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Publications (10 of 15) Show all publications
Bo, P. & Manduchi, A. (2017). Disclosure-based price discrimination by information exchange platforms. Information Economics and Policy, 41, 54-66
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Disclosure-based price discrimination by information exchange platforms
2017 (English)In: Information Economics and Policy, ISSN 0167-6245, E-ISSN 1873-5975, Vol. 41, p. 54-66Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Consumers often face a trade off when considering whether to share more information with firms - for example, by letting an app access their list of contacts, location or browsing history. More precise information can help the sellers to make more targeted offers, and can yield multiple relevant offers and lower prices. However, information disclosure can entail costs via identity theft, fraud, extortion etc. In this paper, we explore this trade-off in a model in which a monopoly platform can gather personal customer information, and offer it to other sellers. The consumers differ relatively to their aversion to information disclosure, and the platform can offer them menus with different disclosure levels. In equilibrium, options featuring greater disclosure levels command a premium, and information about the consumers choosing them is sold to the sellers at a lower price. If we compare scenarios with alternative menus, a greater number of options corresponds to a greater average disclosure level and a greater surplus. If the potential surplus from the induced exchanges is relatively large, equilibrium with a binary menu features levels of the platform’s profit and the surplus close to those achieved with a continuum of offers.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier, 2017
Keywords
Information disclosure, Two-sided platforms, Price discrimination
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-37329 (URN)10.1016/j.infoecopol.2017.08.003 (DOI)000419416300005 ()2-s2.0-85028997718 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2017-09-19 Created: 2017-09-19 Last updated: 2019-01-11Bibliographically approved
Bo, P. & Manduchi, A. (2016). Informative transactions, disclosure and privacy. In: : . Paper presented at 43rd EARIE Annual Conference, Lisbon, 26-28 August, 2016..
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Informative transactions, disclosure and privacy
2016 (English)Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

This paper investigates a model in which a monopolist obtains information about her customers’ preferences by delivering her product, and can disclose the same information to other sellers, at a price. More refined information is a more effective facilitator of further exchanges, and boosts competition among the sellers using it, but entails a greater nuisance for the consumers. The actual nuisance implied by any given disclosure level differs across consumers. The monopolist makes two alternative offers. In equilibrium, the prices can induce too many consumers to choose the low disclosure-offer, the disclosure levels can be inconsistent with surplus maximization, and the average disclosure level is lower than the surplus-maximizing one. A lower proportional participation of the monopolist in the profits from the induced exchanges typically entails more differentiated disclosure levels; the response of the average level is non-monotonic. The high disclosure-offer can feature a higher price, due to the higher probability of further trade and to the more intense competition among the sellers.

Keywords
Information disclosure, consumer privacy, two-sided platforms
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-36032 (URN)
Conference
43rd EARIE Annual Conference, Lisbon, 26-28 August, 2016.
Available from: 2017-06-13 Created: 2017-06-13 Last updated: 2019-01-11Bibliographically approved
Kayitare Tengera, F. & Manduchi, A. (2015). Financial Viability of Rwanda Pension Scheme Fund Investments. American International Journal of Research in Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences, 12(2), 183-197
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Financial Viability of Rwanda Pension Scheme Fund Investments
2015 (English)In: American International Journal of Research in Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences, ISSN 2328-3696, Vol. 12, no 2, p. 183-197Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Pension funds are in charge of the decisions concerning the allocation of a very large share of the wealth of most countries. To guarantee financial viability, the funds should be invested in agreement with the general principles of safety, yield, liquidity and social economic utility. In this article, we evaluate the performance and the long-term viability of the public pension scheme fund managed by Rwanda Social Security Board, the major Rwandan pension fund, by using financial information covering the period from 2009 until 2014. The findings cast doubt on the long-run financial viability of the fund, and suggest the opportunity to implement more sound investment strategies, and possibly also to commit to more realistic payment plans.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Byron: International Association of Scientific Innovation and Research (IASIR), 2015
Keywords
financial viability, pension fund, investment, return, Rwanda Social Security Board
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-29232 (URN)IHHEFSIS (Local ID)IHHEFSIS (Archive number)IHHEFSIS (OAI)
Available from: 2016-01-26 Created: 2016-01-26 Last updated: 2019-01-11Bibliographically approved
Manduchi, A. (2015). The pricing of advertising. In: Robert G. Picard and Steven S. Wildman (Ed.), Handbook on the Economics of the Media: (pp. 123-147). Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing
Open this publication in new window or tab >>The pricing of advertising
2015 (English)In: Handbook on the Economics of the Media / [ed] Robert G. Picard and Steven S. Wildman, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015, p. 123-147Chapter in book (Refereed)
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015
National Category
Economics and Business
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-25425 (URN)10.4337/9780857938893 (DOI)9780857938886 (ISBN)9780857938893 (ISBN)
Available from: 2014-12-23 Created: 2014-12-23 Last updated: 2015-10-09Bibliographically approved
Manduchi, A. & Naldi, L. (2014). Clusters and Conglomerates in the Media Industry. In: Charlie  Karlsson, Börje Johansson, Roger R. Stough (Ed.), Agglomeration, Clusters and Entrepreneurship: Studies in Regional Economic Development. Edward Elgar Publishing
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Clusters and Conglomerates in the Media Industry
2014 (English)In: Agglomeration, Clusters and Entrepreneurship: Studies in Regional Economic Development / [ed] Charlie  Karlsson, Börje Johansson, Roger R. Stough, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014Chapter in book (Refereed)
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014
National Category
Economics and Business
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-23546 (URN)9781849809269 (ISBN)9781783472635 (ISBN)
Available from: 2014-02-28 Created: 2014-02-28 Last updated: 2019-08-21Bibliographically approved
Manduchi, A. (2013). Non-neutral information costs with match-value uncertainty. Journal of Economics, 109(1), 1-25
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Non-neutral information costs with match-value uncertainty
2013 (English)In: Journal of Economics, ISSN 0931-8658, E-ISSN 1617-7134, Vol. 109, no 1, p. 1-25Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This paper investigates a model featuring a monopolist seller and a buyer with an uncertain valuation for the seller’s product. The seller chooses an information system which allows the buyer to receive a private signal, potentially correlated with her valuation. No restrictions are imposed on the conditional distributions of the signal; the cost of the information system is proportional to its precision, measured by the mutual information between the distributions of the buyer’s valuation and the signal. In equilibrium, the information system trades off the information cost against the losses deriving from a probability of trade that is either “too high,” or “too low”—depending on the relative weight of the expected losses resulting from errors of the two types—and sends “non-neutral” signals, typically. Thus, in general, the probability of a correct signal depends on the buyer’s actual valuation, and the probability of trade differs from the probability of a valuation exceeding the cost of production. The expected total surplus generated by the exchange is maximized, in equilibrium.

Keywords
Match-value, Information provision, Mutual information, Bayesian learning
National Category
Economics and Business
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-18345 (URN)10.1007/s00712-012-0283-7 (DOI)000318274300001 ()2-s2.0-84876726308 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2012-06-08 Created: 2012-06-08 Last updated: 2019-09-02Bibliographically approved
Manduchi, A. & Picard, R. (2009). Circulations, Revenues, and Profits in a Newspaper Market with Fixed Advertising Costs. Journal of Media Economics, 22(4), 211-238
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Circulations, Revenues, and Profits in a Newspaper Market with Fixed Advertising Costs
2009 (English)In: Journal of Media Economics, ISSN 0899-7764, E-ISSN 1532-7736, Vol. 22, no 4, p. 211-238Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This article investigates a model in which 2 newspapers compete between them for readers with differentiated preferences and advertise new products at a cost per reader that decreases as thecirculation increases. The model can account for the empirical regularity that the revenues from advertising and the profits of the newspapers increase more than proportionally with the circulation. A complementary finding is that a larger number of potential advertisers lowers the profits of both newspapers.

National Category
Economics and Business
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-11453 (URN)10.1080/08997760903375902 (DOI)
Available from: 2010-01-22 Created: 2010-01-22 Last updated: 2017-12-12Bibliographically approved
Manduchi, A. & Naldi, L. (2009). Clusters and conglomerates in the media industry. In: Uddevalla Symposium 2009: the geography of innovation and entrepreneurship : revised papers presented at the 12th Uddevalla Symposium, 11-13 June, 2009, Bari, Italy. Paper presented at 12th Uddevalla Symposium, 11-13 June, 2009, Bari, Italy (pp. 797-808). Trollhättan: Department of Economics and IT, University West
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Clusters and conglomerates in the media industry
2009 (English)In: Uddevalla Symposium 2009: the geography of innovation and entrepreneurship : revised papers presented at the 12th Uddevalla Symposium, 11-13 June, 2009, Bari, Italy, Trollhättan: Department of Economics and IT, University West , 2009, p. 797-808Conference paper, Published paper (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

We introduce and investigate a framework whereby each firm may be organized either as a “small” unit, systematically relying on cooperation with other units, or as a “large,” stand-alone conglomerate. The framework is used to obtain some qualitative insights into the relative advantages of the two organizational modes. In general, a relatively ease with which the firms can combine productive ideas between them, to create production opportunities, and-or a relatively slow arrival of productive ideas favor the cluster over the conglomerate.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Trollhättan: Department of Economics and IT, University West, 2009
Series
Research reports / University West, ISSN 1653-7831 ; 2009:02
National Category
Economics and Business
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-10033 (URN)978-91-633-5571-4 (ISBN)
Conference
12th Uddevalla Symposium, 11-13 June, 2009, Bari, Italy
Available from: 2009-08-21 Created: 2009-08-21 Last updated: 2019-08-21Bibliographically approved
Picard, R. & Manduchi, A. (2007). Circulation and Advertising: Why Are They Not Proportional?. In: : .
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Circulation and Advertising: Why Are They Not Proportional?
2007 (English)Conference paper, Published paper (Other academic)
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-5453 (URN)
Available from: 2008-03-19 Created: 2008-03-19Bibliographically approved
Manduchi, A. (2004). Price discrimination of buyers with identical preferences and collusion in a model of advertising. Journal of Economic Theory, 116(2), 347-356
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Price discrimination of buyers with identical preferences and collusion in a model of advertising
2004 (English)In: Journal of Economic Theory, ISSN 0022-0531, E-ISSN 1095-7235, Vol. 116, no 2, p. 347-356Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

A model of advertising and price distributions is investigated whereby each seller can contact different buyers, whose preferences are identical, with different probabilities. The model features a continuum of equilibria parametrized by the ratio of the buyers contacted by one seller—differing across “market segments”—and by the other sellers. In general, the sellers practice price discrimination across segments. More asymmetric equilibria correspond to higher volumes of transactions and higher expected transaction prices. This results in a lower expected utility for the buyers and higher expected profits; thus, identifying areas of influence can help the sellers to support collusion.

Keywords
Price discrimination; Collusion; Advertising; Price distributions
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-6300 (URN)10.1016/j.jet.2003.07.006 (DOI)
Available from: 2007-07-31 Created: 2007-07-31 Last updated: 2019-09-02Bibliographically approved
Organisations
Identifiers
ORCID iD: ORCID iD iconorcid.org/0000-0003-4338-908x

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