Change search
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Financial performance and non‐family CEO turnover in private family firms under different conditions of ownership and governance
University of Udine, Italy.
Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Business Administration.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-8203-4655
Bocconi Universitt, Italy.
2017 (English)In: Corporate governance: An International Review, ISSN 0964-8410, E-ISSN 1467-8683, Vol. 25, no 5, p. 312-337Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Manuscript Type: Empirical 

Research Question/Issue

Family firms, as insider-controlled companies, should be less likely to exhibit CEO turnover after poor performance and may thus promote enhanced focus on long-term goals. However, when a non-family CEO is in charge, the relatively limited empirical evidence is contrasting. Some studies find that only family CEOs are immune from the threat of dismissal following poor financial performance, while other studies show that family firms discipline their CEOs for poor financial performance regardless of their family status. In this work, we try to reconcile these contrasting findings and investigate what ownership and governance conditions influence the owners’ pressure on the CEO to achieve short-term financial results.

Research findings/insights

Drawing on a longitudinal dataset that covers the entire population of Italian medium and large family companies, we find that when family ownership is concentrated in the hands of few family shareholders or there is a low number of family members involved in the board of directors, non-family CEOs are less likely to be dismissed after poor performance.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

Our study, adopting the behavioral agency theory as the guiding framework, highlights the importance for governance decisions of the potential goal divergence among principals in closely held ownership structures. Our results also add to the still scant literature on the relationship between family owners and non-family CEOs.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

Our research suggests that, in the decision to hire a non-family CEO, family business owners should not only assess their gaps in managerial skills but also carefully consider the ownership structure and family involvement conditions. On the side of professional non-family managers, our results offer insights on ways to address the employment relationship with the controlling family.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
John Wiley & Sons, 2017. Vol. 25, no 5, p. 312-337
Keywords [en]
behavioral agency theory; Corporate Governance; non-family CEOs; ownership structure; private family firms
National Category
Business Administration
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-37675DOI: 10.1111/corg.12201ISI: 000415925200003Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85018638103Local ID: IHHCeFEOISOAI: oai:DiVA.org:hj-37675DiVA, id: diva2:1150428
Available from: 2017-10-19 Created: 2017-10-19 Last updated: 2017-12-28Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

No full text in DiVA

Other links

Publisher's full textScopus

Authority records BETA

Pittino, Daniel

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Pittino, Daniel
By organisation
JIBS, Business Administration
In the same journal
Corporate governance: An International Review
Business Administration

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar

doi
urn-nbn

Altmetric score

doi
urn-nbn
Total: 41 hits
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf