If an enterprise lacks capital it might be in desperate need of capital contribution to avoid liquidation. One solution to restore the economic balance, is to construct a contract in which the enterprise ensures that capital contribution will be made on given conditions. The purpose with this thesis is to analyze different ways to establish such agreements.

A capital contribution can be triggered by a call-off from the board of directors to the contributor, or automatically, when the shareholders’ equity falls below 50 percent of the registered capital stock. In the literature, the latter is represented as the most adaptable. A consequence of capital contribution, that automatically triggers when shareholders’ equity falls below the critical point, is that it enables for enterprises to stay at a low economic level. This is because the automatically triggered contribution keeps the economic level just as high as necessary. Thus, the enterprise does not have to perform measures that otherwise would be required, according to the Swedish Companies Act. From that follows, that such agreements enables a possibility for the board of directors to avoid legal responsibility to set up a control balance sheet, controlled by an independent auditor. This indisputably reduces the protection for creditors, which are intended to be protected by the rules in the Swedish Companies Act. Therefore, in my opinion, such contractual terms for capital contributions should not be acceptable. When a board of directors has to trigger the contribution by a call-off, they are instead obliged to define the amount before the contribution can be made. Consequently, preventing inactivity within the board of directors, which must be frequently updated with the financial situation. Accordingly these terms of contract in an agreement of capital contribution, would be more in line with the regulations in the Swedish Companies Act.