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Palmberg, Johanna
Publications (10 of 17) Show all publications
Backman, M. & Palmberg, J. (2015). Contextualizing small family firms: How does the urban-rural context affect firm employment growth?. The Journal of Family Business Strategy, 6(4), 247-258
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Contextualizing small family firms: How does the urban-rural context affect firm employment growth?
2015 (English)In: The Journal of Family Business Strategy, ISSN 1877-8585, E-ISSN 1877-8593, Vol. 6, no 4, p. 247-258Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This paper studies the effects of family governance and ownership on firm employment growth, extending existing knowledge by including in the analysis the regional context in which firms are located. We create a regional taxonomy to capture the urban–rural dimension and combine this with the corporate governance structure of the firm. Our results show that, being a family firm per se does not influence employment growth. However, when corporate governance structure and regional context are combined, the urban–rural context influences family firm and nonfamily firm employment growth differently, with family firms exhibiting greater employment growth, compared with nonfamily firms, in rural areas.

Keywords
Family firms, Regional economics, Employment growth
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-28717 (URN)10.1016/j.jfbs.2015.10.003 (DOI)000367411600004 ()2-s2.0-84948844012 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2015-12-22 Created: 2015-12-22 Last updated: 2017-12-01Bibliographically approved
Bjuggren, P.-O., Palmberg, J., Sund, L.-G. & Haag, K. (2014). The Dichotomy and Incongruity of Financing a Family Owned Business and Securing Ownership Positions. In: : . Paper presented at 3rd International Forum on Indigenous Management Practices (3rd IFIMP) Conference, Vientiane, 16-19 March, 2014.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>The Dichotomy and Incongruity of Financing a Family Owned Business and Securing Ownership Positions
2014 (English)Conference paper, Oral presentation with published abstract (Other academic)
Keywords
family business
National Category
Economics and Business
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-23744 (URN)
Conference
3rd International Forum on Indigenous Management Practices (3rd IFIMP) Conference, Vientiane, 16-19 March, 2014
Available from: 2014-05-03 Created: 2014-05-03 Last updated: 2015-07-03Bibliographically approved
Eklund, J., Palmberg, J. & Wiberg, D. (2013). Inherited Corporate Control and Returns on Investment. Small Business Economics, 41(2), 419-431
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Inherited Corporate Control and Returns on Investment
2013 (Swedish)In: Small Business Economics, ISSN 0921-898X, E-ISSN 1573-0913, Vol. 41, no 2, p. 419-431Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This paper contributes to the literature on management in family firms by investigating how succession in family firms affects returns on investment. The identities of the chief executive officer (CEO) and the chairman of the board (COB) were used to establish whether the management of the firm can be characterized as founder, descendant, or external management. A unique, unbalanced panel data set on listed Swedish firms covering the period from 1990 to 2005 was used in the analysis. The results show that founder management has a positive effect on the returns on investment in family firms, whereas descendant management has a negative impact. An external CEO as a successor in family firms leads to more efficient investment policies with increased firm value as a result. That is, when studying corporate governance in family firms it is important to account for what type of management the firm has. Further studies are required to understand the relationship between ownership, control, management, and firm performance.

Keywords
Family ownership, Corporate governance, External management, Succession, Returns on investment
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-23241 (URN)10.1007/s11187-012-9432-1 (DOI)000321552900006 ()2-s2.0-84880036321 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2014-01-23 Created: 2014-01-23 Last updated: 2018-10-23Bibliographically approved
Palmberg, J. (2010). Corporate Governance in Swedish Banks. In: Kostyuk, Alex (Ed.), Anti-Crisis Paradigms of Corporate Governance in Banks: A New Institutional Outlook. Sumy: Virtus Interpress
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Corporate Governance in Swedish Banks
2010 (English)In: Anti-Crisis Paradigms of Corporate Governance in Banks: A New Institutional Outlook / [ed] Kostyuk, Alex, Sumy: Virtus Interpress , 2010Chapter in book (Other academic)
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Sumy: Virtus Interpress, 2010
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-11494 (URN)9789669687210 (ISBN)
Available from: 2010-01-25 Created: 2010-01-25 Last updated: 2010-07-29
Palmberg, J. (2010). Family Ownership and Investment Performance. (Doctoral dissertation). Jönköping: 2010
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Family Ownership and Investment Performance
2010 (English)Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This dissertation provides an economic analysis of families as owners of large listed firms. The essential research question is whether family ownership provides an efficient form of governance. Family ownership and control is evaluated from different angles; how ownership, control, management, and board structure affects firm performance, and executive compensation.

Chapter two “A Contractual Perspective of the Firm with an Application to the Maritime Industry” is a conceptual paper analyzing the contractual structure of a firm. The chapter conceptualizes the relations between firms, and markets, and gives a transaction cost perspective of why firms are organized the way they are.

The third chapter “The Impact of Vote Differentiation on Investment Performance in Listed Family Firms” investigates ownership and control in Swedish family controlled firms. The analysis shows that family control is beneficial, but only if voting rights and cash-flow rights are aligned.

The fourth chapter “Family Control and Executive Compensation” analyses whether families use remuneration as a way to expropriate minority shareholders. The study shows that managers in family-controlled firms have alower share of variable compensation than managers in non-family controlled firms. The analysis shows further that family control has a reducing effect on the total level of CEO-compensation.

The last chapter “Board of Directors, Dependency, and Returns on Investment” investigates if there is a relationship between ownership structure, board of directors, and firm performance. The marginal q analysis indicate that firm dependent directors have a negative impact on firms’ investment performance. Owner-dependent and employee elected directors do not affect firm investment performance.

To sum up, the empirical results show that family ownership and control affects remuneration in listed firms, and the firm investment performance. The analysis further shows that there are clear differences in the ownership and governance structure between family and non-family controlled firms.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Jönköping: 2010, 2010. p. 38
Series
JIBS Dissertation Series, ISSN 1403-0470 ; 066
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-14518 (URN)9789186345143 (ISBN)
Public defence
2010-10-22, B1033, Gjuterigatan 5, Jönköping, 16:53 (English)
Opponent
Supervisors
Available from: 2011-02-10 Created: 2011-02-01 Last updated: 2016-10-07Bibliographically approved
Palmberg, J., Eklund, J. & Wiberg, D. (2010). Family Ownership and Return on Investments: Founders, Heirs and External Managers.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Family Ownership and Return on Investments: Founders, Heirs and External Managers
2010 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This paper investigates how family ownership, control and management affect firm investment performance. We use the identity of the CEO and the COB to establish under what management the firm is: founder, descendent or external management. The analysis shows that founder management has no effect on investment performance in family firms, whereas descendant management has a negative impact on firm performance and having external hired managers significantly improves investment performance. Moreover, we examine the effects of dual-class shares; we find that the separation of voting right from cash-flow right has a negative impact on performance in both family and non-family firms, but the negative effect is larger in family firms.   

Publisher
p. 21
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-11495 (URN)
Available from: 2010-01-25 Created: 2010-01-25
Mellander, C. & Palmberg, J. (2010). Household Migration and the Attractiveness in Consumer Service Supply. In: Johansson, Börje, Karlsson, Charlie, and Stough, Roger (Ed.), Entrepreneurship And Regional Development: local processes and global patterns. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Household Migration and the Attractiveness in Consumer Service Supply
2010 (English)In: Entrepreneurship And Regional Development: local processes and global patterns / [ed] Johansson, Börje, Karlsson, Charlie, and Stough, Roger, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar , 2010Chapter in book (Other academic)
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2010
Series
New Horizons in Regional Science
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-11497 (URN)978-1-84720-932-0 (ISBN)
Available from: 2010-01-25 Created: 2010-01-25 Last updated: 2015-11-10Bibliographically approved
Bjuggren, P.-O. & Palmberg, J. (2010). The Impact of Vote Differentiation on Investment Performance in Listed Family Firms. Family Business Review, 23(4), 327-340
Open this publication in new window or tab >>The Impact of Vote Differentiation on Investment Performance in Listed Family Firms
2010 (English)In: Family Business Review, ISSN 0894-4865, E-ISSN 1741-6248, Vol. 23, no 4, p. 327-340Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This article investigates the effects of separation of ownership and control because of vote differentiation on listed family firms’ investment performance. The authors study the question of whether family-controlled firms have better investment performance than nonfamily firms and whether this investment performance is negatively affected by a separation of ownership and control because of vote differentiation. Marginal q is used as a performance measure. The empirical analysis shows that family control has a positive impact on investment performance when ownership and control are aligned, whereas separation of ownership and control in terms of vote-differentiated shares reduce investment performance.

Keywords
corporate governance, family firms, dual-class shares, investments, firm performance
National Category
Business Administration
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-13944 (URN)10.1177/0894486510379001 (DOI)
Available from: 2010-12-14 Created: 2010-12-14 Last updated: 2017-12-11Bibliographically approved
Bjuggren, P.-O. & Palmberg, J. (2009). A contractual perspective of the firm with an application to the maritime Industry (1ed.). In: The Modern Firm, Corporate Governance and Investment (pp. 63-81). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar
Open this publication in new window or tab >>A contractual perspective of the firm with an application to the maritime Industry
2009 (English)In: The Modern Firm, Corporate Governance and Investment, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar , 2009, 1, p. 63-81Chapter in book (Refereed)
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2009 Edition: 1
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-10461 (URN)978 1 84844 225 2 (ISBN)
Available from: 2009-09-29 Created: 2009-09-29 Last updated: 2016-10-07Bibliographically approved
Eklund, J., Palmberg, J. & Wiberg, D. (2009). Ownership Structure, Board Composition and Investment Performance. Stockholm: Royal Institute of Technology, CESIS
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Ownership Structure, Board Composition and Investment Performance
2009 (English)Report (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
Abstract [en]

In this paper the relation between ownership structure, board composition and firm performance is explored. A panel of Swedish listed firms is used to investigate how board composition affects firm performance. Board heterogeneity is measured as board size, age and gender diversity. The results show that Swedish board of directors have become more diversified in terms of gender. Also, fewer firms have the CEO on the board which can be interpreted as a sign of increased independency. The regression analysis shows that gender diversity has a small but negative effect on investment performance, and the same holds for CEO being on the board. The analysis also show that board size has a significant negative effect on investment performance. When incorporating all the explanatory variables into one equation however, the negative effect of larger boards dilutes the effect of gender diversity and having the CEO on the board.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: Royal Institute of Technology, CESIS, 2009. p. 28
Series
Working Paper Series in Economics and Institutions of Innovation, CESIS ; 172
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-11483 (URN)
Available from: 2010-01-25 Created: 2010-01-25 Last updated: 2010-03-17Bibliographically approved
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