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Regulating the sharing economy: The effects of day caps on short- and long-term rental markets and stakeholder outcomes
Univ Munster, Inst Publ & Reg Econ, Stadtgraben 9, D-48143 Munster, Germany..
Univ Munster, Mkt Ctr Munster, Stadtgraben 13-15, D-48143 Munster, Germany..
Univ Munster, Inst Publ & Reg Econ, Stadtgraben 9, D-48143 Munster, Germany..
Univ Munster, Inst Publ & Reg Econ, Stadtgraben 9, D-48143 Munster, Germany..
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2024 (English)In: Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, ISSN 0092-0703, E-ISSN 1552-7824, Vol. 52, p. 1627-1650Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Home sharing platforms have experienced a rapid growth over the last decade. Following negative publicity, many cities have started regulating the short-term rental market. Regulations often involve a cap on the number of days a property can be rented out on a short-term basis. We draw on rich data for short-term rentals on Airbnb and for the long-term rental market to examine the impact of short-term rental regulations with a day cap on various stakeholders: hosts, guests, the platform provider, and residents. Based on a difference-in-differences design, we document a sizable drop in Airbnb activity. Interestingly, not only targeted hosts (i.e., hosts with reservation days larger than the day cap), but also non-targeted hosts reduce their Airbnb activity. The reservation days of non-targeted hosts decrease between 26.27% and 51.89% depending on the treatment. Targeted hosts experience a similar decline. There is, nevertheless, significant non-compliance: more than one third of hosts do not comply with enacted short-term rental regulations. Additional analyses show that few properties are redirected from short-term rental to long-term rental use and that there is no significant drop in long-term rents. Drawing on a theoretical model, we tie the estimated effects to changes in stakeholders' welfare: Regulations significantly reduce the welfare of hosts, and the loss ranges between 46.30% and 9.02%. The welfare loss of the platform provider is proportional to the loss of the hosts. Welfare of guests decreases moderately ranging between 4.5% to 4.1%. The welfare of residents increases minimal. These results question the effectiveness and desirability of the studied short-term rental regulations.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer, 2024. Vol. 52, p. 1627-1650
Keywords [en]
Sharing economy, Quasi-experiments, Public policy, Airbnb, Regulations
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-65378DOI: 10.1007/s11747-024-01028-7ISI: 001247927000001Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85196111476Local ID: HOA;intsam;959314OAI: oai:DiVA.org:hj-65378DiVA, id: diva2:1877327
Available from: 2024-06-25 Created: 2024-06-25 Last updated: 2025-01-12Bibliographically approved

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Schneider, Andrea

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