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  • 1.
    Dahlström, Tobias
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics.
    Detection of corruption2008In: Economic corruption: detection, costs and prevention, New York: Nova Science Publishers , 2008Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    One often mentioned reason for why it seems very hard to change the amount of corruption in an economy is that those enforcing the laws might also be corrupt. It seems as if the general belief is that if this problem of law enforcement is solved, combating corruption will be as easy in heavily as in less corrupt economies. The paper investigates this often implicitly assumed reasoning by testing two similar propositions; first whether the amount of people being corrupt in a country has any effect on the probability of getting caught given the same legal system and enforcement. Second, whether it is harder to influence the probability of detection in a country with a high level of corruption than in a country with a low level of corruption given the same legal system and enforcement. This is done in two ways; first through an analysis of a simple case and then through numerical simulation of a more extensive case. It is shown that the number of people being corrupt have both a direct negative impact on the likelihood of getting detected as well as an indirect negative impact since it lowers the positive marginal effect that an increase in the degree of enforcement has on the probability of detection.

  • 2.
    Dahlström, Tobias
    et al.
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics.
    Johnson, Andreas
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics.
    Bureaucratic corruption, MNEs and FDI2005In: Host country effects of foreign direct investment: The case of developing and transition economics, Jönköping: Jönköping International Business School , 2005Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper adds to the limited number of studies analysing the relationship between host country corruption and FDI inflows. A model describes the incentives that foreign MNEs and host country bureaucrats have for engaging in corruption and shows how corruption increases the MNE cost of operations in the host country. The model prediction that the costs caused by corruption reduce FDI inflows is verified by regression analysis using panel data. Host country corruption has a significant negative effect on FDI inflows to developing economies but not for developed economies.

  • 3.
    Dahlström, Tobias
    et al.
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics.
    Lundström, Christian
    Corruption and growth2007Conference paper (Other (popular scientific, debate etc.))
    Abstract [en]

    The note adds to the growing body of studies analysing the relationship between corruption and growth. The novelty is that the study cleans the corruption data from the impact of a country’s institutional setting. This enables the authors to verify if it is the absence of corruption and/or the institutional standard of a country that cause growth. The conclusion drawn is that corruption is only a symptom and does not in itself lower the GDP growth rate of a country.

  • 4.
    Dahlström, Tobias
    et al.
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics. Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Media, Management and Transformation Centre (MMTC).
    Picard, Robert
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Media, Management and Transformation Centre (MMTC).
    Humphreys, Edward
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Media, Management and Transformation Centre (MMTC).
    The Economics of Criminal Enforcement of Copyright2007In: 6th SERCI Annual congress, 2007Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper focuses on the implications of the criminalization of copyright violations, the economics of law enforcement, and the incentives and disincentives for national criminal enforcement of copyrights purely from the economic point of view. It provides a model of optimal criminal enforcement of copyright based on those factors and an assessment of how effective criminalization will be. It does not focus on the general issues of the contributions of copyright to producer and national economies or whether and how harm occurs from appropriation.

  • 5.
    Dahlström, Tobias
    et al.
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics.
    Raviola, Elena
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Media, Management and Transformation Centre (MMTC).
    Power and decision making2006In: 2oo6 Hawaii International Conference on Business, 2006Conference paper (Other scientific)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper aims at giving a micro-foundation to the phenomenon of corruption, focusing on intra-organisational corruption. Internal corruption (intra-organisational corruption and internal corruption will be used interchangeably) is defined as the use of power granted in an organisation to enrich oneself. Two additional restrictions are applied as to further limit the definition of corruption. For an act to be labelled as corruption it has to consist, of at least, two parties who actively agree on the transaction without the threat of illegal violence or other types of illegal punishments. Further the transaction has to be a two way transfer where both receive a revenue. Thus we do not consider extortion or theft as corruption, while embezzlement or insider trading could be classified as corruption dependent on the situation.

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