This chapter investigates the construction of status in the relationship between the auditor and the audit committee. Such a study is merited considering that regulation as a driver of corporate governance has been designed towards a regulatory concern with lax audit practice, where the audit committee was presented as a solution. This is, however, a problem not manifested in the Swedish context. The driver was instead connected to the need for companies to follow suit with an Anglo-Saxon regulatory development. The study is informed by interviews with audit committee members and external auditors in large, listed companies and contributes novel insights to the understanding of the transformation of the role of the auditor due to the regulatory driver represented by the audit committees. The findings show a rather paradoxical development where the auditors increase their status through direct access to the board of directors, while also decreasing their status by being reduced to a supplier, among other suppliers of trust and comfort to the directors. The findings are of interest to accounting firms, as well as clients and investors, to recognise the transformation of the status of the auditor in spite of regulations to protect the role.

Comparative corporate governance research has recently emphasized the relationship between formal shareholder protection and a number of firm and country-level outcomes, such as breadth and depth of national stock markets and minority expropriation. Stronger formal protection of minority shareholders is argued to lead to lesser opportunities for management or controlling shareholders to expropriate minority investors, and therefore make external funds, both domestic and international, more readily available for financing firms and ownership more dispersed. European countries display a substantial variety on these dimensions. The UK, on the one hand, has comparatively strict formal minority protection, broad and deep stock markets and dispersed ownership, while most continental European countries, on the other hand, generally have less strict formal minority protection, smaller stock markets and more concentrated ownership. There are, however, notable exceptions to this pattern. Swedish corporate governance, for example, paradoxically combines concentrated ownership, widespread use of instruments to separate cash-flow from voting rights, and moderate formal minority protection with a broad and deep stock market, large foreign ownership and comparatively limited minority expropriation. In this paper we propose that Swedish controlling owners’ widespread propensity for forming business groups combining many, often industrially unrelated, formally independent firms help resolve this puzzle. Controlling shareholders with a reputation for acting in the interest of minority shareholders, as most Swedish controlling shareholders arguably have, can capitalize on this reputation by a lower cost of capital; a benefit which is likely to be transferable across firms. However, while forming a business group allows controlling shareholder to capitalize on their reputation, the cost of acting in ways harming minority shareholders is also raised, as a devalued reputation affect all firms in the business group. We present empirical evidence that consistently show that forced delistings in the context of minority protests lead to negative abnormal returns in firms unaffected by the harmful acts, but in which the controlling shareholder orchestrating the delisting holds a significant stake. Business groups exist in different forms and with different frequencies in most European countries and the paper thus sheds light on a governance mechanisms that potentially is of major importance for understanding corporate governance in a number of European countries characterized by concentrated ownership and, in law, relatively unprotected minority shareholders.

Manuscript Type Empirical

Research Question/Issue This paper addresses the issue of whether controlling family shareholders are exposed to market control. The paper advances the theory that the expected performance of controlling shareholders, inferred from their track records, is constantly reflected in the market value of controlled firms.

Research Findings/Insights By using event-study methodology, we show that unexpected acts that are detrimental to minority shareholder interests performed by controlling family shareholders lead to short-term negative abnormal returns in firms that otherwise are completely unaffected by the detrimental acts, but are controlled by the same family-based business group.

Theoretical/Academic Implications The results shed new light on the significance of track records in corporate governance that have implications for research on informal corporate governance mechanisms, governance of family firms, and, possibly, comparative corporate governance. The results also have tentative implications for the understanding of the function of family-controlled business groups consisting of industrially unrelated firms by suggesting a function that has heretofore been neglected.

Practitioner/Policy Implications The results have implications for reform work in corporate governance by showing that practitioners and regulators must consider variability in non-legal corporate governance mechanisms when analyzing and attempting to change different national corporate governance systems to achieve desired effects.

Despite​ ​evidence​ ​of​ ​global​ ​legal​ ​convergence​ ​in​ ​corporate​ ​law,​ ​Swedish​ ​corporate​ ​law​ ​does not​ ​recognize​ ​the​ ​interest​ ​of​ ​the​ ​corporate​ ​entity.​ ​Rather,​ ​the​ ​corporate​ ​purpose​ ​is​ ​explicitly defined​ ​as​ ​profit​ ​generation​ ​on​ ​behalf​ ​of​ ​the​ ​shareholders.​ ​Although​ ​this​ ​is​ ​not​ ​fully comparable​ ​to​ ​the​ ​normative​ ​stance​ ​of​ ​shareholder​ ​primacy,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​a​ ​stance​ ​of​ ​shareholder prominence.​ ​In​ ​this​ ​paper​ ​we​ ​trace​ ​this​ ​position​ ​in​ ​Swedish​ ​legal​ ​thinking​ ​regarding​ ​the corporation,​ ​and​ ​throughout​ ​history,​ ​drawing​ ​on​ ​Sewells​ ​eventful​ ​temporality​ ​approach.​ ​We find​ ​strong​ ​indications​ ​of​ ​foreign​ ​influence​ ​on​ ​Swedish​ ​corporate​ ​law,​ ​from​ ​its​ ​introduction​ ​in 1848​ ​until​ ​the​ ​last​ ​revision​ ​in​ ​2005,​ ​although​ ​the​ ​shareholder​ ​prominence​ ​position​ ​is​ ​linked​ ​to internal​ ​developments​ ​in​ ​the​ ​1930s:​ ​contemporary​ ​legal​ ​thinking,​ ​conservatism​ ​of​ ​the​ ​legal profession​ ​and​ ​the​ ​economic​ ​disasters​ ​following​ ​the​ ​Kreuger-crash.​ ​This​ ​path​ ​dependent development​ ​led​ ​to​ ​an​ ​inert​ ​institution​ ​of​ ​shareholder​ ​prominence,​ ​strongly​ ​rejecting​ ​legal change.

Manuscript Type: Empirical

Research Question/Issue: The paper examines whether corporate governance differences affect firms' stock repurchasing behavior. Previous hypotheses on stock repurchases, well-supported by US data, are based on assumptions of managerial autonomy that might not be descriptive in corporate governance systems characterized by influential controlling shareholders such as the Swedish. Firm-level corporate governance arrangements may also affect firms' incentives to repurchase stock.

Research Findings/Insights: Stock-repurchasing patterns among Swedish firms differ from those previously observed among US firms. The findings indicate that Swedish firms do not repurchase stock to distribute excess cash, signal undervaluation, or fend off takeovers. Stock repurchases are made in addition to dividends and thus do not substitute for them. Firm-level corporate governance arrangements directly affect stock repurchasing behavior. Firms without a dominant controlling owner seem to use stock repurchases to increase leverage. The existence of a dominant controlling shareholder diminishes the propensity for stock repurchases, while cross listing on a US or UK stock market increases that propensity.

Theoretical/Academic Implications: The findings suggest that corporate governance differences affect stock repurchasing behavior. The agency-theoretical view of the firm, on which the leading hypotheses on stock repurchases are based, accurately predicts stock repurchases only in certain institutional and governance settings.

Practitioner/Policy Implications: The study suggests that differences in national and firm-level corporate governance must be taken into account in order to accurately assess outcomes of regulatory reforms and/or harmonization attempts.

To study how populist sentiments have increasingly influenced businesses in society, we examine how German and Swedish corporations addressed the refugee situation in their 2015 and 2016 annual reports. We find that corporations changed their communication once refugee migration became subjected to populist political sentiments, but that they did so without subscribing to those sentiments. Although populism is based on such sharp oppositions as welcoming refugees or closing borders, our analysis shows that corporations have found ways to communicate about the refugee migration beyond these oppositions. Rather than taking a political stance, the corporations studied have primarily articulated the refugee situation as it pertains to their business operations. We identify four modes of articulation: the refugee as someone needing international aid, as a factor for economic analysis, as a benefit recipient, or as a potential stakeholder. These findings help nuance our understanding of how corporations navigate contested political issues.

The convergence between different corporate governance systems has been lively debated. Most often opinions regarding the existence and path of convergence differ between researchers. In this paper we will look at the convergence from a different angle and instead of questioning or prove the existence of convergence between national corporate governance systems delve into how and why certain issues travel from international into national regulative agendas and how this effect the responsiveness of the national regulation. As a case we are using the Swedish corporate governance code and we investigate the emergency of the arguments that put the code on the regulative agenda, the content of the code and the correspondence between the argument and content and the actual situation of ownership diffusion in Sweden.

Following financialization, there has emerged an understanding of what it implies to be a shareholder based on the shareholder value perception. However, as this shareholder value perception spreads internationally, it clashes with traditional perceptions. In this paper, we apply the language developed by Bourdieu to a Swedish public debate on equal treatment of shareholders in connection with the reform of the Swedish market for corporate control. Using Bourdieu’s conceptual framework, we describe how a global development interacts with the persistence of national practices. We conclude that in Sweden, local institutional investors have allied themselves with international institutional investors to enhance their positions in the restricted field of Swedish corporate control. Shareholder value is then used by these local actors as an argument to strengthen their position. At the same time, some of the controlling shareholders depart from their traditional position as industrial entrepreneurs and embrace a more financial approach to ownership, thereby altering both the power constellations and the capital, in Bourdieu’s sense, of the field.

Despite a number of corporate governance reforms introduced following an Anglo-American blueprint, the Swedish corporate governance system still contains several country-specific traits. In this article, we try to understand this continuity of the national corporate governance system. We do this by outlining a model for describing the processes of change built on Mary Douglas’ (1986) theory of ‘institutional thinking’ and applying this model to a case of the implementation of regulation on independent directors in Sweden. The results highlight (i) that continuity is ensured through the use of ‘sacred objects’ and (ii) that compromises between the old and the new is made possible by the uses of concepts with ‘positive connotations’. Hereby a form of assimilation to the international blueprint occurs which may – or may not – lead to convergence in the long run.

Few, if any, corporate governance related issues have been given as much research interest as ownership dispersion and ownership concentration of listed corporations: ‘Why is that some countries, such as the US and UK, has dispersed ownership of corporations listed there, while others, such as France and Germany, has concentrated ownership of corporations listed there?’. This is a question that has been given countless answers since the seminal work of La Porta et al (1997) laid the Berle and Means (1932) understanding of corporate ownership to rest. Scholars from business history (e.g. Morck & Steir, 2005), legal studies (e.g. Coffee, 2001), economics, (e.g. La Porta et al, 1998), political science (e.g. Roe, 2003), and even creating its own sub-field comparative corporate governance (e.g. Aguilera & Jackson, 2010), has all provided insights to topic. Often minority shareholder protection has been the main issue, although the role of transparent accounting is also highlighted (e.g. La Porta et al, 1998; Roe, 2003; Hopner, 2005). Arguable, transparent accounting is a necessary precondition of ownership dispersion, as few minority shareholders are likely to surface in absence of it. This indicate that the development pattern of transparent accounting may be one of several aspect to look into when explaining ownership structures.

In this paper we empirically investigate the regulatory processes that created the first wave of transparent accounting in Sweden during the 1970s. Theoretically the paper draws on a path dependency perspective (e.g. North, 1990). Elsewhere in the literature, it has been acknowledged that Swedish pre-IAS harmonization accounting was the most transparent accounting in the world (La Porta et al, 1998). In this paper we argue that the development of transparent accounting in the 1970s was one of the triggers for the remarkable development of the Swedish stock markets that began in 1980s (see further Jonnergard & Larsson-Olaison, 2016) that later on created stock-markets comparable to those of the US and the UK regarding width and depth (see Sinani et al, 2008). This dispersion of ownership occurred despite continuous concentrated control in the listed corporations (see e.g. Lekvall et al, 2015), thus making Sweden an ideal case for exploring the role of transparent accounting. In this paper we develop and test a preposition that organized labour interest during the 1970s made way for transparent accounting in Sweden, which later on favoured outside ownership of listed corporations. Thereby the paper contributes to the discussions of the antecedents and reasons for increasing transparent accounting.

During the last decades the idea of maximizing shareholder value as the ultimate goal for the corporation has been diffused throughout the world (Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000). Originating from the US context, the concept today has gained almost worldwide status as the legitimate goal of the public listed firm. The diffusion of the concept into governance systems, where other conceptions of firm performance have been previously salient, assumes a change in the norms regarding the objective of the firms and the role of the board of directors in charge of fulfilling this objective. Up to now, little research has been done on if and how these changes in values occur. In this paper we follow the development of attitudes related to the idea of shareholder value amongst Swedish board directors. This is facilitated by the use of a unique longitudinal dataset covering the period 1994 until 2009. Our empirical interest concerns the development of attitudes regarding the capital market, the responsibility of the board and its role. We find an increased emphasis on norms related to shareholder value, but at the same time a persistence of norms related to earlier perceptions of performance. This implies that even though new values have been integrated into the directors conception of appropriate behaviour, no de-institutionalization of old values has occurred. Instead the new values have been added to the old ones. Also most of the changes in director attitudes that have occurred during the period may be assigned to material changes in the economic reality or explained by interests of different involved parties. Changes in norms important for the governance of listed firms, thereby, seem to be negotiated over time, rather than follow a stepwise model.

De senaste årtiondena har en förändring skett i hur ägare på svenska kapitalmarknaden uppfattas. Särskilt märks detta i relationen mellan de traditionella storägarna och ägarsfärerna i Sverige och de institutionella ägarna som t ex pensionsfonderna. Kapitlet innehåller en analys av den diskussion som under 2008 pågått i affärspressen om budplikt vid köp av aktier, återköp av aktier och avknoppning av företag och som avspeglar de spänningar som finns mellan olika ägargrupper. De olika gruppernas argument diskuteras och en modell för hur man idag kan se på ägandet på den svenska kapitalmarknaden görs.

The issue of the pros and cons with representatives from different interest group on corporate board is lively discussed. Will representatives from stakeholders work in the interest of the stake they represent or in the interest of the corporations where they are a director? The issue has a renewed topicality as claim for e.g. consumer groups or experts on environmental issues have been raised. In this paper we investigate the group that once started the discussion, i.e. the employee representatives on the board of directors. From a resource dependency perspective we are interested in two issues (i) are there significant differences between the perception of responsibility for the firm between owner representatives and employee representatives on the board? (ii) if so, are these differences sustained over time? We report a longitudinal investigation of board of directors in Swedish board indicated a convergence over the last twenty years between employees and owners representatives on corporate board. This convergence is mutual, indicating that it might be something else than the difference in whom you represent that drive the development.

At the intersection between industrial relations and corporate governance - i.e. board level worker representation - this paper attempts to bridge four perspectives from the industrial relations literature (unitary, pluralist, radical and egoist) by observing changes in board director perceptions over time. Empirically, a longitudinal survey (1994-2014), filled out by both shareholder- and worker-elected directors in the largest listed Swedish corporations, is utilized to map differences and similarities between the two director populations regarding ‘perception of responsibility’, ‘governance efficiency’ and ‘board norms’. The findings indicate that some of the different industrial relations perspectives are relevant for understanding worker representation on corporate boards at different times and in different populations. Specifically, we observe that shareholder-elected directors become more financialized in their perceptions over time, whereas worker-elected directors remain more stakeholder-oriented, while to a growing extent acknowledging the interest of the controlling shareholders. Thus, the paper contributes to the industrial relations literature by linking perspectives on industrial relations, often understood as incommensurable, by considering a longitudinal development in perceptions among relevant actors.

At the intersection between industrial relations and corporate governance - i.e. corporate board worker representation - this paper applies three perspectives from the industrial relations literature (unitary, pluralist, and egoist) on changes in directors’ perceptions over time. Empirically, a longitudinal survey (1999-2014), filled out by both shareholder- and worker-elected directors in the largest listed Swedish corporations, is utilized to map differences and similarities between the two director populations regarding the degree to which the directors display pluralistic, unitarian or egoistic assumptions. The findings indicate differences between the two categories of directors than employee elected regarding the egoistic assumptions. Shareholder elected directors expose such assumptions to a significantly higher degree than worker-elected directors However, the assumptions that gain the highest means for both categories of directors are the ones connected to the unitary perspective. This leads to the conclusion that differences between worker-elected directors and shareholder elected directors regards the allocation of value added of the firm rather than how this value added has been created. The paper contributes to the industrial relations literature by linking perspectives on industrial relations, often understood as incommensurable, by considering a longitudinal development in perceptions among relevant actors participating in corporate boards. The paper also contributes to corporate governance understanding of how the institution worker-elected directors interact with the board mechanism.

Corporate governance regulation is a contested area. The dispersion of corporate governance codes could on the one hand be seen as a regulator capture performed by international institutional investors, but on the other hand as support for status quo favoring strong local interests, due to local adaptation of code content. In this paper, these competing explanations are empirically tested through the analysis of noncompliance in number of explanations by Swedish listed corporations with different corporate control arrangements. The main findings are that corporations with a concentrated “Swedish” control situation (i.e. controlling shareholder holding more than 50% of the votes) comply more with the code and provide significantly less explanations than other corporations, whereas corporations controlled by owners in the range of 20 to 50% (which would then represent the typical Swedish business group arrangement) comply less with the code and provide significantly more explanations, as do to some extent (but not as robustly) corporations with dispersed ownership (or an “Anglo-American” control situation). This indicates that the Swedish code through a series of adaptations of the international blueprint favors very strong local controlling shareholders. This is to some extent surprising, as the process of code development was set up to favor controlling shareholders with more moderate stakes. Nevertheless, it is of course to some extent logical that the code would also favor the strongest actors in the Swedish corporate governance system. Still, the strongest effect on code compliance (or not) seem to derive not from ownership concentration and type, but from board and CEO characteristics, traditionally associated with their relative power structure. These findings have implications for how corporate governance codes should be understood in a global setting and what roles such codes could perform in a reform process aiming to change corporate governance arrangements.

Corporate governance regulation is a contested area. The introduction of a corporate governance code could, on the one hand, be understood as a regulatory capture performed by international institutional investors, but on the other hand, as the introduction of a code tend to involve local adaptations it could be understood as support for status quo, and hence favoring strong local interest groups. In this paper, these competing explanations are empirically tested through the analysis of non-compliance by Swedish listed corporations with different corporate control arrangements. The main findings are that corporations with a concentrated “Swedish” control situation (i.e. controlling shareholder holding more than 50% of the votes) explain significantly more than corporations with other ownership arrangements, whereas corporations with dispersed ownership (“Anglo-American” control situation) explain significantly less. This could be interpreted as that the Swedish code - regardless of controlling shareholder involvement in the regulatory process - favor corporate governance arrangements based on dispersed ownership, and hence a control situation that international institutional investors are familiar with. These findings have implications for how corporate governance codes should be understood in a global setting and what roles such codes could perform in a reform process aiming to change corporate governance arrangements.

The development of transparent accounting is often theoretically linked with the development of financial markets. In this paper we argue that such an understanding of transparent accounting does not necessarily consider the temporality of the historical context where transparent accounting is invented. To illustrate this argument we empirically investigate the raise of transparent accounting in Sweden during the 1960s and 1970s. This time-period in Sweden is characterised by underdeveloped financial markets and a strong stakeholder-orientation mostly aimed at economic democracy and strengthened employee voice in corporate decision-making. By providing an alternative understanding of transparent accounting to dominant law and economics scholarship, this paper contributes to our knowledge on the link between accounting and financial markets, especially regarding the role of other interest groups than shareholders influencing accounting development.

The introduction of a new corporate governance code in Sweden, modeled after prevailing Anglo-Saxon norms of corporate governance, offers the opportunity to investigate global regulatory convergence. Using the metaphor of regulatory space, this article analyzes the positions of the parties who submitted formal responses to the introduction of "The Swedish Code of Corporate Governance - A Proposal from the Code Group."While the globalization of financial markets might forecast unconditional acceptance of the proposed code by business and financial interests, the analysis of who made comments, and what was said, reveals three categorically distinct groups: Swedish business "insiders"connected to the existing institutional framework who opposed changes that would erode traditional division of functions, including collective responsibility for the actions of company boards; "outsiders" (i.e., foreign investors and more marginal Swedish investors) aligned with Anglo-Saxon internationalization of the markets who would change the system of corporate accountability; and the professions (i.e., auditors), who advocated for their professional interests. Of the three groups, Swedish business insiders were most successful in gaining support for their positions. Although international financial and political interests were key to the introduction of the Code in the first place, the article demonstrates how the dynamics of national (local) culture and power structures influence the transfer of regulatory law across jurisdictions. 

An important controversy in the literature on comparative corporate governance concerns the role played by the transfer of law and regulations in the process of improving corporate governance. This paper claims this controversy is the consequence of the view of legal transplants assumed. Drawing on legal studies it is argued that transferred regulations could either be socially easy or socially relevant. Not both as standard theories of comparative corporate governance would claim. A model for understanding legal transplants in corporate governance is developed and empirically exemplified by a case based on the introduction of the Swedish corporate governance code, proving a multitude of possible outcomes in relation to the transplant of corporate governance regulations. Comparative corporate governance research is advised to consider a more nuanced understanding of legal transplants.

The predominant approaches to comparative corporate governance view legal transfers dichotomously, seeing corporate governance systems as either converging or diverging as a result of legal reform. Drawing on legal studies, this paper proposes an alternative model using the metaphor of the staircase to conceptualize how legal transplants can meet different evaluation criteria before being considered ‘successful’. The model is empirically illustrated by the introduction of the Swedish Corporate Governance Code. It is found that different corporate governance rules when transplanted could be said to meet evaluation criteria more or less strictly. This finding has implications for our empirical and theoretical understanding of how corporate governance systems converge.

The purpose of this thesis is to elucidate the phenomenon of legal transfers from the perspective of the dominant comparative corporate governance research paradigm. Drawing on legal studies and empirical observations, the thesis develops a terminology for understanding the legal transplant metaphor in comparative corporate governance and problematizes the debate on the convergence or divergence of corporate governance systems.

This purpose is achieved through five empirically-based articles that are included in the thesis. The first article concerns a change in the Swedish Companies Act that allows for stock repurchases. The second article discusses the voluntary and then mandatory introduction of nomination committees. The third and the fourth articles focus on the introduction of the Swedish corporate governance code. Finally, the fifth article discusses the role played by independent directors in the Swedish corporate governance setting.

The focus on legal transplants broadens the framework of comparative corporate governance in three respects. First, it develops and applies a clearer framework for distinguishing between accepted and rejected legal transplants (based on Watson, 1974, Miller, 2003 and Mattei, 1994), thus refining the debate regarding convergence or divergence of corporate governance systems (e.g. Hansmann and Kraakman, 2004, and Branson, 2001). Second, the empirical studies demonstrate how imported regulations can be “localized” (Gillespie, 2008a) by local regulators and/or “fitted” (adapted from Kanda and Milhaupt, 2003) by other local actors. The studies show that fitting often precedes localizing. Third, the thesis ads to a growing body of research (e.g. Buck et al., 2004; Lutz, 2004 and Collier and Zaman, 2005) emphasizing that convergence and divergence are not necessarily two empirically or analytically distinguishable processes. Rather, depending on the perspective of the scholar, convergence and divergence might refer to very similar – or even identical – processes.

Finally, in focusing on the transplant process, this thesis offers a description and analysis of the role played by various key actors in the Swedish corporate governance system.

A frequent starting point when the developments of the world’s corporate governance systems are discussed is whether those systems will converge (see e.g. Hansmann & Kraakman, 2004) or continue on their path of divergence (se e.g. Roe, 2000). The empirical evidence used in that discussion could be referred to as “anecdotic” (Coffee, 2001). Given the weight of the theoretical arguments on convergence or divergence and the weaknesses in their empirical support, one could argue that these two concepts co-vary rather than mutely exclude and can thus help to account for the findings of simultaneous convergence and divergence in e.g. Collier & Zaman (2005) and Jonnergård & Larsson (2007). In this paper the processes leading up to the Swedish corporate governance code being issued are used to shed some light on how divergence in convergence and convergence in divergence are produced in the regulatory discourse (Black, 2002).

Media played an important role in framing the 2015 European refugee situation as a crisis. For example, the Council of Europe report (DG1(2017)03) documents a sharp reorientation in media reporting from ‘careful tolerance’ to ‘fear and securitisation’. Following institutional theory, corporations’ reply to the refugee situation is embedded in a given societal context, that is most actually encapsulated by media sentiment: while what is (and could be) done is imposed and options are limited, there is still some room for different corporate strategies.

We identify four major communication strategies corporations use to deal with the refugee issue: i) taking into account the social dimension (employment, integration, donation, encouragement), ii) considering the refugee issue in terms of business forecasting (opportunity, threat, neutral), iii) doing both, or iv) ignoring the issue altogether. Assuming a link between media coverage and CSR response, the European 2015 refugee situation provides a unique case. Based on content analysis of the 2015 and 2016 annual reports for the largest German and Swedish listed corporations, we analyze patterns in the reporting strategies of the corporations.

The tentative findings of the paper indicate that - in response to the changed media sentiment - German as well as Swedish corporations to a lesser extent reported on the business case of the refugee situation, many restoring to avoidance. However, to complicate things, the findings also indicate an increase in altruistic charitable response the the refugee situation in both Germany and Sweden. Moreover, our findings indicate that patterns vary between German and Swedish corporations to some extent.

Purpose

Arising societal issues challenge corporate social responsibility. The purpose of this paper is to analyze how corporations account for arising issues under different institutional settings: the stakeholder oriented corporate governance model of Germany is hypothesized to produce a different response than the more state dominated Swedish welfare model.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper takes the reported CSR response of the largest corporations in Germany and Sweden, in relation to the 2015 European refugee crisis, as its case. In total, 157 annual reports are investigated by means of text analysis for statements in relation to the European refugee crisis.

Findings

Empirically, German corporations are more prone to communicate on this emerging issue, and deploying corporate resources to an emerging societal crisis. Based on that finding, this study concludes that the German model is more in line with international CSR-discourse than the Swedish.

Research limitations/implications

This study has implications for institutional theory perspectives on CSR accounting-related issues. By comparing two economies that would be characterized as “coordinated market economies” a somewhat different set of topics becomes apparent. Further considering country context could be useful when expanding the debate on CSR accounting.

Originality/value

This study is the first to empirically investigate corporate diplomacy with regard to the European refugee crisis. Besides others, corporations are important societal players. Therefore, corporations bear both, the obligation to deal with arising issues and the potential to participate in public opinion-forming with regard to those issues.