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  • 1.
    Becker, Johannes
    et al.
    University of Münster, Münster, Germany.
    Schneider, Andrea
    University of Münster, Münster, Germany.
    Bidding for firms with unknown characteristics2019In: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, ISSN 0347-0520, E-ISSN 1467-9442, Vol. 121, no 3, p. 1222-1243Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    When a region successfully attracts a firm by offering subsidies, the firm often commits itself to performance targets in terms of employment. In this paper, we interpret these firm-specific targets as a consequence of incomplete information. We analyze a model of two regions that compete for a firm, assuming that the firm's productivity is ex ante unknown. We show that performance targets often induce overemployment in high-productivity firms, and that tax credits are often superior to lump-sum payments. Moreover, when regions differ in wage rates, the low-wage region wins the bid and has a higher surplus than under complete information. Finally, we show that, under incomplete information, bidding might not lead to efficient firm location. 

  • 2.
    Becker, Johannes
    et al.
    University of Münster, Germany.
    Schneider, Andrea
    University of Oslo, Norway.
    Taxation of firms with unknown mobility2018In: Journal of Public Economic Theory, ISSN 1097-3923, E-ISSN 1467-9779, Vol. 20, no 2, p. 202-217Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We analyze optimal business tax policy when some firms are able to escape taxation by moving abroad. In contrast to the existing literature, we assume that the true number of mobile firms is ex ante unknown. While the government may learn from the firms' location responses to past tax rate changes, firms may anticipate this and adjust their choices accordingly. We find that incomplete information on mobility substantially affects the properties and the implications of equilibrium policy choices. First, the government may find it optimal to set a tax rate that triggers partial firm migration but full revelation of the true number of mobile firms. Second, we show that, if the firms' outside option is attractive (i.e., relocation cost and foreign tax rates are low), expected tax rates and expected firm migration are higher if the degree of mobility is unknown. Third, there is a positive value of learning, i.e., commitment on future tax rates cannot increase the government's expected revenue. However, if the government can commit to a rule-based learning mechanism, i.e., credibly tie its future tax policy to present policy outcomes, it may obtain a Pareto improvement. 

  • 3.
    Beckmann, Klaus
    et al.
    Institute of Public Economics, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg, Germany.
    Schneider, Andrea
    Institute of Public Economics, WW University of Münster, Münster, Germany.
    The interaction of publications and appointments: new evidence on academic economists in Germany2013In: Education Economics, ISSN 0964-5292, E-ISSN 1469-5782, Vol. 21, no 4, p. 415-430Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Using a new panel data set comprising publication and appointment data for 889 German academic economists over a quarter of a century, we confirm the familiar hypothesis that publications are important for professorial appointments, but find only a small negative effect of appointments on subsequent research productivity, in particular if one controls for the presence of top researchers ('stars'). Surprisingly, the research output of stars drops significantly more than the average in the aftermath of an appointment. We also provide some evidence of the effects of the fundamental reform of economics in Germany and of affirmative action procedures.

  • 4.
    Berlemann, Michael
    et al.
    Helmut-Schmidt-University Hamburg and CESifo Munich.
    Schneider, Andrea
    University of Münster.
    Monetary policy and central bank independence under endogenous conservatism2014In: Journal of Economic Research, ISSN 1226-4261, Vol. 19, no 2, p. 125-136Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper we study the effects of monetary policy under endogenous conservatism. We find a feedback mechanism of macroeconomic outcomes on policy conservatism to destabilize the economy or at least to contribute to considerable adjustment costs. Central bank independence turns out to be a suitable solution to this problem.

  • 5.
    Garz, Marcel
    et al.
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics. Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Centre for Entrepreneurship and Spatial Economics (CEnSE). Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Media, Management and Transformation Centre (MMTC).
    Schneider, Andrea
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics. Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Centre for Entrepreneurship and Spatial Economics (CEnSE).
    Data sharing and tax enforcement: Evidence from short-term rentals in Denmark2023In: Regional Science and Urban Economics, ISSN 0166-0462, E-ISSN 1879-2308, Vol. 101, article id 103912Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Airbnb and other home-sharing platforms have been facing increasing regulation over the past years, mainly in the form of restricting short-term rentals through day caps. In contrast, as one of the first countries in the world, Denmark applied a collaborative strategy: In 2018, the government negotiated an agreement with Airbnb about the transmission of income data from the platform to the tax agency. We analyze how this data-sharing agreement affected hosts' behavior on the platform, using a difference-in-differences approach with Sweden as a counterfactual. We find that the agreement reduced hosts’ propensity to list property on the platform by 14%, while increasing listing prices by 11%. Our results indicate that platform exits were mostly limited to single-property hosts. In contrast, hosts with many properties and those in areas with initially low Airbnb penetration made their rental objects more often available and managed to increase the number of bookings. Overall, the findings imply that the data-sharing agreement not only helped to increase tax compliance but also led to a commercialization and spatial re-organization of short-term renting in Denmark.

  • 6.
    Garz, Marcel
    et al.
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics. Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Centre for Entrepreneurship and Spatial Economics (CEnSE). Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Media, Management and Transformation Centre (MMTC).
    Schneider, Andrea
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics. Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Centre for Entrepreneurship and Spatial Economics (CEnSE).
    Taxation of short-term rentals: Evidence from the introduction of the “Airbnb tax” in Norway2023In: Economics Letters, ISSN 0165-1765, E-ISSN 1873-7374, Vol. 226, article id 111120Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This research note investigates the impact of a rental-income tax on hosts using Airbnb in Norway. We find that the cost increase implied by the tax did not induce hosts to exit the platform, nor did it lead to an increase in rental prices. These findings support the conjecture that the tax was insufficiently enforced, as it relied on taxpayers to self-report their rental income.

  • 7.
    Göbel, Markus
    et al.
    Institute of Organization and Logistics, Helmut Schmidt University, Germany.
    Schneider, Andrea
    Institute of Public Finance, Helmut Schmidt University, Germany.
    Thomas, Tobias
    Institute of Public Finance, Helmut Schmidt University, Germany.
    Consumption behavior and the aspiration for conformity and consistency2010In: Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics, ISSN 1937-321X, Vol. 3, no 2, p. 83-94Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The (socio-)psychological concepts of individual aspiration for conformity and consistency are integrated into the rational choice framework. By using this integrative approach, it is shown that, after a shock, the aspiration for conformity results in a steady state that deviates from the homo oeconomicus's behavior toward the consumption of the peer group, whereas the aspiration for consistency leads to the result that the steady-state consumption is not reached at once. With the combination of these effects, a new consumption path is derived. After a shock, the individual consumption converges step by step to the new steady-state consumption. 

  • 8.
    Holzinger, Katharina
    et al.
    Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany.
    Schneider, Andrea
    Institute of Public Economics I, University of Münster, Münster, Germany.
    Zimmermann, Klaus W.
    Institute for Economic Policy Research, Helmut-Schmidt-University Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany.
    Minimizing the losers: Regime satisfaction in multi-level systems2011In: Constitutional Political Economy, ISSN 1043-4062, E-ISSN 1572-9966, Vol. 22, no 4, p. 303-324Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The political blessings of federalism are the core of our discussion. These benefits can be operationalized as a decrease in the number of outvoted people in a federal system with majority voting which is an important source of regime satisfaction. The approach originates from the work of Roland Pennock who developed a similar methodology about 50 years ago. Measuring inverse regime satisfaction by the maximum of the outvoted, our results show that regime satisfaction decreases if total population rises. Additionally, the share of the maximum outvoted decreases if the top level cooperates with lower-level jurisdictions and if all jurisdictions of one level are included. However, while the inclusion of an additional lowest-level jurisdiction always reduces the relative number of the outvoted, the effect of including other levels depends on the structure of jurisdictions already intertwined. 

  • 9.
    Juranek, S.
    et al.
    NHH Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science, Norway.
    Schindler, D.
    Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Netherlands.
    Schneider, Andrea
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics. Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Centre for Entrepreneurship and Spatial Economics (CEnSE).
    Royalty taxation under tax competition and profit shifting2023In: Canadian Journal of Economics, ISSN 0008-4085, E-ISSN 1540-5982, Vol. 56, no 4, p. 1377-1412Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Multinational corporations increasingly use royalty payments for intellectual property rights to shift profits globally. This not only threatens the tax base of countries worldwide but also affects the nature of tax competition. Against this background, our theoretical analysis suggests a surprising solution to the problem of curbing profit shifting without suffering major outflows of capital: a strictly positive withholding tax on royalty payments is both the Pareto-efficient solution under international coordination and the optimal unilateral response. If internal debt is sufficiently responsive, governments can even implement optimal targeting. Then, the royalty tax closes the profit-shifting channel, while all competition for mobile capital is relegated to internal-debt regulation. Our results question the ban on royalty taxes in double tax treaties and the EU Interest and Royalty Directive.

  • 10.
    Juranek, Steffen
    et al.
    Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Business and Management Science.
    Schindler, Dirk
    Erasmus School of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute).
    Schneider, Andrea
    University of Münster - Institute for Public Economics.
    Royalty taxation under tax competition and profit shifting2018Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The increasing use of intellectual property as a means to shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions or jurisdictions with so-called ‘patent boxes’ is a major challenge for the corporate tax base of medium- and high-tax countries. Extending a standard tax competition model for capital-enhancing technology, royalty payments, and profit shifting, this paper suggests a simple fix: It is optimal to set a withholding tax on (intra-firm) royalty payments equal to the corporate tax rate and deny any deductibility of royalties. As the tax applies to the full payment, the problem of identifying the arm’s-length component in a digital economy (OECD BEPS Action 1) does not apply. Most importantly, the denial of royalty deductions is the Pareto-efficient solution under coordination and the unilaterally optimal policy under competition for mobile capital. In the latter case, a weakened thin capitalization rule is a crucial part of the policy package in order to avoid negative investment effects. Our results question the ban of royalty taxes in double tax treaties and the EU Interest and Royalty Directive.

  • 11.
    Laich, Mathias
    et al.
    Department of Economics, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg, Germany.
    Schneider, Andrea
    Department of Economics, University of Münster, Münster, Germany.
    The linkage between fertility and labor productivity: A european perspective2014In: Eastern Economic Journal, ISSN 0094-5056, Vol. 40, no 3, p. 405-419Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We estimate vector error-correction models and vector autoregression models, respectively, for 13 European countries (1970-2005) to examine the-widely debated-relationship between population growth and economic growth. While for most European countries we find a positive long-run relationship, some countries show a negative linkage. We also analyze short-term interdependencies and find evidence that the relationship between productivity and reproductivity may have changed over time. 

  • 12.
    Napel, Stefan
    et al.
    University of Bayreuth, Department of Economics, Bayreuth, Germany.
    Schneider, Andrea
    Helmut Schmidt University, Department of Economics, Hamburg, Germany.
    Intergenerational talent transmission, inequality, and social mobility2008In: Economics Letters, ISSN 0165-1765, E-ISSN 1873-7374, Vol. 99, no 2, p. 405-409Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper investigates the effects of intra-family talent transmission when human capital exhibits indivisibilities and parental financing of education involves borrowing constraints. Positive talent correlation reduces social mobility but steady state inequality and macroeconomic history-dependence are not affected. 

  • 13.
    Schneider, Andrea
    Institute of Public Economics, University of Münster, Münster, Germany.
    Corporate taxation of heterogeneous firms and the welfare effects of labour unions2017In: The World Economy, ISSN 0378-5920, E-ISSN 1467-9701, Vol. 40, no 4, p. 703-714Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper examines the welfare effects of powerful labour unions when the government levies a uniform tax rate – as is currently the case in most OECD countries – and firms are heterogeneous with respect to productivity. I show that an increase in the bargaining power of labour unions can decrease the welfare loss generated by restriction of the tax policy and provide conditions under which powerful labour unions decrease the likelihood that firms will move abroad. I also reproduce the well-known effect whereby powerful labour unions decrease corporate tax rates if firms are mobile. 

  • 14.
    Schneider, Andrea
    Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg, Germany.
    Redistributive taxation vs. education subsidies: Fostering equality and social mobility in an intergenerational model2010In: Economics of Education Review, ISSN 0272-7757, E-ISSN 1873-7382, Vol. 29, no 4, p. 597-605Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Redistributive taxation and education subsidies are common policies intended to foster education attendance of poor children. However, this paper shows that in an intergenerational framework, these policies can raise social mobility only for some investment situations but not in general. I also study the impact of both policies on the aggregate skill ratio and inequality. While redistributive taxation can raise social mobility but at the same time never reduces inequality, education subsidies can, under some conditions, achieve both simultaneously. Unfortunately, these conditions necessarily require a population in which the skill ratio is already quite high. 

  • 15.
    Schneider, Andrea
    et al.
    Institute of Public Economics, WW University of Münster, Münster, Germany.
    Zimmermann, Klaus W.
    Institute for International Economic Policy Research, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg, Germany.
    Fairness and its price2012In: Review of social economy, ISSN 0034-6764, E-ISSN 1470-1162, Vol. 70, no 2, p. 181-199Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We discuss the economic aspects of fairness defined here in the benchmark case as equality of producer and consumer rents. We show that there are significant differences considering private and public goods, especially with regard to a potential self-damaging of the initially disadvantaged, resulting from the implementation of the equality-rule. Furthermore, the potential welfare loss to society will be substantially larger in the field of public rather than of private goods. 

1 - 15 of 15
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