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One share–one vote: Evidence from Europe
Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Center for Family Enterprise and Ownership (CeFEO). Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies (CESIS).
Copenhagen Business School.
2014 (English)In: Applied Financial Economics, ISSN 0960-3107, E-ISSN 1466-4305, Vol. 24, no 7, 453-464 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Many European companies use some type of control-enhancing mechanism, such as dual class shares or a pyramid ownership structure. Such mechanisms cause deviations from the one share-one vote principle, allocating more voting rights than cash flow rights to some shares and, in turn, providing the owners of such shares with more influence than what would be warranted by their investment. However, disproportionate influence may also arise in firms without such mechanisms. In this article, we present a method for disentangling disproportionality, which allows us to more precisely test the effects of deviations from the one share-one vote principle. We argue that previous studies suffer from a measurement problem caused by the use of a simplistic notion of disproportionality, and then we show that the effect of control-enhancing mechanisms on firm value has been overestimated in previous studies.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Taylor & Francis Group, 2014. Vol. 24, no 7, 453-464 p.
Keyword [en]
ownership structure, disproportionality, voting power, performance, corporate governance, power indexes, G32, G34
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-29207DOI: 10.1080/09603107.2014.884697ScopusID: 2-s2.0-84895511495Local ID: IHHCeFEOISOAI: oai:DiVA.org:hj-29207DiVA: diva2:897474
Available from: 2016-01-25 Created: 2016-01-25 Last updated: 2016-01-25Bibliographically approved

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JIBS, Center for Family Enterprise and Ownership (CeFEO)JIBS, Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies (CESIS)
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CiteExportLink to record
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Citation style
  • apa
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  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
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  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
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