United in Diversity
A Neo-Functionalistic Approach to European Defence Integration

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Abstract

The aim of this study is to identify and assess policy preferences among European states from an empirical and theoretical angle. The focus of the empirical part will be the formulation and expression of foreign policy in France, UK, and Sweden during the processing and aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty. The overarching empirical objective is to situate the reader within the dynamics of the Common European Security and Defence (CSDP) institution in order to gain an appreciation of its main characteristics and current political trajectory. The study will then adopt a neo-functionalistic narrative when analyzing policy. This will allow the paper to test the explanatory validity of a grand theory in the CSDP, and make conclusions regarding the possibility to theoretically describe contemporary Europe.

This study argues that neo-functionalism is inadequate in fully explaining the momentum of the European defence and security integration. However, this paper concludes that some aspects of the CSDP, such as the transformation from high to low politics, normative adjustments, and policy convergence, correspond with neo-functionalistic predictions.

**Key Words:** Neo-functionalism, regional integration, CSDP, foreign policy, EU
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVCOM</td>
<td>Committee for Civilian Crisis Management</td>
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<td>CMPD</td>
<td>Crisis Management Planning Directorate</td>
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<td>CPCC</td>
<td>Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>ISS</td>
<td>European Union Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSCD</td>
<td>Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union (Treaty of Maastricht)</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
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I  Introduction

In 1999, the formalization of what would be the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) begun. What had been hinted at in the Treaty of Maastricht became a political reality when the first steps towards a common security institution were taken at the Summit at St Malo, France. This would carry the European integration effort into a hitherto unprecedented area of policy, and initiate the final stage of a policy convergence among member states that could be identified in every instance outside foreign policy. With the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, a number of institutional innovations reinforced the notion that Europe was on the way towards a unified European voice in foreign policy and security.

Today, the idea of a common European security and defence is gaining in legitimacy on the international as well as the domestic scene. Politicians begin to see the value of pooling military capabilities and acts thereafter. Aided by an increase of political capital, the CSDP has expanded its operational mandate and have, since its first mission in Bosnia & Herzegovina 2003, engaged in 28 military and civilian missions from Ukraine to Indonesia, Georgia to Congo. However, a continued development of the institution will not happen without a careful reflection on politically heavy questions such as national sovereignty, the continuation of non-alignment, and Europeanization.

The recent intensification of European foreign policy, coupled with the momentum of the already on-going CSDP process, rejuvenated the explanatory validity of neo-functionalism and reintroduced it as a theoretical alternative to dominating realistic schools. However, the plethora of available theories speaks of the increasing complexity of the European Union (EU), and there is a growing academic consensus that its institutional setup has by now outgrown the explanatory power of a single approach. That being said, the late development of the CSDP qualifies for an ontological re-examination of neo-functionalistic premises juxtaposed to the movement of key European actors in a post-Lisbon Europe.

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1 “EU Operations,” last modified April 2011
1.1 Purpose

The aim of this thesis is to look closer at the formulation of European security and defence policy by EU member states in the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty, and then situate these policy preferences within a neo-functionalistic framework in order to test the theoretical possibility to explain state movements in the CSDP.

1.2 Research Questions

- How do states interact politically with the CSDP after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty?
- Can we properly explain these positions through the theoretical framework provided to us by neo-functionalism?

1.3 Methodological Discussion

Robert Philip Weber describes content analysis as a procedural method by which we can make valid inferences from texts.\(^2\) Klaus Krippendorff further argues that content analysis is gaining legitimacy as an academic tool at an accelerating rate; a potent approach when trying to make sense of political leanings and policy options.\(^3\) Today, this is a research method commonly used in social science when analysing patterns in text for the purpose of explaining actor behaviours and attitudes, current communicative trends, political trajectories, or institutional focuses. However, opposed to many other scientific modes of inquiry, content analysis lacks specific theoretical parameters. I.e. the “do’s and don’ts” of content analysis are not clearly defined. Instead, the terminology is incrementally codified as the method gains scholarly approval. Nevertheless, certain ground rules have been established through a number of individual contributions. And, in regards to the type of qualitative content analysis performed in this study, a deductive approach using predetermined categories and concepts when looking at specified arguments or preferences in a text is regularly consulted.\(^4\) Thus, this paper will look at state preferences in relation to

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European security and defence policy in order to derive conclusions based on the political climate that can be analysed through a neo-functionalistic framework.

The following questions then immediately become which medium to search for policy preferences, and through which actors.

Firstly, a careful selection of key political events, such as EU presidencies or substantial domestic developments, or structural novelties that may affect preference formation, such as institutional innovations brought about by the Lisbon Treaty, have determined the scope of the study.

Secondly, the subjects of this study will be member states within the EU that each is characterized by a distinct, different, and established bundle of policy preferences. By paying attention to the formulation and prioritization of security and defence policies of states, a commonly used categorization of preferences can be identified and arranged in three camps and two sub-groups\(^5\): In the broadest sense it is possible to differentiate between “Atlanticist” states, those who favour and advocate a strong interconnectivity between CSDP and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); “Euro-Centric”, those who champion a more autonomous institutional security arrangement; And finally the traditionally non-aligned states. It is then appropriate to divide these camps further into groups of “militaristic” states, who place the largest emphasis on military capability development. And “civilian” states, who want to steer the CSDP towards a greater commitment to civilian crisis management. From this methodological skeleton, three states will be selected that each visibly represents these pre-set policy preferences:

- France, due to its traditional Euro-Centrism and militaristic approach to the construction of the CSDP
- UK, due to its traditional Atlanticism and militaristic approach to the construction of the CSDP
- Sweden, due to its traditional non-alignment and civilian approach to the construction of the CSDP

Thus, the approach to this study will be two-fold. First, the paper will undertake an empirical review of defence and security policy among member states in the EU in an attempt to map out individual preferences. Secondly the study will assess the empirical findings through a neo-functionalistic framework in order to explain these preferences.

In the first part of the paper, an extensive selection of reports, position papers, conclusions from various presidencies, essays, studies and meeting minutes will be used in order to gather and analyse policy preferences. The second part will accommodate a stricter theoretical approach, relying on a background of previous studies in order to engage in a

\(^5\) For a in-depth discussion on these policy categorizations see Howorth “The CESDP and the forging of a European security culture”, Stahl et al. “Understanding the Europeanist-Atlanticist Divide” Giegerich “European Security and Strategic Cultur” and Jonsson, “The Development of the European Security and Defence”
qualitative discussion on neo-functionalism relevance to the study of regional integration in the EU.

Lastly, a focus on the policy formation in the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty is essential to this study. This because of the mainly three things: the large emphasis placed on the expansion of CSDP institutions and its capabilities that permeated the Treaty and has characterized much of the political discussion since; the distinct changes in domestic politics in both France and the UK which coincided with the ratification of the Treaty; and the potential policy adjustments that can occur when states are forced to situate themselves within a new structural configuration.

While an in-depth interpretation of the bargaining process that led up to the Treaty is a keystone in the understanding of actor movements in the EU, it is ultimately beyond the scope of this study. Thus, the temporal foci of this paper will be put on the ratification of the treaty in 2007, to the latest developments.

1.4 Disposition

This paper will be divided into three main parts. In the first part, a general background on both the CSDP as an institution and the particulars of the defence and security part of the Lisbon Treaty will be provided. The second part will be devoted to the description of policy, and divided further into sub-sections which will discuss each one of the three countries separately. And finally the third part will be reserved for a theoretical analysis.
2 Background

This part will provide a general background on the CSDP as an institution and the state specific policy preferences that could be identified in its initial stage. Furthermore, this chapter will explain some of the most salient changes to European common security and defence following the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty. This will offer an understanding of the underlying policy dynamic in the CSDP, its recent development, and the implications of this.

Moreover, the CSDP was referred to as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) up until the Lisbon Treaty, and the thesis will associate itself with that language for the purpose of the first background chapter. However, for the sake of consistency and clarity, this paper will use the term CSDP after that, even in the context of pre-Lisbon Treaty conditions.

2.1 ESDP – A New Approach to European Defence and Security

The formalization of what would be the ESDP begun during the Austrian Presidency at the St Malo Summit in December 1998. Originally a British initiative, the sudden launch of the ESDP process shocked the usually slow moving decision making process of the EU with unprecedented quickness and cooperation in areas of policy where there had been little to none before. This was a change in Europe’s perception of strategy that for the first time in almost 50 years, appeared to question EU’s role in its own defence. Until now, and during the whole of the Cold War, NATO had been the given guarantor of Europe’s safety. The delicacy of Western Europe’s situation during the Cold War had rendered any other option unworkable, and the Western European Union (WEU) used this geopolitical leverage to consolidate its welfare systems and strengthen its communal bonds while trusting NATO to carry their military burden. However, a more elaborated policy formation took place among European states once left without the Eastern threat that had made them so susceptible to American protection.

Two main approaches emerged during the Cold War: the Atlanticists, with the UK as its primary advocate, who saw defence as a task exclusively left to the transatlantic organization; and the alternative, which was most closely associated with France, was the more Euro-centric way which held European defence autonomy in higher regard. It was

between these two policy preferences that the bargaining process of the ESDP would be centred.\textsuperscript{7}

Thus, the meeting could be described as the lowest common denominator between France and the UK, where the two different positions, Atlanticist and Euro-Centric, met in policy under the underlying assumption that the EU would be more able to meet the demands placed upon it by the international community if an autonomous pool of military resources could be established.\textsuperscript{8} This was a shift away from the UK's traditional Euro-Scepticism. But a timely manoeuvre by Blair that corresponded to the Clinton administration’s “softening up” on NATO’s hegemonic status in Europe.\textsuperscript{9} Furthermore, the Yugoslav wars in the 1990’s brutally exposed the WEU’s inability to act as the security institution it was supposed to be, and prompted the EU to aim for a stronger and more effective defence organization.

The following years was marked by a rapid expansion of the ESDP as the institution grew both in political and military weight. The German Presidency that begun immediately after the St Malo Summit focused on providing guidelines for the institutional setup. And the subsequent Finnish Presidency was used to elaborate the Helsinki Headline Goals which would begin to define its operational capabilities.\textsuperscript{10}

The ESDP development was characterized by conciliation and cooperation. However, the process also suffered from normative divergences that permeated the bargaining course and came to define the negotiations preceding the Lisbon Treaty. The UK and France emerged as natural leaders of the initiative due to their central role at the St Malo Summit and the process was progressed mainly in the intersection of their respective policy preferences. This remained the status quo of the ESDP in its infant years. And, while some states, such as the Nordics, very early pushed for a greater inclusion of civilian crisis management, it was largely neglected in favour for a swift, Franco-British development of the institution.\textsuperscript{11}

As the ESDP grew and gained legitimacy as an intrinsic part of the EU, it expanded both in scope (i.e. in its operational capabilities and the width of possible missions) and in political depth (i.e. the acceptance of additional political ideals such as the federalism most commonly associated with Germany, and the idea of an increased civilian crisis management capability usually affiliated with the Nordic countries). This contributed to an increasingly complex and multi-faceted European security structure that had rapidly departed from its previous rejection of a military identity.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., 723
\textsuperscript{8} Giovanni Grevi et al., \textit{European Security and Defence Policy: the first ten years (1999-2009)} (The European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2009), 22
\textsuperscript{9} Pål Jonsson, “The Development of the European Security and Defence Policy - An Assessment of Preferences, Bargains and Outcomes” (FOI – Swedish Defence Research Agency 2006), 69
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., 85
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 730
The next part aims to provide a review over the key institutional rearrangements within the ESDP in order to prepare the discussion on how they relate to the creation of policy asymmetries.

2.2 Lisbon Treaty – From ESDP to CSDP

The Lisbon Treaty has been perceived as a particularly controversial attempt to redesign EU’s institutional design. Seen by some as overly-centralizing and pseudo-federalizing, it has been prone to figure in heckling analogies on a “United States of Europe”. For others, however, the Lisbon Treaty was seen as a structural reconfiguration which would reduce bureaucracy and promote transparency. The dichotomy notwithstanding, it was clear that the post-Lisbon Treaty EU would not be quite the same.

The foreign policy adjustments have been especially salient in the public discourse and a major factor contributing to its initial rejection in the Irish referendum. One of the most distinct features of the Lisbon Treaty was the disassembling of the previous pillar system and the recreation of its jurisdiction under a consolidated version of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. A position now entailing a twofold responsibility as both spokesmen for the common foreign policy of the EU, and the Vice-President of the European Commission. This intra-institutional overlapping consolidates the European Parliament’s role in the European common foreign policy and emphasizes diplomatic delicacy as members pursue common policy options through the High Representative.

The Lisbon Treaty also introduces a new emphasis on member state conformity vis-à-vis third parties, i.e., the treaty underlines the necessity of individual member states to “speak with the same voice” in their respective diplomatic engagements. This provision is not unambiguous, and may widen the democratic deficit when policy asymmetry arises due to different representations and interests in international organizations such as NATO or the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). A need for conformity coupled with an uneven distribution of organizational engagements throughout the member states could favour bigger players such as France and Germany while neglecting, or imposing new policies, on smaller countries outside UNSC or NATO such as Sweden, Austria or Ireland.

The principle of solidarity is a returning rhetoric in the language of the Lisbon Treaty. And in an amendment to the Petersberg Tasks it adds an admonition of “acting unanimous”, in addition to extensions concerning international terrorism.

15 Ibid., Article 17a
16 Ibid., Article 28 A.2
Another eye-catching feature of the Lisbon Treaty is the Mutual Assistance Article which in essence adopts the same principle of mutual defence as asserted in NATO article V\(^{18}\), i.e., the member states are obliged to intervene militarily in case of armed aggression towards another member state. However, steps are taken to ensure the Articles’ compatibility with existing NATO commitments as well as any national dedication towards neutrality.\(^{19}\)

Additionally, the Lisbon Treaty introduces an important institutional liberalization by lifting the ban on sub-group coalitions in security and defence matters. This new possibility of enhanced cooperation called, *Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence* (PSCD) enables countries which share a common and superior military capability relative to other member states to consolidate their defence-related collaboration. The Lisbon Treaty entered into force without a clear directive on the criterions for entering a PSCD, these have partly been elaborated retroactively through discussions among experts in the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and partly formed on an ad hoc basis. One initial criterion for forming a PSCD has been a military devotion representing at least 2% of the national GDP, but this has been largely discarded as it would reduce the possible candidates to only France, UK, Bulgaria, Romania and Greece. Others, such as Belgium, have expressed a view that it should be open for every member.\(^{20}\) A later, more official standard released by the European Union Institute for Security Studies (ISS), claimed that members within a PSCD should not fall below the mean defence expenditure of the Union as a whole.\(^{21}\)

Lastly, one of the most apparent institutional innovations produced by the Lisbon Treaty is the development of the European External Action Service (EEAS) which can be described bluntly as a support team to the High Representative consisting of diplomats and officials. Along with the High Representative, the EEAS can be seen as the conclusion of the Lisbon Treaty’s overarching effort to make the EU foreign policy more concentrated. The EEAS main task will be to bridge the policy segregations nurtured under the previous pillar system and consolidate parliamentary power in the larger Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) under which the CSDP is a subordinate institution. Still an infant concept, it remains to see how and what position it will occupy in regards to the decision making process.

While this list of structural readjustments and institutional redefining brought forth by the Lisbon Treaty is by no means exhausted, it should suffice to reveal the underlining ambition to increase cohesion, concentrate power in a more available position and further promote democracy in the decision making process. The following chapters will initiate the discussion on policy preferences in the CSDP by introducing the theoretical framework of neo-functionalism.

\(^{17}\) Ibid., *Article 28B*


3 Neo-Functionalism - Theoretical Framework

The sheer number of available theories attempting to describe the integration process of the EU is testimony to its complexity. Its unique political structure quickly accelerates away from the frame of understanding provided to us by classical theories of International Relations (IR). This section will begin by a brief discussion on the two main ideas within IR, and how they appear inadequate when applied in the context of European integration. It will then proceed to provide a more in-depth appreciation of the theoretical subject of this thesis, neo-functionalism and the motivation for its application in this study.

On a basic level, two grand theories emerge to explain the movement of actors in the international system: the neo-realist approach, predominantly articulated by Kenneth Waltz. And, its theoretical antipole, international liberalism developed by, among others, Bruce Russet.

In contemporary political thought, neo-realism stands out as one of the most preeminent models of international politics. Its principal posture is that the state, as a unitary and exclusive player on the international scene, formulates policies from a foundation of self-interest in an anarchical system. Neo-realism assumes that the basic, and only, foreign policy interest is the pursuit of national interests. As such, actions in a neo-realist model are reactions to exogenous changes in the international system. Thus, a neo-realist would accordingly explain the development of the European defence as a common identification of external powers which, in a state-centric perception, would be better faced as a unitary body, rather than as an individual actor.  

International Liberalism (IL), the most visible alternative to neo-realism, is built on opposite paradigms. Instead of unitary actors pursing self-preservation in international anarchy, integration in IL is motivated by inter-dependence and notions of democratic peace. Both the role of the state, and the importance of national sovereignty, is diminished in favour for sub- and supra-state elements. In IL, war among democratic states is considered an economically inconceivable enterprise. And thus the formulation of policy in IL depends on a plurality of factors where state-centrism and the pursuit of individual interest is but one of them.

Despite the heavy credentials of these classical approaches to IR, their contribution to the understanding of European integration is, at best, a simplified explanation in specific partitions and outright inadequate on the whole. It has been argued that some parts of the EU can be properly interpreted using the vocabulary of classical theory. But these attempts are quickly discontinued when applied in a bigger context. It is clear that we need

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a new narrative when we discuss European integration and more specifically, the formulation of policies within it. It is for this reason that this study employs neo-functionalism in its attempt to explain the movement of actors within the EU.

Neo-functionalism owes its establishment to Ernst B. Haas, the late German-American who formulated the theory on the foundations in turn provided to him by David Mittrany and Jean Monnet. In itself, Neo-Functionalism has had a volatile history and been deemed obsolescent on several occasions, including twice by its author.25 In recent years, however, it has enjoyed newfound appreciation among scholars of international relations and comparative politics in a range of policy areas connected to deepened European integration.26

In essence, neo-functionalism is the result of an academic endeavour to marry a state-centric approach, preeminent in international relations, with a plurality of non-state actors. This has historically rendered it disciplinary abstract, and in effect, occasionally misunderstood. Initially, we can identify two set of actors which guides the integration efforts in neo-functionalism: i) the secretariat of the different organizations involved, and ii) the social movements that coagulates around a region.27 These sub-state entities will capitalize on the political momentum created for them as states allocate portions of sovereignty to supranational institutions. The unintentional effects that derives from the intrinsically arbitrary process of transferring political capital to another body in a supranational structure under a task specific mandate is referred to as spill-over effects by Haas.28 And, as social movements becomes incrementally more influential through the process of spill-over, their ability to affect the political trajectory of states rise accordingly. Thus, integration is a transformative process which starts off at a given point, and deepens as domestic governments familiarizes themselves with supranational elements. This will in turn initiate additional spill-over effects that, when exploited by sub-state actors affect the executive power of the state. At the end state (which, in the context of the European Union, is still largely speculative), national preferences, entangled in regional pressure, have moved from their original position and become increasingly incited to participate in additional communal exercises.29

It is appropriate to mention the generic suppositions of Haas’s neo-functionalism before proceeding further. These are mainly two. Firstly, Neo-Functionalism rests and falls on the assumption that no form of violent coercion is ever applied during the integrations process. Any physical threat would undermine the presumptive role of regional social movements.

26 See for example: Eriksson “EU Defence Integration: A Case for a Neo-Functionalist”; Ojanen “The EU and NATO: Two Competing Models for a Common Defence Policy”; McGowan “Theorising European Integration: revisiting neo-functionalism and testing its suitability for explaining the development of EC competition policy?”; and Schmitter “Neo-Neo-Functionalism” and “On the way to a post-functionalist theory of European integration”.
This is, however, a highly unlikely scenario in the European context. Secondly, it is taken for granted that the actors will remain first and foremost occupied with their national welfare, and first and foremost autonomous in their decision making process.\(^{30}\)

To this we can now add some distinctive assumptions of neo-functionalism as formulated by Haas and summarized by Schmitter.\(^{31}\)

i) In Neo-Functionalism, states are not considered to be the exclusive, or even predominate, power in a region. Instead, focus is placed on sub-state coalitions and interests groups that, when fuelled by the spill-over created as supranational engagements results in unexpected consequences, affect the decision making process of the state.

ii) It is state specific interests that motivate the integration process rather than a common identity or shared values. I.e., it is not out of tribute to a European identity that states engage in regional integration, but as a way to enforce domestic interests. However, this does not exclude the shaping of additional, or completely new, interests during the process. On the opposite, Neo-Functionalism assumes that preferences will come to converge with that of the region at the end state of the transformative period.

iii) In Neo-Functionalism, low politics make up the entry point of regional integration. The integration process will move from the least controversial matter to gradually come to engage more delicate policy areas such as security and defence.

iv) When actors gather to propose solutions to a commonly identified issue, it will create spill-over into other areas of cooperation. This inclusion of other arenas will in turn provoke new actors and thus widened the scope of activity.

From these assumptions, we can then derive a series of inquires that will help us address the underlying research question of the paper: In the post-Lisbon CSDP, which are the dominant actors? What are the driving forces of integration? Can policy convergence be identified in the field of security, defence and foreign policy? Have states shifted their values towards the region? Is the transformative process of political normalization from high to low politics represented in the CSDP? These are questions by which the basic assumptions of neo-functionalism can be measured by an empirical framework, and allow us to make conclusions regarding its validity as a theory explaining the political integration in European defence and security.

Lastly, it is important to clarify the concept of policy in the context of this study. This thesis is concerned with the formulation and prioritization of policy towards the CSDP. As such, what will be assessed is the communication with the institution by state governments; explicit and formalized public policy by states vis-à-vis the CSDP interpreted in this study as different preferences concerning political actions. It is not, however, associated with the expression of policies within the institution. Thus, a study of the intra-organizational political dynamic in the CSDP is beyond the scope of this study.

\(^{30}\) Ibid., 258

\(^{31}\) Ibid., 259-260
4 France and Foreign Policy During Sarkozy

The summit at St. Malo in 1998 marked an early British attempt to dislodge the European defence discussion from a stagnated policy dichotomy. At this time, France still remained theoretically, as well as practically, inclined to the de Gaullist notion of an autonomous European security identity, unsubordinated to NATO. It is true that France occupied a rather peripheral position in the Trans-Atlantic alliance throughout most of the Cold War and early 21st century. However, in 2007, under the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy, France re-established its icy relationship with the organization and entered the cooperation with renewed pragmatism.

This chapter will provide a review of French policy from 2007 till 2011 with focus on its position in the CSDP. The first part is focusing on the Presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy, the reintegration into NATO and the change in attitude that accompanied it. The second part is discussing the statements made in the 2008 French White Paper on Defence and National Security which formulates France’s strategic visions for the coming years. The third part of this chapter is emphasizing the French Presidency of 2008 and the policy preferences pursued and accentuated during this time. Finally, the Franco–British Military Cooperation signed in November 2010 is described in detail. At the end of this chapter, the empirical groundwork needed for theory testing will be established in regards to France. And, a general appreciation of France role in CSDP and an understanding of its contemporary foreign policy, acquired.

4.1 Enter Sarkozy

It is proper by many accounts to anchor the discussion about French EU policy with President Nicolas Sarkozy’s assumption of office in May 2007. It was during the presidency of Sarkozy that the Lisbon Treaty went from an initial rejection to a later ratification. Furthermore, Paris became closer than ever to Washington, as Sarkozy pushed towards a French integration with the partly alienated NATO. In several other key defence policy areas, such as enhancing military capabilities and interoperability between EU members, France took on an ambitious and innovative role. Thus, true to the scope of this study, a deeper understanding of Sarkozy’s early days as President of France needs to be pursued.

Upon Sarkozy’s accession of office, scholars had increasingly begun to talk about the “end of French Europe”.32 This was a notion brought about by a shift in the structure of the

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EU, which decision making process had become more complex and less prone to individual domination. And a growing disagreement about the Europe puissance – the free and strong Europe, unchained and deserving of its own strategic discretion – which had been the traditional, and French, model of foreign policy. The de Gaullist approach, which held French autonomy and sovereignty in the absolute highest regard, suddenly appeared increasingly out of tune with the rest of Europe. And, the British initiative for structural and cooperative novelty at the St Malo Summit left a lingering expectation on Paris to, at least in part show the same willingness to change.

In a 2008 article, Bastien Irondelle is identifying several reasons to why France foreign policy had begun to lag behind the rest of Europe. Two of which can be argued to have been partly remedied during Sarkozy’s presidency.

Firstly, Irondelle is pointing at France’s troubled relationship to NATO and the U.S. Something pertaining to de Gaulle’s decision to withdraw from the Treaty Organization in 1966 as a defence of France sovereignty, and which has permeated French foreign policy since. However, Sarkozy was quick to establish his ambition to part with old ways and push for a full reintegration into NATO.

This manoeuvre certainly did not lack political foundation. France had begun to play a more active role in NATO since 2002, giving Sarkozy the benefit of making a decision seen as the obvious conclusion of their current foreign policy. Nevertheless, the decision was distinguished by a pragmatism that clearly marked a departure from de Gaulle’s idealism. And, in a 2007 interview Sarkozy talked openly about EU as a complement rather than competitor to NATO.

The change of policy that was hinted in his early statements was formalized in the White Paper released the next year that contained the Grand Strategy of France. However, Sarkozy’s rapprocher with NATO was no one-way street. In a speech at the fifteen ambassadors’ conference in August 2008, Sarkozy illustrated France position in NATO with the words:

“This Atlantic Alliance, I need not remind you, is ours: we founded it and we are one of its major contributors today. Of its 26 members, 21 also belong to the EU”

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39 Ibid., 62
This exemplifies a French determination to reintegration into NATO as someone who is retaking a position belonging to them in the first place, rather than one who ask to be let back in. And, in the same speech, Sarkozy is capitalizing on the EU’s increased potential to act as a strong player on the international scene after Lisbon. So, while a certain withdrawal from de Gaullism can be discerned in the early policies of Nicolas Sarkozy, it is equally important to acknowledge that it remains the core of French foreign policy. The deep entrenchment of de Gaullism in the French mentality limits Sarkozy’s political latitude and may invoke heavy intra-parliamentary opposition. Especially concerning sensitive issues such as the status of French troop in Afghanistan, where Sarkozy’s willingness to increase its numbers by a third was rewarded by a vote-of-no-confidence by France’s Left.42

Secondly, Iro n d e lle is arguing that France traditional adherence to de Gaulle’s notion of defence autonomy and strategic independence has had two immediate effects on its foreign policy: One, France has continued to uphold the idea of Europe puissance, which have been expressed as a reluctance to yield in European security negotiations, especially those concerning an enlargement of civilian crisis management capabilities at the expense of military might.43 And two, France has remained institutionally inclined to a strict intergovernmental approach, consistently vetoing institutional reconstructions which would depart from a strict consensus based decision making process. An approach to international theory which appears paradoxical when France tries to marry grand organizational ambitions with a persistent reluctance to empower the institutions behind it.

However, when Sarkozy assumed office after the elections in 2007, he did so with the message that “France is back in Europe”.44 This is evidential for Sarkozy’s wish to reposition a France whose enduring inclination to promote itself as a natural leader within a Europe on its way to world power status had begun to feel old. Instead, France’s attitude towards Europe and European power would be characterized by a more pragmatic approach and acknowledgment of the growing complexity of the Union which leaves little room for unilateralism.45

Furthermore, the reinforced French allegiance towards the Atlantic has the potential to dispel the lingering suspicion towards France’s underlying intentions with the Union and particularly its defence and security division.46 A French realignment of policy in favor for an increased multilateral commitment has the possibility to accelerate the overall progression of the CSDP as one of its key actors relax in policy and insert additional credibility in the political discussions.

42 “Sarkozy survives vote over Nato” last modified March 17 2009 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7948133.stm
46 See for example Sundberg “Ett maktskifte med konsekvenser” and Bickerton “Oh bugger, they’re in the tent”
De Gaulle’s spirit has not been completely evicted from Élysée Palace; in much it is still present. However, it has been forced to make way for a more outspoken multilateralism. Most apparent of which is France recommitment to NATO, its willingness to dialog concerning EU’s civil crisis management capabilities, and an overall depression of de Gaullism in favour for a more pragmatic approach to regional interactions. The next part will look closer at the formal policy of France which was expressed in the White Paper drafted on Sarkozy’s initiative when he assumed office.

4.2 2008’s White Paper

The French White Paper on Defence and National Security (2008) closely echoed the pragmatism and rapprochement by which President Sarkozy had started off the European defence discussion and its Trans-Atlantic partner organization when he assumed office the year before. The paper gives us valuable insight in the shifting French attitude and through that we can discern several key points onto which we can anchor our understanding of French security and defence policy.

Firstly, France reiterates, and consolidates, its past held ambition of a European defence arrangement which is militarily competent enough to carry out high-intensive expeditionary operations. This would include the pooling of 60,000 men as well as previously contested strategic instruments such as air-lifts which composition primarily would rely on Franco-German and Franco-British initiatives. The French inclination for military expansion in the CSDP framework should come as no surprise. However, the added emphasis on civil management (a to France more foreign facet of the CFSP) bring novelty to its policy preferences. France has previously been hesitant in allowing civil crisis management to take up too large of a place on the CSDP agenda. However, they are now approaching the issue on a broader range.

Secondly, the paper is emphasizing the importance of a European strategic autonomy. This derives from an analysis of previous operational experience, in which French identifies several shortcomings in the CSDP’s ability to carry out missions in distant theatres. France suggests that the Union should be able to, simultaneously and independently, conduct up to two or three large missions, and several minor civil management operations. In order to achieve this, France remains determined on creating a European command and intelligence structure that are able to act autonomous and coherent.

Thirdly, France remains seized about the issue of anti-terrorism in a strategic context. The Lisbon Treaty expanded the provisions of the existing Petersberg tasks to include a

commitment against terrorism. And, while the admonition of anti-terrorism into the solidarity clause of the Treaty certainly is a bargaining victory for France, given its initial opposition by most members including the UK50, further intensification of the Unions anti-terrorist activities is proposed. Among else, extraordinary legislation in time of crisis, and an increase in cooperative exercises between members is expressed as potential measures by which the EU could extend its ability to handle the threat of terrorism.

Fourthly, France devotes considerable political energy to the task of reviving its transatlantic relations. France’s perspective of NATO is complementary rather than competitive and they are careful not to adopt a too definitively Euro-centric, or Atlanticist approach. Rather the French position towards NATO is characterized by an acknowledgment of NATO’s role as the primary source for European defence, but on the same time remaining true to its visions of the CSDP as a military institution capable of carrying out high intensive operations.

France policy, as expressed in their 2008 White Paper, is a further compromise between Gaullist ideals of absolute autonomy, and new pragmatism. Their underlying dedication to a numerically considerable and operationally independent expeditionary force is intact, but now coupled with a renewed commitment to civil crisis management, and a reestablishment of its Atlantic relations.

4.3 The French Presidency

The French Presidency in the last two quarters of 2008 closely echoed its ambitions expressed in their White Paper released the same year. Nicolas Sarkozy had entered the rotating Presidency with an outspoken ambition to fully develop the CSDP in line with France’s overarching dedication to autonomy, l’Europe de la Défense – the Defence of Europe – was to be put at the top of their presidential priorities. However, the French agenda was grossly affected by three major international events: The international financial crisis, the Russia-Georgian War and the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty. All which, to some extent, overwrote the initial agenda and distinguished the French Presidency as crisis management tenure, rather than one which would pursue developments in policy.

This part will assess the French Presidency of 2008, its expectations and accomplishments, as well as the change in policy since the presidency of 2000. This will hopefully provide insight to France’s main priorities and intentions with the institutional development of the CSDP. Furthermore, by paying attention to the manner in which the negotiation played out, a general appreciation of the European policy dynamic during the period of the French Presidency can be obtained.

In a speech at the European Parliament 2008, Nicolas Sarkozy laid out his main objectives in regards to the French Presidency. Unsurprisingly, the points closely echoed those which were as expressed in the White Paper released the same year. France vision with its presidency, in regards to defence policy, was heavily focused on transforming its White Paper ambitions to institutional reality in the CSDP.

At the end of the presidency, Sarkozy’s leadership in 2008 had been rewarded by praise from both Cowen and Berlusconi, perhaps he was aided by the international turmoil that coincided with the presidency, a political climate that must have suited “Speedy Sarkozy”. In any event, the French command of the European Council in 2000 did, however, not receive the same round of applauds. Conversely, the French Presidency under Chirac would become generally criticized because of its overly Franco-centric approach to the construction of the infant CSDP. Nevertheless, the CSDP process as a whole did make considerably headway once one of the major powers behind its establishment assumed office as Council President.

Then as now, the main focus was on the development of the CSDP, deepening of European integration and capability expansion. True to its overarching preferences, France emphasized the EU’s ability to act as a militarily confident power, while pushing the responsibility for civilian crisis management over to the next two presidencies, Sweden’s and Belgium’s. All in all, France did not bother to hide its preference for Euro-Centrism. Rather it openly demonstrated it by pushing for extended cooperation in military affairs and by retaining a more sceptic attitude towards NATO.

In terms of policy, the France EU Presidency of 2008 showed considerable continuity with that of 2000. If anything, France appeared even more ambitious then it had during its last term, and in Le Monde September 13, 2007, it was referred to as a “St Malo mark two”. However, this time France would enter such a summit further away from de Gaulle than ever before. And, while its ambitions were high, the potential to muster the political will necessary for the normalization of its Atlantic relationship, which was required to push them through the cumbersome decision making process of the EU, finally accompanied it.

However it is worth noting that France’s consolatory rhetoric towards NATO has not been spared scrutiny. For one, there is widespread suspicion that France vision for NATO is still heavily painted in a tricolour. Secondly, France withdrawal from the Treaty Organization could be described as a period of unfriendly cooperation, rather than complete absence.

53 Ibid. 101
54 Ibid. 102
After all, France has remained a major contributor (around 13% of NATO’s budget) and a constant supplier of both arms and soldiers to its operations.  

France envisioned an increased military capability that would further qualify Europe on the international arena. Earlier it had been forced to relinquish the vision of a European subgroup that was comparatively more independent, militarily and structurally, from Europe as a whole. Now, however, the provisions for this could lie in the cooperative channels created by the Lisbon Treaty, the PSCD. France wanted to spearhead the European capability initiative together with five other large members, the so-called G-6 group. The qualifications to which would entail a commitment to military spending equating of at least two per cent of the nation’s GDP. However, when the Irish referendum turned out negative, this plan had to be, again, temporally abandoned. Instead, considerable political capital was invested in salvaging the capsizing treaty. And, it was during the French presidency that the high-reaching Constitutional Treaty was replaced with a more timid one, The Reform Treaty, which is the version that eventually would gain the Irish support necessary for implementation.

The French emphasis on defence cooperation is important in several ways. During its previous Presidency, the notion of “reinforced cooperation” was actively pursued by France together with Germany. However, due to opposition from the Atlanticism UK, who feared that the development of such an organization would impose on NATO’s jurisdiction, and the non-aligned Sweden, who rather see the EU develop towards civil crisis management, the initiative was forced to exclude any mentioning of military cooperation. This is not the case with the PSCD implemented in Lisbon. And the ability to engage in such an enterprise would surely fit Élysée with its longstanding commitment to a deepening of European integration and capability expansion. Undoubtedly, Paris will hope that its rapprochement with NATO have granted it sufficient political goodwill to push for France’s active participation in the PSCD without having to answer to allegations concerning an attempt to diminish NATO’s power.

Furthermore, the PSCD is as much France’s rejoice as it is Britain’s concern. Throughout the process of constructing a European defence that is European, there has been a persistent perception of it zero-sum character. That is, the strengthening of one was seen to be at the others expense. And, from the outset, it has been the UK that stood most resilient against any power exchange unfavourable to NATO. At the roundtable discussion concerning Security and defence priorities during France’s EU Presidency in Brussels 2008, the French defence initiatives were being discussed by representatives from the EU and NATO. During the sessions, the typical schism between UK and France, as Atlanticists and Euro-Centrics, were especially evident in the discourse concerning the enlargement of CSDP. However, this time it was not without a certain consolatory sentiment. Britain’s

Deputy Military Representative, Bob Tizard, entertained an anticipated cautionary approach when he suggested that while the CSDP certainly had made considerable advancement since its establishment, effort should be directed at mending its institutional shortcomings, rather than pushing ahead with new ideas\textsuperscript{60}. Furthermore, Tizard agreed to the reasonability in a target of two per cent in regards to military spending, but also claimed that Europe might lack the political will to pursue it.

The French Presidency was permeated by the same commitment to deepen European integration through the construction of a coherent and capable CSDP as it has previously been. Sarkozy had embarked on the six month journey captained by France with the ambition to further enlarge the CSDP through an increased emphasis on its operational capacities. And deepen it by pushing ahead with the plans for structured cooperation. This ambitious agenda was, however, considerably delayed by the simultaneous outbreak of three major international crises. So while the working pace during the Presidency must certainly have accommodated France fast moving President Sarkozy. Less political energy than perhaps desired and needed could be devoted to pushing through the high-reaching targets of the French Presidency in regards to CSDP.

\section*{4.4 France and Britain – Military Cooperation}

France and Britain has been the engine behind the European defence initiative since the summit at St Malo. Thus, whenever the mechanics broke down, or the partnership lacked fuel, the CSDP process would slow down with it. Traditionally, the two have represented two different models of European integration, and the heritage of which still permeates the preferred policy arrangement of Windsor Hall and Élysée. However, whenever one party saw it fit to yield in the negotiations. It was immediately reflected in the progression of the discussions. The Franco-British military cooperation is, as the name entails, one conducted outside the immediate domain of the Union. Nevertheless, its relevance to this study is justified by an assumption of its significance to the formulation of an overall European defence convergence. And, equal in importance, by the shift in French and British policy preference that it represents. This part will be focused on providing a general introduction to the provisions of the treaty and its implication to European military integration.

Just as St Malo came about after Prime Minister Tony Blair decided to compromise with Britain’s hard-line Atlanticism in favour for the development of the European defence institution which absence had been frightfully clear during the Yugoslavian Wars. The bilateral, Franco-British, announcement of military cooperation in November 2010 was

\textsuperscript{60} John Chapman, “Security and defence priorities during France’s EU Presidency” \textit{Security \\& Defence Agenda} (2008): 8
done in the same manner of accommodation, and the ripple-effects it will provoke throughout the defence and security institutions of the EU can be expected to mimic those of the past. Indeed, the military cooperation announcement is ironically analogous to the St Malo Summit. At that time, the Atlanticist Britain chose to move from its ideological conviction in order to seek agreement with the Euro-Centric French. Now Sarkozy seems to return the favour. However, just as the overarching purpose of the Lisbon Treaty, in regards defence and security appears, by all accounts, to be to induce coherency in foreign policy and consolidate its ability to act as a strategic ally to NATO. The Franco-British military cooperation is an initiative towards maintaining the present commitment towards CSDP and European defence rather than marking the beginning of a new institutional offensive.

There is reason to adopt an optimistic approach to the evaluation of the November initiative. What we see is essentially a partial abandonment of ideological dogmas that has long acted as an obstructive element in the development of a European strategic identity. In its place, an incremental convergence of foreign policy has taken root. While this is certainly not the first time that Britain and France has cooperated on defence matters⁶¹, the treaty is engaging the parties in defence matters on an unprecedentedly extensive level. The treaty first establishes the coordinated development of military capabilities, and cooperation in defence and security matters interpreted in its broadest sense, as its overarching purpose. From this general understanding, several military initiatives, from ‘the pooling of equipment and personnel’, to ‘the strengthening of the co-operation between the armed forces’ and ‘joint work on military doctrine’, is concretized in the provision of the treaty.⁶² The latter is displaying a further willingness to converge military preferences between the two big European powers.

The few restrictions that apply throughout the otherwise inclusive and open treaty text are of the sort regularly found in other European defence treaties. Such as the sovereignty of deploying and employing troops of each party⁶³ and that the provision of the treaty should be exercised without prejudices to other defence and security collaborations⁶⁴.

As Prime Minister Cameron said during the press conference announcing the defence cooperation treaty, “This is not about a European Army […] It is about defending our national interest. It is about practical, hard-headed cooperation between sovereign countries. It is about sharing development and equipment costs, eliminating unnecessary duplication, coordinating logistics, and aligning our research programs.”⁶⁵ This is certainly

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⁶⁴ Ibid., Article 13
the case. The treaty is first and foremost a practical innovation, secondarily an ideological statement. However, if the CSDP process learned us anything, it is that nothing France and Britain do will be contained solely to France and Britain. Thus, the appropriate question to ask is not whether the Franco-British initiative will affect the CSDP, but how and to what extent.

As noted by Javier Solana in a news article from January 2011\textsuperscript{66} and Ben Jones in an Occasional Paper to the European Institute for Security Studies\textsuperscript{67}, the importance of the treaty, in respect to the rest of Europe, is due to its ability to pave the way for similar expressions of deepened European integration. The Lisbon Treaty (re)-introduced the concept of militarily focused sub-groups within the CSDP as a means for states with similar military composition to streamline their intra-organizational defence commitment. The possibility of PSCD has been largely left unexplored by any major European power, and a successful Franco-British military integration may inject the necessary credibility in its potentials\textsuperscript{68}.

However, the British and French twoness can also be interpreted as an expression of dissatisfaction with the status quo\textsuperscript{69}. By prioritizing bilateralism over communitarianism; Britain has situated itself in a familiar position and France in a foreign.

\subsection*{4.5 Summary and Conclusion}

Since Nicolas Sarkozy entered the Élysée Palace in 2007, France has embarked on several important political ventures. Among the most important is the realignment with NATO, Sarkozy’s careful but distinct shift from de Gaullism, the furthered commitment to CSDP’s civil crisis management, the continued and strong commitment to European defence and security during the French Presidency, and the Franco-British defence cooperation. In respect to the CSDP process, France has remained seized of its development and of the elaboration of a European strategic identity. Furthermore, France’s inter-governmental inclination is as strong as ever during Sarkozy’s reign. France’s White Paper is permeated by concrete suggestions for future ambitions and consolidated inter-European capability pooling.

As shown, France’s EU policy over the latest four years has manifested some definitive adjustments. However, one must avoid drawing too far-fetched conclusions from its character. Put in light of history, France today is quite corresponding to the cyclist relations

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{68} Ibid., 12
\item \textsuperscript{69} Ronja Kempin, et al. “Turning Away from CSDP?” German Institute for International and Security Affairs 30 (2010): 3
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
with EU and NATO that it has upheld from the outset. The rapprochement to NATO is not the first attempt to normalize its Atlantic relationship, nor is it extraordinary in its practical implications. And, its flirtations with a true European defence convergence, as deeper military integration with Britain is pursued, are neither novel nor radical. Still, one should be equally careful not to underestimate, or rather underappreciate, the symbolism activated through such enterprises. In the politically exhausting exercise of creating policy cohesion among twenty seven members, willingness to compromise and replace theology with pragmatism matters a great deal. It matters too that France’s incumbent President is arguably the most Atlanticist ever. And, it does matter that while the constitution of France’s latest commitment to rapprochement and integration is almost habitual, its depth and wideness is unprecedented.
5 UK and the Shift of National Preferences

It was first when the inadequacy of the European institutions was so frightfully demonstrated in the Yugoslavian wars, that the necessary political momentum for the establishment of the CSDP was gained. Prime Minister Tony Blair, who assumed office in the aftermath of the wars, had first-hand experience of the institutional disarmament that followed once NATO took a more cautionary approach to intervention. Without NATO, the EU lacked the military might, the political determination and the structural competence to carry out high-intensive, large-scale, humanitarian interventions. The motives for the CSDP were thus, to a very large extent, derived from the acknowledgment of an institutional weakness.

Traditionally, Britain had been anti-federalist and Atlanticist. But, after the Yugoslav wars the determinants for the future of European defence had been forced to assume a more pragmatic flavour. However, the CSDP process, of which Britain was an obvious leader together with France (and to a large but lesser extent Germany), would become characterized by the occasionally difficult relationship between the two. It was foremost in regards to Washington that the two powers diverged in policy. France rested on a de Gaullist notion of large autonomy, Britain on an equally established reluctance to expand European defence on the expense of NATO.

This part will concentrate on mapping out British policy in respect to European defence since the beginning of 2007 and onwards. It will begin by discussing the British response to the French reintegration into NATO and what it tells us about interstate dynamics in the EU and the current foreign policy of the UK. The paper will then move on to make an account of the British response to the Lisbon Treaty and the institutional innovation it introduces. Finally, the thesis will examine the Conservative – Liberal coalition and its impact on the CSDP.

5.1 Response to Rapprochement

When Sarkozy announced the French reintegration into NATO he doubtlessly expected a wholehearted welcome from Windsor Hall. In reality, the British reaction was, at best, lukewarm.70 This part aspires to move through the British response to the French recommitment to NATO in order to gain an appreciation for the inter-European dynamics that reflects in the CSDP process. Its relevance to the study is motivated by the assumption that the British reaction will reveal a shift in policy which familiarization is necessary for the overall understanding of its European policies today.

70 Christopher Bickerton, "Oh bugger, they're in the tent!: British responses to French reintegration into NATO" European Security 19:1 (2010): 111
At the conclusion of the French Presidency, the release of their White Paper and the statements from President Sarkozy, the French position had been made entirely known to the rest of Europe. At this time the Royal United Services Institute, an independent think tank, released an occasional paper evaluating the effects of France’s newfound dedication to normalization. The study argues that there exists a gap between French expectation of member responses and the little attention that they actually received. Perhaps due to the fact that the political investments made by Sarkozy in order to push towards Atlantic realignment were far greater than the yield it produced.

The source of London’s response is threefold. Firstly, there still exists a widespread suspiciousness over France’s true motive for pushing ahead with European defence integration. The previous attempt to rapprochement by Chirac came to a halt after his demands that the Southern Command necessarily had to be under the leadership of a French general, an unacceptable arrangement for the U.S. And it not uncommon that EU bureaucrats insinuates that Sarkozy’s policies is just another attempt to erode NATO’s power base in Europe, albeit in a more discreet fashion. On the other hand, however, the French move was also considered to be an appreciated convergence to British policy. In a Parliamentary Report from 2008 on EU and NATO relations, the election of Sarkozy was met with optimism and belief that he could jerk Quai D’Orsay from its transatlantic stalemate. Professor Michael Cox, of the London School of Economics, called it a “Great Moment” in the same report. And, while there was an agreement that France historically had obstructed the smoothness of EU-NATO relations, the overall tone was considerably positive. The reservations concerning its realization were more attributed to internal divisions within France, than to the project of European integration itself. However, the far from coherent French attitude towards NATO gave cause to some caution in the British evaluation. The early British reports had indeed welcomed the initiative but remained relatively conservative in the magnitude of its praise due to an identification of internal fraction within the French parliament coupled with historical experience.

Secondly, Blair’s surprising Euro-Centrism aside, London remains reluctant to thoughtlessly endorse any political move that can disrupt their special relationship with the U.S. Indeed, the Anglo-American friendship has been put to test in the latest decade following the U.S’s foreign policy adventures. And, David Cameron introduced some novelty in the British rhetoric when he in 2006 stressed the importance of rediscovering a foreign policy balance that would avoid tilting too far in favour for either US or Europe. That being said, however, a distinct British break with the special relationship is neither expected nor plausible in any credible projection of the future. On the contrary, the British European policy is so largely intertwined to that of the U.S, and their relationship so spared

72 Christopher Bickerton, "Oh bugger, they’re in the tent!" British responses to French reintegration into NATO” European Security 19:1 (2010): 115  
74 Ibid.  
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Thirdly, by taking firm steps towards European integration, France is causing uneasiness in
the UK by speaking clearly of a vision for a Europe that the UK have still to situate
themselves in. While the French is pushing ahead with consolidated visions for European
defence, the British appears remarkably stagnated in comparison. The political triangle
between NATO, Europe, and CSDP has changed a lot in the latest decade, and without
national visions for its composition, its design risk getting unilaterally determined.

The British response, or rather non-response, is important from several perspectives. It
was easy for UK to assume the opposite role of the obviously Euro-Centric France during
de Gaulle and onwards (and perhaps especially during Mitterrand). But what happens when
old ideals get replaced by new, less definable ones? In the history of the CSDP, whenever
one actor has embraced pragmatism, others have followed. Thus, it is not unlikely that
France’s current posture will induce closer, rather than more cautious, collaboration in
defence and security. This notion is reinforced by the Franco-British defence
collaboration in 2010, their corresponding policies in regards to the revolutions in
Northern Africa and the Middle-East and most recently their common position on Security
Council Resolution 1973 on the no-fly zone over Libya (which Germany choose not to
support).

As Bickerton prophesize in his 2010 paper, the current political situation indeed points
towards a relative increase in policy convergence between Britain and France. However, the
assumption that a Franco-British friendship is the same as a European is neither supported
nor hinted in the recent policy development of the Union. If anything, the recent initiatives
towards consolidated bilateral cooperation between the two points to an increasing
impatience with the sluggish pace of the CSDP.

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76 Christopher Bickerton, "Oh bugger, they’re in the tent!: British responses to French reintegration into NATO" European Security 19:1 (2010): 114
79 Christopher Bickerton, "Oh bugger, they’re in the tent!: British responses to French reintegration into NATO" European Security 19:1 (2010): 119
5.2 Britain and Lisbon – A New Discussion?

This part aspires to evaluate the British relation to the process and implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. As well as elucidate how it has caused traditional British preference to make room for a broader European voice.

The general implications for the Lisbon Treaty in regards to European defence and the position of the British Parliament are discussed specifically in a committee report from 2008. Within it, two structural innovations are given special attention, the Permanent Structured Cooperation and the Mutual Defence Clause.\(^80\)

The concerns of the UK in regards to the PSCD is unsurprisingly echoing their general disinclination to too freely support and help construct structures that risk undermining NATO hegemony. The possibility that the groups would eventually become as distinct as to form a European NATO pillar is of particular concern, the report says.\(^81\) And Secretary of State for Defence, Dr Liam Fox called it "integration in defence common policy by stealth" in a speech to the House of Common.\(^82\) In which he also called France’s plans for a defence-sixtet with more able military capabilities than that of the Union as a whole, “completely unacceptable”.

Furthermore, the British Parliament voiced additionally concern that a too elaborated, and too exclusive PSCD, could serve to dissuade other members to develop their military sphere.\(^83\) However, in a consultation to the British Military of Defence (MoD), the worth of the PSCD as a capability enhancing mechanism which had the potential to motivate a net increase in the Unions military architecture without agitating either NATO or other member states, was emphasized.\(^84\) And, in a debate the same year, the foreign secretary at the time, David Miliband, welcomed the provision and its capacity to promote defence collaboration and capability enchantment in line with the UK’s underlying goal to allocate the burden of defence and security spending more evenly across the European Union.\(^85\)

It is not without caution that the UK approached the PSCD, yet the tone was unmistakably positive in the British Parliament. But, while Britain most certainly will both be an able and willing partner in a future defence coalition, it first needs to be convinced that such an arrangement will not impose on either the jurisdiction of NATO, or the military integrity of other member states.

It should be noted, though, that the British benignancy towards the defence and security segment of the Treaty was not constant throughout the negotiations running up to its

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\(^{81}\) Ibid.\(^{,}\)

\(^{82}\) UK Parliament “Commons Hansard Debates” Volume 472 (2008): Column 418


\(^{84}\) Ibid.\(^{,}\)

\(^{85}\) UK Parliament, “Select Committee on Foreign Affairs” Examination of Witnesses (2008): Questions 520-539
ratification. In a series of amendments to the TEU in 2003 concerning defence policy, the U.K representative, Peter Hain, pushed for the exclusion of the defence part from the proposed ‘enhanced cooperation’. And in a statement by Hain, the UK’s reluctance to any form of provisioned cooperation was explicitly stated. However, the British concern was unsuccessful in its attempt to modify the treaty, and was officially abandoned in a meeting with France and Germany later that year.

Secondly, the mutual defence clause is given attention in the Ninth Report. Also here, the British dissected it in light of their commitment to NATO. The Treaty was, however, not believed to duplicate the already existing Article V in NATO. On the contrary, there appear to be a wide-spread assumption that the Lisbon Treaty is reinforcing NATO’s status as the defender of Europe.

In a special report by the Foreign Affairs Committee from 2007, that was used as a background to the 2008 Parliamentary Report, a more in-depth inquire in the details of the Lisbon Treaty had been made. During the oral witnesses that make up the bulk of the committee’s report, several concerns were verbalized concerning the jurisdiction and transparency of the new High Representative. In particular the British Government questioned the new legal personalities which would be attributed to the EU after the Lisbon Treaty. Indeed, the UK had historically blocked such initiatives, and the acceptance of it now remains conditional upon the safeguarding of Britain’s international engagements, its autonomous position on the UNSC and on the continued absence of a European army.

In general, a great many matters on which the UK had remained reluctant (in some cases even openly opposed) during the CSDP process, had been forced back on the table for reconsideration during the later years of the Lisbon Treaty negotiations. And, as France, Britain’s attitude and preference forming towards European integration appears heavily influenced by the domestic political climate. However, as noticed by Philip Cowley and Mark Stuart in an article from 2010, the splits concerning Europe in the UK are of inter-party rather than intra-party character, a brake with British political history, where its policy towards the Union frequently caused some of the deepest schism within the major parties. It was also a parliamentary difference to that of France, where President Sarkozy had to face off with his own party members several times in order to proceed with his transatlantic vision.

86 The European Convention. “Summary of proposed amendments concerning enhanced cooperation” CONV 791/03 (2006)
87 UK Parliament “Commons Hansard Debates” Volume 472 Column 418 (2008)
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
93 Philip Cowley and Mark Stuart, “Where has all the trouble gone? British intra-party parliamentary divisions during the Lisbon ratification” British Politics 5 (2010): 136
During the time of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the British attitude were one colored by compromise on several areas on European integration that they had previously contested. Furthermore, it was marked by a convergence of intra-party preferences, and a more distinct inter-party division. Whether this can be seen as evidential for the new pragmatic political landscape of Europe, is debatable. Although one thing can be certain, the British Conservative-Liberal coalition in 2010 would require no less than disciplined, down-to-earth, politics, perhaps especially when it comes to European integration. In this sense, Prime Minister Cameron could be considered fortunate having his Europe Minister, David Lidington, dubbed by the Economist as “immovably pragmatic”.

The next part will in greater detail discuss the current coalition and its meaning for British preference forming in relation to the construction of European defence and security.

5.3 Liberal and Conservatives – What It Means for Europe

Britain’s relationship with the EU never took the same proportion of enthusiasm as that of France’s. Where France envisioned a grand Europe that was economically, socially, and politically as well as military coherent, Britain took a more cautious approach. Its bond with the EU was economical, rather than idealistic. And, during the Conservative’s leadership, which covered the bulk of the Union’s early years, the move towards European integration always entailed a domestic political risk.

A European crisis that had its roots in a growing Conservative discomfort with the UK’s position vis-à-vis the Union had steadily emerged during the premiership of Thatcher. So when John Major succeeded her in 1992 it was partly to remedy the status quo. However, the more dovish European policy during Major was unfruitful in its attempt to appease the intra-party conflict in the Conservatives. And, by 1997 and the release of power in favour for the Labour Party and Tony Blair, Britain had been firmly established as a sceptic on the European scene.

The next thirteen years would be characterized by a more pragmatic approach to the Union, albeit not hasty. With the UK mostly aligned to the general policy path of the EU. By the final days of Gordon Brown, Labour had managed to partly normalize severed European relations. But, as Gifford mentions, the efforts to approach the EU with a broader commitment was not anchored in a public consensus and before the coalition in

94 “No laughing matter” last modified June 3 2010
http://www.economist.com/node/16276853?story_id=E1_TGNSGRVP
2010 the future for UK-EU relationships were still largely uncertain. This part will focus on the Liberal-Conservative coalition that formed after the British elections in 2010 in order to gain an appreciation of its impact on UK’s policy toward European security and defence.

The largely Euro-Sceptic Conservatives and the largely Pro-Euro Liberals do indeed make an interesting marriage when it comes to the shaping of the governments European policies. And, while they may be politically divided, they are together facing a budget deficit in defence of around £38 billion. With the ambition to spend less, an unfounded military, particularly the one reserved for Europe, becomes an attractive target. And while the previous Labour tenure was supportive of many of the institutional innovations introduced in Lisbon, such as the PSCD, the Treaty had been a growing ground of British frustrations that would play out in the policy preferences of its succeeding Government.

This frustration has arguably been the narrative by which we have come to interpret British EU policy in 2010 and 2011. This has been manifested in mainly three ways:

Firstly, Britain answers alone for a fourth of the Unions total defence budget. This, according to writers such as Clara O’Donnell, disinclined Britain to devote also the political capital needed to enrol in extensive, multilateral, defence collaborations. However, when the large defence budget appeared to come up short during Brown’s last years, the need to engage in military cooperation in order to spare its defence sector from too harsh of a cutback was realized. To this point, the British defence initiatives have been firm, but mainly bilateral, as, for example, the Franco-British defence cooperation discussed in Chapter 3.4.

Secondly, the British scepticism over the European defence project was underlined by a widespread feeling that its military partners repeatedly had failed to commit to the same extent. During the NATO led operation in Afghanistan, European reluctance had agitated Labour and Conservative alike. The increasing disbelief in the military integrity and dedication of many European states, coupled with the visible schism between Europe and the U.S in regards to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (a disagreement that which would force the U.K to make the easy choice between Europe and America) had led Britain to slowly back away from the CSDP during Labour, and more clearly distance itself from it during the 2010 coalition.

97 Ibid., 336
98 Liam Fox, "Beyond the Smoke: Making Progress in Afghanistan" IISS (2009)
99 “Defence data of EDA participating member states in 2009” last modified May 2010
http://www.eda.europa.eu/defencefacts/
100 Clara Marina O'Donnell, “Britain’s coalition government and EU defence cooperation: undermining British interests” International Affairs 87:2 (2011): 425
101 “John Hutton says Europeans are 'freeloading' on Britain and US in Afghanistan” last modified January 15 2009
102 Liam Fox, "Beyond the Smoke: Making Progress in Afghanistan" IISS (2009)
103 Clara Marina O'Donnell, “Britain’s coalition government and EU defence cooperation: undermining
Thirdly, a fear of loss of sovereignty that has lied dormant has become more apparent in the present Government and the current Secretary of State Defence Liam Fox. In a 2010 speech, Fox voices concern over the new High Representative’s ability to “blur the line between what is supranational and what is intergovernmental”.

The same concern is expressed in relevance to the European Defence Agency (EDA) which has been placed under the supervision of the supra-national European Commission after the Lisbon Treaty. However, the UK will remain in the agency for some time following Liberal demand.

In the same speech, Fox proceeds to urge the European countries to devote their military resources to the process of re-establishing NATO in Europe, rather than pushing ahead with autonomous defence integration. As a whole, Fox’s speech is evidential for a Conservative discomfort and frustration with the current European defence and security institutions. But for now, however, they remain checked in some areas by the much more Euro-Centric Liberals.

The central features of British foreign policy under the current government indeed appear to be that of a de-Europeazation, and this notwithstanding the Liberals success in many areas to procrastinate its departure. The “new” Conservatives are, while pragmatic by necessity and choice, not excessively dissimilar in EU policy to that of Major and Thatcher.

Another big shift in European politics has been the suspension of the WEU in 2011. Once the stepping stone for future integration, the WEU have become more and more obsolete as much of its previous jurisdiction was transferred to the EU. However, the decision to quit the organization, taken during Brown’s tenure, induced some concerns regarding the loss of inter-parliamentary scrutiny over the CSDP, a position that the WEU assembly previously occupied. In a report by the Foreign Affairs Committee printed in January 2011, the British Government proposed a biannual meeting in regards to this called the EU Inter-parliamentary Conference on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security (COFADS). Yet to play out, the proposal can be seen as another step in the Governments current attempts to hedge a supranational development perceived to undermine British sovereignty.

The British disaffection with the Union can be seen as typical for the times. Even the endlessly Euro-Centric French is beginning to look across the pond, rather than towards the Alps. And, while the Lisbon Treaty had made defence and security convergence one of its most salient issues, its biggest members has so far held back their excitement. The stark realization of the Union’s inadequacy in acting as the coherent body they envision to become came recently. In the management of the Libya crisis, EU, torn by internal disagreement and unanimity, had to step aside for a NATO led coalition. Indeed, as the Lisbon Treaty reassured, NATO should be the principal agent of European defence. But, unless uniform in their foreign policy response, the CSDP will achieve neither a complementary nor even a supportive function to NATO and thus risk being overlooked and neglected in the very domain it is designed for.

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104 Liam Fox, “The EU should only act when NATO cannot” (2010)
106 Catherine Ashton, “Remarks at the AFET Committee European Parliament” (2011)


5.4 Summary and Conclusion

The British, as the France, hold an essential position in European integration. Indeed, it would not be academically daring to point out the hollowness of any political venture undertaken in the absence of those two powers. In 2010, the Liberal-Conservative coalition formed government after a tumultuous election, inheriting both a budget deficit, and a political legacy of far Euro-Centric, and Atlanticist preferences. From the outset, the British EU policy would be marked by a distancing of European integration projects, and a scepticism regarding those already under way. Instead of pursuing multilateral engagements, the UK pushed further into bilateral commitments, reemphasizing its strong friendship with France, and its special relationship with the United States. So, albeit checked by Liberals in many areas where the Conservative division would like to have seen a more complete separation (as in the EDA for example), the tone of the coalition is unmistakably reserved.

During Blair and Brown, the parliamentary climate was cautious, but positively, disposed to the Lisbon Treaty. Committee reports on the main institutional innovations brought by the Treaty in the immediate years following its ratification had showed a British willingness to invest in the PSCD and the mutual defence clause. Today, the UK remains seized to its European defence commitments, but the rhetoric has sharpened, and the frustrations that built up during the CSDP process has left Britain less inclined to unconditional participation.

In the four years ahead, one could expect Windsor hall to: further engage in bilateral agreements with what they perceive to be militarily dependable members; remain unenthusiastic about furthering its military integration with the rest of Europe, but not outright unwilling due to pragmatism and concessions to its Liberal partners; and, finally, to be more inclined to cater for its sovereignty, which may be expressed in a heavy allegiance to intergovernmentalism.
6  Sweden and Europe - A Growing Affinity

Sweden has arguably one of the most distinct histories of non-alignment in the EU. By remaining outside direct conflict for over two hundred years, Sweden’s neutral stance has incorporated itself deep within the societal nomenclature. The Swedish indisposition to commit to outspoken alliances has transcended the national and affected its policy preferences in the European Union and the CSDP. Within it the most distinct feature of Swedish policy has been the heavy inclination towards civilian crisis management. During the bargaining process of the CSDP process, Sweden, together with Ireland, spoke most loudly in opposition to a development that would lead to military expansion and integration in favour for civilian power. However, as the CSDP matured, and its disposition became increasingly formed by pragmatic compromises, Sweden has been seized to the institution, remained a steadfast supporter and promoted the CSDP as an important foreign policy venue in the domestic political debate.

This part of the thesis will strive to assess Sweden’s foreign policy and stance on European defence integration in the years following the Lisbon Treaty. First, the paper will look closer at the Swedish Presidency in 2009 in order to map out Sweden’s policy preferences in a post-Lisbon context. Secondly, the paper will put focus on the EU Battlegroups as a potential expression of Sweden’s shift in values towards a European centre. Lastly, the paper will discuss Sweden’s traditional inclination to civil crisis management and its overall impact on the CSDP process.

6.1  Swedish Presidency

Sweden’s traditional recipe for how to approach the common defence and security of the Union has been a cautious but determined commitment with a heavy focus but not an exclusive focus on civil crisis management. Sweden had been an active member of every CSDP mission and the common defence institution is acknowledged as the principal venue for Sweden’s foreign policy engagement along with the UN. This has been more or less maintained throughout the establishment of the institutional framework of the European defence, and is echoed in their agenda for Sweden’s time as helm of the commission. However, the Swedish Presidency faced two, at the time, very articulated issues; the financial crisis and the climate challenge (the latter being centred on the Climate

109 Claes Nilsson and Anna Sundberg, ”Swedish Presidency Ambitions and ESDP (ARI)” Real Instituto Elcano (2009):2
Conference in Copenhagen). Both of which were early proclaimed top issues on Sweden’s EU agenda.\textsuperscript{110} The purpose of this part is to look closer on the Swedish presidency in order to gain an understanding of Sweden’s position towards the CSDP.

The Swedish presidency in 2009 was not one distinguished by an obvious devotion to European defence politics. Instead, economy, employment and climate were identified as key areas of the six month period.\textsuperscript{111} However, Sweden’s ambitions in regards to the EU’s crisis management capabilities were highlighted in a separate document\textsuperscript{112}, wherein three areas where given special attention:

Firstly, the extension of the Battlegroup programs to go beyond the scope of rapid reaction operations. This was an area of European integration where the Swedish ambitions were met with a particular scepticism.\textsuperscript{113} Indeed the notion of EU Battlegroups ventures close to controversial topics such as PSCD and deepened defence assimilation. And Sweden’s proposal to extend the, in its opinion, too scarcely used Battlegroups to fill gaps in ongoing operations instead of lying dormant in wait for crisis, proved politically unachievable.\textsuperscript{114} However, in less contested, and more practical, areas of the Battlegroups, such as employability and cooperation, Sweden managed to further interoperability and enhance capability pooling.\textsuperscript{115}

Secondly, effort was directed at the development of civil-military relations in the EU, which includes a continued effort to consolidate and articulate EU-NATO relations, maritime surveillance and closer cooperation between the EDA and the Commission. The continued expansion of the EU’s civil crisis management capability had remained a pronounced Swedish interest throughout the CSDP process, and would persist as such during their 2009 Presidency. Thus, in November the same year, the Council embarked to enhance its civil crisis commitments across the board. The EU missions in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, DR Congo, and Palestine were among those that were strengthened during the Swedish Presidency.\textsuperscript{116}

With a tradition of non-alignment, Sweden’s position in the CSDP framework could sometime be seen as uncharacteristically firm. Its vision of the European Union as an able and distinct actor on the global scene was articulated on many accounts. In a 2008 speech to the Swedish Defence College, EU-Commissioner Cecilia Malmström encouraged a greater responsibility in crisis management and greater security convergence among members.\textsuperscript{117} And in a Statement of Government Policy made by Swedish Foreign Minister

\textsuperscript{110} Government Offices of Sweden “Work programme for the Swedish Presidency of the EU 1 July --- 31 December 2009” (2009): 2
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 3-5
\textsuperscript{112} Defence Ministry of Sweden. “Important defence policy issues during the Presidency” (2009)
\textsuperscript{113} Claes Nilsson and Anna Sundberg, ”Swedish Presidency Ambitions and ESDP (ARI)” Real Institute Elcano (2009): 4
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 12
\textsuperscript{117} Cecilia Malmström, “Crisis Management in the EU and the Swedish Presidency” Swedish National Defence College (2009)
Carl Bildt in February 2009, close cooperation with NATO in crisis situations, as well as further European integration, was put forward as salient Swedish concerns. As one author noted, “the Swedes pro-activity is what will one remembered when thinking of this Presidency”. Indeed, when Stockholm’s six-month period had drawn to an end, it was widely acknowledged as successful and efficient, but it is worth noticing that it was spared of the external crisis of the French Presidency, and the internal of the Czech. Furthermore, opposite to Britain and France, Sweden’s attitude towards the CSDP remained relatively intact throughout the governmental succession in 2006.

Lastly, operational planning and deepened European integration in future civil and military missions was emphasized. During its Presidency, Sweden gathered support for a report on the initial design of the EEAS, which was the first attempt to properly define the jurisdiction of the newly established institution. The initiative came about at a time when the Lisbon Treaty still stirred substantial domestic debate in Sweden, and neither had Sweden fully accepted the Treaty at the time of their Presidency. Yet the EEAS composition, as described in the 2009 report, was largely “integrationist” in nature and presented as a *sui generis* service, autonomous from both the Commission and Council. In a subsequent resolution by the French senate, the Presidency report was received well in general, but the senate expressed deep concerns that it lacked a sufficient degree of intergovernmentalism.

### 6.2 EU Battlegroups

The EU Battlegroups, created in 2004 and fully operational 2007, were designed as the rapid reaction force of the larger CSDP. However, its employment has been largely restricted by divergence in member state policies concerning threat assessments, the traditional break between Atlanticism and Euro-Centric models for the CSDP, and strategic culture. The Battlegroups are divided into coalitions of (usually, but not exclusively) geographical proximity. Sweden has been the core supplier of military hardware and personnel to the Nordic Battlegroup which consists, as of 2011, of Sweden, Norway, Finland, Estonia, Ireland, and of late, Croatia. Of a total of 2 200 men, Sweden’s contribution amount to 1 600. This part of the paper will attempt to show how the

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120 Ibid., point 16
121 French Senate “Resolution of the French Senate about the European External Action Service” (2011): point 8 and 16
123 “Nordic Battlegroup” last modified December 5 2008
development of the EU Battlegroups has acted as a catalyst towards further Swedish alignment with the CSDP framework.

To a greater extent than others, Sweden has reformed its military capacity to accommodate an increasing demand of agile and small crisis intervention forces.\textsuperscript{124} To this end, the EU Battlegroups have become a channel through which Sweden could reshape its contemporary troops. All in all, the relatively modest Battlegroups are expected to influence the military reality of small states to a greater extent than larger ones.\textsuperscript{125} And in Sweden's case this has been exceptionally visible. However, as Jacoby and Jones point out, the primary determinant to Sweden’s enthusiastically participation in the Battlegroups is domestic, rather than European, in nature. Its roots are found buried deep in a societal mentality, which, despite Sweden’s traditional reluctance to alignment, lean heavily towards notions of common security and defence.\textsuperscript{126} Furthermore, Sweden had built a military force during the Cold War which focused on a large manufacturing capacity, conscriptions and defence. This model had begun to appear increasingly out of tune with post-modern military affairs. And, juxtaposed to the initial development of the CSDP, the Swedish defence forces begun a transition from invasion defence, to greater international applicability.\textsuperscript{127} The creation of EU Battlegroups fitted well in the Swedish reformation drive, and went on to become one of the clearest demonstrations of Sweden’s consolidated effort towards international, and European, engagement.

What conclusions can then be drawn from the Battlegroups particular establishment in the Swedish milieu? Sweden is in the middle of an outspoken restructuration of its military sector. This appears to have come about out of necessity and changes on the international scene that had rendered a traditional Swedish hope for autonomous territorial defence an unlikely ambition.\textsuperscript{128} But to a large extent, what constitutes the Swedish endorsement of the Battlegroup project consists of national, rather than European, interests.

As of early 2011, the Nordic Battlegroup had not yet been employed. However, during the Libyan Crisis, the Expeditionary Air Wing (EAW) was given promotion by the Swedish Parliament to aid the implementation of UN Resolution 1973.


\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., 317

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., 324

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 325

\textsuperscript{128} Regeringens skrivelse "Totalförsvar i förnyelse" 98:4 (1997): 4-5


6.3 Civilian Crisis Management

From the outset, the development of the CSDP took place in the intersection of military expansion and civil crisis management. It was largely through the bargaining process between, chiefly the UK and France as militaristic, and mainly the Nordic states as pro-civilian, that the CSDP was given its current composition.

Sweden’s spontaneous reaction to the CSDP project was to retard the progress, which was perceived to conflict with traditional, non-aligned policies. It later acknowledged the institutions under the premise that it would function without prejudice to Sweden’s preferred neutrality. Since that time, the initial policy preferences of the member states appear to have been relatively unchanged. Sweden remained consistent in its pursuit for a more outspoken dedication to civilian crisis management and was an active promoter of its establishment during the infant years of the CSDP. In each case, France was an as active opponent, and the UK remained sceptical, albeit not explicitly disapproving except in response to the suggested Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) launch during its Presidency in 2005. In spite of opposition, Sweden had, however, been quite successful in enforcing its civilian agenda on the articulation of the common defence and security initiative. It had initiated the creation of the Committee for Civilian Crisis Management (CIVCOM) which represents the civilian side of European crisis assessments, implemented policies dictating the exercise of civil management, as well as spearheading the EU Program for the prevention of violent conflicts during its 2001 Presidency.

This part attempts to retell the Swedish commitment to civil crisis management in light of recent changes and the Lisbon Treaty. Since Sweden has been so obviously attached to CSDP’s civil crisis facet, a description of the Treaty’s effects on the very same will simultaneously sketch the picture of Sweden’s present role and sphere of influence in the CSDP. This chapter will thus begin by reviewing the changes to EU’s civil management brought about by the Treaty, and then move on to talk more about how Sweden’s position has changed during the CSDP process.

The Lisbon Treaty introduced a refreshed focus on civil crisis management. The tightening of the CSDP’s institutional mechanism by the establishment of the EEAS and the foundation of the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) has been attributed to an overarching attempt by the EU to level its civilian capabilities with its military ones. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty put a new institution at the disposal of the EEAS, The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). The CIVCOM, which came about on

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130 Ibid., 89
Swedish initiative (repetition), had previously been assigned with the task of ensuring that the civilian side of crisis management was included in the planning of the larger Political and Security Committee (PSC), the highest EU authority when it comes to CSDP operation. After the Treaty, however, the CPCC has been assigned the provisional planning structure of the CIVCOM and consist of an equal division between Council and national staff. This may facilitate the expression of national preferences in the decision making process of the whole CSDP. The CPCC is also given a more articulate responsibility over civilian crisis management and is most appropriately described as the headquarters for civilian operations.\(^{133}\)

The Swedish niche for the civilian side of conflict has remained constant throughout the entire process of the CSDP development. As opposed to France and UK, the Swedish domestic political situation has not brought any major inconsistencies to its preferred policies. This has allowed Sweden, and its Nordic neighbourhood, to attain a reputation of “forerunners” in the overall development of civil crisis management.\(^{134}\) And, as laid out in the same study by Jakobsen, the Nordic contribution to the civilian dimension had been substantial.\(^{135}\) Thus, it is important to note that the Swedish initial disinclination with the CSDP is not evidential of an underlying disinterest with the European defence and security program. On the opposite, Sweden has showed consecutive political support, as well as a steadfast commitment, to EU operations. However, Sweden’s participation in the CSDP has to be look upon in light of its traditional position of non-alignment, which is subjected to continuous domestic debate. This is the one fundamental principle on which Sweden’s bargaining interests lie.

This outspoken preference, along with a political reputation of neutrality and impartiality (the Nordic Presidencies of the EU where all positively received by the rest of the members due to their dedication towards the role as “honest broker”)\(^{136}\), has given Sweden disproportionately large influence on the CSDP process and is sure to benefit from the new Lisbon provisions

### 6.4 Summary and Conclusion

Sweden’s position in the CSDP framework appears relatively fixed during its formation. From the outset, and through the development of the institution, Sweden represented the civilian aspect of the crisis management. Its presidency was, however, not marked by an extensive commitment to the common defence of Europe. Instead, the three E:s of

\(^{133}\) Christopher S. Chivvis, “EU Civilian Crisis Management: The Record So Far” National Defence Research Institute (2010): 7
\(^{135}\) Ibid., 96-98
\(^{136}\) Ibid., 91-94
employment, environment and economy received the bulk of political attention during the six-month period. Nevertheless, Sweden pushed ahead with firm actions in many areas included under the umbrella of CSDP. Among the most visible was the strengthening of EU missions on a wide scale, the emphasis on extending the scope of EU Battlegroups in order to accommodate a more versatile role in crisis management, and the drafting of the initial blueprints of the EEAS. Despite a paradigmatic shift in Swedish domestic politics from 2001 to 2009, as the bourgeoisie replaced the long history of nearly uninterrupted Social Democracy, the Swedish foreign policy agenda offered little novelty in regards to CSDP. Thus, in much, the Swedish Presidency of 2009 was a continuation of that of 2001. Relatively spared from any major external crisis, enabling Sweden to push ahead with a traditional agenda.

In regards to the Battlegroup project, Sweden has remained in the forefront and has continued to explore the concept. Indeed, the lion’s share of military capability in the Nordic Battlegroup has been provided by Sweden. Furthermore, the military character of the Battlegroups fitted well with the Swedish transition from a large territorial defence to a smaller, more agile, and internationally prepared force. By tapping into the potential of the EU Battlegroups, Sweden was able to demonstrate European commitment at the same time as they were adjusting the composition of their national military to better fit the contemporary strategic reality.

Sweden’s preference formation in regards to CSDP is largely formed domestically. The fundament to its policy lies in a traditional adherence to neutrality, and its behaviour towards the EU Battlegroups is partly motivated by a simultaneous reformation of its national defence force. As such, Sweden’s position in the CSDP appear unlikely to change in the near future, a heavy dedication towards civil management coupled with further development of the EU Battlegroups and a broad support of EU operation will likely be the Swedish recipe for some time to come.
7  A Comparative Summary of Policies

The general effects, brought onto the common security and defence institutions of the European Union by the Lisbon Treaty, should now have been revealed to us. In the process of identifying actors in the CSDP that each represents a specific bundle of preferences, France, UK and Sweden were picked out as the most suitable candidate: France for its traditional alignment towards a greater Europe, UK for the same towards the Atlantic collaboration, and Sweden for its persistency towards civil crisis management as the foci of European security integration. This part will summarize the main changes to these states policy preferences in order to set the scene for a theoretical evaluation.

In regards to France, the most visible change in their attitude towards the CSDP was the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as the president of the French Republic. During his presidency, France re-established its partly frozen transatlantic relationship, pushed ahead with the CSDP process as helm of the Commission, and tied Britain closer in a bilateral defence commitment. In much, Sarkozy’s policy preferences can be considered evidential of the pragmatism that now permeates the two biggest military powers in Europe, UK and France, following their respective governmental successions. While openly engaging in unprecedented military multilateralism, France still remains De Gaullist at heart, which is reflected in their inclination to intergovernmentalism and continuous harbouring of French security and defence autonomy.

This change in French foreign policy is concretized in their 2008 *French White Paper on Defence and National Security*. In this official policy document, France is specifying their commitment to the European defence initiative. Aside from high reaching ambitions in terms of military potency, the White Paper comes with a reiteration of Sarkozy’s initial, consolatory, rhetoric vis-à-vis NATO, as well as novelty in regards to France’s attitude towards civil management.

France’s presidency of the European Commission was marked by an outspoken ambition to approach the CSDP on several levels. And, while it was largely overshadowed by three successive crises during the period, France managed to bring some controversy to the table by pushing ahead with the notions of PSCD, a long held ambition. However, the French wish to spearhead this development was met with some scepticism by the British representatives, and rendered, for then, wholly unachievable by the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty. Yet, on the whole, the discussion around the possibilities for deepened military integration in the form of specific sub-groups was considerably less inflamed and dogmatic than it had previously been.

In November 2010, the Franco-British military cooperation was established as a bilateral collaboration outside the immediate framework of European defence. On the academic scene, this was received with mixed feelings, ranging from a belief that it can provoke positive spill-over to other areas of European defence, to the opposite notion that Franco-British bilateralism is pursued on the expense of European multilateralism.
In the UK, the French move towards NATO was met with controlled enthusiasm. This was due to, among else, a lingering suspicion towards France’s true intentions. However, the British Parliament allowed itself to a degree of optimism, both over the election of Sarkozy and his subsequent movement towards the Atlantic. Furthermore, some analysts suggested that the French policy adjustment discomforted the UK and their “special relationship” with the U.S. It was, however, commonly perceived that it marked a relative increasing in convergence among the two.

Furthermore, several points could be identified which have had an impact on Britain’s position towards European integration in regards to the Lisbon Treaty. Most salient in the British domestic debate have been the PSCD and the Mutual Defence Clause. The PSCD had not been received well by the Conservative elements in the British Parliament which assumed it to be an infraction on British sovereignty, and an impediment to future European defence constructions as certain states segregates themselves to evidently from the rest of Europe. Several motions had been carried by the British representatives on the discussions on enhanced cooperation in the TEU, and albeit few were successful it left a lingering disinclination to accelerate to rapidly into sub-communal commitments. On the other hand, the Labour and Liberals is characteristically positive towards deepened European integration, setting the British scene for inter-party disagreements. The Mutual Defence Clause, as well as the High Representative, appears to be only provisionally accepted on the condition that Britain’s sovereignty remains entirely intact. This study leaves Britain at a time where many of their traditionally sensitive issues has made way for the type of pragmatism that necessarily needs to accompany its current governmental composition.

Finally, the most visible consequence of the Liberal-Conservative coalition has been the checking of Conservative Euro-Scepticism. While the British policies now indeed hold a certain flavour of Euro-Centrism, an overarching scepticism towards European integration can be easily discerned in recent policies and official statements. On the whole, British focus appears to have shifted from Europe to bilateral commitments and transatlantic consolidation.

When looking at Sweden, the civilian aspect of the CSDP is visibly represented. It is traditionally a non-aligned state and Sweden’s engagement in European defence has in much reflected that preferences through its commitment to prioritize the development of civil crisis management over pushing ahead with the military aspect.

Sweden’s presidency during 2009 was not one overtly directed towards the CSDP, however, when addressed, Sweden pushed the scarcely activated EU Battlegroups and civil-military relations to the top of their agenda. Furthermore, Sweden gathered the political support needed for an initial drafting of the newly established EEAS, an obviously integrative unit. As one author noted, “the Swedes pro-activity is what will one remembered when thinking of this Presidency” can be considered nothing but evidence of the increasingly European trajectory of Swedish foreign policy.
The Lisbon Treaty brought with it increased opportunities for civil crisis management expansion. Throughout the CSDP process, the Swedish (and Nordic) inclination for the development of the civilian side of it, granted them disproportionately large influence in its development. This has, however, not resulted in a Swedish attempt to procrastinate or obstruct the development of the CSDP, on the contrary, Sweden have remained, and are continuing to remain, a steadfast in support of the European defence.
Policy Meets Theory – Analysis of State Preferences

For several reasons, foreign policy and security has been left largely “un-integrated” throughout the development of the European Union. Realists would attribute the absence of any substantial policy convergence to the extraordinary delicacy of this particular area. I.e., it is highly unlikely that states would be as willing to integrate their military integrity, something requiring a large supranational commitment, as they would their transportation infrastructure, a sector with low effect on national sovereignty. However, for reasons discussed earlier, realism as the exclusive theoretical framework appears inadequately qualified for studies of the European integration. Indeed, on more than a few occasions, member states have acted in a, for realists, uncomfortable manner, placing themselves well outside their explanatory sphere. For one, the self-entangled international scene of today leaves little room for pure, autonomous, decision making that is wholly unattached to other actors. And, as noted by Risse, while defence alliances such as NATO are intergovernmental at core and theory, its practical application becomes conspicuously supranational. Furthermore, the reluctance to abandon national sovereignty in defence matters is not coherently represented in member states. Risse is specifically pointing at the traditionally non-aligned states such as the Nordics, and the federals, like Germany, as examples of types of states that one could consider relatively more inclined to a communalized defence. This may very well be true, however, the development and aftermath of the Lisbon process has arguably shown similar preference formulations also in highly militaristic states such as France and even, albeit to a lower extent, in the typically Euro-sceptic Britain.

This section will conduct a comprehensive analysis of state preferences after and during the development of the Lisbon Treaty using a neo-functional approach in order to address the initial research questions. The study will proceed by stating some of the key assumptions of Neo-Functionalism and then measure the empirical findings to its premises.

Assumption: Neo-functionalism assumes that preferences will come to converge with that of the region at the end state of the transformative period.

Comments: Neo-functionalisms core aspiration is to explain how states act when engaged in regional integration. This can be measured in different ways but one especially apparent is to map out policy preferences during a given period and derive conclusions based on their political trajectory. Neo-functionalism assumes that states, once absorbed in supranational commitments, will trigger a self-reinforcing loop that deepens regional integration through the effects of spill-over. As such, states will enter communalization at areas pertaining to low-politics, and move horizontally through political controversially.

138 Ibid., 300
until the critical point in the integration process where states will amalgamate on the whole spectrum of politics. In the context of the European security and defence, however, this does not appear to have happened. By all standards, foreign policy and defence has been the least integrated area of European policy. Nonetheless, the consistency and speed by which the institution has expanded in the last decade have awarded it with an academic consensus that Europe is indeed beginning to grow together. The difference in opinion is only how far it has gone, and why. So, to what extent can we identify a shift in national preferences, and how rightly can we attribute it to deepened regional integration in a post-Lisbon Europe?

The historical foundation necessary for a holistic analysis of actor movements in the EU is beyond the scope of this study. However, a number of qualitative conclusions can be derived from the shifts in preferences following the Lisbon Treaty alone. Firstly, France has reinitiated its commitment to NATO, pushed through with ambitious plans of consolidating the CSDP, reaffirmed its aspiration to form sub-communal PSCD’s, and tied itself closer to Britain in a bilateral military cooperation. While it is important not to overestimate France’s foreign policy adjustments from a clear De Gaullist approach to regional integration, to a less so, we shall be equally careful when overriding it as just a renewed Europe puissance, only in a more consolatory package. As confirmed in their 2008 White Paper and emphasized during their Presidency, the civilian focus, previously almost absent in France’s vision for the CSDP, has been accorded a far greater emphasis. In the same manner, Britain has withdrawn much of their traditionally held objections in favour for a European policy convergence during the run-up to the Lisbon Treaty. And, the overarching Euro-Scepticism of the Conservative faction of the current government coalition aside, there is a certain pragmatism that now permeates Windsor Hall. Sweden has remained seized to its long held dedication to civil crisis management, but has increasingly begun to exchange its historic niche for non-alignment with a greater involvement in the development of a common European defence. Its self-chosen pioneering of the development of EDA and the ambition to cultivate the EU Battlegroups can be seen as evidential for a Sweden leaning heavier towards European integration than ever before.

Across the board, states have moved from their original position. However, it must be underscored that the most visible shift in policy is accompanied by an equally large movement in domestic politics. In France, it happened as Chirac was replaced by Sarkozy, in the UK, Blair and Brown to Cameron (and Clegg). This naturally reinvigorates the latent schism between realism and neo-functionalism, between a state-driven integration and an integration fuelled by its own momentum. Because if changes in domestic politics freely alter the course of the CSDP, and the ability to accelerate or discontinue the process is wholly placed under the discretion of national governments, then the realistic narrative emerges as the only possible account for the formulation of a common security and defence. However, there seems to be a considerable portion of the integration that takes places covertly and consistently. Like an iceberg, the regional integration immediately available for us, such as high clad defence agreements between states and quasi-constitutional treaties, is only the tip of a much larger integration process that manifests
itself as a continuous advancement towards deepened communalization through bargaining and compromise. Sweden has remained comparatively static in their foreign policy adjustment to Europe in spite of a paradigm shift in domestic politics. Sarkozy’s policies did indeed encounter heavy national opposition, but they would have been altogether unimaginable had it not been for a priori preparatory period where France had familiarized itself with a Europe beginning to grow too complex and interdependent for hard-line de Gaullist attitudes. Finally, Britain too has experienced a shift in rhetoric’s, from the unconditional rejection of any form of enhanced cooperation, to the willingness to engage the matter during the French Presidency and withdrawal of several of its initially held objections to the Lisbon provisions. So, while domestic actors are the most visible player in the CSDP, the progression of the process has passed the point where it can be entirely defined by national interests.

The neo-functionalistic assumption that states will move away from their original position, and situate themselves within a new bundle of preferences formed in the process of regional integration, does seem to have some bearing on the political reality of the CSDP. But the causality is still fragile. In this study, states have shown a visible degree of convergence, and, to certain extent, a repositioning of original preferences. Nevertheless, the process is considerably influenced by domestic politics and the policy formulation seems to take place in the intersection of the national and supranational.

However, it should also be noted that the relative ease by which the CSDP has expanded in spite of large changes to national governments may be partly due to the absence of any “real” Euro-sceptic parliamentary influence. The British Conservatives comes closest but are checked by its Liberal counterpart. Thus, the real test to the integration process is likely to take place when the most pronounced opposition to EU, typically found in the far Left and far Right of the political spectrum gain hold of any substantial domestic influence in any of the larger European states.

**Assumption:** In Neo-Functionalism, States are not considered to be the exclusive, or even predominate, power in a region. Instead, focus is placed on sub-state coalitions and interests groups that, fuelled by the spill-over created as supranational engagements results in unexpected consequences, affect the decision making process of the state.

**Comments:** Noting how states appear to be moving from their original positions in favour for a European coherency, can we really assume that they are still the dominant actor in the integration process? Neo-functionalism says otherwise, but in the context of European defence and security, are we able to identify the interest groups that allegedly run it in its place? When we look at the movements of political actors from 2007 and onwards, the most discernible engine of European integration is quite possibly the momentum of the process itself. A common European security and defence have, in accordance with neo-functionalistic logic, developed a life of its own. Regional pressure, value adjustments towards a greater Europe, and a normalization of its status as high-politics, has come together to drive the integration efforts further and consequently away from the immediate jurisdiction of states.
However, the increasing salience of foreign policy in European politics seems to be inversely correlated to neo-functionalism’s explanatory competence. The popularization of the process leaves considerably less room for bureaucrats and regional officials to exploit the unintended consequences of supranational engagements. This notion remains valid when one scrutinizes state behaviour in the context of the Lisbon Treaty. Today everyone has an agenda for Europe, and everyone have an agenda for its external decorum. States are not the dominant actor, nor are they superseded by regional officials. They are in the driving seat of European integration, but not fully capable of deciding the directions. This captures the grand theories in a non-definable theoretical limbo where none succeeds in completely explaining the integration process.

Assumption: In Neo-Functionalism, low politics make up the entry point of regional integration [...] in this way, the integration process will move from the least controversial matter to gradually come to engage more delicate policy areas such as security and defence.

Comments: From having been almost unthinkable for the better part of the Unions history, a European foreign policy has become very real in the last decade alone. The theoretical discussion around the 60’s, where the French ‘empty-chair’ policy coupled with Hoffman’s intergovernmentalism nearly reduced the neo-functionalistic assumptions to unworkability, revolved around the notion that some areas of policy was unable to integrate due to their permanent position as high-political. However, there are some indications that the common European defence is becoming increasingly normalized as a political area. The CSDP has gone from an ‘untouchable’ sector of EU polity, to an indispensable domain, present in almost every official statement on the current and future state of the Union.

Of the countries examined in this study, each could demonstrate an extensive devotion to the development of the CSDP in presidential agendas, official statements, and planned policy trajectories. This is not a development exclusive to the Lisbon Treaty, rather it has grown forth after the late 1990’s, but it has increased in salience during the Treaty process due part to the eye-catching emphasis of a High Representative and part to the political potential of mainly the EEAS and PSCD. This has coincided with a change in domestic military premises when, as in Sweden’s case, territorial defence and conscription based armies appears increasingly out-dated as a defence model. And furthermore, enormous cuts are to be expected in the UK in the years to come. This cushions the political consequences of furthering European defence and limits the impact it has on national sovereignty. Furthermore, that the EU should be able to speak with one foreign policy voice is a fairly novel ambition. The recent developments appear to have breached the long held assumption that CFSP would be an impregnable fortress of policy segregation. And in less than a decade, EU foreign policy has arguably become one of the principal venues for furthered European integration. The boundaries between the original positions that initially polarized the preference formulation into four (three which is represented in this study) distinguishable camps, Atlanticists, Euro-Centric, and Civil, has become increasingly eroded during the development of the CSDP. While Sweden remains inclined to civil crisis, they have been pushing ahead with reforms aimed at deepening European security integration as a whole, partly by their commitment to the expansion of EU Battlegroups,
partly by their support and pioneering of the development of the EEAS. In a similar way, Britain has toned down their hawkish attitude towards measures that could potentially infringe on national autonomy, leaving room for pragmatism in previously contested territory such as PSCD. France is visibly less affectionate about their past in their reconciliatory efforts with NATO and their willingness to put a greater emphasis on civilian crisis management.

This can, in turn, be interpreted as a result of a twofold change in how states experience the common defence; vertically through a normalization of the high-political status of foreign policy, and horizontally through increased inter-state entanglement. Today it is not only conventional to address CSDP issues, it is expected. However, this alone is not sufficient to confirm the neo-functional hypotheses. One could associate this change with the idea of state interests rather than a consequence of a transformative process that eventually reached external security policies. I.e., the only reason that states engage the CSDP is because they choose to and it is in their best interest. The dynamics of the intra-institutional discourse would, however, suggest otherwise. Firstly, some participants express a disproportionally large influence on the CSDP, of which the Nordic favouring for civil crisis management is the most apparent. Secondly, the degree by which states has reconfigured their original positions imply that the framing of the common foreign policy is not up to their full discretion. Thirdly, the willingness for domestic politicians to derive from traditional preferences in order to engage Europe (this is most pronounced in Sweden's incremental departure from non-alignment, and France's more swift, albeit partial, separation with de Gaullism) exhibit a growing sentiment that there is a value in European integration in itself, and not only as a means to a nationally promoting end. This correspond better with the neo-functional assumption that regional integration will move along a path that gradually deepens and eventually encapsulate the whole spectrum of policy by virtue of the process itself. However, there seems to exist, as in the case of political entanglement, an emergency exit where states can engage in transatlantic or bilateral cooperation, wholly detached from the Union and without suffering any political consequences. This does not regress the normalization of high-politics, but it may stall the speed of European defence harmonization. Ironically, the European bilateralism right now appears to be motivated by a lack of homogenization in military expenditure and operational commitments, rather than as a hedge against sovereignty imposing developments.

The Neo-Functionalistic assumption that regional integration is transformative in the sense that it starts out as purely inter-governmental and ends up purely supranational appears to correspond to the post-Lisbon Europe in quite some ways. This is especially apparent when one dissects the micro movements inside the Commission and Council, where much of the policy adjustments take place. However, while the UK is not directly repelling itself from the common defence arrangements, and France too remains seized on its development, the latitude of their actions indicate that the entangling effect is so far insufficient in superseding the nation states in the process of regional integration. Although what can be said in favour for neo-functionalists is that the assumptions that actors, when finding themselves absorbed in regional pressure, will respond by transferring more, rather
than less, political capital to supranational institutions. This has certainly been the *modus operandi* of the CSDP, judging by the continuous amplification of its mandate and capabilities.

**Assumption:** When actors gather to propose solutions to a commonly identified issue, it will create spillover into other areas of cooperation. This inclusion of other arenas will in turn provoke new actors and thus widen the scope of activity.

**Comments:** The majority of institutional innovation brought forward by the Lisbon Treaty, such as the extended salience of the HR/VP, the EEAS, the PSCD, and the Mutual Defence Clause, as well as adjacent defence developments such as the EU Battlegroups and CPCC, is all examples of potential areas for further integration. And, they are all examples of institutional arrangements that, when engaged by states, are likely to assume supranational characteristics which cannot be altogether controlled by a single actor. But the bonds are loose, as shown by the comparatively easy British transformation from relatively pro-Europe (domestically speaking) to relatively Euro-sceptic. It would be advantageous for neo-functionalism if one were to interpret the bilateral UK-France defence cooperation as a means to provoke spillover effects onto other states, urging them to ‘step-up’ their defence spending. However, given the UK’s current position, and France’s newfound Atlanticism, it is more likely that this particular defence integration is a step away, not towards, furthered European integration.

However, with high-politics tuned down to a more accessible level, the Neo-Functional case for spillover, usually reserved for none to low controversial polity, get partly revived as a theoretical possibility. The Lisbon Treaty, even in its less ambition appearance, introduced a number of interesting institutional setups that have the potential to invite for deepened integration. And while Schmitter suggests that spillover as concept may have become obsolete in terms of European integration since the CFSP was the real last outpost of none-integrated policy, the principle may find revived legitimacy as a vertical force, deepening already integrated policy areas. Two of the areas where this is especially apparent are the PSCD and the EEAS. While the former has invoked far greater controversy during the Lisbon process, the latter is arguably the more potent when it comes to potential spillover effects. This point is, however, more pertaining to intra-institutional analyses, rather than the type of policy interpretation conducted in this thesis and will not be pursued further under the scope of this thesis. For a more in-depth discussion on this see Helwig and Stroß.

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139 Schmitter, Philippe C. "Ernst B. Haas and the legacy of neofunctionalism." Journal of European Public Policy 2:12 (2005): 268


9 Conclusion

This thesis has looked closer at three European countries with especially pronounced interest areas in order to map out their policy preferences in a post-Lisbon Europe. The study has then subjected them to a neo-functionalistic frame of reference for the sake of measuring its theoretical applicability in the context of European security and defence.

This paper argues that by employing neo-functionalism as the explanatory theory, one is provided with an ample, but not exhausted, analytical toolkit. Four neo-functionalistic assumptions were tested in accordance to the empirical evidence:

Firstly, the assumption that states will come to converge with that of the region was found to carry empirical confirmation. In general, states expressed a considerable policy convergence in European defence and security: The traditionally Euro-Centric France have begun to re-establish its transatlantic commitment, engaged in Franco-British bilateralism, and moderated its stance on civil crisis management; The originally Atlanticist UK withdrew many of its initial objections during the bargaining process of the Lisbon Treaty, welcomed deepened integration in the shape of the EEAS and the PSCD, and adopted a refreshed pragmatism; The consistently non-aligned Sweden pushed for the development of the EU Battlegroups, and pioneered what has the potential to become the CSDP institution with the largest potential for supranationalism.

However, the greatest shifts in policy were heavily connected to an equally large transformation in domestic politics. The assumption of office by Nicolas Sarkozy as the President of the French Republic considerably accelerated France’s reintegration into NATO and made room for a more consolatory rhetoric vis-à-vis its transatlantic partnership. Furthermore, the Liberal-Conservative coalition in the UK can be assumed to amplify parliamentary Euro-Scepticism. However, checked in its place by the Liberal faction, and aided by the pragmatism that appears to guide its current government, any distinct departure from the CSDP will be unlikely in the near future. While acknowledging the impact of these domestic movements on the overall progression of regional integration, this study argues that they cannot be wholly separated from the increasing momentum of the CSDP process; domestic actors are limited in their political latitude by an increasing European integration.

Secondly, this paper looked closer at the neo-functionalistic assumption that states cannot be considered the exclusive actors of an integration process. Post-Lisbon Europe is converging in policy and states initial interests seem to be diminishing in influence. However, the increased salience of foreign policy on domestic agendas also appears to marginalize sub-state actors and quarantines their influence. The result is that the interests groups and bureaucrats which, according to neo-functionalistic logic, should be on the forefront of regional integration, is pushed back into a peripheral state. And, in the same time, the magnitude of the process itself is competing with nation states over political
influence. This political limbo limits the explanatory power of Neo-Functionalism by decreasing its ability to determine the drivers of integration.

Thirdly, it appears that the neo-functionalistic prediction of a transition from high- to low-politics can be said to have some empirical foundation in the EU judging by the enthusiasm and willingness by which states engage the CSDP. The Lisbon Treaty has brought security and defence to the forefront of political discussion, increasing the potential of the area as a venue for integration. Today, a clear agenda for the CSDP can be identified in the political expression of EU members. As such, European foreign policy is becoming increasingly de-controversialized as actors identify themselves further with the CSDP project and push ahead towards a “common voice”.

Lastly, some attention was paid to the effects of spill-over. While an in-depth exploration of the concept would require an institutional focus not included under the scope of this study, the initial inquire in the structural novelties brought about by the Lisbon Treaty shows that the potential for political spill-over have increased. This is, however, an area of regional integration that encourages for further research, especially in consideration to the EEAS and PSCD.
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