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The Impact of Vote Differentiation on Investment Performance in Listed Family Firms
Högskolan i Jönköping, Internationella Handelshögskolan, IHH, Center for Family Enterprise and Ownership. Högskolan i Jönköping, Internationella Handelshögskolan, IHH, Nationalekonomi.
Högskolan i Jönköping, Internationella Handelshögskolan, IHH, Center for Family Enterprise and Ownership.
2010 (engelsk)Inngår i: Family Business Review, ISSN 0894-4865, E-ISSN 1741-6248, Vol. 23, nr 4, s. 327-340Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert) Published
Abstract [en]

This article investigates the effects of separation of ownership and control because of vote differentiation on listed family firms’ investment performance. The authors study the question of whether family-controlled firms have better investment performance than nonfamily firms and whether this investment performance is negatively affected by a separation of ownership and control because of vote differentiation. Marginal q is used as a performance measure. The empirical analysis shows that family control has a positive impact on investment performance when ownership and control are aligned, whereas separation of ownership and control in terms of vote-differentiated shares reduce investment performance.

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
2010. Vol. 23, nr 4, s. 327-340
Emneord [en]
corporate governance, family firms, dual-class shares, investments, firm performance
HSV kategori
Identifikatorer
URN: urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-13944DOI: 10.1177/0894486510379001OAI: oai:DiVA.org:hj-13944DiVA, id: diva2:377778
Tilgjengelig fra: 2010-12-14 Laget: 2010-12-14 Sist oppdatert: 2017-12-11bibliografisk kontrollert
Inngår i avhandling
1. Family Ownership and Investment Performance
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>Family Ownership and Investment Performance
2010 (engelsk)Doktoravhandling, med artikler (Annet vitenskapelig)
Abstract [en]

This dissertation provides an economic analysis of families as owners of large listed firms. The essential research question is whether family ownership provides an efficient form of governance. Family ownership and control is evaluated from different angles; how ownership, control, management, and board structure affects firm performance, and executive compensation.

Chapter two “A Contractual Perspective of the Firm with an Application to the Maritime Industry” is a conceptual paper analyzing the contractual structure of a firm. The chapter conceptualizes the relations between firms, and markets, and gives a transaction cost perspective of why firms are organized the way they are.

The third chapter “The Impact of Vote Differentiation on Investment Performance in Listed Family Firms” investigates ownership and control in Swedish family controlled firms. The analysis shows that family control is beneficial, but only if voting rights and cash-flow rights are aligned.

The fourth chapter “Family Control and Executive Compensation” analyses whether families use remuneration as a way to expropriate minority shareholders. The study shows that managers in family-controlled firms have alower share of variable compensation than managers in non-family controlled firms. The analysis shows further that family control has a reducing effect on the total level of CEO-compensation.

The last chapter “Board of Directors, Dependency, and Returns on Investment” investigates if there is a relationship between ownership structure, board of directors, and firm performance. The marginal q analysis indicate that firm dependent directors have a negative impact on firms’ investment performance. Owner-dependent and employee elected directors do not affect firm investment performance.

To sum up, the empirical results show that family ownership and control affects remuneration in listed firms, and the firm investment performance. The analysis further shows that there are clear differences in the ownership and governance structure between family and non-family controlled firms.

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
Jönköping: 2010, 2010. s. 38
Serie
JIBS Dissertation Series, ISSN 1403-0470 ; 066
HSV kategori
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-14518 (URN)9789186345143 (ISBN)
Disputas
2010-10-22, B1033, Gjuterigatan 5, Jönköping, 16:53 (engelsk)
Opponent
Veileder
Tilgjengelig fra: 2011-02-10 Laget: 2011-02-01 Sist oppdatert: 2016-10-07bibliografisk kontrollert

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