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Schneider, Andrea
Publications (10 of 19) Show all publications
Engström, P., Hagen, J., Khoshghadam, A. & Schneider, A. (2024). Effects of electronic cash registers on reported revenue. International Tax and Public Finance
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Effects of electronic cash registers on reported revenue
2024 (English)In: International Tax and Public Finance, ISSN 0927-5940, E-ISSN 1573-6970Article in journal (Refereed) Epub ahead of print
Abstract [en]

We assess the impact of a Swedish regulatory change, which required businesses with any business-to-consumer transactions, whether by cash or card, to use a certified electronic cash register (ECR), on reported revenue. To do this, we use administrative data on the monthly reported revenue of all affected firms and a staggered difference-in-differences approach. Our findings indicate that there was an immediate increase of about 2.7–4.3% in reported revenue following the implementation of a certified ECR. However, the effect was temporary and diminished to zero after just a few months, which indicates that firms found innovative methods to underreport their revenue.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer, 2024
Keywords
Electronic cash register, H25, H26, M21, O17, Regulatory change, Small business, Tax compliance, Tax enforcement
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-64177 (URN)10.1007/s10797-024-09844-x (DOI)001218790300001 ()2-s2.0-85192151126 (Scopus ID)HOA;;950707 (Local ID)HOA;;950707 (Archive number)HOA;;950707 (OAI)
Available from: 2024-05-14 Created: 2024-05-14 Last updated: 2024-05-27
Hagen, J. & Schneider, A. (2024). Hur ser svenskarnas pensionsplaner ut? En studie av Uttagsplaneraren på minPension. Stockholm: minPension i Sverige AB
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Hur ser svenskarnas pensionsplaner ut? En studie av Uttagsplaneraren på minPension
2024 (Swedish)Report (Other academic)
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: minPension i Sverige AB, 2024. p. 34
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-66802 (URN)
Projects
Digitalization of Pension Claiming in Sweden
Funder
The Kamprad Family Foundation, 20210086
Note

Denna rapport har utarbetats inom ramen för projektet ”Digitalization ofPension Claiming in Sweden” vid Jönköping University.

Available from: 2024-12-19 Created: 2024-12-19 Last updated: 2024-12-19Bibliographically approved
Raabe, R., Sander, C. J. & Schneider, A. (2024). Public goods and diversity in democracies and non-democracies. Kyklos (Basel), 77(3), 496-519
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Public goods and diversity in democracies and non-democracies
2024 (English)In: Kyklos (Basel), ISSN 0023-5962, E-ISSN 1467-6435, Vol. 77, no 3, p. 496-519Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This paper analyzes how ethnic diversity affects the provision of public goods in democratic and non-democratic societies when political parties compete for voter support by offering a mix of private and public goods. Our model implies that increasing diversity that leads to more heterogeneous preferences for public goods decreases the provision of public goods in democracies, where political power is distributed equally among citizens, while there is a weaker or no effect in non-democracies, where political power is distributed unequally among citizens. When measuring diversity by ethnic fractionalization and public good provision by either levels of government expenses, expenditures on health, or life expectancy, we indeed observe a negative association between diversity and the provision of public goods in democracies but no or only a weak association in non-democracies.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
John Wiley & Sons, 2024
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-63859 (URN)10.1111/kykl.12374 (DOI)001178635300001 ()2-s2.0-85186923880 (Scopus ID)HOA;intsam;943074 (Local ID)HOA;intsam;943074 (Archive number)HOA;intsam;943074 (OAI)
Available from: 2024-03-21 Created: 2024-03-21 Last updated: 2025-01-12Bibliographically approved
Gauss, P., Gensler, S., Kortenhaus, M., Riedel, N. & Schneider, A. (2024). Regulating the sharing economy: The effects of day caps on short- and long-term rental markets and stakeholder outcomes. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 52, 1627-1650
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Regulating the sharing economy: The effects of day caps on short- and long-term rental markets and stakeholder outcomes
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2024 (English)In: Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, ISSN 0092-0703, E-ISSN 1552-7824, Vol. 52, p. 1627-1650Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Home sharing platforms have experienced a rapid growth over the last decade. Following negative publicity, many cities have started regulating the short-term rental market. Regulations often involve a cap on the number of days a property can be rented out on a short-term basis. We draw on rich data for short-term rentals on Airbnb and for the long-term rental market to examine the impact of short-term rental regulations with a day cap on various stakeholders: hosts, guests, the platform provider, and residents. Based on a difference-in-differences design, we document a sizable drop in Airbnb activity. Interestingly, not only targeted hosts (i.e., hosts with reservation days larger than the day cap), but also non-targeted hosts reduce their Airbnb activity. The reservation days of non-targeted hosts decrease between 26.27% and 51.89% depending on the treatment. Targeted hosts experience a similar decline. There is, nevertheless, significant non-compliance: more than one third of hosts do not comply with enacted short-term rental regulations. Additional analyses show that few properties are redirected from short-term rental to long-term rental use and that there is no significant drop in long-term rents. Drawing on a theoretical model, we tie the estimated effects to changes in stakeholders' welfare: Regulations significantly reduce the welfare of hosts, and the loss ranges between 46.30% and 9.02%. The welfare loss of the platform provider is proportional to the loss of the hosts. Welfare of guests decreases moderately ranging between 4.5% to 4.1%. The welfare of residents increases minimal. These results question the effectiveness and desirability of the studied short-term rental regulations.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer, 2024
Keywords
Sharing economy, Quasi-experiments, Public policy, Airbnb, Regulations
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-65378 (URN)10.1007/s11747-024-01028-7 (DOI)001247927000001 ()2-s2.0-85196111476 (Scopus ID)HOA;intsam;959314 (Local ID)HOA;intsam;959314 (Archive number)HOA;intsam;959314 (OAI)
Available from: 2024-06-25 Created: 2024-06-25 Last updated: 2025-01-12Bibliographically approved
Garz, M. & Schneider, A. (2023). Data sharing and tax enforcement: Evidence from short-term rentals in Denmark. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 101, Article ID 103912.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Data sharing and tax enforcement: Evidence from short-term rentals in Denmark
2023 (English)In: Regional Science and Urban Economics, ISSN 0166-0462, E-ISSN 1879-2308, Vol. 101, article id 103912Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Airbnb and other home-sharing platforms have been facing increasing regulation over the past years, mainly in the form of restricting short-term rentals through day caps. In contrast, as one of the first countries in the world, Denmark applied a collaborative strategy: In 2018, the government negotiated an agreement with Airbnb about the transmission of income data from the platform to the tax agency. We analyze how this data-sharing agreement affected hosts' behavior on the platform, using a difference-in-differences approach with Sweden as a counterfactual. We find that the agreement reduced hosts’ propensity to list property on the platform by 14%, while increasing listing prices by 11%. Our results indicate that platform exits were mostly limited to single-property hosts. In contrast, hosts with many properties and those in areas with initially low Airbnb penetration made their rental objects more often available and managed to increase the number of bookings. Overall, the findings imply that the data-sharing agreement not only helped to increase tax compliance but also led to a commercialization and spatial re-organization of short-term renting in Denmark.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier, 2023
Keywords
Airbnb, DAC7, Digital platforms, Home sharing, Income tax, Tax enforcement
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-61330 (URN)10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2023.103912 (DOI)001010950900001 ()2-s2.0-85161033498 (Scopus ID)HOA;;886511 (Local ID)HOA;;886511 (Archive number)HOA;;886511 (OAI)
Funder
The Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation, P21-0158
Available from: 2023-06-20 Created: 2023-06-20 Last updated: 2023-08-14Bibliographically approved
Juranek, S., Schindler, D. & Schneider, A. (2023). Royalty taxation under tax competition and profit shifting. Canadian Journal of Economics, 56(4), 1377-1412
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Royalty taxation under tax competition and profit shifting
2023 (English)In: Canadian Journal of Economics, ISSN 0008-4085, E-ISSN 1540-5982, Vol. 56, no 4, p. 1377-1412Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Multinational corporations increasingly use royalty payments for intellectual property rights to shift profits globally. This not only threatens the tax base of countries worldwide but also affects the nature of tax competition. Against this background, our theoretical analysis suggests a surprising solution to the problem of curbing profit shifting without suffering major outflows of capital: a strictly positive withholding tax on royalty payments is both the Pareto-efficient solution under international coordination and the optimal unilateral response. If internal debt is sufficiently responsive, governments can even implement optimal targeting. Then, the royalty tax closes the profit-shifting channel, while all competition for mobile capital is relegated to internal-debt regulation. Our results question the ban on royalty taxes in double tax treaties and the EU Interest and Royalty Directive.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
John Wiley & Sons, 2023
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-62531 (URN)10.1111/caje.12682 (DOI)001067566400001 ()2-s2.0-85170837723 (Scopus ID)HOA;intsam;906465 (Local ID)HOA;intsam;906465 (Archive number)HOA;intsam;906465 (OAI)
Available from: 2023-09-25 Created: 2023-09-25 Last updated: 2024-01-15Bibliographically approved
Garz, M. & Schneider, A. (2023). Taxation of short-term rentals: Evidence from the introduction of the “Airbnb tax” in Norway. Economics Letters, 226, Article ID 111120.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Taxation of short-term rentals: Evidence from the introduction of the “Airbnb tax” in Norway
2023 (English)In: Economics Letters, ISSN 0165-1765, E-ISSN 1873-7374, Vol. 226, article id 111120Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This research note investigates the impact of a rental-income tax on hosts using Airbnb in Norway. We find that the cost increase implied by the tax did not induce hosts to exit the platform, nor did it lead to an increase in rental prices. These findings support the conjecture that the tax was insufficiently enforced, as it relied on taxpayers to self-report their rental income.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier, 2023
Keywords
Digital platforms, Home sharing, Income tax, Tax enforcement
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-60312 (URN)10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111120 (DOI)000988065000001 ()2-s2.0-85153303350 (Scopus ID)HOA;;878467 (Local ID)HOA;;878467 (Archive number)HOA;;878467 (OAI)
Funder
The Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation
Available from: 2023-05-04 Created: 2023-05-04 Last updated: 2023-06-01Bibliographically approved
Becker, J. & Schneider, A. (2019). Bidding for firms with unknown characteristics. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 121(3), 1222-1243
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Bidding for firms with unknown characteristics
2019 (English)In: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, ISSN 0347-0520, E-ISSN 1467-9442, Vol. 121, no 3, p. 1222-1243Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

When a region successfully attracts a firm by offering subsidies, the firm often commits itself to performance targets in terms of employment. In this paper, we interpret these firm-specific targets as a consequence of incomplete information. We analyze a model of two regions that compete for a firm, assuming that the firm's productivity is ex ante unknown. We show that performance targets often induce overemployment in high-productivity firms, and that tax credits are often superior to lump-sum payments. Moreover, when regions differ in wage rates, the low-wage region wins the bid and has a higher surplus than under complete information. Finally, we show that, under incomplete information, bidding might not lead to efficient firm location. 

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
John Wiley & Sons, 2019
Keywords
Business taxation, incomplete information, mechanism design, state aids, subsidy competition, competition (economics), design, employment, industrial performance, productivity, state role, subsidy system, tax system, wage
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-46451 (URN)10.1111/sjoe.12309 (DOI)000471704900013 ()2-s2.0-85063468154 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2019-10-04 Created: 2019-10-04 Last updated: 2019-10-04Bibliographically approved
Juranek, S., Schindler, D. & Schneider, A. (2018). Royalty taxation under tax competition and profit shifting.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Royalty taxation under tax competition and profit shifting
2018 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

The increasing use of intellectual property as a means to shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions or jurisdictions with so-called ‘patent boxes’ is a major challenge for the corporate tax base of medium- and high-tax countries. Extending a standard tax competition model for capital-enhancing technology, royalty payments, and profit shifting, this paper suggests a simple fix: It is optimal to set a withholding tax on (intra-firm) royalty payments equal to the corporate tax rate and deny any deductibility of royalties. As the tax applies to the full payment, the problem of identifying the arm’s-length component in a digital economy (OECD BEPS Action 1) does not apply. Most importantly, the denial of royalty deductions is the Pareto-efficient solution under coordination and the unilaterally optimal policy under competition for mobile capital. In the latter case, a weakened thin capitalization rule is a crucial part of the policy package in order to avoid negative investment effects. Our results question the ban of royalty taxes in double tax treaties and the EU Interest and Royalty Directive.

Publisher
p. 45
Series
CESifo Working Paper Series ; 7227
Keywords
source tax on royalties, tax competition, multinationals, profit shifting
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-46462 (URN)
Available from: 2019-10-04 Created: 2019-10-04 Last updated: 2019-10-04Bibliographically approved
Becker, J. & Schneider, A. (2018). Taxation of firms with unknown mobility. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 20(2), 202-217
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Taxation of firms with unknown mobility
2018 (English)In: Journal of Public Economic Theory, ISSN 1097-3923, E-ISSN 1467-9779, Vol. 20, no 2, p. 202-217Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

We analyze optimal business tax policy when some firms are able to escape taxation by moving abroad. In contrast to the existing literature, we assume that the true number of mobile firms is ex ante unknown. While the government may learn from the firms' location responses to past tax rate changes, firms may anticipate this and adjust their choices accordingly. We find that incomplete information on mobility substantially affects the properties and the implications of equilibrium policy choices. First, the government may find it optimal to set a tax rate that triggers partial firm migration but full revelation of the true number of mobile firms. Second, we show that, if the firms' outside option is attractive (i.e., relocation cost and foreign tax rates are low), expected tax rates and expected firm migration are higher if the degree of mobility is unknown. Third, there is a positive value of learning, i.e., commitment on future tax rates cannot increase the government's expected revenue. However, if the government can commit to a rule-based learning mechanism, i.e., credibly tie its future tax policy to present policy outcomes, it may obtain a Pareto improvement. 

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
John Wiley & Sons, 2018
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-46452 (URN)10.1111/jpet.12240 (DOI)000426861700005 ()2-s2.0-85015327602 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2019-10-04 Created: 2019-10-04 Last updated: 2019-10-04Bibliographically approved
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