Mission-oriented innovation policies put government and state agencies at the forefront of the innovation process. Currently, little is known about the interests of the government agencies in charge of implementing mission-oriented innovation policies. In this chapter, we set out to explore the incentives and behavior of such government agencies. We do so by analyzing 33 annual reports from three government agencies in charge of implementing innovation policies in Sweden over a 10-year period: Sweden’s Innovation Agency (Vinnova), the Swedish Energy Agency (Energimyndigheten), and the Swedish Agency for Regional and Economic Growth (Tillväxtverket). First, we track all cases in these annual reports where an evaluation is mentioned. Identifying 654 instances, we subsequently make a sentiment analysis and code whether these statements are positive, neutral, or negative. Our findings show that 84% of these instances are positive, 12% are neutral, and 4% are negative. Second, we relate these results to more critical evaluations and show that these agencies often ignore research that generates more critical results. In sum, our results suggest that government agencies in charge of implementing mission-oriented policies benefit from the enlarged role they are given and that they act according to their own self-interest.

While considerable efforts have been made to conceptualize and outline the theoretical and normative logic of mission-oriented innovation policies and the role of the entrepreneurial state, there is a stark lack of empirical studies concerning how missions are designed and executed, and when they may work or do not. This monograph reviews theoretical rationales for mission-oriented innovation policy and provides an empirical overview of 30 articles which together cover 51 concluded or ongoing missions from around the world. We synthetize varieties of mission formulations, actors involved, and analyze characteristics of missions described as more or less failed or successful. Among the projects analyzed, many do not fulfill common definitions of “innovation missions.” Missions related to technological or agricultural innovations seem more often successful than broader types of missions aimed at social or ecological challenges, and challenges in the governance and evaluation of missions remain unresolved in the literature. None of the mission cases contain a cost-benefit analysis or takes opportunity cost into consideration.

Previous research in business and management history has identified the Icarus paradox, which describes how organisations may fall due to overconfidence and hubris. We build upon previous research on paradoxes in business history and introduce the notion of an inverted Icarus paradox. Using rich archival sources coded in a relational database, we show how an entrant firm, Comvik, outmanoeuvred an established government monopoly in the non-market domain from 1980 to 1990, despite inferior resources and a weak market position. The government monopoly Televerket faced an inverted Icarus paradox; it could not leverage its strengths and political connections as they were stuck in a David versus Goliath narrative where public opinion was more sympathetic to the entrant firm Comvik.

The Hydrogen Illusion (2022) is a self-published book by Samuel Furfari, a retired chemical engineer who worked for 36 years in energy policy at the European Commission. Hydrogen has been brought to the forefront of environmental policy in recent years as the EU and other Western economies are allocating billions of euros and dollars towards hydrogen production. Furfari argues that this is a mistake, and that hydrogen has little potential as an energy form, primarily as it requires so much energy in order to be produced. While at times technical and difficult to follow, The Hydrogen Illusion is a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate about how Western economies can combine economic and environmental development.

This chapter integrates findings from several different case studies on mission-oriented innovation policies (MOIPs) and makes use of the existing literature to briefly describe three other missions: The War on Cancer, homeownership in the United States, and the Swedish Million Program. Together with the analyses in the other chapters of this volume, seven takeaways regarding mission-oriented innovation policies are developed and described: (1) wicked problems cannot be solved through missions, (2) politicians and government agencies are not exempt from self-interest, (3) MOIPs are subject to rent seeking and mission capture, (4) policymakers lack information to design MOIPs efficiently, (5) MOIPs distort competition, (6) government support programs distort incentives and result in moral hazard, and (7) MOIPs ignore opportunity costs. These seven takeaways are illustrated using the cases described in this chapter and elsewhere in this volume.

This open access book raises some central questions: Do we need moonshot policies to spur innovation and economic growth? What are the risks associated with such policies?

Economic turbulence, the COVID-19 pandemic, and mounting environmental concerns have paved the way for a renaissance of targeted industrial policy. In particular, the idea that society should be organized around large missions is gaining momentum among high-income economies. However, the authors and editors of this volume contend that this shift has occurred without much critical examination, especially as the European Union has adopted these ideas, and Western economies are now increasingly organizing toward the achievement of large, state-formulated goals.

Recognizing the urgent need for continued scholarly attention to question notions of the mission economy, more than 20 scholars discuss the dangers of top-down/vertical approaches to industrial policy and draw attention to the progress of independent enterprise, entrepreneurialism, and market solutions in a sound economy and society. By critically examining mission-oriented innovation policies, using theoretical perspectives and empirical investigations, the book highlights both the mechanisms behind failed missions and alternative approaches. This is a must-read for policy researchers and policymakers alike.

The notion that society should be organized around large so-called missions has gained momentum in public debate, and the reemergence of active industrial policy across the world has been inspired by academic scholars promoting the idea of mission-oriented innovation policies (MOIPs). Besides this introductory chapter, this collective volume consists of 16 chapters distributed across 3 overarching themes: theoretical perspectives, empirical evidence, and alternative paths. The volume provides a comprehensive assessment and normative critique of the efficacy of such policies. In addition to summing up the main findings in the 16 chapters, this introduction provides some additional analysis, pins down the most important general conclusions, and suggests future research questions. Today’s economies are highly dependent on a well-functioning process of decentralized experimentation, selection, and screening. Instead of large-scale MOIPs, governments should strive to create an institutional framework that levels the playing field for potential entrepreneurs while encouraging productive entrepreneurship.

Introductory paragraph:

Large-scale government programmes and centrally directed industrial policies to address well-defined societal goals – mission-oriented innovation policies (hereafter referred to as ‘missions’) – are now prominent on many governments' agendas. This new-found enthusiasm that a ‘visible hand’ should – or perhaps even must – drive the economy forward has, until recently, escaped significant critical scrutiny. There is a dearth of academic studies examining how, when and why such missions often risk failure.

This chapter reviews theoretical rationales for mission-oriented innovation policy and provides an empirical overview of extant 28 papers and 49 cases on the topic. We synthetize varieties of mission formulations, actors involved, and characteristics of missions described as more or less failed or successful. Fifty-nine percent of the studied missions are still ongoing, 33 percent are considered successful, and 8 percent as failures. Sixty-seven percent of the studied missions have taken place in Europe, 24 percent in North America, and 8 percent in Asia. The majority of innovation projects referred to as missions do not fulfill the criteria defined by the OECD. Results suggest that missions related to technological or agricultural innovations are more often successful than broader types of missions aimed at social or ecological challenges. Challenges regarding the governance and evaluation of missions remain unresolved in the literature. We find no case that contains a cost-benefit analysis or takes opportunity cost into account.

I Hur använder myndigheter utvärderingar? studeras myndigheters förhållande till utvärderingar. Författaren utforskar hur Energimyndigheten, Vinnova och Tillväxtverket hänvisar till utvärderingar i sina årsredovisningar under åren 2010–2020 samt vilken effekt myndigheternas satsningar indikeras ha haft. De senaste åren har allt större summor offentliga medel tilldelats industriföretag, bland annat för att främja hållbar utveckling. Det har ökat behovet av utvärderingar och kunskap om hur myndigheterna använder sig av utvärderingar i praktiken. Genom att analysera 33 årsredovisningar från tre olika myndigheter har författaren identifierat över 600 fall där myndigheten beskriver resultat utifrån en utvärdering. Detta ger en bild av hur myndigheter använder sig av utvärderingar som förmedlar positiva respektive negativa slutsatser.