Purpose: The purpose of this master thesis is to explain the relationship between family control and agency costs. This will be done in a setting of listed Swedish corporations focusing on monitoring to limit agency costs.

Theoretical perspective: The paper will use interpretation through the agency theory, which presents the conflicts between agent and principal in the firm, but also the conflicts between principal and principal. The theory explains how the problems and costs occur and how they can be facilitated with the help of monitoring.

Method: The thesis conducts a quantitative study with a multiple regression analysis to measure the relationship between agency costs and family ownership. The sample consists of 892 observations from firms listed on Stockholm stock exchange. The data was interpreted through the use of Pearson correlation and multiple regression.

Conclusion: It can be concluded through this master thesis that there is a negative significant relationship between family ownership and agency cost. This suggests that the family through family control has an impact on reducing the agency problem themselves. Although listed corporations tend to move away from family-specific aspects the larger the firms are, the thesis displays these aspects are still present to some extent.