Double taxation is known as restricting the free flow of capital and accordingly results in a limited access of the internal market. Although, not many Member States have entered into double taxation conventions in order to avoid juridical double taxation of inheritances. The question then arises whether this failure to eliminate juridical double taxation is restricting the free movement of capital. The ECJ‟s case law regarding inheritance taxes are very varying. In its initial case law, the ECJ stated that national measures which reduce the value of the inheritance are in breach of EC law. Even measures which could restrict investors in one Member State from investing in other Member States are considered to be a breach of EC law. The ECJ also stated that discriminating situations could not be justified with the argument that these situations arise due to the co-existence of national tax systems. Given these facts, it seems like juridical double taxation is likely to constitute a breach of EC law. The ECJ has however only concentrated on which effect the national provisions in a single Member State may have and have not given concern to which effect these provisions may have in connection with the tax provisions in other Member States. The author believes that the Court takes this approach because of a respect of the Member States fiscal sovereignty.

This respect also shows in the Block case. In this case the ECJ made it clear that juridical double taxation, caused by the co-existence of national tax systems, is not considered to be a breach of EC law. The ECJ also stated that when the Member States develops their tax systems, due to the lack of harmonised Community rules regarding direct taxation, they are not obliged to adapt to the tax systems of other Member States in order to avoid double taxation. The ECJ also made it clear that the citizens are not guaranteed a neutral tax situation when transferring their place of residence. In this thesis a comparison has also been made to judgements where the ECJ considers economic double taxation to be a breach of EC law. After studying all these cases it seems like the ECJ considers juridical double taxation to be an undesirable restriction of the free flow of capital. But even though the ECJ encourages the Member States to enter into double taxation conventions, there are no consequences when the Member States fail to do this. The difference between cases regarding economic double taxation and juridical double taxation could be that the ECJ considers it to be too far reaching to judge juridical double taxation as a breach of EC law and do not want to regulate how this restriction shall be avoided and thereby take the role of the Community legislator or breach the fiscal sovereignty of the Member States. The author believes that it would be more beneficial for the internal market if juridical double taxation was avoided and that it would not be harmful if the ECJ would give the Member States some incentives for entering into double taxation conventions in order to eliminate or alleviate situations where juridical double taxation occurs.