the nation. By taking advantage of the problems that the national government is facing the organization can build and expand their operations and recruitment. The major question that arises from this knowledge is; will dealing with national state failure on the international level in turn deal with the problem of global terrorism? The most likely answer is no. Terrorism has always focused their struggle towards the ruling elite. Just as it is not a new phenomenon, it is not a third world problem. The 'western' world has had its problems with terrorism all through the twentieth century and it is very likely that this will continue to be a problem. It is a problem that has spread all over the globe and it is not just located to nations that are experiencing state failure.

State failure has, however, made it easier for terrorist organization to hide, recruit, and build their organizations. Many of the nations that are presented in the Failed States Index have vast financial problems leading to very tough living conditions for the citizens of these nations. When people find no other way of improving their living condition they might turn to terrorism as a last resort. Terrorist organizations will take advantage of the misery that people are experiencing. By assisting nations that experience state failure the international community can make it much more difficult for terrorist organizations grow. It will never eradicate terrorist networks and organizations, but might make it harder for them to perform their acts of violence.

Directing both attention and support towards failed states should be done regardless of the problems associated with global terrorism. By sending humanitarian aid and knowledge to the right places many of the nations that are on the Failed States Index might be able to improve their situation. This does, however, depend quite a lot on the leadership of the nations in question. By targeting the problem of global terrorism directly in failing states, as has been done in Afghanistan is not the right way to go. The international community should instead focus on humanitarian aid and help these nations provide public goods such as infrastructure, education, health care etc. By doing so the international community will very likely be indirectly fighting terrorism.

It is, however, important to recognize that humanitarian aid and resources alone cannot eradicate terrorist elements in failed states, but neither can military or intelligence operations. There will always be faction of a society that will, with the use of violence, try to achieve their goals. What humanitarian resources can do is to limit these groups, making it harder for them to recruit new members and grow stronger.

7 Conclusion

Al Qaeda has since its creation by Abdallah Assam and Osama bin Laden in the late nineteen eighties employed violence to reach their political goals. Under the leadership of bin Laden the organization shifted its focus from corrupt Muslim leaders to the superpower of the United States of America and its allies. The organization has been behind major attacks such as the bombing of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, bombing the American warship the USS Cole and the infamous attack on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington DC. Al Qaeda is, furthermore, suspected for being involved in terrorist attacks in Bali and Spain.

The organization uses the most powerful tool that a terrorist network has at its disposal, namely violence or the threat of violence. Through the use of violent acts such as the attacks in New York and Washington DC in September of 2001 the organization has been able to instill fear all through the western world. The fact that they have used violence or the threat of violence, to achieve predetermined political goals makes it clear that al Qaeda is truly a terrorist organization.

It is, however, not a terrorist organization in the traditional sense of the word. Al Qaeda has been very successful in creating terrorist cells all over the world, making it the first real global terrorist network. The way in which they have structured the organization further separates them from the older and more regional terrorist organizations that were active during the nineteen seventies and eighties. Although al Qaeda has adopted a similar structure for their leadership (with Osama bin Laden as Emir and chief ideologist) their operations have a different structure. By adopting a cluster model they have been able to create a very independent cell structure that has proven hard to detect. In addition to this the leadership of the organization is not directly involved in all of the operations conducted

by the network. It has also adopted a very sophisticated way of financing its operations such as credit card fraud in addition to more classical sources of income such as private donors, and using a large number of different bank accounts to avoid detection. They have, furthermore, invested money in legitimate businesses, making it hard to locate and freeze the organization's bank accounts.

The organization has recognized the advantages that can be found in states that are either failed or on the verge of failing. By using the organizations funds they have initiated the construction of public works, in order to gain both public support and the support of the specific leaders of a nation. Al Qaeda has further taken advantage of the widespread corruption that usually exists in failing states bribing government officials at all levels of the bureaucratic chain. By using bribes they have been able to move both people and supplies within a nation's border without interruption from the local law enforcement. Many nations that are experiencing state failure will see their controls over the nation's territory diminish. This is often due to violent conflict within the country, where different factions will fight the government for control. Situations like this can lead to that the government does not have de facto control over all of its territory; something that al Qaeda has taken advantage of in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan.

Al Qaeda has, as has other terrorist networks, taken advantage of several of the internal and external features that are linked to state failure. It is, however, important to mention that there is no automatic linkage between terrorism and state failure. Just because a nation is experiencing state failure it will not become a breathing ground for global terrorist organizations. Furthermore, terrorism is usually not the prominent factor when it comes to explaining why a nation is experiencing state failure. Other factors such as bad leadership or internal conflict are much more common examples of why certain states fail.

Failed state do, however, provide global terrorist networks with opportunities that they would not find in more solid or strong states where the government has complete control over the nation's territory, monopoly on law enforcement, and is able to provide its citizens with adequate public services such education or health care. In states that are experiencing failure terrorist organizations can use the instability of the country to their advantage. They can, with the different measures presented above, strengthen their economy, gain public support for their cause, and operate without intrusion from the national and international agencies.

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Appendix

The Fund for Peace and the Foreign Policy journal's Failed States Index 2007.

Rank	Total	Country	Demographic Pressure	Refugees and Displaced Persons	Group Grievance	Human Flight	Uneven Development	Economy	Delegitimization Of State	Public Services	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention
1	113.7	Sudan	9.2	9.8	10.0	9.0	9.1	7.7	10.0	9.5	10.0	9.9	9.7	9.8
2	111.4	Iraq	9.0	9.0	10.0	9.5	8.5	8.0	9.4	8.5	9.7	10.0	9.8	10.0
3	111.1	Somalia	9.2	9.0	8.5	8.0	7.5	9.2	10.0	10.0	9.7	10.0	10.0	10.0
4	110.1	Zimbabwe	9.7	8.7	8.8	9.1	9.5	10.0	9.5	9.6	9.7	9.5	9.0	7.0
5	108.8	Chad	9.1	8.9	9.5	7.9	9.0	8.3	9.5	9.1	9.2	9.6	9.7	9.0
6	107.3	Ivory Coast	8.6	8.3	9.8	8.4	8.0	8.9	9.5	7.9	9.2	9.6	9.3	9.8
7	105.5	D.R C[i]	9.4	8.9	8.8	7.6	9.1	8.0	8.3	8.7	8.9	9.6	8.6	9.6
8	102.3	Afghanistan	8.5	8.9	9.1	7.0	8.0	8.3	8.8	8.0	8.2	9.0	8.5	10.0
9	101.3	Guinea	7.8	7.4	8.1	8.3	8.5	8.5	9.6	8.9	8.6	8.1	9.0	8.5
10	101.0	CAR[ii]	8.9	8.4	8.8	5.5	8.6	8.4	9.0	8.0	8.2	8.9	9.3	9.0
11	100.9	Haiti	8.6	4.2	8.0	8.0	8.2	8.4	9.2	9.0	9.1	9.3	9.3	9.6
12	100.1	Pakistan	8.2	8.5	9.0	8.1	8.5	5.8	8.7	7.1	8.7	9.5	9.5	8.5
13	97.7	North Korea	8.0	6.0	7.2	5.0	8.8	9.6	9.8	9.5	9.7	8.3	7.9	7.9
14	97.0	Burma	8.5	8.5	9.1	6.0	8.9	7.6	9.1	8.3	9.8	9.0	8.2	4.0
15	96.4	Uganda	8.1	9.4	8.5	6.0	8.5	7.5	8.5	8.2	8.2	8.3	7.8	7.4
16	95.9	Bangladesh	8.6	5.8	9.6	8.4	9.0	6.9	9.0	7.4	7.8	8.0	9.5	5.9
17	95.6	Nigeria	8.2	5.6	9.5	8.5	9.1	5.4	9.1	8.7	7.1	9.2	9.5	5.7
18	95.3	Ethiopia	9.0	7.9	7.8	7.5	8.6	8.0	7.9	7.0	8.5	7.5	8.9	6.7
19	95.2	Burundi	9.1	8.9	6.7	6.7	8.8	8.2	7.1	8.9	7.5	6.8	7.5	9.0
20	94.9	Timor-Leste	8.1	8.5	7.1	5.3	6.5	8.5	9.5	7.9	6.9	9.0	8.8	8.8
21	93.6	Nepal	8.1	5.2	8.9	6.1	9.2	8.2	8.5	6.6	8.8	8.3	8.5	7.2
22	93.5	Uzbekistan	7.7	5.4	7.1	7.1	8.6	7.5	9.2	6.8	9.0	8.9	9.2	7.0
23	93.4	Sierra Leone	8.6	7.4	7.1	8.7	8.7	8.7	8.0	8.0	7.0	6.5	7.7	7.0
24	93.2	Yemen	8.0	6.7	7.3	7.2	8.7	8.0	7.8	8.1	7.2	8.0	9.0	7.2
25	93.1	Sri Lanka	7.0	8.6	9.5	6.9	8.2	6.0	8.9	6.5	7.5	8.7	9.2	6.1
26	93.0	RC[iii]	8.7	7.3	6.8	6.1	8.1	8.3	8.5	8.8	7.9	7.9	7.2	7.4
27	92.9	Liberia	8.1	8.5	6.5	6.8	8.3	8.4	7.0	8.6	6.7	6.9	8.1	9.0
28	92.4	Lebanon	6.9	8.6	9.0	7.0	7.1	6.3	7.3	6.4	7.0	9.0	8.8	9.0
29	92.2	Malawi	9.0	6.0	6.0	8.0	8.8	9.2	7.9	9.0	8.0	5.4	7.5	7.4
30	92.0	Sol. Isl.[iv]	8.5	4.8	8.0	5.1	8.0	8.0	8.5	8.5	7.1	7.7	8.8	9.0
31	91.3	Kenya	8.4	8.0	6.9	8.0	8.1	7.0	8.0	7.4	7.0	7.1	8.2	7.2
32	91.2	Niger	9.2	5.9	8.9	6.0	7.2	9.2	8.2	8.8	7.1	6.7	6.0	8.0
33	89.7	Colombia	6.8	9.5	7.4	8.4	8.4	3.8	8.2	6.0	7.4	8.3	8.5	7.0
33	89.7	Bur. Fas.[v]	8.6	5.6	6.4	6.6	8.9	8.2	7.6	8.9	6.6	7.6	7.7	7.0
35	89.4	Cameroon	7.0	6.8	7.0	7.9	8.7	6.1	8.5	7.5	7.2	7.7	8.0	7.0
36	89.2	Egypt	7.7	6.5	7.8	6.2	7.8	7.0	9.0	6.7	8.5	6.1	8.3	7.6
36	89.2	Rwanda	9.1	7.0	8.7	7.6	7.1	7.5	8.5	6.9	7.4	4.6	8.2	6.6
38	88.8	Guinea-B.[vi]	7.6	6.5	5.4	7.0	8.6	8.0	7.2	8.5	8.0	8.0	6.8	7.2
39	88.7	Tajikistan	7.7	6.1	6.3	6.4	7.3	7.3	9.0	7.3	8.6	7.8	8.8	6.1
40	88.6	Syria	6.5	8.9	8.0	6.8	8.1	6.8	8.5	5.3	8.5	7.4	7.5	6.3

Rank	Total	Country												
41	88.2	Eq. Guinea[vii]	8.0	2.0	7.0	7.4	9.0	4.0	9.4	8.6	9.4	8.9	8.5	6.0
41	88.2	Kirgizstan	7.5	6.2	6.8	7.4	8.0	7.5	8.2	6.3	7.9	7.9	7.5	7.0
43	87.5	Turkmen.[viii]	7.0	4.5	6.2	5.6	7.3	7.4	9.0	7.7	9.6	8.5	8.2	6.5
44	87.2	Laos	8.0	5.5	6.5	6.6	5.7	7.1	7.9	8.0	8.5	8.2	8.6	6.6
45	86.7	Mauritania	8.7	6.2	8.0	5.0	7.0	7.8	6.8	8.1	7.1	7.4	7.9	6.7
46	86.6	Togo	7.5	5.4	6.0	6.5	7.5	8.2	7.7	8.0	7.8	7.8	7.6	6.6
47	86.4	Bhutan	6.5	7.5	7.0	6.7	8.7	7.9	8.0	6.5	8.5	4.6	8.0	6.5
48	85.7	Cambodia	7.6	5.9	7.3	8.0	7.2	6.4	8.5	7.6	7.1	6.2	7.5	6.4
48	85.7	Moldova	7.0	4.7	7.3	8.4	7.5	7.5	7.9	7.1	6.8	6.3	7.5	7.7
50	85.5	Eritrea	8.1	7.1	5.4	6.0	5.9	8.4	8.3	7.7	7.4	7.5	7.2	6.5
51	85.2	Belarus	8.0	4.6	6.5	5.0	7.5	6.8	9.1	6.9	8.5	6.7	8.5	7.1
52	85.1	Papua NG[ix]	7.5	3.5	8.0	7.9	9.0	7.3	7.8	7.8	6.1	7.0	6.7	6.5
53	84.9	Angola	8.5	7.5	5.9	5.0	8.7	4.2	8.6	7.7	7.5	6.2	7.5	7.6
54	84.5	Bosnia	6.1	8.0	8.3	6.0	7.2	6.0	7.6	5.6	5.3	7.3	8.3	8.8
55	84.4	Indonesia	7.0	7.5	6.0	7.5	8.0	6.5	6.5	7.0	7.0	7.3	7.2	6.9
56	83.2	Philippines	7.0	5.7	7.2	6.7	7.6	5.8	8.2	5.9	6.8	7.6	7.8	6.9
57	82.8	Iran	6.3	8.6	7.1	5.0	7.2	3.3	7.8	5.7	8.7	8.3	8.9	6.0
58	82.3	Georgia	6.3	6.8	7.6	5.7	7.0	5.7	7.9	6.1	5.4	7.8	7.8	8.2
59	82.0	Bolivia	7.4	3.7	7.0	7.0	8.5	6.4	7.2	7.4	7.0	6.2	8.3	5.9
60	81.4	Guatemala	7.0	6.0	7.1	6.7	8.0	7.0	7.4	6.6	7.1	7.3	5.9	5.3

= Highest indicator score

= Lowest indicator score

[i] Democratic Republic of the Congo

[ii] Central African Republic

[iii] Republic of the Congo

[iv] Solomon Islands

[v] Burkina Faso

[vi] Guinea-Bissau

[vii] Equatorial Guinea

[viii] Turkmenistan

[ix] Papua New Guinea