Using the Mannheim innovation panel, we investigate whether family firms have higher financial need and how this affects both innovation input and innovation outcomes such as firm or market novelties, or process innovation. Applying the CDM framework, we find that family firms are more likely to have a latent financial need for innovation, which means that they have innovation ideas which they have not implemented yet. We find that family firms have a significantly lower marginal innovation productivity in particular for innovations with radical character, i.e., market novelties. We conclude from this evidence that family firms have a comparative disadvantage in innovation projects that imply high risk and require high innovation capability.

This study investigates the importance of social norms for shaping women's and men's decision to participate in the stock market, aiming to disentangle the different channels playing a role in this decision. Gender role asymmetry is indicated by the country's rank in the gender equality index of the World Economic Forum. Using data from four national household surveys, we find that in Italy – the country with highly asymmetric gender role prescriptions – women's risk-taking behavior responds to this non-supportive environment. Consistent with the theory of social identity, Italian women refrain from stock market participation more than their self-reported risk tolerance levels would suggest. In contrast, in the three countries with a lower asymmetry in gender role prescriptions, no exaggerated female backing off from investing in stocks is observable. The result is robust to separately analyzing sub-samples of singles and couples. However, women who self-select into stock market participation invest the same portfolio share in stocks as do their male peers – independent of the society's degree of gender role divergence. 

This study examines the actual funding behavior of German innovative firms in the pre- and post-crisis period. Specifically, we investigate if and how the funding patterns and financial constraints of German small and medium enterprises (SME) changed during and since the financial crisis. The purpose of our analysis is to assess whether the aims of the European CMU action plan, funding innovation and investment activities, complements the behavior of German SMEs. We find fairly stable funding patterns over the years and there is no indication that financial constraints have become tighter in the post-crisis period. Consequently, realizing the CMU?s central goal of broadening the funding mix could leave the funding behavior of German SMEs largely unaffected. 

Diese Studie untersucht das aktuelle Finanzierungsverhalten deutscher innovativer Unternehmen vor und nach der Finanzkrise. Speziell untersuchen wir, ob sich die Finanzierungsstruktur und finanzielle Restriktionen der deutschen kleinen und mittleren Unternehmen (KMU) seit der Finanzkrise verändert haben. Der Zweck unserer Analyse ist es, zu beurteilen, ob die Ziele des europäischen CMU-Aktionsplans, insbesondere das Ziel der Förderung von Innovations- und Investitionstätigkeit, die Finanzierungssituation von deutschen KMU tatsächlich verbessern kann. Wir finden über den Untersuchungszeitraum hinweg stabile Finanzierungsstrukturen, und wir finden keine Evidenz, dass finanzielle Restriktionen nach der Krise zugenommen hätten. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird der CMU-Aktionsplan mit der Zielsetzung, den Finanzierungsmix von KMU zu erweitern, das aktuelle Finanzierungsverhalten deutscher KMU kaum beeinflussen.

We examine whether monetary transmission during the financial and sovereign debt crisis was dominated by the cost channel or by the demand-side channel effect. We use two approaches to track down the potential pass-through of changes in the monetary policy rate to those in consumer prices. First, we utilize panel data from the German manufacturing industry. Second, we conduct time series analyses for Germany, Italy, and Spain. We find that when manufacturing firms’ interest costs drop, the changes in their respective industry’s price index are smaller one year later. This finding is consistent with the cost channel theory. Taken together, the results of both panel data and time series analyses imply that the ECB’s low interest rate policy has worked better for boosting inflation in Italy and Spain than in Germany.

This paper studies the reaction of the Euro's value againstmajor currencies to sovereign rating announcements from Moody's, S&P and Fitch CRAs during the Eurozone debt crisis in 2010--2012 based on eventstudy methodology combined with GARCH models. We also analyze how theyields of French, Italian, German and Spanish government long-term bondswere affected by CRA announcements. Our results reveal that CRA downgrades, watchlist and outlook announcements had no impact on the value of the Euro currency but increased exchange rate volatility. At the same time, downgrades as well as negative outlook announcements increased the yields of French, Italian, and Spanish bonds and evenaffected the German bond's yields. This shows that the monetary union hasled to a breakdown of the consequences of the rating shocks between currency value and sovereign bond yields. The reason is that part of the rating shock is absorbed by an internal repricing of sovereign bonds.

The study aims to assess the distributional effects of taxing financial transactions including a focus on gender. It specifically investigates the impact of the low interest rate environment on tax revenues and distribution. The first part of the study is explorative, aiming to develop a concept for the assessment. This is because the role of low or even negative interest rates is not yet specifically considered in the context of FTT. In the second part, the challenge is to find appropriate data for European countries in order to assess distributional effects. The study also highlights the existing data gaps that prevent a long-term evaluation of FTT with regard to tax revenues, impact, and distributional consequences.

In the course of the recent financial, economic and debt crisis significant regulatory efforts have been taken to make financial markets more resilient. Not all of these regulations are effective. For example, it is hard to imagine that the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) are applicable to the largest of European banks, because the required minimum coverage of losses by shareholders and debtors would most likely trigger a systemic crisis. Furthermore, the many roles of the ECB may lead to severe confl icts of interest. It should be also reconsidered whether the planned Capital Market Union’s focus on the securitisation of loans and the promotion of direct investments by savers in the capital market makes sense.

Nach der Finanz-, Wirtschafts- und Verschuldungskrise sind erhebliche Regulierungsanstrengungen unternommen worden, um die Finanzmärkte robust zu machen. Nicht alle sind zielführend. So lässt sich beispielsweise der einheitliche Abwicklungsmechanismus (SRM) und die Abwicklungsrichtlinie (BRRD) für Großbanken kaum durchführen, weil die Eckdaten so gewählt wurden, dass im Ernstfall eine Systemkrise droht. Auch die Aufgabenvielfalt der EZB kann zu Interessenkonflikten führen. Ob der Fokus der geplanten Kapitalmarktunion auf die Verbriefung von Krediten und die Förderung der direkten Anlage auf dem Kapitalmarkt sinnvoll ist, sollte ebenfalls noch einmal überdacht werden.

Variable remuneration in credit institutions and investment firms can encourage excessive risk-taking behaviour. The present research investigates the impact of the Capital Requirement Directive and Regulation (CRD IV package) on this type of behaviour. The research shows that the Directive has had a significant effect on risk management. Deferral of variable pay, malus arrangements and a maximum ratio for the variable pay of risk-taking personnel are seen to be effective incentives even at this early stage. Competitive disadvantages with regard to attracting and retaining staff from unregulated sectors could not be verified. Problems have been found with regard to clawback clauses in the context of national employment law. Other problems concern the need for rules that are better adapted to the business scale. The rules work well in the case of big and significant institutions. For small and non-complex institutions, which are less engaged in risky activities and which pay out low amounts of variable remuneration, the relatively high implementation cost of deferral and pay-out in instrument are of concern. Member States have made wide use of exclusions. Regulating the extent, process and identification of such exclusions at the EU-level would further harmonise remuneration policies in the member states.

La rémunération variable des établissements de crédit et des entreprises d'investissement peut encourager des prises de risques excessives. Cette étude examine l’impact de la mise en œuvre de la directive et du règlement relatifs aux exigences de fonds propres (CRD IV et CRR). Elle démontre leurs effets significatifs sur une meilleur gestion des risques. Les règles de report de la rémunération variable, de dispositifs de malus ainsi que du ratio maximal entre les composantes fixes et variables de la rémunération totale des preneurs de risques sont considérés comme des incitations efficaces, même à ce stade précoce. Sans pouvoir vérifier la pertinence des désavantages concurrentiels par rapport aux entreprises des secteurs non réglementés dans leurs capacités à attirer et à retenir le personnel, des problèmes ont été identifiés dans l’application des dispositifs de récupération (‘clawback’) au sein des codes du travail nationaux. Des règles mieux adaptées à l'échelle de l'entreprise paraissent nécessaires car si elles font preuve d’efficacité de fonctionnement quand elles s’appliquent aux gros établissements de portée significative, elles le sont de façon moindre pour celles de plus petite taille ou de moindre complexité. Les coûts relativement plus élevés pour elles du report de la rémunération variable et du paiement en instruments ne correspondent souvent ni avec les risques de leurs activités ni avec leurs politiques de rémunérations avec peu de variable. Les États membres font fort usage d’exclusions, mais la réglementation de la portée du processus et de l'identification de celles-ci au niveau européen permettrait une meilleur harmonisation des politiques de rémunération dans les Etats membres.