European Identity-building and the Democratic Deficit
– a Europe in search of its ‘Demos’

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Abstract

Background and problem
The popularity of the European Union among its citizens has during the last decades decreased. It has been argued that the Union lacks a demos, i.e. there is no clear picture of who constitutes ‘the people’. This has resulted in a legitimacy problem which has shown itself hard to overcome for the Union. In overcoming problems of legitimacy, or in creating a demos, identity-building is crucial. It seems as if the very idea of a ‘European’ identity causes problems for the Union however. Thus, the basis of this thesis will be ‘European’ identity-building.

Aim
The aim of this thesis is to study ‘European’ identity-building in an impartial way. By impartial it is meant to present theories and facts which both see ‘European identity-building as possible and not possible. The main questions of the thesis are what makes the Union united, and why the idea of a ‘European’ identity is a source of anxiety.

Method
A research method of textual analysis has been used where different texts relating to identity-building and the EU has been compared.

Theoretical framework
First, a comparison between the visions of Europe of two classical statesmen (Monnet and de Gaulle) will be made in the third chapter. Second, the Union and its democratic deficit will be focused upon. Here a brief history of the Union and the idea of European unity will be provided. This will be followed by a chapter where definitions of a number of concepts (e.g. society, community, etc) will be discussed. Then, a chapter of “citizenship” and the Union will be followed by a chapter of identity-building. Next, there will be a chapter about European integral factors. Here concepts as culture, symbols, and myths will be discussed in relation to the Union. Last, there will be a chapter concerning Europe and the importance of myths where a possible ‘European’ myth will be discussed.

Conclusions and Discussion
In the final part of the thesis a conclusion and a discussion will be presented. Here conclusions will be drawn from the gathered material. Finally there will be a discussion on the subject and of how the research procedure has proceeded.
Magisteruppsats inom Statsvetenskap

Titel: European Identity-building and the Democratic Deficit – a Europe in search of its ‘Demos’

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Sammanfattning

Bakgrund och problem

Syfte
Syftet med föreliggande uppsats är att studera skapandet av en ’europeisk’ identitet ur ett oberoende rättviseperspektiv. Med detta menas att vikt kommer att läggas vid presentation av material som behandlar ämnet både som möjligt och omöjligt. Uppsatsens huvudfråga är: Vad gör Unionen enad, med andra ord, varför är tanken på en ’europeisk’ identitet en källa till oro?

Metod
Tillämpningen av metoden textanalys har använts och ett antal texter som relaterar till identitetsskapande och EU har jämförts.

Referensram

Slutsats och diskussion
I denna del kommer en analys kombinerad med slutsatser att presenteras. Som avslutande kapitel kommer en diskussion att föras om hur arbetet framkridit och vilka frågor som författaren ställt sig utifrån det material som behandlats.
“If we could first know where we are, and whither we are tending, we could then better judge what to do, and how to do it.”
- Abraham Lincoln.
1 Introduction

During the last two decades the citizens’ trust in the European Union (EU) has decreased. It has been established that the Union suffer from a democratic deficit which has caused it to impose so called “identity-policies”. There is a need for the citizens to identify with the Union as a foundation of its legitimacy. But there is a problem since there is no clear idea of who constitutes “the people” in the European case.

Democratic theory presupposes a demos and a polity. The problem of the EU is that there are difficulties defining the ‘demos’ – there are difficulties identifying ‘the people’. The fact that the EU is in a situation where it has to deal with ‘peoples’ instead of a ‘people’ (demoi instead of demos) makes it more difficult since demos is closely related to the ‘nation’. Only nations may have states, thus the EU may not have a state. Hence it is difficult for the EU to conceptualize a demos, and without a demos there cannot be democracy. By arguing in this way the great need to create a ‘peoples’ Europe’ is understandable.1

The thesis will concentrate on why there is a lack of a demos, or a “We-feeling”, within the Union, why this is a source of anxiety, and what possibly could unite the Union.

Attempts have been made to create a ‘European’ identity through constitution-making (however, a new constitution was recently rejected) and citizenship rights. The Union has also adopted a number of symbols to facilitate the citizens in identifying with the Union. Most of these symbols have been similar to those of the memberstates, thus, the Union has tried to use the methods of nation-building to overcome the legitimacy problem. Still, there is a lack of uniqueness of the Union. This may be for various reasons. Institution-building and constitution-making cannot alone provide democratic legitimacy; social practice and contestation must be included. This should take place in a public sphere but, in order to ‘have’ a public sphere, there must be a certain degree of collective identification.

It has also been claimed that there is a ‘European’ culture stemming from three ancient treasure houses (the ancient Near East, the ancient Greece, and the Roman Empire). Since culture is based on norms, i.e. customs, attitudes, beliefs, and values of a society, it is of importance to the Union when this is what politics are based on.

The study of this topic is relevant since the EU has an increased impact on the lives of its citizens, yet troubles to reach them. There is a lack of communication between the Union and its citizens and the democratic deficit becomes more and more obvious. The methods used by the Union do not seem successful and the issue of a European identity has become a source of anxiety.

1.1 Problem

The debate on the good of the EU is never-ending. Today one of the most debated questions is whether or not there is such a thing as a united Europe. It is often argued that there is a lack of “We-feeling” within the Union. Since the “new” members entered the Union these types of problems have become increasingly clear. Is there a common ground of values within the Union and is it possible for its citizens to identify themselves as Europeans?

As Anthony Pagden argues in his work “The idea of Europe”: “The very thought that it might be useful to talk of a European identity (…) has become a source of anxiety.”

### 1.2 Aim

The motto of the EU is: “United in Diversity”.

The aim of the thesis is to find out what makes the Union united. That is, why is the idea of a European identity a source of anxiety?

The questions that will be asked while pursuing research are:

**Should / Could the Union be based on nation state building?**

- Is there a European identity?
- What does a European citizenship imply?
- What is the European “public”?
- Is there a European culture?
- What measures has been taken by the Union to create a “We” within its borders?

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2 Methodology

Methodology is the study and knowledge of methods. There are a number of main principles of philosophical and logical nature which different methods rest upon. The relevant principle for this study is the “Theory of science”, which concerns the methodology and formation of a theory within different disciplines of science.

2.1 Method

Data may be divided into two main categories - qualitative and quantitative data. The main difference between these two is that qualitative data are more sensitive and exemplifies more, while quantitative data are more precise but generalizes more. Both methods aim at validity. Validity may be divided into internal and external validity. Internal validity concerns the possibility to include a number of factors related to each other, i.e. several factors which may affect the outcome should be included. Internal validity is generally covered by the question: are all aspects of the problem covered? External validity concerns whether it is possible or not to generalize from the results of the study. The external validity is more concerned about the project as a whole, whether or not there are possibilities of a generalisation from a specific study. Thus, the relation between internal and external validity may be described as the relation between “explanation” and “generality”.3 It is sometimes argued that internal validity is easier to attain in a qualitative research. External validity is supposed to be equally hard to attain in both qualitative and quantitative research.4

A qualitative analysis often deals with more complex themes than the quantitative analysis.5 The qualitative study concentrates on the whole rather than on any specific theory. This creates openness for what the result might be.6

This study has been made using qualitative data and has been conducted based on the questions asked in the aim. To answer these questions and through them fulfil the aim, different texts relating to identity-building and the EU has been compared. No interviews have been made since the aim of the thesis is of a more theoretical kind. A number of official treaties of the EU have been analyzed to compare with the texts used. Both the texts and the treaties have been analyzed to find out why there is a problem with creating a ‘European’ identity.

The method used in particular has been “textual analysis”. Here an analysis of the content of a text is used to penetrate a certain problematic.7 It may be inductive or deductive. Deductive conclusions are often drawn from general principles, while inductive conclusions are based on empirical evidence giving a general knowledge of the theory. Usually both of these are used when performing research.8 In this thesis both inductive and deductive conclusions have been drawn using both theories and general principles, and treaties and the like.

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5 Ibid. p, 69-75.


2.2 Sources

When pursuing research it is important to be aware of factors which might affect the way the researcher chooses and presents his or her material. Thus, the question of objectivity is important. It is generally admitted that no one possesses an absolute overview of society and knowledge, i.e. it is only possible to grasp a part of reality which is decided by our individual history. This makes research perspective related, but it does not necessarily make the research less objective. The subjectivity of a researcher depends on what perspective he or she has chosen as a basis for the research process. What makes the researcher objective or not depends on whether he or she manages to look at the problems and understand them from the chosen perspective. 9

The objectivity-problem is not the only issue when performing research. The validity of the research is of great importance. It is sometimes argued that internal validity is easier to attain in a qualitative research. External validity is supposed to be equally hard to attain in both qualitative and quantitative research. 10

A qualitative analysis may create a number of problems. The researcher may choose wrong groups of material for the research which may result in validity problems. Furthermore, the researcher may misinterpret the material used and the level of analysis may not correspond to the problem. 11

The subject of this thesis has been approached in many different ways. This makes it more difficult to perceive the relevance of the texts used. The subject of the thesis is not really a “yes or no” question, but rather a question with a great number of answers, ideas, and visions.

Among the authors of the sources used in the thesis there has been optimists and pessimists, more or less disguised. Authors like Van Gerven, Bellier and Wilson, and Pagden write in a quite positive way about the “European project”, while for example Hindes and Jolly tends to take up a less positive attitude towards it. Interesting about the sources used is that most of the sources treating the lives and visions of de Gaulle and Monnet tend to have an “overly” positive jargon when discussing the statesmen’s deeds. This urged the author to read their work with certain scepticism.

This research has been based mainly on secondary sources. A number of treaties concerning the EU has been used which may be seen as primary sources. There is one secondary source (e.g. Pattison de Ménil 1977) which was published for almost 30 years ago, however, this source was considered valid since it treated the vision of a man already passed away at that time.

Most of the material used in this thesis is printed material. Articles used have been published in professional texts of good repute. Internet sources make it difficult to know whether information is credible or not. It is crucial to know who lies behind the information since it could be a private person as well as an organization. Organizations such as the World Bank, the UN, etc. have a high degree of credibility. Nevertheless does this mean that these web pages could not be misused for the purpose of distributing propaganda. The internet sources used in this thesis have been the homepage of the EU and the homepage of the University of Gothenburg.

10 Ibid. p, 64-67.
11 Ibid. p, 159-164.
3 Monnet and de Gaulle

In the following chapters a number of factors relevant to identity building will be discussed. First, however, this chapter will discuss and compare the visions for “Europe” of two classical “statesmen” which may be considered representative for the two main directions taken by “European visionaries” in general – Charles de Gaulle and Jean Monnet.

The vision of a “United Europe” has a long history; however, the ‘modern’ idea of a European “Union” took form during and after World War II. There are to main “ideas” of a united Europe which may be represented by Jean Monnet (1888-1979) and Charles de Gaulle (1890-1970). These two classical politicians may be considered important since Monnet is by many considered to be the “father” of the EU and the direction it has taken; and de Gaulle is interesting since his idea of Europe and Europe as a Union represents an opposite standpoint. Both de Gaulle and Monnet recognized the realities of cultural, commercial, and political interdependence in Europe. However, they wanted to shape that interdependence in fundamentally different ways. How did these two politicians regard European history and culture, and the creation of a European identity? Could the “situation” of the Union today have been different depending on which ‘model’ (Monnet’s or de Gaulle’s) the European leaders had chosen?

3.1 Jean Monnet

In short, Monnet believed that national sovereignties eventually would merge into a European sovereignty in a not too distant future. To facilitate that event national sovereignties had to be progressively dismantled. He understood the impossibility of persuading governments to give up sovereignty; however, he considered it possible to persuade them to yield major attributes of their sovereignty in a limited economic sector. Monnet basically believed that a change in institutions would cause citizens of the European nation states to conform their thought and actions to show allegiance to a united Europe. He stressed that equality before common rules was urgently needed between nations as well as between individuals.12

“There will be no peace in Europe if States are reconstituted on a basis of national sovereignty with all that implies in terms of prestige politics and economic protectionism. If the nations of Europe adopt defensive positions again, huge armies will be necessary again (…) The nations of Europe are too circumscribed to give their people the prosperity made possible, and hence necessary, by modern conditions. They will need larger markets. And they will have to refrain from using a major proportion of their resources to maintain “key” industries needed for national defence and made mandatory by the concept of sovereign, protectionist States, as we knew them before 1939.”

In 1950 the Schuman Declaration was announced by the French Foreign minister Robert Schuman. This plan was initiated by Monnet himself and based very much upon his suggestions. The High Authority was to consist of technocrats who were to act independently

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of the memberstates’ governments, and it was to provide ‘overall direction’ and function as a mediator whenever there was a conflict of interests. In the case of the ECSC Monnet insisted upon the necessity of a High Authority, a parliamentary assembly, and a court. The High Authority was to be given the responsibility of shared sovereignty.\textsuperscript{14} However, the strictly economic cooperation of the ECSC was not the first vision Monnet had for Europe. Before he came up with the proposal of a Coal and Steel Community he also tried to convince the leaders of Europe to extend their cooperation to a united army for Europe. At that time his efforts were in vain, but throughout his whole career he actively worked for integrating Europe through “the Action Committee for the United States of Europe”. He made his voice heard on all issues he considered to be of importance to the Community, e.g. a European Political Union, an economic and monetary union, good relations with the USA, development of common policies, and respect for the European institutions. Monnet also supported the enlargement of the Community and believed that any European country with a democratic political system should be allowed to join the Community.\textsuperscript{15}

Monnet put great emphasis on the need for strong, democratic institutions. He also claimed the moral and human aspects of the European idea to be of great importance. He argued that:

“In our national life, principles of freedom, equality and democracy have been accepted and applied because people managed after centuries of striving to give them concrete institutional forms – elections, parliaments, courts of justice, universal education, freedom of speech and information. With national frontiers, men long ago found civilized ways of dealing with conflicts of interest: they no longer needed to defend themselves by force. Rules and institutions established equality of status. The poorer and weaker organized themselves to exert greater influence. The more powerful and the less-favoured recognized their common interest. Human nature had not changed. It was human behaviour that had been changed by common institutions under conditions providing at least a minimum of material well-being, which is essential to all societies.”\textsuperscript{16}

He went on arguing that a new form of relations between nation States should not only be based on cooperation, but on the ‘Community spirit’ – “which places the emphasis on the common good and entrusts the task of administering it to strong institutions”. He saw Europe as the testing ground for “a vision of mankind with a universal dimension”\textsuperscript{17}. Monnet understood that this “vision” had to be introduced in a small-scaled way or it would not be accepted.

“There was a well-conceived method in this apparent madness. All of us working with Monnet well understood how irrational it was to carve a limited economic sector out of the jurisdiction of national governments and subject that sector to the sovereign control of supranational institutions. Yet, with his usual pascipacity, Monnet recognized that the very irrationality of this scheme might provide the pressure to achieve exactly what he wanted – the triggering of

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid. Quotation. p, 30.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid. p, 30.
a chain reaction. The awkwardness and complexity resulting from the singling out of coal and steel would drive member governments to accept the idea of pooling other production as well.  

3.2 Charles de Gaulle

Charles de Gaulle had a different idea about Europe. Instead of the transnational European integration which Monnet stressed for the “united Europe”, de Gaulle argued for a “Europe des patries” – a Europe of the fatherlands. He was both a partisan of European unity and a critic of the transnational integration which dominated the process of European integration at the time.19

De Gaulle was sceptic about the idea of even modest constraints of state autonomy through supranational policies of international organizations. He argued the debate over European integration to be a battle between two visions of Europe – that of utopian myths of supranational power, and that of a ‘confederation’ in which sovereign states could not be overruled by any other in economic, social, and political matters. This conception was shared by Monnet, however, his normative evaluation was the opposite. De Gaulle rejected any attempt to decrease the sovereignty of the member states; hence he preferred to view the Treaty of Rome (The Treaty of Rome was signed on 25 March 1957 by the six original member states. The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) was signed at the same time and these two treaties are commonly known as the Treaties of Rome20) as an “improved treaty of commerce”.21 His view on European integration was, as his politics was in general, flexible and varying over time; it may be summarized as putting the interests of governments in promoting the economic welfare of the citizens, and powerful domestic ‘producer-groups’ first. De Gaulle is widely known as a nationalist. “In this view, the EU has been designed primarily to increase export opportunities for industrialists and farmers, to modernize the economies of European governments, to coordinate effective regulation of environmental and other externalities, and to stabilize the macroeconomic performance of its member states.”22

It is commonly argued that the difference between Monnet’s and the de Gaulle’s view of Europe was that of a “United States of Europe” and a “European Union”.23 De Gaulle argued that Europe would have to be built by and through politique – there had to be dedication to a great and transcendent goal. He believed that any realistic European confederation had to be built on the firm realities of the nation-states. A supranational European “civil society” did not, by itself, have the authority or the capacity to act politically.24

It seems as if de Gaulle believed that Europe possessed a historical, spiritual, cultural, “poetic”, and political heritage which did not receive its rightful place in the “narrow, soulless, and technocratic” understanding of common European inheritance. The economic heritage was only secondary to him. De Gaulle argued that there could not be any other Europe than a

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22 Ibid. Quotation. ch, III(a).
Europe of states, since it was the states, and only the states, that created the Economic Community. He argued in a speech in 1951, that Europeans must gradually and deliberately create their own federation with each state delegating a part of its sovereignty to a common confederal state; especially in economics, defense, and culture.25

To de Gaulle Europe were a culture and civilization as well as an interdependent economic and social community. He believed that European unity was not only possible but also natural because the European people formed a common “civilizational” whole. He tried to integrate tradition and modernity into the meaning of Europe – to him, Europe was a common civilization inseparable from its Christian origins.26

De Gaulle’s idea of Europe and European politics may be seen as striving towards some sort of unification of Western Europe or Europe in itself, or as a means to strengthen the independence and influence of France. These interpretations of de Gaulle’s politics are often described as either “Cathedral-building” or “Mosaic-building”. With Cathedral-building it is meant that France is regarded to be the foremost building stone and the most important instrument in the unification of Europe “from the Atlantic ocean to the Urals”. The two half’s of Europe (East and West) needed to be equally powerful so that none was dominating. Europe also needed to demonstrate its independence towards the USA, and together with the USA and Asia it would produce a balance of power which would preserve peace in the world.27

In the other interpretation – Mosaic-building – de Gaulle’s main goal is seen as constantly strengthening and increasing the independence and “grandeur” of France. With the support of Western Europe France would be able to pursue a power politics which would fulfil his dream of France as “the Great nation”. Here Britain is seen as a potential concurrent of the leading position. De Gaulle’s negative attitude towards American foreign policies, the NATO, and sometimes the UN is explained by France’s need for more influence at the global arena.28

However, it is not clear whether de Gaulle’s “European goals” ever became more important than his “French ambitions”. What can be said is that de Gaulle considered there to be common European social and cultural values which ought to be fortified and spread; and that, in the long-term, the unification of Western Europe was one of his main goals. The unification of all of Europe (from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals) was merely a short-term goal in order to enervate the American influence in Western Europe. Thus, de Gaulle’s politics may be argued to fit into both interpretations – the Cathedral-building and the Mosaic-building. In both cases France (or the nation state) was considered the most important element.29 But, there are also times where a greater dream than that of “the Great nation” is possible to detect.

“For, in our time, the only quarrel worth-while is that of mankind. It is mankind that must be saved, made to live and enabled to advance. We, who lie between the Atlantic and the Urals; we, who are Europe, possessing with Europe’s daughter America the principal sources and resources of civilization (...) why do

26 Ibid. p, 138-139.
28 Ibid. p, 6-7.
29 Ibid. p, 103-108.
we not erect, all together, the fraternal organization which will lend its hand to others? (...) Let us do this – not that they may be the pawns of our policies, but to improve the chances of life and peace. How much more worth-while that would be than territorial demands, ideological claims, imperialist ambitions which are leading the world to its death.”

3.3 Summary

Jean Monnet seemed convinced that national sovereignties would eventually merge into a gathered ‘European’ sovereignty. He realized the difficulty to persuade nation states to give up their sovereignty, therefore the European integration was to start with a limited economic cooperation. From there changes in institutions would cause nation states to give up their sovereignty and European citizens to show allegiance to a united Europe. Monnet greatly emphasized the role of strong, democratic institutions.

Charles de Gaulle, on the other hand, argued strongly for a united Europe based on sovereign nation states. He disapproved any restriction of the sovereignty of nation states. The interests of governments in promoting economic welfare were to be the primary aim of European integration. At the same time it is possible to detect a greater “idea” of Europe in his vision. He argued that Europe had a common “spiritual” and “political” heritage and that it had to be united by “mystique” and not, as Monnet argued, through “politiqute”. De Gaulle considered Monnet’s view of European inheritance to be “soulless and technocratic”. Even though de Gaulle’s idea of Europe was based on Europe as a culture and civilization, rather than social and economic; it is not clear whether his European visions ever became more important than his French ambitions.

It may be argued that Monnet and de Gaulle had the same goal – to create a “Europe” that was stronger and a Europe of peaceful cooperation. Nevertheless, the two statesmen had very different views on how to achieve this goal. Monnet was more of a pragmatist while de Gaulle was characterized by his moral and ‘political absolutism’. One may also question what role the wish for “their” nation (both being French) to regain its fading greatness played. To de Gaulle this was one of his main goals. It is harder to find any evidence showing this to be a motive for Monnet. Perhaps Monnet realized that France’s time of greatness had passed, at least if one are to judge by what was said in the Schuman-declaration which was mainly created by Monnet:

“The contribution to which an organized and living Europe can bring to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations. In taking upon herself for more than 20 years the role of champion of a united Europe, France has always had as her essential aim the service of peace. A united Europe was not achieved and we had war. Europe will not be made all at once,

It seems as if Monnet’s idea of Europe was that of a European “community”, while that of de Gaulle was a Europe as a “society”. The difference between these two will be discussed later in this thesis.

As the ideas of “Europe” of these two statesmen have been discussed the thesis will proceed by discussing what course the development of the EU took, and what problems that have arisen from it.

4 The EU and the Democratic Deficit

In this chapter a brief description of the EU and its development will be provided. During the last decades the Union has struggled with a ‘democratic deficit’ which has given cause to European “identity politics”. The concept of “Europeanization” is also frequently used in this context. Hence the European ‘democratic deficit’ and the concept of “Europeanization” will be discussed here. In relation to the democratic deficit stands the topical creation of a European constitution; but since a Constitution may not in itself provide legitimate democracy and solidarity, this thesis will concentrate on what possibly can provide it – the creation of a ‘European’ identity.

This section will also provide a concise discussion on when the economic cooperation of the European Community turned into a political union, and in what way the idea of a united Europe has evolved.

The EU started as a project to secure a lasting peace between France and Germany. This was to be achieved through integrating the coal and steel industries of Western Europe and in 1951 the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was set up. It consisted of six members – Belgium, West Germany, Italy, France, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands. The ECSC was ruled by an independent supranational body – the High Authority – and its first president was Jean Monnet, the person behind the proposal of the ECSC.33

The cooperation between the countries led to further integration, e.g. the treaties of Rome creating the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM or EAEC) and the European Economic Community (EEC) forming a “common market”. In 1967 the three institutions were merged creating the European Community (EC) and the Commission, the Council of ministers, and the European Parliament was set up. Since then the European Community has evolved into a Union (EU) of 25 members34 with a cooperation much more extended than that of the beginning.35

Today the EU consists of “…a common market of goods, persons, services, and capital subject to free competition and with a common commercial policy…”36

The Union may be divided into three pillars: The first pillar contains the three initial communities – the EC, the EAEC, and the ECSC (until it expired in 2002). The second pillar concerns the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the third pillar constitutes the Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCC), or the “Justice and Home Affairs” as it was formerly called. Of these three pillars the first is the most supranational in nature therefore the pillar where the democratic legitimacy of the European “construction” is most developed.37

34 The EU has grown in waves of accessions. Despite the six original members (Belgium, West Germany, Italy, France, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands) Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined in 1973 followed by Greece in 1981. Spain and Portugal joined in 1986 and Sweden, Finland, and Austria in 1995. In 2004 ten new countries joined the European Union: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Bulgaria and Romania are expected to follow in 2007 and membership negotiations were started with Croatia and Turkey in 2005.
37 Ibid. p. 8-9.
4.1 From Economic Cooperation to Political Union

The Union’s political nature is relatively young since the EC was mainly based on economical cooperation. The ECSC, on which the EC was founded, was set up as an economic institution.38 “Member States built the EC on a solid foundation of informal economic integration stretching back to the late nineteenth century, which they now shaped in particular geographical and functional directions.”39 Even though the ideas of a more integrated community through a common defense and political community, with Jean Monnet leading the way, were present, it “went too far, too soon after the end of the war”. At that time, the “functional economic communities” were to most of its members enough cooperation in a broader European context. The anti-supranationalist climate in Europe indicated that it was not yet ready for a cooperation more integrated than in economical terms.40

During the 1970’s the EC suffered from the international financial instability and the oil crisis which prevailed. With this followed a period of disbelief in the European cooperation. During the 1980’s the question of increased European integration was of immediate interest and the EC gained newfound popularity. Goals of a European monetary union (EMU) to consolidate a single market and of strengthening Europe’s political cohesion were set, and the end of the Cold War encouraged the memberstates towards a common foreign and security policy.41 This deepened economic integration was a response to a new era of globalization with rapid technological changes and increased international competition. To keep up the Single Market Program was presented and in the mid-1980’s and The Single European Act42 came into force as completion of the internal market, constituting a link between market integration and the future goal of a monetary union.43

In the end of the 1980’s and the beginning of the 1990’s changes in the political context of the EC started to take expression at intergovernmental conferences (IGC’s). However, a political union was not identified but rather the elements of it – “greater democratic legitimacy, more efficient decisionmaking, coherent socioeconomic policies, and the development of a common foreign and security policy”44. It was not until 1990 that the European Council declared its aim to transform the EC “from an entity mainly based on economic integration and political cooperation into a union of a political nature, including a common foreign and security policy”45.

In 1991 the EC became the EU through the Maastricht Treaty, which cornerstones was the EMU and the common foreign and security policies. Europe had now set out a new goal of becoming a global power unified both politically and economically.46 The political union set out by the Maastricht Treaty covered a large number of institutional and policy issues such as majority voting in the Council, the role of the Parliament, the social policy of the Union, and the transformation of the previous political cooperation into a common foreign and security

40 Ibid. p, 46.
41 Ibid. p, 7-8.
42 The Single European Act (SEA) was the first major revision of the Treaty of Rome. Its goal was to remove remaining barriers between countries, increase harmonization, and thus increasing the competitiveness of European countries. It was signed in Luxembourg and the Hague in 1986 and came into force in 1987.
44 Ibid. Quotation. p, 244.
45 Quote from the EC Bulletin Vol.6 1990. Ibid. p, 245.
46 Ibid. p, 7-8.
policy.\textsuperscript{47} However, the Maastricht Treaty was not met with enthusiasm by the European peoples, especially the pace of which European integration took place. The political establishment tried to create a more open EU which was responsive to its citizens without much success.\textsuperscript{48}

4.2 The Democratic Deficit

The democratic deficit of the EU has been described as “a gap between formal legitimation and material democratic deficiency”\textsuperscript{49}. In 1988 a committee of the European Parliament described the EU’s democratic deficit as following:

“the combination of two phenomena: (i) the transfer of power from the Member States to the EC; (ii) the exercise of these powers at Community level by institutions other than the European Parliament, even though, before the transfer, the national parliaments held the power to pass laws in the areas concerned.”\textsuperscript{50}

The democratic deficit of the EU has been identified in a number of ways, in general it may be described as European institutions’ failure to live up to democratic standards of accountability and legitimacy. The main problem has been, and still is, the absence of a European ‘demos’.\textsuperscript{51}

There is a tension between an approach to constitutionalism (constitutional engineering) and one that emphasizes politics as cultural recognition in constitution building. Thus, the challenge is not simply a procedural one where emphasis is put solely on ‘finding the right mix of liberal democratic institutions, procedures and principles’.\textsuperscript{52}

“A constitution (...) defines what ‘constitutes’ a polity. This implies ‘who’ constitutes the polity as well, and the process by which they define themselves as members of that polity.”\textsuperscript{53} The ‘consent’ of the ‘people’ is necessary for a liberal democratic order to call itself legitimate. However, this requires that those who share a constitution agree upon being a ‘people’.\textsuperscript{54}

The EU may be argued to have two channels of which it ‘connects’ with its ‘citizens’ – indirect channels of representation via national governments, and direct channels of representation via the European Parliament. In large, the problem of the democratic deficit is whether these channels are satisfactory in connecting the opinions of the citizens to the outcome of EU decision-making. A limited popular participation in, and identification with, the EU may lead to elitist decision-making without reflecting upon popular wishes.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid. p, 7-8.
\textsuperscript{50} Hindess, B. (2002). Deficit by Design. Quotation. p, 30.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid. p, 30-31.
\textsuperscript{52} Wiener A, Della Sala V. (1997). p, 597-598.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid. Quotation. p, 598.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid. p, 600-601.
Thus, the increasingly political nature of EU has caused a need for legitimacy when the modes of legitimation, namely that of international organizations, are inadequate. To overcome the legitimacy problem the EU must establish its own democratic credentials. The establishment of a European constitution to enhance European integration and sense of belonging, and reduce the democratic deficit is highly topical at this time since it was not long ago the first ‘European constitution’ was rejected by the people in some of its memberstates. Fossum and Menéndez argue that no matter how democratic a constitution is, it cannot provide democracy alone. “…the Constitution is best understood as a frame or map that ground and enables democratic political action, the solving of conflicts, and the coordination of action in view of common interest. The higher democratic dignity of a truly democratic constitution should come hand in hand with the central role of ordinary statues as the articulation of the common will.”

A number of ideas and measures have been taken with the purpose of integrating within the EU. This has given rise to a phenomenon called “Europeanization”. Interesting with this phenomenon is that there seem to be difficulties in defining “Europeanization” in any other way than that it has to do with the idea that EU has an impact on structures, national policies, and national governance. Thus, in a broad sense “Europeanization” may be described as a process of adaptation or as “the process of the external becoming internal”. It may also be described as a cultural integration process where national identity is redefined. All these “definitions” are common and will be dealt with later in this thesis.

The process of ‘Europeanization’ or European integration has lead to the establishment of European citizenship. The concept of European citizenship was from the beginning linked to the concept of European identity. The question of a citizens’ Europe goes back to the beginning of the 1970’s when the heads of the memberstates agreed on the establishment of special rights for the citizens of Europe. In the Treaty of the EU (Title 1, Article B) it is stated that: “The Union shall itself set the following objectives: - to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of its Member States through the introduction of a citizenship of the Union”. The primary aim of the establishment of a European citizenship was to reduce the gap between the EU institutions and the peoples of the memberstates. However, the establishment of European citizenship to promote the feeling of being ‘European’ seems to have made little progress so far. According to Eurobarometer surveys EU citizens are still more aware of rights from which they can benefit more – that is, the right to work or study in other memberstates.

4.3 The Idea of European Unity

The idea of a European cooperation or unity may be found in literary works and political thought back to the thirteenth century. Early visions of a united Europe are based on limitation of the possibility for sovereign states to independently decide upon and engage in war. These early ideas of peacekeeping cooperation propose organization through the

57 Ibid. Quotation, p 409.
establishment of European institutions. However, most visions of European cooperation have been based on the idea of the nation state as the central actor - international cooperation within a European framework.61

Frederic J. Fransen argues that European unity is a response to “the problems caused by lodging unlimited sovereignty in the governments of Europe’s nation states”.62 He also argues that what causes the problem with European unity is that Europe’s most unique contribution to politics is the nation state. The problem with European unity is basically overcoming a defining characteristic of Europe itself.63

There may be two problems derived from basing Europe on the nation state. First, national sovereignty does not provide mechanisms for resolving disputes between states – there is a need for a higher authority. Otherwise, interstate relations may be regarded as nothing else than war by other means. Second, there is a need to compete in a world where the market is dominated by the USA. “The European nation state has become increasingly unable to provide an optimal or even efficient scale.”64

In general terms one may say that these two are the problems of peace and greatness, and these are the very two directions which separate the two main political ideological ‘wings’ of European politics. Jean Monnet (by many considered the founder of the EU) may be considered a good representative for what has emerged into rationalism and ‘constitutional patriotism’, while Charles de Gaulle may represent the “opposition” which greatest concern is to keep the Union’s supranationalist features as few as possible. If applying the Union’s motto (“United in Diversity”) on these two wings one may argue that the first emphasizes ‘unity’ more while the second puts more emphasis on ‘diversity’.

4.4 Summary

In this chapter the concept of ‘Europeanization’ has been established to concern what impact on structures, national policies, and national governance the EU has. To this concept the idea of citizenship and cultural identity may be linked – two concepts which will be discussed later on in this thesis.

The original aim of a European cooperation was to preserve peace by economical means. For this the ECSC was set up. The idea of European unity has a history reaching back to the thirteenth century and the aim of preserving peace has throughout time remained to be the main goal. The political nature of the Union is young considering that its political aim was not clearly stated until 1990 by the European Council. The European Community became the European Union by the Maastricht Treaty shortly afterwards. This “new” political nature of the EU has caused problems when the European peoples have expressed dissatisfaction with e.g. the rapid integration taking place.

The problems linked to the EU have reflected the democratic deficit burdening the EU. There are a number of ways of which the democratic deficit has been defined but, the main problem is the lack of a European “demos”. It has become increasingly clear that a European “demos”

63 Ibid. p, 2.
64 Ibid. p, 2-3.
cannot be created solely by procedural factors, but also that emphasizing politics as cultural recognition is important.

The problem of the democratic deficit is mainly whether there is a satisfactory connection between the citizens’ opinions and the outcome of European decision-making. Thus, there is a legitimacy-problem which must be overcome by establishing ‘European’ credentials. However, the establishment of a ‘European’ constitution does not in itself provide a ‘European’ “demos”.

When comparing the development of the Union with Monnet’s and de Gaulle’s visions for Europe it is interesting to see that even though Monnet is claimed to be the ‘father’ of Europe and the Union to be based on his vision it seems as if the Union is based more on the ideas of de Gaulle. De Gaulle’s idea of a European society with space for diversity has caused fewer problems for the ‘Union-building’ than the ‘communitarian’ vision of Monnet – a vision which emphasizes unity in a way leaving less room for diversity.

Next chapter will discuss a number of definitions of concepts (some of them already mentioned) to clarify in what way these concepts will be used throughout the rest of the thesis, and also to stress the importance of distinguishing between the different concepts when dealing with the subject of the thesis. In the discussion of European identity-building these concepts are important to understand what ‘kind’ of identity the Union is trying to create.
5 Definitions of Concepts

In this section the concepts of “society” and “community”, “civic” and “civil”, and “public” and “private” will be examined. Here the difference between the ‘pairs’ will be discussed as well as in what way these concepts are linked to each other. In the discussion of identity-building and nation-building these concepts are, and have been, important cornerstones. In relation to the ‘Europe’ and the Union these concepts turns out to be quite complicated.

Central to all these concepts are the “citizen”. It is the “citizen” that links the ‘pairs’ together. Below there will be a short discussion of the concept of “citizen”, while the concept of “citizenship”, put in relation to the EU, will be examined in the next chapter. This since the Union bases both its identity-policies and its policies for increased legitimacy, i.e. its efforts to create an “Europeanness”, on the ‘European citizenship’.

This section will first treat the concept of “society” and “community”. This is important since it may be argued to be a fundamental difference between the two. This difference may also be the difference which the Union so far has not managed to overcome.

Second, the concepts of “civic” and “civil” will be brought up. Both these concepts and the concepts of “society” and “community” are in close relation to the concepts of “Gesellschaft” and Gemeinschaft”. However, the last two will not be elaborated on until later in this thesis in relation to identity and identity building. Therefore, the section on “civic” and “civil” may appear somewhat scarce. However, this division has been considered necessary by the author.

The idea of “citizen” and “citizenship” goes back to the ancient philosophers. Aristotle defined the “good” citizen as one “who had both the knowledge and the capacity for ruling and being ruled”. A citizen was one who participated in legislative and judicial deliberations. To Aristotle, the political community was synonymous with “the whole of the citizenry”. This was in contrast to Plato’s idea of citizenship as something severed from the idea of meaningful participation in the making of political decisions.65 Here it is possible to distinguish citizenship as both participation and non-participation, thus the citizens is both a participant and a subject in political processes.

In the ancient Greece there were some experiments made with federal organizations and other systems for unifying military and diplomatic actions of several “allied” cities. This idea has some resemblance to that of the Union. “Thus under the arrangement called “isopolity”, a citizen of one city enjoyed citizenship in all of the member cities; in another form of federation, “sympolity”, the citizen of the individual city also possessed membership in the federal union.”66

In the middle of the seventeenth century Thomas Hobbes claimed the citizen to be synonymous to the subject, arguing that man was an apolitical being. As a member of society man remained individualistic and isolated. Society was in itself simply a product of an agreement between individuals which had made the same choice. This isolated single agreement could not create a common identity or corporate unity among the individuals since society was characterized by political alienation.67 In Hobbes theory there was no community

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66 Ibid. Quotation. p, 67.
67 Ibid. p, 243-244.
since society consisted solely of several wills aiming at often conflicting aims which could not issue in a single act. There were no consensus in society, thus Hobbes’ sovereign did not have any community to represent. In a community there must be consensus – in a society, there need be no consensus.68

5.1 “Society” and “Community”

With the emergence of liberalism a certain view of society, community, and citizenship emerged on which the Western democracies today are based. “The political society is formed by an act of consent in which each man resigns his natural power ‘into the hands of the community’; that is, to an impersonal authority. (...) Thus authority comes to be identified with the community, while the individuals who are actually entrusted to act on behalf of the community do so only because they are ‘authorized’ to act.”69 About society it was said that its power was impersonal and directed against all of the members indifferently. “Society was no single individual: it was none of us, yet it was all of us.”70 Locke implied in his various elaborations on the subject, that a “community” existed before civil society was invented. “...Men gave up all their natural power to the society which they enter into, and the community put the legislative power into such hands they think fit with this trust...”. In the event that a government violated the trust of the citizens, power would be reverted to “society”, which would then act as a coherent group.71

The concept of “civil society” has generally been used as synonym for the kind of society that is desirable. It has become a metaphor for “the good” society and has received an image as “...a desirable social order or self-image of modernity defined in normative terms.”72 Normative terms such as non-discrimination, non-violence, trust and cooperation, freedom, and democracy are common and present the self-image of civil society. Edwards argues that ‘civic engagement’ or ‘civic culture’ are independent variables which provide societies with norms, and by expecting favours to be returned and verifying templates for collaboration, reinforces cooperative behaviour which in turn brings conformity to ‘civic values’. By this process a fair distribution of positive social norms among the population will create a “society that is civil”. Thus, civil society may be argued to represent the institutionalization of ‘civility’, or be described as a society that is civil. When applying these ideas and values at the transnational level the concept of “global civil society” is more appropriate to use. This type of society is by Edwards described as: “a mechanism by which new global norms are developed and cemented around notions of universal human rights, international cooperation and the peaceful resolution of differences in the global arena.”73 However, he also points out that we are at least a generation away from any kind of “cosmopolitan democracy”.74

DeLue describes modern society as a group of people who “think of themselves as individuals with the freedom to define their own agenda and course in life”. However, these individuals must accommodate themselves to the “civilized” forms of freedom, which means that the condition of their individuality is that they “accord to others the same respect for basic rights that they want others to accord to them”. There will also be times when it is necessary for the

69 Ibid. Quotation. p, 311.
70 Ibid. Quotation. p, 311.
71 Ibid. p, 276.
73 Ibid. Quotation. p, 39.
74 Ibid. P, 38-76.
individuals to sacrifice aspects of their freedom to maintain the society that upholds it. Thus, the society depends on the balancing between obligations and duties – the combination of individuality and a sense of citizenship which primarily considers the larger needs of society (civic virtue commitments).75

Both Hobbes and Locke did, as did Rousseau, in their theories of social contracts suppose a state of nature where men arrive at “that crisis when the strength of each individual is insufficient to overcome the resistance of the obstacles to his preservation”76. Thus, the human being, or the individual, has come to a point where he must find a new way to protect himself and for this the only solution would be some kind of a social contract. Civil society is a construction.77

5.2 “Civic” and “Civil”

Relevant in the case of the Union is also the difference between “civil society” and “civic society”. “Civil society” may be argued to be ‘the realm of organized social life’. Van Gerven claims the civil society to be distinct from other groups in five ways:

- It is concerned with public ends rather than private ends;
- It relates to the state in some way but does not seek control over or position within the state;
- It encompasses pluralism and diversity (…);
- It does not seek to represent the complete set of interests of a person or a community;
- And it should be distinguished from civic community or society…78

Civic society consists of “interperson trust-building associations”, while civil society groups have an explicitly public or political purpose. Civic society and civic community is closely related to social capital, which refers to connections among individuals – i.e. social networks and the social norms that arise from them. This relates in turn to the concept of “civic virtue”; thus, social capital is crucial for the quality and consolidation of democracy, and in that way also for legitimation. Social capital generates “active participation in public affairs, widespread political equality, norms of solidarity, trust, and tolerance, and a thick structure of associations with multiple memberships [that] correlate highly with one another”.79 Thus, civil society and civic society are crucial instruments to the development of democracy in the search of democratic legitimacy.80

5.3 “Public” and “Private”

“The definition of ‘public sphere’ comprises the public expression of opinion of all actors of the ‘civil society’, which includes interest groups such as trade unions or public interest groups, political associations and political parties.”81

77 Ibid. p, 322-328.
79 Ibid. Quotation. p, 233.
80 Ibid. p, 230-234.
Habermas describes the public sphere as a sphere between civil society and the state. This is a place where critical public discussion of matters of common interest may take place and is institutionally guaranteed. In general “public” refers to events and occasions which are ‘open’ to all, in contrast “private” refers to closed exclusive affairs. However, there are “public” areas, i.e. public buildings, which need not be open to public traffic but nevertheless are “public” anyhow. Also, the state is the “public authority” since it is to promote the “public or common welfare of its rightful members”. The public sphere always appears in contrast to the private sphere. There cannot be a “public” without a “private”. Depending on the circumstances, either the organs of the state or the media, like the press, which provide communication among members of the public, may be counted as ‘public organs’.

The concept of “public” goes back to the ancient Greek societies where the public life went on in the market place (agora). The public sphere was constituted in discussion, but could also be constituted by forms of consultation, sitting in the court of law, or by common action. In ancient Greece, the public sphere was perceived as a realm of freedom and permanence. In the Middle Ages, the public sphere was not constituted as a social realm, but rather as a ‘publicness’ (or publicity) of representation. It was something like a status attribute. The prince and his equals represented their lordship not for but before the people. Public activities i.e. dance and theatre was not public precisely because it was presented before the people. However, in the eighteenth century the “public” changed into an entity having an objective existence over and against the ruler. The “public” became the ‘public authority’ and the statesmen became ‘public persons’. It was not until the eighteenth century that the “public” as it is known today emerged as the sphere of private people coming together as a public. The “public” became a part of civil society which established itself as an area of trade and social labour governed by its own laws. As for today, the public sphere may be described as a “communication space” where citizens meet in order to communicate and in which media have had an increased role during the last fifty years. Thus, public sphere is the factual basis of the expression of interests by and for citizens.

“Public spheres emerge in the process in which people debate controversial issues in the public. The more we debate issues, the more we engage each other in public discourses, the more we actually create political communities.”

Risse argues in relation to Europe that the public sphere constitutes a social construction where social and discursive practices create a “common horizon of reference”, and a transnational community of communications. In the case of Europe, media plays a great role in the development of a public sphere since the public awareness of European questions, and scepticism about a European public sphere depends on to what extent media pays attention to European questions. However, little attention or not to European questions; the use of similar criteria of relevance and similar frames of reference by media when discussing European issues enhances the emergence of a transnational community of communication. Thus, it would be wrong to argue European institution-building to lead to the emergence of a transnational European public sphere. Rather, these kind of perspectives need to be backed up

83 Ibid. Quotation. p, 2.
84 Ibid. p, 2-26.
by social practice and contestation. In the ‘community of communication’ one need not agree on all things, however, one need accept other “citizens” as legitimate speakers in a common public sphere, that is, contradicting statements must be taken seriously in a democratic polity. Thus, a certain degree of collective identification with ‘Europe’ is needed for the emergence of a community of communication. However, it does not imply a deep sense of loyalty towards each other. “Thus, a European public sphere as a transnational community of communication creates a collective European identity in the process of arguing and debating the common European fate.” Hence, Risse argues that a ‘common European perspective’ simply requires policy questions to be framed as issues of common transnational concern in the European public space. He also argues there to be two common understandings of Europe: Europe as a moral community (human rights and democracy), and Europe as a legal community (prevailing under the rule of law).

Risse also argues it possible that a European public sphere exists that extends beyond the national public spheres:

1. “if and when the same (European) themes are controversially debated at the same time at similar levels of attention across national public spheres and media;
2. if and when similar frames of reference, meaning structures and patterns of interpretation are used across national public spheres and media;
3. if and when a transnational community of communication emerges in which speakers and listeners recognize each other as legitimate participants in a common discourse that frames the particular issues as common European problems.”

Based on these criteria Risse argues a European public sphere to begin to emerge, however, it is just at the beginning of its development into a “full-fledged” community of communication. One cannot see expressions of interests taking place only at one level in the Union. There is no homogenous European public sphere (yet?). However, expression of interest (or communication) takes place within different national and transnational publics.

Van Gerven claims that even though public debate in Europe today is argued to be mainly among “intellectuals” and politicians, radio and television provide “outstanding debating groups and constructive talk shows”. Even though the ‘citizens’ do not really join in the discussions, they are given the opportunity to react and ask questions. However, this makes the existence of ‘objective’ and well-informed media much more important.

5.4 Summary

This section has discussed distinguishing between a number of concepts all closely linked to each other. First there has been established that the objects of all these concepts are the “citizens”. A citizen is a member of a society, a society which is constructed by consent. However, there need not be any particular consensus within a society between its citizens. Citizenship entails rights towards the State and the society. Community, on the other hand, may be seen as an “impersonal authority”. The community legitimizes the actions of trustees by “authorizing” them to act. In the community there must be consensus.

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88 Ibid. p, 2-8.
89 Ibid. Quotation. p, 9.
Society, then, seems to be a “group” of “citizens” constructed and restricted by rules e.g. laws;
while community is a “group” of “members” brought together by some other characteristics,
e.g. values, ethnicity etc.
“Societies might enjoy power and plenty and yet be poor in the vital element of community (...) fringeunity.”

Civic society and civil society has been established to be crucial for the development of
democracy. The “civic” is mainly related to connections among individuals, while the “civil”
relates more to the “public” and the “political” – that is, to the “We”. However, the social
networks related to “civic virtue” and social norms is crucial when it generates active
participation in public affairs, thus it is important in the search for democratic legitimacy.

The “public” and the “private” are dependent upon each other - there cannot be a public
without a private. The concept of “public” and “private” goes back to the ancient Greek
societies and the public life in the market place, however, today the public sphere is more of a
communication space where citizens are able meet to communicate. Media has played an
increasingly important role as forum for communication during the last fifty years. In short,
the public sphere can be described as “the factual basis of the expression of interests by and
for citizens”.

Some describe Europe as a “community of communication”, meaning that it uses “similar
criteria of relevance and similar frames of reference” in media when discussing European
issues. However, it should be noted that a certain degree of collective identification with
Europe is needed for it to become a “full-fledged” ‘community of communication’. A
European public sphere can from this point of view be argued to begin to take form; but it is
not yet fully developed. Van Gerven argues that citizens do not really take part in the
‘European’ public sphere, but they are “given the opportunity to react and ask questions”. He
also argues that this makes it even more important for media to remain “objective”. However,
one may ask if the possibility to react and ask questions is enough? There need to be a way for
the citizens to communicate with the politicians and ‘leaders’ or their questions will have no
effect. At the same time one should consider that the communication with the popularly
elected may not even be functioning at the nation state level in certain memberstates at the
time.

In the next chapter the concept of “citizenship” and its relevance to the EU will be discussed.
From this section it may be established that citizenship can be distinguished both as
participation and non-participation, leaving the citizens to be regarded as participants or
subjects; and that the idea of citizenship in a (federal) Union seems to be old, but the role of
the citizen in such a union remains undefined.

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6 Citizenship

The concept of “citizenship” is topical in the European case. The Union has based much of its integrational politics on the development of a European citizenship with increased relation between the Union and its citizens, decreasing the role of the nation states. Thus, the concept of “citizenship” has emerged from being national to being transnational. In this section the difference between national and transnational citizenship will be discussed, and also in what way the concept of “citizenship” has emerged. Here the meaning of being a “European” citizen is treated and what the criteria for “qualifying” as a “European” citizen are. Also, five different ways of understanding European ‘citizenship’ will be presented.

In the previous section “citizenship” has been defined both as participation and non-participation. In the European case a ‘citizenship’ may be argued to stand in between these two when the ‘citizens’ do not fully “participate”, however, there is a wish for them to do so in order to gain democratic legitimacy. In an article written by Meehan it may be learnt that “…both nationality and citizenship are social constructs imbued with ideological value which must be explained by what they mean to real participants in their various historical and social contexts”\(^{93}\). From this it may be argued that nationality can be based either on a contractual understanding of society, or a communitarian one. In the first, nationality and the rights of citizenship can be relatively easily acquired through law, in the second nationality is primarily inherited through blood-ties. The second may entail that the community is closed for those without the “right” inheritance.\(^{94}\)

6.1 National and Transnational Citizenship

Historically, the concept of “citizenship” has related to the political, or as Bellamy et.al argues - the state-related, dimension of membership. However, being a member of a political community means different things depending on the requirements of membership, and the meaning of membership changes from one political community to another.\(^{95}\)

The idea of citizenship originates from Greek political thought by which it was defined as an aspect of “democratic” political order. “Citizens where those members of a political society whose basic equality was established by the constitution recognizing them as entitled and capable of being rulers and ruled in turn.”\(^{96}\) This idea of equality for all members of a political community has remained a central feature of the idea of citizenship until this day.\(^{97}\)

Throughout history, the idea of citizenship has become increasingly “privatized”, meaning that it has shifted away from the ability and duty to be self-ruling to become increasingly conceived as ‘subjective’ rights. Today citizenship establishes a limit to the burdens and obligations that public power itself could impose upon “those subject to them”. Citizenship does today imply “a legal and status relationship, comprising obligations, entitlements and privileges”.\(^{98}\)

\(^{94}\) Ibid. p, 175.
\(^{96}\) Ibid. Quotation. p, 3.
\(^{97}\) Ibid. p, 3.
\(^{98}\) Ibid. p, 3.
Bellamy (et.al) argues that there were three processes which provided certain preconditions of democratic citizenship during the 19th and 20th centuries.

- **State-building**: “This phase created a sovereign political body possessing authority over all activities within a given territorial sphere, with those people residing within it becoming its legitimate subjects.”

- **The emergence of commercial and industrial economies**: “Markets (...) gradually broke down traditional social hierarchies and systems of ascribed status, fostering freedom of contract and equality before the law – particularly with regard to civic and economic rights.”

- **Nation-making**: “…involved the socialisation of the masses into a national consciousness suited to a market and industrial economy…”

These three phases became important for the development of democratic citizenship. The first phase provided the basis for regarding all persons as equals before the law, the second created a community of interest, and the third led citizens to consider themselves as a people – it created a sense of uniqueness. From this the idea of the modern citizen may be argued as the subject of the state, the active member of a democratic society and the fellow member of a national community.

Many argue that there exists three main ‘traditions’ of (modern) citizenship – the American, the French, and the British. The American citizenship is mostly concerned with relationships between minorities and the state, while the French one (marked by the Revolution) stresses the political dimension of citizenship, and the British is developed out of the emerge of the welfare-state and socio-economic traits. Naturally, these three traditions, or ‘models’, have had variations over time due to emphasizing the individual’s freedom and responsibility, or rights and the duty of the state to look after its citizens. The development of a European citizenship is characterized by a competition of these three conceptions.

### 6.2 What Does An EU Citizenship Imply?

In the end of the 1970’s, concerns about a possible democratic deficit in the EU (or at that time the EC) were raised. The EC seemed to acquire increasing influence over the everyday lives of European citizens. With the Maastricht treaty citizenship became established as an aspect of the political union. Thus all persons who were citizens of a memberstate were also citizens of the Union; however, the European citizenship could not replace the national citizenship.

“Nationals of one member state residing elsewhere in the Union have a right to vote or be a candidate in elections for the European Parliament and for municipal offices. They have the right to diplomatic and consular assistance from the representatives of other EU member states when travelling or living in a third country where their own country has no embassy or consular offices. They have the right to correspond with the institutions of the Union in any of its official languages, and they may petition the European Union.”

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100 Ibid. p, 4-5.
Clearly, access to EU citizenship remains dependent on being a national of a member state. Thus, the most important “characteristic” of Union membership remains a matter for the memberstates themselves to determine.

In its very transnational context, European citizenship has become an object of contrasting projects which neither aims at functioning as integrative in a modern citizenship on the European level, nor as strengthening the viability of nation-based citizenship when being under the pressure of an increasingly globalized and multicultural world. It may be argued that European citizenship – because of its transnational character – highlights the tension between the universalistic and the particularistic features of modern democratic citizenship.104

Many argue that from the beginning, the memberstates have looked for a compromise between four conceptions of citizenship – “to assert a common identity, and/or a single values system; to create specific rights for the citizen as a producer; to extend such rights to the citizen as a consumer; or to assert a more political citizenship, thus recognizing at last the new democratic legitimacy created by the Union.”105 The first ‘option’ to be launched was the assertion of a common identity in the 1970’s. Citizens of the memberstates were granted special rights and Union passports. There was also a period under which Union policies focused on and provided its ‘citizens’ with rights first as producers or workers, and later as consumers. After 1985 Union policies have been focusing mainly on emphasizing the symbolic and cultural dimensions of citizenship using means such as education, consciousness-raising campaigns, and constructing Euro-symbols. After the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty a series of rights have been created to give new opportunities for direct relationships between Europe and its individual citizens. Hence the national level has been bypassed through rights such as voting for the European Parliament, applying to a European Ombudsman, and the access to diplomatic representation abroad from one of the memberstates.106

European ‘citizenship’ may be understood as five different types of citizenship:

- **Market citizenship** – depicts European citizenship as compromising a core entitlement designed to facilitate market integration. However, economic transactions do not take place in a vacuum; they are embedded in a social and political context. European citizenship is not a freestanding institution emptied of political content. Hence, this view on European citizenship fails to recognize crucial elements of European citizenship.

- **Civic Republican European citizenship** – draws on the conception of citizenship as practice, as expressly political, dynamic and participatory. This active engagement in common affairs could approach European citizenship either in the form of “liberal communitarianism, thereby praising belonging, solidarity and fairness in a political community, or of a thicker notion of citizenship – one that embodies a common identity, common political values, and shared final ends”.107 However, both variants...

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106 Ibid. p, 123-124.
are likely to be criticised by those valuing cultural particularity of national communities high.

- **Deliberative European citizenship** – (or constitutional patriotism) is mainly based on Habermas notion of a supranationally shared political culture based on the rule of law, separation of powers, democracy, respects for human rights etc. Central to this model is a strong notion of participatory democracy and a vivid European public sphere. However, this approach is often argued unable to elicit subjective identification with the EU.

- **Corrective European citizenship** – share the ‘normative premise’ of constitutional patriotism but emphasizes the ethno-cultural traditions of the member states. Here a European civic public is argued to be able to coexist with national publics. Thus, “…national citizenship would be the realm of affinity and nationhood, European citizenship would be the realm of law and Enlightenment ideals”\(^{108}\). However, it is questioned whether the tension between the two opposing elements are so easily overcome.

- **Constructive European citizenship** – conceives the EU as ‘evolutionary and reflexive design’. Here citizenship is regarded not as “…an issue of either the Right (individual rights) or the Good (the community), but as a matter of calling into question the constructed senses of community and the self underlying such policies”\(^{109}\). European citizenship is conceived of as both a process and a project of political restructuring of Europe. Thus, citizenship entails new possibilities for transformative politics beyond the nation-state. However, critics have argued it impossible to decouple European citizenship from the state.\(^{110}\)

Meehan argues that “…a new kind of citizenship is emerging that is neither national nor cosmopolitan but which is multiple in enabling the various identities that we all possess to be expressed, and our rights and duties exercised, through an increasingly complex configuration of common institutions, states, national and transnational interest groups and voluntary associations, local or provincial authorities, regions and alliances of regions”\(^{111}\).

Sometimes these interests may coincide with national identity and such an interest would be articulated vertically from subnational levels through central governments and national parliaments. If necessary, it would be brought up to the Community level. At other times, interests and identities may be regional and solutions may be generated through cooperation amongst Community institutions and other similar authorities in other regions.\(^{112}\)

The ideas of “experimentation and knowledge creation, flexibility and revisability of normative and policy standards, and diversity and decentralisation leaving final policy-making to the lowest possible level”\(^{113}\) are classified by Stijn Smismans as characteristics of “new governance”, i.e. expanding participation by elements of civil society in policy-making and to extend deliberation among its members. However, more horizontal and heterarchical governance does not necessarily mean automatically more participatory governance on normative democratic terms.\(^{114}\)


\(^{109}\) Ibid. Quotation. p, 242.

\(^{110}\) Ibid. p, 238-243.


\(^{112}\) Ibid. p, 185.


\(^{114}\) Ibid. p, 5-19.
6.3 Summary

This chapter has established that the concept of “citizenship” is possible to understand in more than one way. It may be contractual or communitarian, meaning that “citizenship” may be acquired through law, or through a sense of belonging by “blood-ties” or some other value. This raises the question whether one may argue that the problem of the Union is the existing contractual understanding of citizenship, while it seeks a communitarian understanding of citizenship in order to legitimize its politics. Also, may citizenship be de-coupled from nationality, or does the European citizenship make a complement to national citizenship?

Today citizenship is argued to establish a limit to the burdens and obligations that public power itself could impose upon “those subject to them”. That is, citizenship today entails legal and status relationships, rights and duties towards the society and the state. Three processes have facilitated the emergence of democratic citizenship – State-building, the emergence of commercial and industrial economies, and Nation-making. Three “main traditions” of citizenship (the American, the French, and the British) have also been discussed and the development of a European ‘citizenship’ has been claimed to be a mix of these three.

The concerns of a growing democratic deficit in the EU began to form in the 1970’s, however, the emergence of the European “citizen”, or European ‘citizenship’, did not take place until 1992 when the Maastricht Treaty established citizenship as an aspect of the political union. The problem with European citizenship is that access to it is dependent upon nationality – that is, one cannot be a European citizen without first being a citizen of at least one of its memberstates. Thus, one of the most important characteristics of a European “We” remains in the hands of the memberstates.

There are five different ways of understanding European citizenship – Market citizenship, Civic Republican European citizenship, Deliberative citizenship, Corrective European citizenship, and Constructive European citizenship. Whether one of these conceptions is “right” or whether there is a mix of some, or all of them, is difficult to establish. There have been suggestions that there is a new kind of citizenship emerging in the Union which, if necessary, may be brought up to the Community level. Problems may still be settled on regional levels through cooperation between Community institutions and similar authorities of the regions.

When considering the five conceptions of European citizenship it is relevant to ask whether European citizens have accepted European unification because they have accepted the idea of it being favourable to their economic development (and doing so without developing a new political identity), or have a new European identity actually been developed?

Next section will review the construction of a European identity and why the Union became concerned with identity-building.
7 European Identity Building

Why is it of importance to develop a European identity? Bruter argues that: “A citizen’s political identity can be defined as his sense of belonging to politically relevant human groups and political structures. (...) the emergence of a corresponding political identity can be considered as the primary source of legitimisation of a political community.”

Referring to what has been discussed in previous sections, it seems as though the legal preconditions of citizenship and democratic participation provided by the Union has fallen short in providing it democratic legitimacy. How come? There is one element crucial to all the elements (or concepts) discussed previously, and therefore crucial in creating democratic legitimacy since it has been established to be “the factual basis of the expression of interests by and for citizens”. There need to be a “public sphere” – that is, a space in civil society where the citizens may communicate and practice their “sense of belonging”. Here identity-building is important for more than one reason.

This section will discuss the concept of “identity” and in what ways it may be classified and linked to social organization and politics. Here the concepts of “Gesellschaft” and “Gemeinschaft” will be discussed (as mentioned earlier), this to facilitate the reader in connecting identity-building with the democratic legitimacy which has been discussed earlier in this thesis. The EU may be argued to lack a demos, which the memberstates do not, therefore “national” identity and in what way EU institutions became concerned with identity will be review.

7.1 European Identity

Ever since the eighteenth century the legitimacy of nation states has relied on a combination of democratic processes and underlying political identity. The EU has now emerged into a political construction and it is often claimed to suffer from a democratic deficit. If this is the case, then it would be even more important to be able to rely on a progressive underlying “mass identity” as a foundation of its legitimacy.

Bruter argues there to be two conceptions of mass identities: top-down and bottom-up perspectives. The top-down model focuses on trying to understand what unifies Europe and Europeans in terms of cultural heritage, values, etc. and how to characterize the “European”. The bottom-up model is concerned more about how to define, conceptually, a European identity. Here one may differentiate between a “cultural” and a “civic” political identity, but first the concept of political identity will be more clearly defined.

Identities may be divided into personal, social, and political identities. The individual may have a personal and a social identity. Its personal identity is directly centered on the individual and extends towards the rest of the world. Social identity, on the other hand, starts from a group socially expected to matter which includes or matches the individual. Thus the political identity is a mere extension of an individual’s social identity. It is common that political identity is understood to be a matter of “status or citizenship, rather than a deeper personal constitutive identity”. Bruter, however, argues that this is not true. He claims that

116 Ibid. p, 3.
117 Ibid. p, 5.
political identity is not a sub-category of social identities, but rather that it is an identity which involves both the personal and the social components of identity. \(118\) “...political identities involve a whole 'philosophical' position of individuals towards the imaginary institution of the social contract, towards democracy, community, society, and relationships between human beings altogether.” \(119\)

As mentioned above, there are two ways of defining political identity – a “cultural” and a “civic”. In a cultural perspective political identity is defined as “the sense of belonging an individual citizen feels towards a particular political group”. In a civic perspective political identity will be seen as “the identification of citizens with a political structure (...) which can be defined as the set of institutions, rights, and rules that preside over the political life of a community”. In an over-simplified example one may say that the cultural perspective of political identities is related to the idea of a “Nation”, while the civic idea of political identities is related to the idea of a “State”. However, these two conceptions of identity are often almost impossible to differentiate. \(120\)

### 7.2 “Gesellschaft” vs. “Gemeinschaft”

There are two ideal types of social organization by which the debate on European identity may be divided into – “Gesellschaft” and “Gemeinschaft”. Gemeinschaft relates to “a certain sense of belonging based on shared loyalties, norms and values, kinship or ethnic ties (‘community’)”. There exists a feeling of “natural” association based on the idea of “one people” which leads to a clearly cognizable demos. Gesellschaft, on the other hand, is a more artificial construct which remains on the idea that individuals are independent from one another, but may decide to group together by a “social contract” for profiting (“society”). \(121\) These two conceptions were invented by the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies (1855-1936) in 1887, and are among the oldest and most central sociological conceptions. \(122\)

It may be argued that the EU memberstates has through its history built a European Gesellschaft; however, it still lacks the most important characteristics of an organic entity – it is still not a truly European Gemeinschaft since: “Europe’s cultural and social topography is fragmented, lacking clear unifying principles and shared experiences around which people could identify”. Today the Western world is characterized by a value-free multiformity which have made the notion of “Europe” to become one of many images which has to compete for allegiance. It has been argued by some that there is no European demos, but simply a European telos (purpose, goal). Thus, a European Gemeinschaft remains the main desideratum for the Union. \(123\)

What makes a demos problematic in relation to the EU is that there is no clear idea of who should be governed – there is no clear idea of who constitutes the “people”. As already argued, it is necessary for the citizens in a democratic system to be connected to each other by a feeling of a common identity. “…the need for a demos is related to the principle of a majoritarian decision-making, namely that members of a democratic political system must respect the decisions of a majority. In order for this to happen there needs to be a sense of

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\(119\) Ibid. Quotation. p, 10-11.
\(120\) Ibid. p, 12-13.
There are two dimensions of demos – a legal and a social dimension. These two dimensions may be linked to the two concepts of Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft when the legal dimension of demos can be created from the top via institutions, including such things as the rights of citizenship; and the social demos includes other elements i.e. history, identity, language etc. It is also possible to make a distinction between two concepts of the social demos, namely ethno-cultural elements (language, political habits, history, religion, ethnic origin) and subjective emotional elements (identity and solidarity). A lack in ethno-cultural elements in a demos may cause a lack of subjective emotional elements since the elements of the first have a tendency to affect the elements of the second.

7.3 National Identity

Since the EU may be argued to lack, and desire, the demos its memberstates have, the concept of national identity will discussed here. There are two main ways of viewing national identity – primordial and ephemeral. Those who see national identity as primordial argues that all humans belong to some ethnic community “by nature”, and those who view national identity as ephemeral see it as manifestations of a modern, state-centric era that is now drawing to a close. There are those who argue history and “memory” to be such a central feature to identity that it is impossible to replace existing “deep” cultures (those of the nation-states) with a cosmopolitan “flat” culture (that of e.g. Europe).

The mythical and often ethnic nature and foundation of nationalism is generally considered to be a key instrument in controlling the contemporary nation-states. Since most identities in the Western world are based on a sense of “belonging”, this assumes that ‘identity’ is an exclusionary concept. There is only the possibility of “belonging” or not – you are either a citizen or you are not. However, there are those who argue that the nation-state and nationalism have been “suitable and fitting” to modern industrial society, but has now lost much of its core purpose in the postmodern era now prevailing. This new globalizing world requires a “global ideology and a more global and unified (…) culture of mass consumerism…”. The emergence of a postmodern cosmopolitan “culture” would mean continent-size markets regulated by one clear set of economics and political rules and values which would include a large number of cultures.

7.4 How Did European Institutions Become Concerned With Identity?

It may be argued that the process of European integration can be divided into four phases of development.

- The first began after the end of World War II. In this phase Europeanization was based on international cooperation as an insurance policy against war.
- The second phase started with the Treaty of Rome which was signed on March 25 1957. This was a phase of technical integration and new policy areas developed which made “Europe” into a new policy-maker.

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125 Ibid. p, 14-15.
127 Ibid. Ch, 2.
• The third phase began with the first enlargement of the European Communities (EC) in 1973. At this time the first major reforms also took place to strengthen the institutional framework.

• The last phase, or the phase which is still prevalent, began in the middle of the 1980’s when the creation of a new ‘People’s Europe’ took form, and which was intensified after adopting the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. It is in this phase that the European citizenry, citizenship, and the attempt to foster at new European identity takes form.\textsuperscript{128}

The Union started to attempt providing its institutions with greater democratic legitimacy already in the third phase. In the beginning of the 1980’s the Union was becoming more economically liberal than ever with the effect of risking to lose any ‘political’ sense and become “simply” a large area of free trade. Social and cultural measures were considered necessary to guarantee a balance between the economic and the ‘political’ aspects of the Union. Among other things there were programmes of cultural and educational exchange developed as well as increased co-operation in “highly” political areas such as foreign policy. During this last phase European integration has been the most intense in history in terms of making European unification a daily reality in the life of citizens.\textsuperscript{129}

Why did the Union start to take social and cultural measures to increase the ‘political’ aspect of the Union? Bruter argues that there can be two legal streams derived from the European project – ‘Community’ and ‘Union’. “Community implies the idea of co-operation between the member-States while Union expresses the existence of a single super-national and super-State power. In other words, Community refers to an inter-national organisation, whilst Union refers to an integrated power.”\textsuperscript{130} Thus, when the EC took the step towards becoming a ‘union’ instead of a ‘community’ in 1992, it was well aware of the need of unifying symbols, which might explain the early attempt to provide its institutions with greater democratic legitimacy. An ‘inter-national’ organization works on the State-level and receives legitimacy mainly on the State-level. The Union, on the other hand, needs its legitimacy from its citizens.\textsuperscript{131}

\section*{7.5 Summary}
This chapter has discussed two different perspectives of mass-identity – top-down and bottom-up. The top-down perspective focuses on how to characterize the “European” while the bottom-up perspective focuses on how to define the “European”. Identities have been argued to come in three types – personal, social, and political identities. Personal identity is individual while social identity is based on a group. Political identity may be argued to be a mix of the two. The political identity may be divided into cultural and civic identity meaning that it may either be based on a sense of belonging towards a political group, or the citizen’s identification with a political structure – that is set of institutions, rights, etc. These two conceptions may be described as the idea of the “nation” and the idea of the “State”.

“Gesellschaft” and “Gemeinschaft” have been defined as “community” and “society” and the EU has been argued to not yet ‘be’ or ‘have’ a Gemeinschaft since “there are no clear unifying and shared principles around which people could identify”. The Union may be argued to not yet have a “demos”, but ‘simply’ a “telos”. Thus the problem with a ‘European’

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{129} Ibid. p, 58-74.
\bibitem{130} Ibid. Quotation. p, 86.
\bibitem{131} Ibid. p, 86.
\end{thebibliography}
demos is that there is no clear idea of who constitutes the “Europeans”. The memberstates of the Union, however, have a demos which is based on a mythical and often ethnic nature.

The process of European integration may be divided into four periods. The Union may be argued to have taken social and cultural measures to increase its “political” cooperation when the EC was to become the EU, which started in the end of the third period. “Community” implies cooperation between memberstates while “Union” refers to an integrated power. To have a well integrated power, that is a political Union, there is a need for greater democratic legitimacy of the institutions of the Union.

“The EU is a complex composite and a hybridized political entity defined by betweenness and multi-cultural diversity.”132 The concept of “Europeanization” creates it a sense of dislocation, displacement, and puzzlement. The increased political homelessness has given rise to so called “identity politics”, which basically means pursuing politics based on gender, ethnicity, sexuality, etc. This, however, has shown to be a passive instrument since it tends to focus on what values that divides people instead of what values that unites them. Instead European politics may now be argued to be “reversed” identity politics, or essentialist politics as it is more commonly known. European essentialist politics emphasizes in what ways it is possible to think in terms of a concept of “Europe”.133 The question is in what way this should be done. Should a united “Europe” be based on its checkered past or should a European community be developed focusing on the future? “Indeed, there are partially-shared European heritages, but the pre-modern past of nation states forbade the creation of a trans-European identity. No European equivalent to national myths can be found.”134

Many argue that a “United Europe” should be based on its heritage (its “checkered past”). Here European ‘culture’ is important, thus the idea of a common European culture and history will be treated in the next chapter. “Cultural identity” and what really is meant by “culture” will also be discussed, as will two other important elements relevant to integration and identity-building – symbols and myths.

133 Ibid. Ch, 4.
8 European Integrational Factors

In the previous chapter classifications of identity and identity-building, and how the EU became concerned of identity-building has been discussed. This chapter will treat a number of concepts which serve as integrational factors, and cornerstones, in identity-building – “culture”, “symbols”, and “myths”. This section will also discuss in what way these factors relate to the Union and its democratic deficit. It is important to observe that the cornerstones in identity-building are closely linked to each other. Symbols and myths may be argued to be used in creating or being part of a culture, or an identity, that is – culture being something people identify with. Thus, to facilitate the understanding of the reader the author has chosen to treat symbols and myths as elements, or means, of culture, and to divide the chapter into two sections – one for “culture” and one for “symbols” and “myths”. In the first section the concept of culture in relation to Europe will be discussed, in the second the other two concepts will be discussed.

“A culture embodies the historical experiences and derived ”wisdom” of a people. It is characterized by a variety of myths, assumptions, and prescriptions regarding nature, man, and society.”

In this chapter the political will be put in relation to culture and the meaning of “political culture” will be treated. In relation to this the definition of “culture” will be discussed, and if a “European” culture necessarily results in unification. A short historical overview of Europe’s cultural identity and ‘European’ values will also be provided to create the possibility of comparison between past and present.

The discussion of symbols will include definitions of symbols and what types of symbols the Union has utilized, and for what purpose. The discussion on myths will be pursued from a “European” perspective mainly discussing what types of myths the Union may be built upon and what types of myths there exist about the Union today.

8.1 Culture

Those aspects of culture which, through processes of socialization, bear upon and shape the politics of a society are what constitute a “political culture”. Elder and Cobb argues that a political culture includes “all the socially shared information and “knowledge” that inform the various individual dispositions that may be engaged by a political symbol”.

In a report treating the cultural dimension of Europe it is stated that it is not the geographical or national borders that define the European cultural space, but rather the opposite. It is the European cultural space which defines the European geographical space, a space which is principally open.

“This also means that the common European cultural space cannot be defined in opposition to national cultures. Polish farmers and British workers should not see “European culture”

136 Ibid. p, 81-82.
as something foreign or even threatening. (...) What constitutes the content of “European culture” is not a philosophical question that can be answered a priori; nor is it a merely historical question. It is a question that calls for political decisions which attempt to demonstrate the significance of tradition in the face of future tasks that Europe’s Union must address.”

European culture does not in itself create European unity; however, it may help to create the opportunity for a European unity to emerge.

Essential in this discussion is to establish what is meant by culture. What is culture? Veltman argues that culture is "concerned with the development of coherent viewpoints which bring a cumulative effect to otherwise isolated experiences of a group, making them feel special yet allowing others to have a parallel experience." Culture may also be described as a system of social control where people act according to learned ways of group living and group responses to different situations. Sociologists often describe culture as “the values, attitudes, beliefs, and customs of a society.”

Frank Pfetsch argues that culture is the “heart and content” of politics, and that in contrast to national identity, European identity has some particular characteristics such as being intentional and not yet existing.

Veltman argues one of the key elements of culture to be uniqueness. This implies what seems to be a common denominator of all definitions of culture – that culture is something which creates a “We-feeling”.

Europe’s cultural identity is diverse and has its roots in the cultural legacy of the three treasure houses: the ancient Near East, Greece, and Rome. The ancient Near East (Israel) established the foundations of Christian civilization, the ancient Greece influenced civilization by its philosophy and rationalism, and Rome influenced civilization both by political principles and systemic law.

Van Gerven argues a “European” cultural identity to have emerged first in the ancient Greece, at that time identified mainly by freedom and democracy. It emerged a second time during the Roman Empire; here it took form of the Roman law which still today remains to be the basis of the law in large parts of Europe, but it also emphasized citizenship, individual rights, equity, and the common good. All the same, it is worth noting that the fall of the Roman Empire began when it started to integrate its provinces in a more “cultural” way. Last, a “unifying cultural framework” emerged with Christendom in late antiquity and which gradually expanded during the Middle Ages. With the Renaissance the modern era emerged with humanism and the Enlightenment rationalists and it was argued that Europe shared common morals and customs.

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140 Ibid. pp, 76-82.
144 Ibid. p. 47.
However, the French and the Industrial revolutions gave birth to new secular ideologies such as liberalism, socialism, and nationalism. A strong nationalist movement caused a break-up of Europe into nation states and national cultures, and to defining a nation in terms of ethnicity and language. European diversity may also be explained by the shifting fault-lines marking cultural diversity e.g. Western and Eastern Europe by a wide transitional zone – Central Europe. There are also lines dividing religious areas and lines separating the areas where Germanic and Slavic languages are spoken. All of these dividing lines have affected the values of Europeans.145

“Whatever these differences and resulting prejudices are, the overarching attitude among European peoples remains one of pride for having shared a common history that (...) has nurtured and developed the cradle of civilization and culture for more than two millennia. It is a feeling that unites the whole of Europe (...) and differentiates it from other parts of the world.” 146

Pagden, on the other hand, argues that Europeans have more than a shared past, they have “a shared history of antagonisms to overcome”.147

However, when it comes to common ‘European’ values Europe’s diversity becomes more apparent than ever. It is not difficult to find a core of ‘European’ values. In Article 6, paragraph 1, of the EU Treaty it is stated that: “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States”. It is added in paragraph 2 that: “The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional conditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law.”148

In the Draft Constitution, Article I-2, which recently was not accepted by all memberstates, it is added that those principles, or values, on which it was founded: “...are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between men and women prevail.” In Article I-3 it is also stated that: “The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.”149

However, these values which are claimed to be ‘European’ are very common and in no sense unique for the memberstates of the EU, but is rather common for all Western democratic countries. The principles on which the Union is founded are very general and, by some argued to be hollow.

146 Ibid. Quotation, p. 48.
Since the ‘European’ values are not unique it is of even greater importance to the Union to create, or pinpoint, other ‘factors’ which may provide solidarity among its citizens. Here symbols and myths play a great role. This will be discussed in the following section.

8.2 Symbols and Myths

“A symbol is any object used by human beings to index meanings that are not inherent in, nor discernible from, the object itself. (...) An object becomes a symbol when people endow it with meaning, value, or significance.” Thus, a symbol is a human invention which does not have any meaning unless given so. A social, or significant, symbol is an object which individuals give meaning to both singly and collectively. Social communication is the process of different individuals giving meaning to the same objects. Socially significant symbols arise and are sustained through a system of social action; therefore they may be regarded as elements of culture. Political symbols are those symbols which are relevant to the exercise of political authority – i.e. they mediate the relationship between the individual and the social and political order. Political symbols are generally used to give definition to a political community. It sorts common understandings and patterns of preference.

Bruter describes a symbol as a “physical element” which may be used to represent for example a political or social collectivity i.e. a flag, a name, an allegory, an anthem, etc. The use of symbols for a political purpose has a long tradition going back to the ancient times. In general it may be argued that a symbol is used to personify a political or social entity and to create an allegory of a State in people’s minds. This “image” will represent the collectivity e.g. it is an attempt to direct identification between a real object and an abstract category. Symbols facilitate the citizen to identify with the political community and make their level of knowledge of the community and their capacity for abstraction less significant.

Symbols are important to processes of social organization and they structure social communications. Symbols constitute the means of which political demands are articulated and they are used as objects for political mobilization. However, symbols are not only important to political mobilization, but also to the processes of legitimacy. Basic support towards basic symbols of the system mainly has its roots in the identifications acquired through the socialization process. Thus, political symbols serve to provide “diffuse gratifications” in the form of reassurance of the integrity of the system. “...while the initial legitimacy of a political system may depend upon the allocation of specific benefits, the symbols become an alternative basis of legitimacy and a substitute source of gratification and satisfaction.”

Symbols may be linked to the two classifications of political identities mentioned earlier in this thesis – civic and cultural identity. There are a number of questions which are fundamental for every society in order to develop a communitarian sense of belonging: Who are we collectively? What are we for one another? Where and in what are we? What do we want; what do we desire; what are we lacking? Society needs an “identity” and the role of “symbols” is to provide an answer to these questions which neither reality nor rationality can

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151 Ibid. p, 28-30.
152 Ibid. p, 82.
155 Ibid. Quotation. p, 119.
answer.\textsuperscript{156} “The use of symbols to achieve peaceful processes of identity formation and legitimisation seems to be mandatory for all modern governments.”\textsuperscript{157}

The EU may be argued to be in acute need of symbols in order to assert its identity and thereby assert its legitimacy. There is a need for the Union to express its originality, its specificity, and its ethical meaning. This can only be done through a particular set of symbols of “European unity”.\textsuperscript{158}

The Union presents four main ‘symbols’ of the Union on its homepage – The European flag, The European anthem, Europe Day, and the motto of the EU.\textsuperscript{159} However, more symbols may be argued to exist. Important to mention in a more profound analysis of the ‘European’ symbols is that the first major ‘national’ symbol of Europe was not provided by the Unions itself. This symbol, the European flag, was provided by the Council of Europe\textsuperscript{160} in the 1950’s and was not adopted by the EC until 1972. The European flag symbolizes all the European institutions and Europe as a whole. The idea of a European anthem (Ode to Joy, music by Beethoven and lyrics by Schiller) also emerged in co-operation with the Council of Europe. The Union (or at that time the EEC) chose a somewhat abstract symbol as the first symbol produced by the Union itself. This was that elections to the European Parliament would be held at the same time in all memberstates of the EC in a direct universal poll in 1979. After 1985 symbols such as the European passport and ‘Europe Day’ (May 9\textsuperscript{th}) emerged.\textsuperscript{161}

The change of name from the European Community to the European Union by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 was a symbolic change, as was the decision to create a common currency (the Euro) which was taken under the same treaty. The Euro has come to be one of the most significant symbols of European unity. Other important symbols of European unity is the Charter of Fundamental Rights which symbolizes shared ethical, moral, cultural, and social values; and the joint operational force which symbolizes European military independence. The most relevant symbol of European unity is the struggles to adopt a first Constitution of the EU. A constitution is important to the unity of the Union when it is a symbol of a sovereign political system.\textsuperscript{162}

These symbols correspond to those mentioned by van Ham with one exception; van Ham also mentions educational exchange (i.e. the ERASMUS program) as one of the symbols of European unity. There are a number of exchange programs increasing student mobility across Europe with the purpose of developing a “European dimension” of higher education. It is not for nothing the motto of the ERASMUS program is: “Bringing students to Europe; Bringing Europe to students.” Van Han also points out a contradicting fact in two of the ‘European’ symbols. The EU passport is designed to have the same standard in all member-States which it also has; however, inside the passport one can find national variations of the layout, i.e. the Dutch passport shows a brief pictorial history of the history of the Netherlands. The same holds for the banknotes and coins of the Euro where every member-State may decorate their

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid. Quotation. p. 80.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid. p. 80-81.
\textsuperscript{160} The Council of Europe is an institution independent of the EU dealing with cultural co-operation and human rights in the whole of Europe, not only members of the Union. The Council of Europe was founded in 1949 by the ‘Treaty of London’ and has today 46 member-States.
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid. p. 81-85.
coins with a national motif. This twofold message may both help and be a hindrance to further integration of the Union.163

It is also possible to divide the ‘European’ symbols into civic or cultural symbols. The election of the European Parliament, the passport, and the Euro are typically civic symbols when they represent the authority of an institution which is normally under the power of the State. The anthem and the design of the Euro notes are typically cultural symbols since they refer to a shared European heritage. However, the Europe Day and the flag are more difficult to define since they may be perceived in both ways. Generally one may argue them to be civic since the idea is intrinsically linked to the nation state.164

Not only symbols are important elements of culture and identity-building. Myths are essential when they provide a community something to construct its culture around.

It is often argued that Europe is in lack of myths. The EU project is a project of functionalism. The current debate over the democratic deficit in the Union has often been linked with criticism of its functionalist approach. The relationship between myth and functionalism is generally claimed to be non-existent since functionalism tends to be described as practically in lack of mythical elements. Since the politics of the Union until now have been characterized by functionalist policies, its previous attempt to create a demos causes problems.

Prentoulis argues that the citizenship born out of the European Economic Community (EEC), which citizens he calls the “European Market Citizens”, did not in itself create allegiance since the rights of the citizens were simply means to promote individual welfare. There was an absence of a European solidarity and therefore the market citizen participated in the common market solely for his own interest.165

Hansen and Williams argues that functionalism is not “free” from myths since it “draws powerfully upon modernist myths of rationalization”.166 The liberal-political (functionalist) vision and the ‘Romantic’ (mythic) vision of “community-building” in the EU may be argued to reside in the distinctions between civic and ethnic or social nationalism (or as van Ham argues – between ephemeral nationality and primordial nationality). “Civic nationalism’s intertwining with liberalism constructs ‘the people’ as a group of individuals rationally united within shared structures of citizenship...”167. The liberal-political view of the ‘crisis’ in the EU may be argued to concentrate around the lack of representation, that there is a citizenry who demands to be represented more directly in the institutions of the Union. This is a quite optimistic attitude towards the ‘crisis’ since the problem lies “simply” in structural and procedural barriers to the representation of the Union within its institutions. This problem will be solved with or without the consent of the citizens since, in any case, “they are acquiescing ... as the political structures that typically precede such a development are put in place”.168 Putting it this way, the liberal-political vision of a “European community” seems somewhat elitist.169

167 Ibid. Quotation. p, 236.
169 Ibid. p, 233-237.
The ‘romantic’ vision of community-building argues that the essence of legitimacy is grounded in shared histories, identities, cultures, etc – or in other words – myths. An “original organic people” must exist before being represented by an elite, thus the problem of legitimacy in the Union is not due to a lack of adequate institutions of representation, but rather the very absence of a European ‘people’ itself. Legitimacy and myth is here argued to be intertwined.170

8.3 Summary

In this chapter different aspects of culture have been brought up. Political culture (which is most relevant here) has been described as socially shared “information” and “knowledge” informing individuals by political symbols. It has been established that “European cultural space” set the borders of Europe and not the opposite, however, that cultural space is principally open meaning that political decisions are what constitutes ‘European’ culture, not history or philosophy.

Culture has been described as a “system of social control” where people act according to norms i.e. values, attitudes, beliefs, and customs. One of the most important characteristics of culture is ‘uniqueness’ – culture should create a “We-feeling”.

‘European’ culture may be argued to stem from the legacy of three treasure houses – the ancient Near East which established the foundations of Christianity, ancient Greece preparing the way for civilization through its philosophy and rationalism, and Rome which influenced civilization politically and by systemic law. Europe was later divided into nation-states which along with new ideologies (socialism, liberalism, etc) and shifting fault-lines marking cultural diversity, affected European values.

It has shown difficult to find a core of ‘European’ values going deeper in structure than “pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity, and equality between men and women”. These values are not unique for Europe, but common for all Western democratic states.

One may ask whether living by the same laws will create “simply” a ‘civic’ society and not a “civil” society. That is, will living by the same laws create a “We”? 

This chapter has also discussed the meaning of symbols and in what way symbols have been used in the case of Europe. A symbol has been defined as an object which is endowed by meaning, value, or significance by people. Thus, the symbol is a human invention. Social symbols may be argued to be part of culture since they are sustained through social action. Political symbols mediate the relation between the individual and the social and political order, and are used to identify a political community. Thus, social and political symbols are used to represent and define a ‘collectivity’ of some sort. Symbols are important to the processes of legitimacy since they provide an alternative basis of legitimacy and a substitute source of gratification and satisfaction.

There is a need for the EU to express its originality and to assert its identity – there is a need for symbols of European unity. The Union has four main symbols – the flag, the anthem, 

Europe Day, and the motto of the EU. There are more symbols though. Symbols such as holding the elections of the European Parliament at the same time in all memberstates, the European passport, the Euro, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the joint operational force, the struggle for creating a constitution, the ERASMUS-program, and the change of name from “Community” to “Union” has been created. These symbols may be divided into civic and cultural symbols where the Euro and the European passport are typically civic symbols, while the anthem is a typically cultural symbol.

The Union has adopted national symbols and modified them into symbols of the Union. If the Union is something completely new and not like that of the nation state, why is it using the same methods as the nation states did to create a European identity? Could there be any better way to create a European identity which is more suited for this ‘new’ type of union? Does not the Union need its “own” building stones when creating its “own” identity?

A section in this chapter has been dedicated to ‘myths’ and a discussion of European myths. The EU is characterized by and based upon functionalism. This poses a problem when combining it with identity-building and culture since functionalism in general lacks mythical elements. This may be one of the main reasons why the functionalist policies of the Union have failed in creating a demos. The ‘European’ citizen participates for individual interests – there is an absence of European solidarity. However, there are those who argue that functionalism is not free from myths after all, since it draws upon “modernist myths of rationalization”, presenting itself as “homeless and timeless”. This view and other views of European myths and the future will be discussed in the next chapter.
9 Europe and the Importance of Myth

In the previous chapter the non-existence of European myths was discussed. Here the possibility of functionalism being a myth in itself will be examined. It is also relevant to question whether myths should be used in creating this ‘new’ union. Are myths a thing of the past?

This chapter will be divided into two sections. One mainly treating the relevance of myths in European “community-building”. What should the Union do when it lacks a myth to build its legitimacy on? What are the alternatives to myths? Here one of the most well-known political writers, Jürgen Habermas, presents the alternative of “constitutional patriotism” or “deliberative democracy”, which will be discussed below, along with the problems it may constitute. Along with “constitutional patriotism” it is possible to detect a number of approaches towards European community-building. The main three approaches will be discussed in the first section.

The second section will examine the Union and the future. Here the motivations of developing a European community will be discussed. What social significance do the European fundamental rights have? What alternatives are there for the Union in its search for legitimacy in the future?

9.1 The Age of Myth

There are those who argue the “age of myth” to be over. “…while the nation-states of Europe have recourse to their premodern mythical foundations in opposition to the EU, attempts to generate European myths are constrained precisely because they are seen as myths rather than as objective accounts of history.” The historical conditions under which the myths of the nation-states were founded are not available to identity-building in the European case. Thus, the EU is at a cross-roads where it has to choose between “unacceptable historical myths and memories on the one hand, and on the other a patchwork, memoryless scientific “culture” held together solely by the political will and economic interest that are so often subject to change”. The EU is in a dilemma since its memberstates are founded upon precisely what the Union lacks – myths.

However, to argue that the role of myth is a thing of the past may be rash. Functional or rational categories may be argued to represent “the successful operation of a mythic structure”, meaning that the very rationalist, liberal, or functionalist vision against which it is argued is itself mythic. Hansen and Williams argue that the opposition between rationality and the mythic culture of identity represents one of the greatest myths of the modern world – that of modernity itself. Weber tried to uncover the myth that modern rationality had no mythic origins. One of the aspects of modern rationality is its mythic ability to present itself as “homeless and timeless”. From this perspective, the liberal-functionalist attempt to replace one myth with another may be seen “simply” as an attempt to countervail the romantic myth of a community ‘grounded’ on identity and culture.

172 Ibid. Quotation. p, 238.
173 Ibid. Quotation. p, 238-239.
If the Union lacks a “nation-building myth” such as that of its memberstates, it may better succeed if concentrating on “constitutional patriotism” instead. Here the citizens are expected to be loyal to the principles of a common constitution instead of a common culture. Among the more ardent advocates of “constitutional patriotism” is Jürgen Habermas who, with his model of deliberative democracy emphasizes the need of a new constitution of the Union. In general, advocates of constitutional patriotism argue the Union to be “an opportunity to create post-national membership in a political community free of the burden of cultural homogenisation, within the framework of modernity”. To emphasize constitutional patriotism may also be seen as a ‘second-best’ solution.\textsuperscript{175}

“A nation of citizens must not be confused with a community of fate shaped by a common descent, language and history. This confusion fails to capture the voluntaristic character of a civic nation, the collective identity of which exists neither independent of nor prior to the democratic process from which it springs. Such a civic, as supposed to ethnic, conception of ‘the nation’ reflects both the actual historical trajectory of the European nation-states and the fact that democratic citizenship establishes an abstract, legally mediated solidarity between strangers.”\textsuperscript{176}

One of the main problems with constitutional patriotism is that the individual rights, to which the citizens are expected to be loyal, may not be enough to integrate a political community. The principles of human rights may integrate to a certain level but, when this level is reached some argues it to be insufficient as means of integration when rights become somewhat taken for granted. The result of that integration risks becoming simply neutral and artificial. Another more important problem with constitutional patriotism is that it creates problems as to determining which community is the appropriate object of loyalty. Its criteria are too wide and too common. It does not present any cogent reason of in what way it is different from every other similar constitutional culture.\textsuperscript{177}

“What then, does this rational constitutional culture of patriotism use to derive authority and legitimacy from its citizens in lack of a traditional culture or ‘myth’? Hansen and Williams claims that: “The presentation of the EU as a rational, functional institution, as the natural extension of the processes of social and political rationalization already well advanced in the historical evolution of modern states, becomes a key mythic move, one that is inextricably related to its more overtly ‘mythic’ foils.”\textsuperscript{178} They argue further that this is not simply another myth in the irrationalist sense (the myth of a unified Europe of the future battling against the myths of European nationalism of the past), but rather it is one of the most powerful European myths of all: “the myth of modernity and the structure of rationalization with which it is bound up”. Romantics see the lack of a past in liberalism as mythological emptiness, while liberals see the same as in need of a myth of the future. Functionalism sets itself up as made

\textsuperscript{177} Prentoulis, N. (2001). p, 203-204.
\textsuperscript{178} Ibid. Quotation. p, 203-204.
out of universal reason and progress and it is precisely this that may be seen as one of functionalism’s most mythologically important elements.\textsuperscript{180}

There are a number of approaches towards European community-building. The idea of a “European Commonwealth” may be argued to be a “lighter” version of constitutional patriotism since it is based on the same idea. Here the issue of democracy within the EU is addressed as a commonwealth, that is, a civic consciousness that a group of people have a “common weal” with a civic demos and a European civic identity. Both this idea and that of constitutional patriotism perceive loyalty as civic rather than ethnic or ethnic-cultural; however, the ‘European Commonwealth’ does not seek loyalty on the basis of established constitutional principles, but rather it seeks loyalty on the basis of a common goal within a post-national context.\textsuperscript{181}

The idea of ‘Supranational citizenship’ is also based on the idea of civic community rather than ethnic community. Here the essence of Union citizenship is those features that transcend the differences of ethnic culture and civic culture – in other words, those features which decouples nationality from citizenship. Decoupling these two would allow the conceptualization of coexisting multiple demoi\textsuperscript{182}. Thus, citizens may be memberstate nationals based on ethic identification and at the same time an EU citizen in the sense of “transnational affiliation” to a different set of values. However, a problem with this approach is that there is no clear way in which the values supporting European loyalty would be different from that of national loyalty. The idea of ‘Social citizenship’, on the other hand, offers an alternative of a European social identity rather than civic identity. It also relates citizenship to social policy. These two main points are fused together by the concept of “solidarity”: “Solidarity is about ‘seeing welfare as a form of collective activity and so the responsibility of the wider society rather than of individuals’.\textsuperscript{183} This idea is often linked with the idea of participatory democracy.

\subsection*{9.2 Europe and the Future}

As argued above, the development of ‘Europe’ is a cause of concern for the future. In its initial stage in the middle of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, it was held together by the fear of political instability and war. Men and women of that time had experienced the difficulties of World War I and II, hence a ‘union’ for preserving peace was practically self-legitimizing. Today the EU has reached its goal of preserving peace within Europe and evolved into a more integrated political union. The rising generations are no longer witnesses to the difficulties of the past and therefore do not understand the original sources propelling the Union.

Today, the motivations of the past have transformed into three main categories:
1. Economic interest, the common market has provided European citizens with new rights to work within a larger economic sphere which has led to enrichment.
2. Shared European values, the values of the Enlightenment, the welfare state, and the rule of law.

\textsuperscript{180} Hansen L, Williams M C. (1999). p, 244.
\textsuperscript{181} Ibid. p, 206-207.
\textsuperscript{182} In Ancient Greece Demoi (in singular Deme) were simple subdivisions of land in the countryside. Citizenship was based on the demoi which in turn could be part of larger unions or “states”.
\textsuperscript{184} Ibid. p, 207-211.
3. The evolution of social mores, citizens of different nationalities of the young generation shares an increasingly common style of life. However, the question remains whether these ‘motivation’ are enough to “unite” the peoples of Europe.185

Many citizens of the Union have been citizens for some time now and are guaranteed a host of fundamental rights. However, this is solely a grant of legal status which does not have much social significance. "The Euro-citizen may get preferential treatment at customs when she returns from aeroplane trips to foreign parts. But this is hardly enough to generate hope and pride in their citizenship standing."186 Even though the EU has developed into a political entity within its own right, it has not received an explicit mandate by the people to do so. The citizens’ rights have been granted to them rather than demanded by them. Thus, the EU is deficient with regard to what democratic legitimacy requires. This is mainly argued to be due to the lack of European political parties, the scantiness of representative accountability, and the absence of a truly European public sphere. There are three determining factors of the gravity of the deficit: The nature of the Union qua polity; the normative standards applied; the nature of citizens’ demand on the EU.187

The new generation of ‘public opinion’ in Europe depends on the input of the actors of a European civil society. Consequently, a European public sphere must consist of a political culture shared by most of the citizens.

One of the most recent attempts to overcome the democratic deficit, thus strengthen the ‘unification’ of Europe and its citizens, is the creation of a European constitution. The first version was recently rejected. There are different opinions of why the constitution was rejected, or rather wherein the ‘problem’ of the constitution lies. Fossum argues that the crucial question is whether the Constitution embraces a mainstream type of constitutional doctrine that presupposes the creation of one demos, or if it set up to retain a system of multiple demoi. Retained allegiance to a multiple demoi may be argued to recognize the fact that there is no ‘European’ people upon which the EU could be based. Fossum calls this system of multiple demoi “deep diversity”.188

Deep diversity may be described as “a situation where a ‘plurality of ways [are] acknowledged and accepted’ within the same state or polity.”189 Communitarianism is characteristic for deep diversity when it does not presuppose a constitutional demos, but rather acknowledges the existence of separate national wills, and establishes a set of common institutions and principles based on a treaty. The deep diverse society consists of several, and different, collective conceptions of its “cultural or national or linguistic or ethnic make-up”.190 “Deep diversity presumes that a group’s sense of belonging to the overarching entity passes through its belonging to another smaller and more integrated community. Citizenship in the overarching entity is thus differentiated because it must reflect the nature of this relation and the character of the smaller and more integrated community.”191

186 Ibid. Quotation. p, xiv.
187 Ibid. p, 1-6.
189 Ibid. Quotation. p, 227.
190 Ibid. p 226-228.
191 Ibid. Quotation. p, 228.
At present the structure of the EU has many resemblances to the deep diversity model. To move from the present situation to one with constitutional patriotism requires a constitution explicitly derived from its citizens.\footnote{Fossum, J E. (Eriksen, E O (et.al). (2004) p, 228-234)}

\section*{9.3 Summary}

In this chapter it has been discussed whether or not mythical elements are important in the European case. Since the historical conditions which were at hand when the nation states were founded are not at hand in the European case, the EU is at a crossroads where it has to choose between insufficient historical myths and a “scientific culture” held together by political will and economic interest. Thus, the EU is at a dilemma.

An alternative if lacking identity-building myths is to promote “constitutional patriotism” instead. Here citizens are expected to be loyal to and identify with the principles of a common constitution instead of a common culture. To take on this approach, there is a need for a new constitution of the Union. However, the individual rights of this constitutional patriotism may not be enough to integrate a political community, risking the integration to become ‘simply’ neutral and artificial.

Three main approaches to European community-building have also been presented. The idea of a “European Commonwealth” resembles that of constitutional patriotism. Both perceive loyalty as civic rather than ethnic or ethnic-cultural. However, the “European Commonwealth” seeks loyalty on the basis of a common goal rather than on the basis of constitutional principles. The idea of “Supranational citizenship” is based on those features which decouples nationality from citizenship. Thus, citizens could be loyal to their Member-States based on ethic identification, and loyal to the Union to a different set of values based on a civic community. The idea of “Social citizenship”, on the other hand, relates citizenship to social policy. Here a European social identity should be based on solidarity.

In the second section of this chapter the motivations of developing a European community have been discussed. When starting the “European project” the main goal and motivation was to preserve peace. Today this has been attained. Thus, the motivations of today may be divided into three categories – economic interest, shared European values, and the evolution of social mores. However, these motivations may not be enough to unite the peoples of Europe. The low social significance which may be ascribed to the European fundamental rights creates problems of legitimacy.

The Union has tried to overcome its democratic deficit by creating a new constitution. However, this was rejected for various reasons. There are some who argue the vital question, when it comes to legitimacy, to be whether the Union can allow a multiple demoi or if it will try to create one demos. With a multiple demoi, or a deep diversity, the Union must accept that the citizens’ sense of belonging to it passes through the memberstates.

The next chapters consist of a conclusion answering the questions asked in the beginning of the thesis, and a general discussion about the subject.
10 Conclusion
The final part of the thesis consists of two chapters – first a conclusion will be made based on
the material presented above, and second a discussion will be held about the findings and the
subject in general.

As pointed out in the beginning of the thesis (with the help of Anthony Pagden), the idea of a
European identity has become a source of anxiety. My aim with the thesis was to find out
what makes the Union united – or ultimately, why is the idea of a European identity
uncomfortable and troublesome? To find an answer a number of questions have been asked.
Thus, through answering these questions my hope is to clarify wherein the problem of
Europe’s “identity-crisis” lies.

European citizenship
To be “European” today presupposes membership in any of the memberstates of the EU.
European citizenship cannot be granted without the person in question being a citizen of a
memberstate. The rights and obligations of the citizen towards the state or the like may vary.
Citizenship may include participation or non-participation. The democratic citizenship which
has developed during the 19th and 20th centuries together with the emerging of the nation-state
has imposed citizenship as participation. In the case of the EU the meaning of citizenship is
somewhat unclear, it may be placed somewhere between participation and non-participation.
Citizens do not fully participate; however, there is a wish for them to do so in order to gain
democratic legitimacy. This poses a problem for the Union.

However, the problem goes deeper than “simply” an unclear definition of European
citizenship. Historically, the concept of “citizenship” has related to the political dimension of
membership – that is, the sense of belonging.

Democratic citizenship evolved through a process of three phases i.e. state-building, the
emergence of commercial and industrial economies, and nation-making. The Union have gone
through processes similar to the first two, but is still struggling with the third (and most
important) process which creates a sense of uniqueness.

The democratic deficit, or the lack of a demos, became clear already in the end of the 70’s,
although it was not until 1992 (with the Maastricht treaty) that the ‘European’ citizenship was
created. Today there are a number of ways of understanding European citizenship. There have
been suggestions that the ‘European’ citizenship is unlike any other and is mobile between
levels in community.

A European “public” sphere?
The ‘public sphere’ may be defined as the factual basis of the expression of opinions and
interests of all actors of society. “Public” refers to something that is ‘open’ to all. Thus, the
public sphere may be described as a communication space. Similar frames of reference when
communicating in the public sphere enhances the emergence of a “community of
communication”. Thus, institution-building cannot produce a public sphere; it can only be
done through social practice and contestation. It is crucial that the citizens accept each other
as “legitimate” speakers in a common public sphere. This demands a certain degree of
collective identification with, in this case Europe, in order for it to ‘have’ a public sphere.
There need not be any deep sense of loyalty or solidarity among the citizens; however, the
citizens need to ‘meet’ each other at the ‘same’ public sphere.
In the case of the Union it seems as if there does not yet exist a European public sphere. Expressions are not taking place only at one level in the Union and even though the citizens are given the opportunity to react they do not really join in the discussions. There is not yet a homogenous European public sphere.

**European culture**

Without doubt it is possible to argue culture to be something people identify with. A culture is built upon, among other things, myths and symbols, i.e. flags, anthems, etc. In the case of Europe it is difficult to define the cultural space since it is not defined by geographical or national borders. Instead it seems as if the European cultural space defines its geographical space, and this, in turn, is not well defined. Thus, it is political decisions that constitute ‘European’ culture, not history or philosophy. This poses a problem since in general people only identify with political decisions if they feel as participants in those decisions. This is a problem common both in the Union and within its memberstates.

Some argue ‘European’ culture to have emerged in three main steps beginning with the ancient Near East which established the foundations of Christianity, ancient Greece which provided philosophy and rationalism, and the Roman Empire from which Europe adopted the politics and the systemic law. However, even though Rome in many ways is comparable with the EU, it is interesting to consider that its fall began when the empire tried to evolve into a ‘community’.

As culture may be defined as a “system of social control”, or as “the values, attitudes, beliefs, and customs of a society”, it is easy to understand why it is important to the Union to claim their “own” culture – these are what politics are based on. However, it has shown difficult to find any ‘European’ values and beliefs which are not general for all of the Western democratic states.

A culture cannot be based entirely on laws based on general values; this will not create a sense of belonging. Here the importance of symbols and myths comes in. Symbols and myths are used to represent and define a collectivity of some sort. They also provide an alternative basis of legitimacy. Since there is a need for the Union to express its originality, a number of ‘European’ symbols have been adopted, i.e. the flag, the anthem, Europe Day, the motto of the EU, etc. Interesting is that the Union uses the same type of symbols as the nation states did to create a unity. This may be both positive and negative.

Another important element in nation-building, or identity-building, is the use of myths. Here the Union is confronted with yet another problem. The Union is characterized by, and greatly influenced by functionalism. However, functionalism generally lacks mythical elements. The fact that the European citizen participates solely for individual interests does not pave the way for increased solidarity.

On the other hand, functionalism may be argued to be a ‘myth’ in itself. The way that rationalist functionalism presents itself as “homeless and timeless” may be seen as an attempt to compensate one myth (the romantic myth of identity-building through culture etc) with another. Thus, the EU must choose between its weak historical myths and a ‘new’ scientific culture, based on political will and economic interest.
European identity
The political identity of an individual is the primary source of legitimization. The Union struggles with a democratic deficit, i.e. there is a lack of legitimization. Thus, the importance of creating a ‘European’ identity becomes obvious. There are two ways of defining political identity – cultural and civic identity – where the first relates to the sense of belonging the individual citizen feels towards a political group, and the second ‘simply’ relates to the identification of citizens within a political structure through a set of institutions, rights, etc.

In relation to the two concepts above two other concepts may be used – Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft. Gesellschaft is based on the idea that individuals join together in a ‘social contract’ for profiting. Gemeinschaft, on the other hand, rather relates to norms and values, kinship, etc. Thus, Gesellschaft relates to “society” while Gemeinschaft relates to “community”. The citizens of the Union possess a civic identity, but not a cultural identity. That is, there exists a Gesellschaft within the Union, but no Gemeinschaft.

Problematic when it comes to ‘European’ identity-building is also that there seems to be no clear idea of who constitutes ‘the people’. There is a “legal” demos, but no “social” demos.

What have been done to create a “We” within the Union?
The Union bases much of its integration politics on developing a European citizenship with an increased relationship between the Union and its citizens, i.e. the Union tries to create a transnational citizenship. However, the citizenship is mainly of a contractual understanding which problemizes a possible identification with a communitarian understanding of the Union.

The EU realized the problem already in the 1970’s and started to attempt providing its institutions with greater democratic legitimacy in a number of ways. Programmes of cultural and educational exchange were developed and cooperation in political areas such as foreign policy was increase

The increased political “homelessness” within the Union has created “identity politics” based on gender, ethnicity, etc. However, this has shown to have the opposite effect which in turn has led to essentialist politics based on in what ways it is possible to think in terms of “A” Europe.

In search of a “European” culture and a feeling of belonging the Union has used the same methods as that of nation-building. It has tried to pinpoint ‘European’ values; however, these values have shown to be too general to bring forward any sense of uniqueness. A number of symbols have also been produced, i.e. the European flag, the anthem, Europe Day (similar to the national holidays of the memberstates), the motto, the elections to the Parliament, not to mention the change of name from “Community” to “Union”. Interesting is that most of the ‘European’ symbols are equal to the national symbols of the memberstates. The Union has also based its existence on functionalism which generally is argued to lack any elements of myths. This causes problems when combined with identity-building based on ‘cultural’ elements.

A Union through nation-building
The Union is in lack of a demos which its memberstates possess. The situation today rather resembles a ‘Union’ of multiple demoi – that is, a union of peoples not a people. When the European Community enlarged its cooperation and was transformed into a Union the need of
a single demos was observed. The problem in the case of the EU is that there is no clear idea of what constitutes the people.

Whether or not the Union should be based on nation-building has been the main question ever since its creation. It is this question which divides the two main visions of Europe’s future. It was this question which separated Monnet and de Gaulle. Monnet believed that national sovereignties would emerge into a ‘European’ sovereignty – a European “community”. De Gaulle urged the importance of a union based on the sovereign nation states, he saw Europe as a “society”. Interesting is that today the Union seems more based upon de Gaulle’s ideas than those of Monnet, even though the opposite is claimed. The EU today resembles a society where the individual citizens have agreed upon certain principles out of benefit, or profit, more than solidarity and sense of belonging.

It seems as if the Union is trying to ‘become’ a community through nation-building principles. The question is: If the Union is a “project” unlike any other of its sort, why base it on principles of integration made for a different “project”?

All the same, if the Union must base its search for legitimacy on nation-building principles, it must “remind” its citizens of what unites them more than their constitutional rights. As argued in the thesis a “community” must be based on something more than rights and duties. The Union needs not only a “civic” but a “civil” society; it needs social norms which are less general than those existing at the moment. That this creates problems is not surprising since the social norms directing the communities of the memberstates are very different. Naturally, the social norms which are to direct all of these communities together becomes general and empty.

There is also the question of why the Union is urged to pursue identity-building policies. Is it “simply” because of its acute need of legitimacy, or because of a genuine wish of becoming something ‘more’ than an ‘inter-national’ cooperation; i.e. to actually follow Monnet’s vision of a supranational Europe? Could this ‘vision’ be a uniting factor in itself? Possibly, but first the Union would have to ‘sell’ its ‘myth’ to the citizens. This has not succeeded so far, perhaps that is the reason why one can distinguish more similarities to de Gaulle’s idea of Europe than that of Monnet at present.

Europe must decide whether it wants a “Gemeinschaft” or if it is ‘satisfied’ with a “Gesellschaft”. There are many different opinions; however, to unite a diverse union, there must be something to unite towards. Thus, the Union is in desperate need of a myth, and the citizens need to accept it. Then, at first, the Union may overcome its democratic deficit. Whether it is possible to create a European “Gemeinschaft” is difficult to establish. If the Union does not manage to ‘interest’ its citizens, or create a ‘demos’ instead of the current ‘demoi’, its possibilities will be next to nothing.

When the Union took the step from being a “community” to becoming a “union” it seems as it was taken for granted that its citizens would do the same without questioning. The result seems to be a political union lacking “the political” – i.e. lacking a ‘demos’.
11 Discussion

Writing this thesis has been interesting. There has almost been an overflow of information causing troubles to sift through the useful information from the less useful information. This phenomenon seems to reflect the relationship between the Union and its citizens: there are enormous amounts of information; however, there seems to be no clear idea of what is really “going on”. The Union has not succeeded in informing its citizens of what it is, or where it is heading. This problem becomes increasingly clear when pursuing research on this subject. It is difficult to “sell” an idea described in an unclear and confusing way. Thus, from this outset a ‘European’ identity is not likely to develop.

When starting to write this thesis I wanted to find out whether there existed a ‘European’ myth or not. While pursuing research my interest shifted as I started to ask the question: Why does Europe need a myth, what are myths used for, and ultimately – is there a European identity?

Once on the “identity-track”, questions such as why Europe needs an identity and wherein the problem of creating a European identity lies are essential.

It is obvious that the Union suffers from a democratic deficit which it wishes to overcome through creating a ‘European’ identity. It appears to have used mostly “civic” methods rather than “civil”, or cultural, methods – however, it does not seem as though these methods create a sense of uniqueness and therefore it is surprising that the Union still does not concentrate more on social integration. It has been argued that the vital question when it comes to legitimacy is whether the Union can allow a ‘multiple demoi’ or not. If so it must accept that the citizens identify foremost with the memberstates. A demos of the Union seems incompatible with its motto: “United in diversity”, since a demos generally intend a people united not in diversity, but rather by solidarity. Since the citizens of the Union participate for individual interests rather than solidarity, the Union is at a dilemma. How does one “force” together a demoi consisting of various different cultures, into a demos? It is understandable that the Union avoids it as long as possible.

At the same time, how will the Union proceed to develop if not dealing with its problems, and more importantly – if not setting out clear goals for what type of union it wants to be?

Considering the two visions of Monnet and de Gaulle it is not surprising that confusion exist about where the Union is heading since it claims to be based on and develop after the ideas of Monnet, but rather resembles the ideas of de Gaulle. Some argue that the Union are to base integration and solidarity among its citizens on deliberation and multilevel government; however, as argued by Smismans, there is a tendency to assume these policies to be infallible. Using more heterarchical horizontal and flexible modes of governance does not guarantee more participation and inclusion in terms of involving all citizens.

One may also question why the Union needs to be more integrated than it already is. The profit from integrating even more is not obvious which again pinpoints the important question of what kind of union the EU is and where it is heading. These questions are crucial to determine in what way the Union should integrate and why. There are numerous alternative ways of classifying where the Union is on the “social scale of integration”. The Union has been described as a “Gesellschaft” but not yet a “Gemeinschaft”, i.e. it lacks clear unifying and shared principles. There are other classifications possible to use for the purpose of determining what the Union are, or are not, however. Hedley Bull distinguishes between “a system of states” and “a society of states” in international order. A “system of states” is
described as: “when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave (...) as parts of a whole.”, whereas a “society of states” is described as: “a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions”. May the EU be classified as a society of states then? This is difficult to establish since the members of the Union seems to be bound by a common set of rules in their relation with each other, and there are common institutions shared. But, if the definition of Bull is carefully read it says that the members of the society (which in this case would be the citizens of the Union since it aims at a direct relationship with its citizens) should conceive themselves as being “bound by a set of rules in their relations with one another” – i.e. sharing a set of norms. Again the importance of having the citizens to identify with the Union makes itself reminded.

Bull also mentions three main goals which an international society may promote, two of them being to preserve the society in itself and to preserve peace. These two goals are also goals which the Union have adopted but, as Bull argues, they are universal – all societies appear to take account of them. As argued earlier the core of ‘European’ values are not unique for Europe. Thus, the Union does not seem to have neither goals nor values which creates a sense of uniqueness. From this outset it seems unlikely that the citizens of the Union will relate to it in any other sense than being economically profitable to them. The Union have been argued to lack a demos, my question is: does it even have a clear telos?

In relation to the unclear picture of where the Union is heading, there is also the question of whether there really is a need for myths. As discussed earlier in the thesis there are those who claim myths to be a “thing of the past”, and that the citizens should “unite” for other reasons, i.e. economic interest, shared general values, and social mores. This seems to be a reasonable proposition; however, it presupposes that the Union will not evolve into a socially integrated power. If that is to be, solidarity among its citizens is necessary, and for solidarity to exist among its citizens the Union must answer the question why or for what purpose the citizens should integrate; otherwise, the talk of a ‘European’ culture and norms, the use of ‘European’ symbols, etc. will remain hopeless attempts.

How shall the Union manage its citizens to think in “European” terms instead of in “national” terms? Philippe de Schoutheete argues that the citizens must learn to communicate over cultural limits and work in the diversity which is “the most important European asset”. The citizens must be habituated to think in a broader political context, i.e. their reasoning must move from the national level to the European level. The problem is how this should be done. No matter how well-informed the citizens are the Union still need to answer the fundamental questions “who are we and where are we heading”, and show in what way it is unique. As for now it seems that the “only” unique thing about the Union is that it is such a new phenomena that it cannot itself determine its uniqueness.

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