This thesis aims to investigate the effects of the Swedish minimum capital requirement in relation to the Swedish private limited liability companies. The issue of whether there should be a requirement for minimum share capital has been debated in Sweden and the rest of the European Union. Sweden and other continental European countries have a tradition of providing a minimum share capital requirement in order to provide creditor protection. Countries that administer an Anglo-Saxon tradition such as England and the United States do not express the same belief in the minimum share capital’s function as creditor protection and has therefore abolished these requirements. The European Union’s Second Company Law Directive provides a minimum share capital of EUR 25,000 for companies similar to the Swedish public limited liability company. The companies comparable to the Swedish private limited liability companies is thus regulated under the law of the Member States themselves. In Sweden the frequently used arguments for abolishing the minimum share capital requirement are the rule’s dysfunction as creditor protection, the fact that the minimum share capital does not consider the specific capital demand of the company and the potential obstacle effect on entrepreneurship. The author agrees with these arguments but emphasises the minimum share capital’s function as an “entrance fee” to the private limited liability company form as an argument why the requirement should maintain in Swedish company law. The rules in ABL regarding protection of restricted equity could be replaced by a solvency-sufficiency test similar to the provision in § 6.40 MBCA. The minimum share capital’s obstacle effect on entrepreneurship could be reduced by introducing a beneficial loan with low interest rate provided by the state or the municipalities.