This thesis concerns agreements for the exchange of information relating to tax matters between Sweden and the previous tax havens Monaco and Liechtenstein. Monaco does not apply any tax on income or capital for individuals and Liechtenstein has strict bank secrecy, both aspects are supposed to be counteracted by similar agreements. The purpose is to investigate whether the entered agreements increases transparency and effective exchange of information in accordance with the OECD´s objectives in the area. Furthermore, is there any regulation in the agreements that can be seen as potentially loopholes to avoid the exchange of information and if so; may these loopholes be justified in any way?

OECD believe that the tax havens favorable tax regulation is resulting in harmful tax competition and they identify lack of transparency and lack of effective exchange of information as the main reasons. A model agreement on exchange of information in tax matters has been designed in order to reduce those gaps. Through the Nordic Council of Ministers Sweden sign agreements on exchange of information with previous tax havens in order to provide the Swedish tax authority with relevant information in tax matters. Some of the regulations in the agreements may be seen as potentially loopholes. It is discussed in this thesis whether or not these loopholes may be justified on the basis of some other superior interest. Despite the loopholes, the agreement on exchange of information with previous tax havens, such as Monaco and Liechtenstein, will open up for transparency, ease of state secrecy and contributes to a more efficient effective exchange of information. OECD´s objectives may therefore be regarded as fulfilled. However, there are provisions in the agreements that should be subject to evaluation in order to obtain maximum impact.