In this thesis the definition of intangible property contained in the Transfer Pricing Guidelines is analysed with the aim of exploring whether it is satisfactory or not. Furthermore, the need to have a definition of intangible property for transfer pricing purposes at all is explored. To properly allocate income and expenditure relating to intangible property one needs to first establish who is the owner of the property. In the light of this the economic ownership is explored as well. Two countries, the United States and the United Kingdom, are chosen for a comparative analysis to see how their national legislation is designed and what advantages or disadvantages they might have.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has defined intangible property by giving examples of assets that shall be considered as intangible. As regards the ownership issue the guidance is scarce and questions such as what constitutes economic ownership and who will have a right in the future return of an intangible asset still remain. The United States and the United Kingdom, both members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, have defined intangible property and handled the issue of ownership in two different ways. Ways that do not always coincide with the Transfer Pricing Guidelines.

The conclusions of this thesis are mainly that the current definition of intangible property contained in the Transfer Pricing Guidelines is not satisfactory and that it needs to been changed. The author recommends that more focus is put on the third party's willingness to pay for the property in question. Although the definition is found to be unsatisfactory the author's conclusion is that a uniform definition of intangible property is necessary to achieve harmonisation and certainty. Furthermore the concept of economic ownership needs to be clarified.