This paper contributes to the literature of ownership, control and performance by exploring these relationships for Swedish listed companies (1997-2002). A marginal q will be used as measures of economic performance. Marginal q was presented in an article by Mueller and Reardon in 1993 and has recently been used in empirical studies of ownership and performance by among others Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003). Frequently an average Tobin’s q is used in studies of this type, but Tobin’s q has a number of disadvantages which can be circumvented by employing a marginal q. In addition to marginal q estimations have been made with the valuation ratio as performance measure. The valuation ratio is interesting from a theoretical viewpoint, as it is an efficiency measure that plays a central role in Marris (1964) growth model of the firm. It is also easy to compute and is related to Tobin´s q. This study adds to earlier studies by using Swedish data with its specificities in form of pyramid ownership and a vote differential. The relationships between the two performance measures and different ownership characteristics like ownership concentration and foreign ownership is investigated. We find that firms, on average, are making inferior investment decisions and that the Swedish corporate governance system have some efficiency drawbacks.
In this paper the relation between ownership structure, board composition and firm performance is explored. A panel of Swedish listed firms is used to investigate how board composition affects firm performance. Board heterogeneity is measured as board size, age and gender diversity. The results show that Swedish board of directors have become more diversified in terms of gender. Also, fewer firms have the CEO on the board which can be interpreted as a sign of increased independency. The regression analysis shows that gender diversity has a small but negative effect on investment performance, and the same holds for CEO being on the board. The analysis also show that board size has a significant negative effect on investment performance. When incorporating all the explanatory variables into one equation however, the negative effect of larger boards dilutes the effect of gender diversity and having the CEO on the board.
Previous studies have shown that differences in corporate governance systems, traditions, and both formal and informal institutions appear to correlate with firm performance. It has been suggested that Scandinavia and South East Asia have similar ownership structures with vote differential shares, pyramids and strong family ownership. However, the regions have different legal traditions and hence formal institutions, and also informal institutions. This paper presents a detailed overview of firm performance for a sample of listed firms in Scandinavia (represented by Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) and South East Asia (represented by Malaysia, Thailand, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea). Firm performance is estimated using both the Marginal q-approach and the Tobin’s Q on an unbalanced dataset from 1998 to 2006.
This paper investigates how family ownership, control and management affect firm investment performance. We use the identity of the CEO and the COB to establish under what management the firm is: founder, descendent or external management. The analysis shows that founder management has no effect on investment performance in family firms, whereas descendant management has a negative impact on firm performance and having external hired managers significantly improves investment performance. Moreover, we examine the effects of dual-class shares; we find that the separation of voting right from cash-flow right has a negative impact on performance in both family and non-family firms, but the negative effect is larger in family firms.
This paper explores the relation between ownership structure, board composition and firm performance among Swedish listed firms. The descriptive statistics show that Swedish board of directors have become more diversified in terms of gender. The analysis show that board size has a significant negative effect on investment performance. Gender diversity has a small but negative effect on investment performance, and the same holds for CEO being on the board. When incorporating all the explanatory variables into the same equation the negative effect of larger boards dilutes the effect of gender diversity and having the CEO on the board.
This thesis consists of five separate essays and an introductory chapter, The essays can be read independently from each other, but they are all in the field of corporate governance and investment performance. Specifically, the focus is on the role of institutional owners in the conflict between controlling shareholders and minority owners. The essays mainly contribute to the empirical literature on corporate governance and investment performance. In four of the five essays, panel data methods are used in the empirical investigation.
The first essay investigates time and industry specific factors in the evaluation of firms’ investment performance, measured by marginal q. Significant differences in valuation is found between firms, depending on the market sentiments and industry affiliation. The second essay focuses on the role of institutional owners in relation to firms’ investment performance. Institutional owners are found to have a positive influence on firms’ investment performance. By studying a large panel of Swedish listed firms the essay also provides evidence on the relationship between control enhancing mechanism, such as vote-differentiated shares, and investment performance. The third essay looks at the role of institutional owners from the perspective of dividend policy. It is shown that institutional owners demand higher dividends to compensate for aggravated agency conflicts due to vote-differentiated shares. The fourth essay investigates the performance of European firms from a long run perspective. Firm profits converge over time, but this convergence is incomplete. Investment in R&D is put forward as an explanation for persistent profits above the norm. The fifth and last essay looks at individual mutual funds and specifically how to measure risk-adjusted performance. The results show that Swedish bond funds underperform their benchmark, even when risk-adjusted to the same level of risk.
This paper aims to provide a summarize review of recent empirical research, in the field of corporate governance and its relation to performance of firms. Specifically, the focus is on the role of institutional owners in the conflict between controlling shareholders and minority owners. The paper also contributes to the literature on corporate governance and performance by providing some discussion on the statistical methods used in most empirical investigations. Summing up recent studies in the evaluation of firms’ investment performance has shown significant differences in the valuation of firms, depending on the market expectations and industry affiliation. Focusing on the role of institutional owners in relation to firms’ investment performance, the existing empirical evidence suggest that institutional owners have a positive influence on firms’ investment performance. Studies that looks at the role of institutional owners from the perspective of dividend policy has shown that institutional owners demand higher dividends to compensate for aggravated agency conflicts due to vote-differentiated shares. A large body of research investigates the performance of firms from a long run perspective. These studies demonstrate that profits converge over time, but the convergence is incomplete. Investment in R&D is often put forward as an explanation for persistent profits above the norm. Looking at individual mutual funds, and specifically how to measure risk-adjusted performance, investigations generally show that mutual funds underperform in relation to their market benchmark, even when risk-adjusted to the same level of risk.
Economic theory tells us that abnormal firm and industry profits will not persist for any significant length of time. Any firm or industry making profits in excess of the normal rate of return, will attract entrants and this competitive process will erode their profits. However, a substantial amount of research has found evidence of persistent profits above the norm. Barriers to entry and exit, is an explanation often put forward to this anomaly. In the absence of, or with low barriers to entry and exit, this reasoning provides little help in explaining why these above-norm profits arise and persist. This paper explores the links between the systematic search for knowledge and the persistence of profits. By investing in R&D (Research and Development) firms may succeed in creating products or services that are preferred by the market and/or find a more cost efficient method of production. Corporations that systematically invest in R&D may, by doing this, offset the erosion of profits and thereby have persistently high profits, which diverge from the competitive return. The paper argues that even in the absence of significant barriers to entry and exit, profits may persist. This can be accredited to a systematic search for knowledge through R&D.