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Minimizing the losers: Regime satisfaction in multi-level systems
Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany.
Institute of Public Economics I, University of Münster, Münster, Germany.
Institute for Economic Policy Research, Helmut-Schmidt-University Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany.
2011 (English)In: Constitutional Political Economy, ISSN 1043-4062, E-ISSN 1572-9966, Vol. 22, no 4, p. 303-324Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The political blessings of federalism are the core of our discussion. These benefits can be operationalized as a decrease in the number of outvoted people in a federal system with majority voting which is an important source of regime satisfaction. The approach originates from the work of Roland Pennock who developed a similar methodology about 50 years ago. Measuring inverse regime satisfaction by the maximum of the outvoted, our results show that regime satisfaction decreases if total population rises. Additionally, the share of the maximum outvoted decreases if the top level cooperates with lower-level jurisdictions and if all jurisdictions of one level are included. However, while the inclusion of an additional lowest-level jurisdiction always reduces the relative number of the outvoted, the effect of including other levels depends on the structure of jurisdictions already intertwined. 

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer, 2011. Vol. 22, no 4, p. 303-324
Keywords [en]
Decentralization, Federalism, Multi-level systems, Regime satisfaction
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-46455DOI: 10.1007/s10602-011-9107-yScopus ID: 2-s2.0-80255123501OAI: oai:DiVA.org:hj-46455DiVA, id: diva2:1357483
Available from: 2019-10-04 Created: 2019-10-04 Last updated: 2019-10-04Bibliographically approved

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