Board of directors, dependency, and returns on investment
(English)Manuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
This paper examines the relationship between board dependency, family control, and return on investments in Swedish listed firms. Board dependency is defined with regard to the principal owners (family and non-family owners), to the firm management, and to employees. The definition of dependency, as applied in the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance, together with good accessibility of detailed data on corporate governance variables, makes it possible to apply a precise measure of board dependency.
The analysis indicates that total board dependency has a significantly negative effect on returns on investment. The negative effect originates from the firm-related directors, whereas dependency on principal owners, families, and employees does not have any impact on firm performance.
Board dependency, family control, returns on investment, marginal q
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-31946OAI: oai:DiVA.org:hj-31946DiVA: diva2:1033527