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  • 1.
    Bo, Pingjing
    et al.
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics.
    Manduchi, Agostino
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics.
    Disclosure-based price discrimination by information exchange platforms2017In: Information Economics and Policy, ISSN 0167-6245, E-ISSN 1873-5975, Vol. 41, p. 54-66Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Consumers often face a trade off when considering whether to share more information with firms - for example, by letting an app access their list of contacts, location or browsing history. More precise information can help the sellers to make more targeted offers, and can yield multiple relevant offers and lower prices. However, information disclosure can entail costs via identity theft, fraud, extortion etc. In this paper, we explore this trade-off in a model in which a monopoly platform can gather personal customer information, and offer it to other sellers. The consumers differ relatively to their aversion to information disclosure, and the platform can offer them menus with different disclosure levels. In equilibrium, options featuring greater disclosure levels command a premium, and information about the consumers choosing them is sold to the sellers at a lower price. If we compare scenarios with alternative menus, a greater number of options corresponds to a greater average disclosure level and a greater surplus. If the potential surplus from the induced exchanges is relatively large, equilibrium with a binary menu features levels of the platform’s profit and the surplus close to those achieved with a continuum of offers.

  • 2.
    Bo, Pingjing
    et al.
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics.
    Manduchi, Agostino
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics.
    Informative transactions, disclosure and privacy2016Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper investigates a model in which a monopolist obtains information about her customers’ preferences by delivering her product, and can disclose the same information to other sellers, at a price. More refined information is a more effective facilitator of further exchanges, and boosts competition among the sellers using it, but entails a greater nuisance for the consumers. The actual nuisance implied by any given disclosure level differs across consumers. The monopolist makes two alternative offers. In equilibrium, the prices can induce too many consumers to choose the low disclosure-offer, the disclosure levels can be inconsistent with surplus maximization, and the average disclosure level is lower than the surplus-maximizing one. A lower proportional participation of the monopolist in the profits from the induced exchanges typically entails more differentiated disclosure levels; the response of the average level is non-monotonic. The high disclosure-offer can feature a higher price, due to the higher probability of further trade and to the more intense competition among the sellers.

  • 3.
    Creane, Anthony
    et al.
    University of Kentucky.
    Manduchi, Agostino
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics. Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Media, Management and Transformation Centre (MMTC).
    Informative advertising in monopolistically competitive marketManuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In their seminal paper Grossman and Shapiro (1984) find that informative advertising is socially excessive in an oligopoly (entry is also socially excessive). However, to derive the results, it was assumed that all consumers receive at least one ad, i.e., advertising does not have a demand creation effect. Christou and Vettas (2008), Tirole (1988), among others, have presented counter-examples in alternative settings, showing when the assumption does not hold, advertising may socially advertising. Christou and Vettas (2008) also show that quasiconcavity may not hold and present examples in which the equilibrium does not exist as firms would deviate to a higher price. We revisit the question by modeling firms (like consumers) as a continuum, which eliminates the discontinuity that bedeviled both papers and allows us to not use the assumption that all consumers receive at least one ad. As a result, we are able to derive explicit and intuitive conditions for an equilibrium. More importantly, we find instead advertising is socially insufficient regardless of the fraction of the consumers who receive an ad, including when there is effectively no demand creation. We also find that there is insufficient entry instead of excess entry. We provide intuition for the difference between our and previous results, which partly turns on firms deviating to a lower (supercompetitive) price.

  • 4.
    Karlsson, Charlie
    et al.
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics.
    Manduchi, Agostino
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics.
    Knowledge Spillovers in a Spatial Context: A Critical Review and Assesment2001In: Knowledge, Complexity and Innovation Systems / [ed] Manfred M. Fischer, Josef Fröhlich, New York: Springer , 2001, p. 101-123Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 5.
    Kayitare Tengera, Françoise
    et al.
    University of Rwanda.
    Manduchi, Agostino
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics.
    Financial Viability of Rwanda Pension Scheme Fund Investments2015In: American International Journal of Research in Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences, ISSN 2328-3696, Vol. 12, no 2, p. 183-197Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Pension funds are in charge of the decisions concerning the allocation of a very large share of the wealth of most countries. To guarantee financial viability, the funds should be invested in agreement with the general principles of safety, yield, liquidity and social economic utility. In this article, we evaluate the performance and the long-term viability of the public pension scheme fund managed by Rwanda Social Security Board, the major Rwandan pension fund, by using financial information covering the period from 2009 until 2014. The findings cast doubt on the long-run financial viability of the fund, and suggest the opportunity to implement more sound investment strategies, and possibly also to commit to more realistic payment plans.

  • 6.
    Manduchi, Agostino
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics.
    Essays on Bounded Rationality, Complexity, and Strategic Interactions: Columbia Business School1999Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other scientific)
  • 7.
    Manduchi, Agostino
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics.
    Non-neutral information costs with match-value uncertainty2013In: Journal of Economics, ISSN 0931-8658, E-ISSN 1617-7134, Vol. 109, no 1, p. 1-25Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper investigates a model featuring a monopolist seller and a buyer with an uncertain valuation for the seller’s product. The seller chooses an information system which allows the buyer to receive a private signal, potentially correlated with her valuation. No restrictions are imposed on the conditional distributions of the signal; the cost of the information system is proportional to its precision, measured by the mutual information between the distributions of the buyer’s valuation and the signal. In equilibrium, the information system trades off the information cost against the losses deriving from a probability of trade that is either “too high,” or “too low”—depending on the relative weight of the expected losses resulting from errors of the two types—and sends “non-neutral” signals, typically. Thus, in general, the probability of a correct signal depends on the buyer’s actual valuation, and the probability of trade differs from the probability of a valuation exceeding the cost of production. The expected total surplus generated by the exchange is maximized, in equilibrium.

  • 8.
    Manduchi, Agostino
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics.
    Price discrimination of buyers with identical preferences and collusion in a model of advertising2004In: Journal of Economic Theory, ISSN 0022-0531, E-ISSN 1095-7235, Vol. 116, no 2, p. 347-356Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A model of advertising and price distributions is investigated whereby each seller can contact different buyers, whose preferences are identical, with different probabilities. The model features a continuum of equilibria parametrized by the ratio of the buyers contacted by one seller—differing across “market segments”—and by the other sellers. In general, the sellers practice price discrimination across segments. More asymmetric equilibria correspond to higher volumes of transactions and higher expected transaction prices. This results in a lower expected utility for the buyers and higher expected profits; thus, identifying areas of influence can help the sellers to support collusion.

  • 9.
    Manduchi, Agostino
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics.
    Similar Actions and Cooperation in the Centipede Played by Automata1998Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper analyzes the evolutionary dynamics of a modified version of Rosenthal's "centipede," whereby the players' strategies are represented by finite-state automata. In the framework considered, the automata required to implement different strategies may differ among them both with respect to their complexity, and with with respect to their cost. This is due to the possibility that the players have to identify similar situations, and similar actions, across different information sets. This modification of the original game introduces an unstable equilibrium at which all strategies are represented in the population of the players. With the unperturbed replicator dynamics, the system eventually converges to some point belonging to a continuum of rest-points that the present model shares with the evolutionary version of Rosenthal's original game. The transient phase - characterized by fluctuations in the fractions of the two populations adopting different automata - can however be relatively long. Furthermore, numerical results point to the fact that small perturbations can turn the fluctuations characterizing the convergent paths of the unperturbed system into persistent phenomena. In this case, the players' payoffs can be significantly higher than those achievable at the Nash-equilibria.

  • 10.
    Manduchi, Agostino
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics. Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Media, Management and Transformation Centre (MMTC).
    The pricing of advertising2015In: Handbook on the Economics of the Media / [ed] Robert G. Picard and Steven S. Wildman, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015, p. 123-147Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 11.
    Manduchi, Agostino
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics.
    Tre saggi su aspettative, informazione e problemi di coordinamento (University of Siena): English Title: Three Essays on Expectations, Information and Co-ordination Failures1995Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other scientific)
  • 12.
    Manduchi, Agostino
    et al.
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics, Finance and Statistics.
    Naldi, Lucia
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, ESOL (Entrepreneurship, Strategy, Organization, Leadership). Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Center for Family Enterprise and Ownership (CeFEO).
    Clusters and Conglomerates in the Media Industry2014In: Agglomeration, Clusters and Entrepreneurship: Studies in Regional Economic Development / [ed] Charlie  Karlsson, Börje Johansson, Roger R. Stough, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 13.
    Manduchi, Agostino
    et al.
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics.
    Naldi, Lucia
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, EMM (Entrepreneurship, Marketing, Management). Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Media, Management and Transformation Centre (MMTC).
    Clusters and conglomerates in the media industry2009In: Uddevalla Symposium 2009: the geography of innovation and entrepreneurship : revised papers presented at the 12th Uddevalla Symposium, 11-13 June, 2009, Bari, Italy, Trollhättan: Department of Economics and IT, University West , 2009, p. 797-808Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    We introduce and investigate a framework whereby each firm may be organized either as a “small” unit, systematically relying on cooperation with other units, or as a “large,” stand-alone conglomerate. The framework is used to obtain some qualitative insights into the relative advantages of the two organizational modes. In general, a relatively ease with which the firms can combine productive ideas between them, to create production opportunities, and-or a relatively slow arrival of productive ideas favor the cluster over the conglomerate.

  • 14.
    Manduchi, Agostino
    et al.
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics.
    Picard, Robert
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Media, Management and Transformation Centre (MMTC). Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics.
    Circulations, Revenues, and Profits in a Newspaper Market with Fixed Advertising Costs2009In: Journal of Media Economics, ISSN 0899-7764, E-ISSN 1532-7736, Vol. 22, no 4, p. 211-238Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article investigates a model in which 2 newspapers compete between them for readers with differentiated preferences and advertise new products at a cost per reader that decreases as thecirculation increases. The model can account for the empirical regularity that the revenues from advertising and the profits of the newspapers increase more than proportionally with the circulation. A complementary finding is that a larger number of potential advertisers lowers the profits of both newspapers.

  • 15.
    Picard, Robert
    et al.
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Media, Management and Transformation Centre (MMTC). Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics.
    Manduchi, Agostino
    Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics.
    Circulation and Advertising: Why Are They Not Proportional?2007Conference paper (Other academic)
1 - 15 of 15
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  • ieee
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