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A regulation and transaction cost perspective on the design of corporate law
Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Center for Family Enterprise and Ownership (CeFEO). Department of Management and Engineering, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-8012-2635
Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Economics. Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, JIBS, Center for Family Enterprise and Ownership (CeFEO).ORCID iD: 0000-0002-0519-2617
2019 (English)In: European Journal of Law and Economics, ISSN 0929-1261, E-ISSN 1572-9990, Vol. 47, no 3, p. 407-433Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

For the corporate business model to be successful, it is important to align the interests of those who control and finance the firm. Corporate law has here an important task to fulfill. It offers a legal framework that can facilitate parties to conclude mutually preferable agreements at low transaction costs. The purpose of this paper is to show how to design corporate law to fulfill this task and apply this knowledge to a Swedish case. A two-dimension model that simultaneously considers both the regulation intensity and the level of default of corporate law is presented. The earlier literature treats these dimensions separately. By adding a transaction cost perspective to our model, we assess different regulatory techniques and examine how the Swedish legislation can be amended to help corporations by offering a standard contract that lowers the transaction costs of contracting. This can be achieved if default rules or standards of opt-out character are combined with other regulatory techniques with lower transaction costs such as opt-in alternatives and menus. We also show how our model can be used in other studies as a tool to analyze the design of legal rules. 

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer, 2019. Vol. 47, no 3, p. 407-433
Keywords [en]
Contracts, Corporate law, Regulation, Transaction costs
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-44463DOI: 10.1007/s10657-019-09620-xISI: 000474421000005Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85068798427Local ID: HOA JIBS 2019OAI: oai:DiVA.org:hj-44463DiVA, id: diva2:1324321
Funder
VinnovaAvailable from: 2019-06-13 Created: 2019-06-13 Last updated: 2019-09-25Bibliographically approved

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Almlöf, HannaBjuggren, Per-Olof

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