This article investigates the effects of separation of ownership and control because of vote differentiation on listed family firms’ investment performance. The authors study the question of whether family-controlled firms have better investment performance than nonfamily firms and whether this investment performance is negatively affected by a separation of ownership and control because of vote differentiation. Marginal q is used as a performance measure. The empirical analysis shows that family control has a positive impact on investment performance when ownership and control are aligned, whereas separation of ownership and control in terms of vote-differentiated shares reduce investment performance.

This paper examines the effect of family ownership and control on executive compensation in listed firms during the period 2003-2008. The descriptive statistics show that CEOs in non-family-controlled firms have a significantly higher share of variable compensation than CEOs in family-controlled firms, they also receive remuneration in stock options relatively more often. The econometric analysis shows that family control and ownership concentration reduce CEO compensation whereas multiple-class shares increase the level of compensation. In line with the findings of previous research, firm size and performance are positively related to CEO compensation.

This paper examines the relationship between board dependency, family control, and return on investments in Swedish listed firms. Board dependency is defined with regard to the principal owners (family and non-family owners), to the firm management, and to employees. The definition of dependency, as applied in the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance, together with good accessibility of detailed data on corporate governance variables, makes it possible to apply a precise measure of board dependency.

The analysis indicates that total board dependency has a significantly negative effect on returns on investment. The negative effect originates from the firm-related directors, whereas dependency on principal owners, families, and employees does not have any impact on firm performance.