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Informative transactions, disclosure and privacy
Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics.
Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics.ORCID iD: 0000-0003-4338-908X
2016 (English)Conference paper, (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

This paper investigates a model in which a monopolist obtains information about her customers’ preferences by delivering her product, and can disclose the same information to other sellers, at a price. More refined information is a more effective facilitator of further exchanges, and boosts competition among the sellers using it, but entails a greater nuisance for the consumers. The actual nuisance implied by any given disclosure level differs across consumers. The monopolist makes two alternative offers. In equilibrium, the prices can induce too many consumers to choose the low disclosure-offer, the disclosure levels can be inconsistent with surplus maximization, and the average disclosure level is lower than the surplus-maximizing one. A lower proportional participation of the monopolist in the profits from the induced exchanges typically entails more differentiated disclosure levels; the response of the average level is non-monotonic. The high disclosure-offer can feature a higher price, due to the higher probability of further trade and to the more intense competition among the sellers.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2016.
Keyword [en]
Information disclosure, consumer privacy, two-sided platforms
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-36032OAI: oai:DiVA.org:hj-36032DiVA: diva2:1108787
Conference
43rd EARIE Annual Conference, Lisbon, 26-28 August, 2016.
Available from: 2017-06-13 Created: 2017-06-13 Last updated: 2017-06-13Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

fulltext(413 kB)3 downloads
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CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf