The literature on disruptive innovation has successfully explained why firms often encounter problems under conditions of discontinuous change. It states that incumbent firms fail to invest in new technologies when these are not demanded by their existing market, due to forces of resource dependency and the associated assumption that customers control firms’ internal resource allocation processes. While the problem of disruptive innovation has been convincingly described, there is still a need for managerial solutions. We argue that a main reason why such solutions are lacking can be found in the asymmetric assumptions made in the original theory of disruptive innovation. Specifically, the focal firm is treated as a collection of heterogeneous actors with different preferences, incentives and competencies, whereas firms in the surrounding environment are treated as if they contained no such heterogeneity. A consequence, the theory on disruptive innovation has described incumbents as controlled by their environment, but has failed to recognize that the environment can also be influenced. In this paper we argue that a more symmetric theory of disruptive innovation – i.e. one that treats all similar entities in the same way – raises opens up for a range of interesting managerial solutions to the innovator’s dilemma.