Family control and executive compensation
(English)Manuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
This paper examines the effect of family ownership and control on executive compensation in listed firms during the period 2003-2008. The descriptive statistics show that CEOs in non-family-controlled firms have a significantly higher share of variable compensation than CEOs in family-controlled firms, they also receive remuneration in stock options relatively more often. The econometric analysis shows that family control and ownership concentration reduce CEO compensation whereas multiple-class shares increase the level of compensation. In line with the findings of previous research, firm size and performance are positively related to CEO compensation.
Corporate governance, executive compensation, and family ownership
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-31945OAI: oai:DiVA.org:hj-31945DiVA: diva2:1033525