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Corporate control and regulation: The explain mechanism as a sign of "capture"
Lund University, Sweden.
Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Business Administration. Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Centre for Family Entrepreneurship and Ownership (CeFEO).ORCID iD: 0000-0003-4961-1569
Linnæus University, Sweden.
Linnæus University, Sweden.
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2019 (English)Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

Corporate governance regulation is a contested area. The introduction of a corporate governance code could, on the one hand, be understood as a regulatory capture performed by international institutional investors, but on the other hand, as the introduction of a code tend to involve local adaptations it could be understood as support for status quo, and hence favoring strong local interest groups. In this paper, these competing explanations are empirically tested through the analysis of non-compliance by Swedish listed corporations with different corporate control arrangements. The main findings are that corporations with a concentrated “Swedish” control situation (i.e. controlling shareholder holding more than 50% of the votes) explain significantly more than corporations with other ownership arrangements, whereas corporations with dispersed ownership (“Anglo-American” control situation) explain significantly less. This could be interpreted as that the Swedish code - regardless of controlling shareholder involvement in the regulatory process - favor corporate governance arrangements based on dispersed ownership, and hence a control situation that international institutional investors are familiar with. These findings have implications for how corporate governance codes should be understood in a global setting and what roles such codes could perform in a reform process aiming to change corporate governance arrangements.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2019.
Keywords [en]
Corporate governance code, ownership concentration, shareholders, board of directors
National Category
Business Administration
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-48168OAI: oai:DiVA.org:hj-48168DiVA, id: diva2:1425395
Conference
WINIR Symposium 2019, 16-18 December, 2019, London, UK
Available from: 2020-04-21 Created: 2020-04-21 Last updated: 2020-04-21Bibliographically approved

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Larsson Olaison, Ulf

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CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf