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How different third party interveners affect the dura- tion of civil war

Bachelor's thesis within Political Science

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Hur olika typer av interven- tionsparter påverkar läng- den av inbördeskrig

Kandidatuppsats inom Statskunskap

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Sammanfattning

Det finns en uppsjö av akademisk forskning om inbördeskrig och fredskapande. Denna uppsats avhandlar också dessa ämnen men fokus ligger istället på ett speciellt område; hur olika typer av interventionsparter påverkar längden av inbördeskrig.

Målet med en intervention är att få slut på inbördeskriget så fort som möjligt. För att kunna nå det målet så är det av yttersta vikt att ha kunskap om vilken typ av interventionsparter som gör det snabbast. Interventionsparterna har sedan den moderna tiden varit internationella organisationer, stormakter och småstater. I denna uppsats kommer de olika typerna att diskuteras, jämföras och analyseras. Allt för att sedan kunna dra slutsatser om vad som karakteriserar dem och vad de har för inflytande på längden av inbördeskrig.

I uppsatsen kommer sex olika inbördeskrig att analyseras. Dessa fall är hämtade från ett data set som innehåller information om alla inbördeskrig mellan åren 1945 och 1999. Två utav inbördeskrigen är krig där en internationel organisation var interventionspart. I två andra inbördeskrig är interventionsparten en stormakt och i de resterande två inbördeskrigen är interventionsparten en småstat. Dessa sex inbördeskrig är sedan analyserade med hjälp av karaktären utav kriget och typen av interventionspart.

En viktig aspekt för analysen rör internationella organisationer och när de gör interventioner. En forskare, Regan, påpekar att internationella organisationer tenderar att intervensera i inbördeskrig som redan har pågått under en längre tid och där enskilda stater har valt att inte ingripa eller har misslyckats. Analysen i denna uppsats visar att beroende på hur kraftfull interventionen är desto kortare blir längden utav inbördeskriget. Vad som avgör vad som är kraftfullt är hur stark interventionsparten är, vilken sida interventionen sker på och vilken strategi som används.

Bachelor's Thesis in Political Science

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Subject terms: Intervention, civil war, conflict termination, international relations.

Abstract

There is a great variety of research about civil war and peacemaking. This thesis also deals with those topics, however, it focuses on one specific area about how different third-party interveners affect the duration of civil war.

Since the main goal of an intervention is to terminate the civil war as fast as possible, it is of great importance to be able to know which type of intervener can terminate it fastest. Throughout the modern history third-party interveners have been a mix of international organizations and major- and minor powers. These different types of interveners and what characterize them will here be discussed, compared and analyzed.

From a data set containing information about all civil wars between 1945 and 1999 six conflicts have been chosen for further examination. Two of the civil wars are wars where an international organisation was the intervener, two conflicts where major powers were the interveners and two where minor powers were the intervener. These six civil wars are viewed upon with characteristics of the conflict and intervener as basis.

Important to take into account is the aspect when international organizations in general tend to intervene. A scholar, Regan, pointed out that international organizations tend to intervene in already long lasting civil wars where states have chosen not to intervene or have failed. The result in this thesis shows that depending upon how forceful the intervention is, the shorter the duration of the civil war will be. What shows how forcefull an intervention can be is how strong the intervener is, on which side the intervention takes place and which strategy it chooses.

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1 Introduction

As long as some have favoured to start wars, others have desired to end them. And as the characteristics of warfare have changed so has the way to end them. Third-party intervention has, as a tool to change the outcome or duration of a war, become increasingly more important since the end of the cold war. Such interventions in civil wars have increased in numbers. The establishment of the United Nations peace keeping troops and the development of military alliances like NATO have implied an increasing number of different actors on the world arena.

At least for the UN peace keeping troops, the aim of its interventions is to terminate the duration of the civil wars. However, in general other kinds of third-party interventions share the same goal as the UN peace keeping troops. NATO is an example of another peace and security alliance where the goal of its intervention today is to stop warring parts from fighting. Nevertheless, single states with interest in managing and maintaining peace share the same goal of termination.

Of most fundamental concern for those engaging in such interventions, is how to be as successful as possible. Therefore, factors which influence how well they will achieve their goals are important to analyze. Does kind of method used by the interveners play an important role? Is it of importance on which “side” the intervention takes place, and, essential for this thesis, does the type of intervener influence the duration of civil war?

When we have answered those questions we are able to draw conclusions about variables that influence the duration of civil war. With such knowledge we are able to make more correct decisions when deciding how to intervene in civil war.

There are several factors that affect the duration of civil war. In addition to that, new factors affect the duration when an intervention takes place. So far, not much academic research has focused on different types of third-party interveners and how that influences the duration. The general influence third-party interventions have on the duration has been examined. According to for example Regan (*Conditions of Successful Third-Party Interventions in Intrastate Conflicts*, 1996) the duration of civil war will be prolonged when third-party intervenes. He also studies how the duration is affected depending upon which type of strategy the intervener chooses. His findings showed that a mixed strategy, economic and military, is the most successful with a successful rate at 35 %. On second place comes a strictly military intervention with a successful rate at 30 %. After considering factors that influence the duration with third-party intervention, the variables of different types of third-party interveners need to be taken into consideration (1996, p. 345-346).

1.1 Problem

A state or an organization have plenty of information to handle and several questions to answer before deciding to intervene in another state's internal conflict. First of all, a goal of a possible intervention must be shaped. Does the intervener have a hidden, selfish, agenda or is the goal to terminate the civil war? In this essay, the goal is assumed to be the latter. Otherwise, the intervention would be an action taken to be a warring party, not a pure peace making action.

To achieve the goal, to terminate the civil war, yet more questions need to be answered. However, not much research has been carried out to help the decision makers in organizations and states to make appropriate judgments. When the goal is to terminate the civil war as fast as possible, those in charge need to have all important information at hand. Until some decades ago statesmen and international organizations had very little knowledge about which strategy is the most successful one. For example they did not know on forehand how great the possibility of success a military intervention was. But as interventions by international organizations increased in numbers, the research about how different factors influence the duration of civil war with third party intervention also increased. One of the most accomplished scholars on this subject is Regan, who has written several groundbreaking essays on this subject (1996, 2000a, 2000b and 2002). Although he has made extensive research about different aspects of third part intervention and the duration of civil war, some possible important pieces are missing. Another scholar, Thyne (2005), drew the attention in one of his essays to different third-party interveners. As a part of his essay, he includes different types of interveners. However, he differentiates them only as UN-interveners and independent state-interveners, leaving out several other types of possible important interveners.

Next step to be taken is to make a proper and wider differentiation between the different types of third-party interveners. There are many variables that affect the duration of civil war and needed to be taken into account are also those variables that are characteristic of the different interveners.

1.2 Purpose

The purpose of this essay is to improve the knowledge of matters concerning third-party intervention. Such actions make up an important cornerstone in the field of peace making and managing, as well as international relations. For international organizations like the UN and NATO and for single states, which also are powerful actors in the world arena, an improved knowledge about successful and less successful intervention strategies is important to avoid people to suffer from the cruelty of war. New knowledge on this will be generated by presenting and evaluate the different thoughts and already established concepts and thereafter add new findings and beliefs.

This thesis will clarify and discuss the characteristics and variables that affect the duration of civil war. Specific for this thesis is the characteristics and variables of different third-

party interveners and how they influence the duration. Through analysing that, a new framework of successful intervention strategies will be developed.

Since this thesis will be dealing with wide-ranging issues and different concepts, to achieve the goal set up, a comprehensive discussion part is included. This is necessary to attain the purpose.

A few limitations have been made for the purpose of making the essay as correct and comprehensible as possible. The data that will be used for analyzing the duration is limited to material from 1945 and 1999. This is due mainly to two reasons, the accessibility of data and because it was after 1945 that interventions started to be carried out in the name of the UN and other international organizations.

Another limitation concerns the content of different concepts. Left out in this essay is a discussion about when and why it is suitable to intervene. Neither are descriptions on how, for example, the UN and NATO intervene included. It is not explained how they perform and how they more specifically carry out their interventions, even though that might be interesting.

1.3 Questions

The questions which will be answered throughout this essay concern the influence different third-party interveners have on civil war duration. Does one type of third-party intervener lead to a longer duration compared to another type of intervener?

The questions that will be answered in this essay are;

1. Will third party interveners affect the duration of civil war in another way because of the characteristics of the intervener?
2. Are there differences in the duration of a civil war when the third-party interveners are international organizations and when they intervene on behalf of the; government, rebels or as neutral, compared to when single states, being major or minor powers, intervene on behalf of the; government, rebels or as neutral?

2. Method and material

2.1 Method

The focus in this essay is on how the different characteristics of the intervener influence the duration of civil war. Nevertheless, other associated issues are also dealt with. What influences the duration of civil war in general and previous findings on third-party intervention and strategies used, are of course important issues to be able to deal with the question of how different types of third-party interveners affect civil war.

This essay will use a qualitative method. To be able to reach the purpose of seeing how different third-party interveners affect the duration of civil war, one part dealing with different concepts used and one part with comprehensive literature review are needed. In these parts different texts, made up by different articles, essays and thesis, are compared with each other and discussed. Thereafter, there is a discussion about new beliefs and ideas regarding how different characteristics of the interveners might affect the duration of civil war.

The qualitative way of research is needed in the first parts of the essay. Here, different beliefs and ideas are compared with each other. Thereby clinging to the qualitative approach of explaining and creating an understanding. It also tries to continue working on previous developed theories and develop new ones.

After the qualitative discussion, a deeper analysis will follow. In order to test the ideas and findings the analysis will be made by comparing six different civil wars with third-party interventions. Here, a data set with information about civil wars from 1945 to 1999 serves as the base. Other information included in this data set is for example possible third-party intervention, conflict months and intervention strategy. The six different civil wars have been chosen for the study on unsystematic basis. The six different countries will be analyzed through the earlier discussion about characteristics of different third-party interveners and the variables which affect the duration of civil war.

For this kind of study, a qualitative test seems to be the most appropriate. By presenting earlier literature on the subject, both qualitative and quantitative studies, and comparing the chosen civil wars with third-party intervention with each other, correct conclusions can be drawn. As a result of this the readers will be able to greatly improve their knowledge of different concepts and theories about civil war and the affect by third-party interventions. It also gives the reader a better understanding on how the different third-party interveners influence the duration and the reasons behind that.

2.2 Material

Most of the materials used in this thesis are previous research on the subject. It is of great importance to use already existing research on closely connected issues since it provides a solid framework and it contributes to an accumulation of knowledge. For example the

works by Singer, Small and Regan have served as a base in this thesis. Other scholars' work have been used to broaden the view and sharpe arguments of the previous mentioned scholars. There are two main reasons to why so many different scholars' ideas and findings are included. The first reason is that they contribute to an accumulation of knowledge. The second reason is that by comparing many results the discussion and findings in this thesis will be more trustworthy.

When choosing material, the intention was to be as objective as possible and to take into account as many aspects as possible. To be objective per see is not achievable, however the goal is to act in such a manner and not having any presuppositions. By including a great variety of beliefs, findings and models the possibility to make new, proper and sound conclusions on the issue of third-party interveners and the duration of civil war increases.

The data used for comparing the six different civil wars is primarily taken from a data set used by Regan (2002). It contains all intrastate conflicts from 1945 to 1999, information about if interventions took place, how it was conducted etc. He in turn has collected the data for the purpose of a paper "Third Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflict". In this paper he uses the data set to analyze if and how third-party interventions are a successful method to handle a conflict. Further information about the chosen civil wars and the interventions is taken from other sources such as country reports from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office and UN reports.

Some of the materials used are taken from different homepages on the internet. For example some of the material are electronic reports from the UN and background material of the different civil wars. The use of internet sources should be done with greatest care and criticism. It is important to know as much as possible about the source which present information. Can the information be trusted? Is the information biased or is it neutral? The homepages used in this thesis are mainly from wellknown organisations, news-papers etc. These sources are commonly conceived as credible and trustworthy and can therefore be used in the thesis.

3. Outline

This thesis is divided into nine chapters. The first chapter contains the introduction part where the purpose is explained. The second chapter deals with method and material. The fourth chapter deals with concepts that are used throughout the thesis. Several such concepts are needed to be explained more thoroughly than others in order to make the work as clear as possible. Here, previous research on the subject is presented and to some extent also debated. The fifth chapter deals with different, already existing, theories and the discussion about the characteristics of third-party interveners. In this chapter are also the new suggestions presented about how and why the characteristics of the different third-party interveners affect the duration. Here, international organizations, major and minor powers are compared and analyzed. In the sixth chapter the six different cases of civil wars are presented and analyzed. In the seventh chapter the civil wars are discussed together with how the third-party interveners influence the duration. In the eight chapter the questions asked

in the first chapter are answered and conclusions are drawn. The ninth chapter contains a discussion and in the tenth and last chapter the references can be found.

4. Theory

4.1 Concepts

As in every academic work several different concepts are used, some less agreed upon and some more generally accepted. This thesis will analyze how different third-party interveners influence the duration of a civil war and several concepts will be discussed and used. In order to make it as comprehensible as possible many concepts which are needed in this study will be presented.

To further study and to be able to understand the role external interventions have in a civil war, there is a need to include some thoughts about civil war. Elbadawi and Sambanis (*External interventions and the Duration of Civil Wars*, 2000) give a good explanation to the occurrence and the duration of civil wars in their study; *external intervention and the duration of civil wars*. They explain it as; “*civil war occurrence and duration may be modelled as the result of a forecast error on the part of the rebels or the state with reference to each other’s military capability*” (2002, p. 2). The determination of the duration of the war depends upon how well a forecast can be made. And when a third-party intervenes on behalf of the government or the rebels the forecast of the military capabilities alters.

A widely used definition of a civil war is the definition stated by Singer and Small. According to them there are three criteria that have to be fulfilled. First, the conflict has to take place within the borders of the state in question. Secondly, one of the fighting parties in the conflict is a part which has much power, often a government. Third and lastly, there must be a capacity to resistance by the opposing party.

In addition to that, the level of casualties has to be taken into account. What number of people dead in a conflict shall be the level for when the conflict can be de classified as a war? Singer and Small have in their works a minimum level of 1 000 battle deaths. Two other scholars, Doyle and Sambanis, also include in their definition of civil war that a conflict can be described as civil war when the number of battle deaths exceeds the number of 1 000. They also include another criterion, which means that such a conflict has to challenge the sovereignty of a state (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, p. 32). However, other levels of battle deaths are also used when classifying a civil war. For example, P. Regan uses the minimum level of 200 battle deaths because, according to him, in civil war there are often periods of evidently less fighting although the war continues to proceed (Regan, 1996, p. 338). Regan’s opinion on this subject, a minimum of 200 battle deaths, will in this thesis be followed.

¹ According to Elbadawi and Sambanis similar explanations are also given by e.g. Collier and Fearon.

The start date and end date of civil war might in some cases be difficult to define. The starting point can for example be when the first armed attack is carried out. The end date is more difficult to define. A civil war might during a phase have low or none hostility. A peace settlement is a clear indication of an end of civil war, however, an official settlement is not very common. A common used definition of an end of civil war is the end date of the hostility in connection to that no new war emerged within a period of 12 months after that.

Extensive studies have been carried out to analyze the possible causes of civil wars. This is of course necessary to be able to understand and to take correct actions. According to El-badawi, Sambanis (2000, p. 2) and Regan (1996, p. 338) there can be mainly three different kinds of causes, although it can also be a mix of them;

1. Ethnic.
2. Ideological
3. Religious

These three different main causes can be further divided and explored. The level of development in the state is claimed to be a very significant indication on the likelihood for an outbreak of civil war. According to Collier and Hoeffler countries with a higher income per capita and economic growth are less likely to face civil war. A poor country has less to lose in a civil war than a rich country and can therefore take the economic risk it implies. Another reason is that a rich country has the possibilities to redirect the financial resources and by that avoid possible hostilities. Sudden shocks in the economy may also lead to an increased risk of civil war (www.humansecuritycentre.org).

However, the development issue is very much correlated to the political decisions taken. And other scholars like Fearon and Laitin suggest that how well the political system is developed, for example how strong the institutions are, is connected to the likelihood of civil war (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, p. 7-13).

If the country has a neighbouring state engaged in a civil war, the likelihood increases that the other country will also end up in civil war. This can be explained by earlier developed political commitments by the country or negative economic influence by a possible decrease in trade, loss of important investments, destructed infrastructure and increased military spending (Collier et al., 2003). The hostilities may also spread because the people in the neighbouring country are inspired to take action in order to improve their situation (www.humansecuritycentre.org). Other reasons might also exist and they are presented later in the thesis.

It is not uncommon that in a country with a previous history of civil war, yet another civil war will break out. When a third-party has intervened, the strategy after the termination of the civil war is important to avoid a second one. According to Doyle and Sambanis (2002), the aftermath and how dedicated the third-party intervener is to help rebuild the society are significant aspects to if a second civil war will begin (Doyle and Sambanis, 2002, p. 779-801).

A widely discussed issue concerns natural resources and if they have any affect on civil war outbreaks. Collier and Hoeffler were among the first to analyze if it was significant. Together with other scholars, what seems to be the most important aspect is who owns and has access to the natural resources. For example, if the country is natural resource-dependent and there are only a few owners, the likelihood of civil war increases (www.humansecuritycentre.org).

For external interveners to be able to achieve their goal, they need to use the most appropriate methods which take into account the causes of the war. Some strategies may be more fruitful when the cause of the civil war is ethnic, compared to ideological or religious.

The definition of an external or third-party intervention is naturally important for this essay. To have a clear-cut definition of third-party intervention is essential to be able to conduct this study. James Rosenau has developed a definition which consists of two types of principles; convention-breaking and authority-targeted (1968, p. 165-176, 1969, p. 147-171).

These two principles are in turned used and modified by Regan. His definition of the concept is; *“I define third party interventions in intra-state conflicts as convention breaking military and/or economic activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and opposition forces”* (Regan, 2001, p. 6).

As Regan points out there is an evident difference between his definition of third-party intervention and “normal aid” to a country. The goal of intervention is to change the situation of the conflict. Therefore, for example financial aid given to a country without the intention to influence the political situation in the country is classified as “normal aid”. While, on the other hand, financial aid given to a country with the aim to change the balance of power and the political situation is labelled as an intervention. By doing a necessary distinction between “unavoidable” influence and “intended” influence, a distinction between intervention and influence is made and accepted (Regan, 2001, p. 6 and 2002, p. 59).

Yet another scholar bases his definition on the two principles stated by Rosenau. However, Jordan Miller in his *External military intervention in civil wars* (2003) includes a third condition. He argues that the intervention should not develop into a lasting element of the relationship between the intervener and the country in conflict. If that would still happen, then the intervention can, according to him, no longer be classified as an intervention. The definition of third-party intervention in this thesis is therefore the definition stated by Regan, and in addition to that, the third principle stated by Miller (Miller, 2003, p. 4).

The strategies at hand for the third-party interveners are according to Regan (1996, p. 339) of three different kinds;

1. Economic
2. Military

3. Mix of strategies

Left out in Regan's thinking is diplomacy. His explanation to why he did not include diplomacy as a strategy is mainly the reason of the concept's complexity. It is very difficult to actually agree about what can be the definition of a diplomatic strategy in the case of intervention. Is it possible to draw a distinct line between "ordinary" international relations and relations with the only goal to direct the state into a specific direction? It is possible when the cases are more extreme, but in between it is often difficult to label a relation as a diplomatic strategy or not. The discussion in Rioux's thesis *Third party interventions in international conflicts: theory and evidence* (2003) helps us to give us a better understanding of how diplomacy can be outlined and used. The first level according to Rioux is a discussion between organizations and states that have an interest in the war. The second level is where a third party tries to get hold of more information about the war from the involved actors. In the next level of diplomacy, a third party or parties try to begin negotiations without involving themselves in the issue which led to the war. If that level of diplomacy proved to be insufficient to put an end to the fighting, the next action to be taken is for the third party to condemn the situation. Rioux includes more levels of diplomacy in his essay, however, they are not necessary for this study. The point is; it is too difficult to include a clear diplomacy-concept as a strategy (Rioux, 2003, p. 6-8).

Another important variable for understanding external interventions and its effects is on which side the intervention takes place. Starting with the assumption that there are two main combatants in a civil war, the third-party intervener can choose to intervene on three different sides. The third-party can intervene on behalf of the government, the rebels or it can act as neutral. Either way, the intervention is hoped to be powerful enough to make it too costly for the combatant, who is in opposition to the intervener, to continue to fight and by that terminate the war.

4.2 Literature review

A vast majority of the studies conducted so far on this issue do not differentiate between different types of external interveners. The third-party interveners are mostly treated as one type of intervener. Previous research has focused on the duration of civil war in general and which strategy that terminates the civil war fastest.

Regan has conducted a study where he analyzes when a third-party most likely will intervene. He concludes that if the probability of success is high, the domestic opinion is in favour of the intervention and if the expected duration is short, then a state is more willing to intervene (Regan, 2002, p. 61-62). By that we are able to conclude that if a state believes that it has a large probability to succeed, and doing so relatively quickly, an intervention will be carried out.

Thyne (2005) takes into account the findings made by Regan (2001, 2002) and develops the theories about likelihood of intervention. Thyne argues that states and the UN share those

factors which will increase the likelihood of an intervention, however, he also claims that interventions by the UN are often such interventions where single states have failed to make an intervention (Thyne, 2005). States are, according to Thyne, not attracted to intervene in a civil war when the costs are high and the expected duration is long. States will intervene in civil war when the likelihood of success is anticipated, and the UN will intervene in those civil wars which are avoided by single states. Thyne quotes the former Secretary General U Thant on this subject and this is also included in this thesis; “*Great problems usually come to the United Nations because governments have been unable to think of anything else to do about them. The United Nations is a last-ditch, last resort affair, and it is not surprising that the organization should often be blamed for failing to resolve problems that have already been found to be insoluble by governments*” (Thyne, 2005, p. 12).

Some of the important works involving this question are conducted by Elbadawi, Sambanis and Regan (2000, 1998, 2000, and 2002). In *External intervention and the duration of civil wars* the authors first make a preliminary study where they test external intervention and civil war duration. They find out that there is a positive relationship between external intervention and civil war duration. However, in that preliminary study they have not taken into account some supposable important variables. They point out that external intervention usually only takes place in already long-lasting civil wars and that correct conclusions cannot be drawn (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000, p. 12).

Therefore, to overcome this problem with biased data and result, they conduct yet another study where they also include some new variables. One of the new variables supposes that intervention is correlated with the length of the war. Another new variable supposes that when the costs of the war (read: the costs of lives) are high, there is a higher possibility of an intervention. Yet another variable is included; there is less probability of an intervention in a state which can be labelled as a “high-scoring” democracy (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000, p.12).

In their study about civil war duration and external intervention the data used has been collected between 1960 and 1999. The result of this study shows that external intervention, without distinguishing different types of interveners, is connected to long wars. During this period of time, the civil wars with third-party interventions had a mean duration of nine years, while civil wars without external interventions had a mean duration of one and a half year (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000, p. 16-17).

Regan conducts a similar study in his work *Conditions of Successful Third-party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts* (1996). In short, he finds out that in general a third-party intervention increases the duration of a civil war. The data he tested consists of 138 intrastate conflicts, where 85 of them had at least one third-party intervention. Of these 85 cases there were 196 individual interventions. About 40 % (76 cases) of all interventions were made by major powers, 5 % (10 cases) were made by the United Nations or under its command and the rest were made by minor powers. Regarding which type of intervention strategy that is mostly used, he finds out that a strictly military intervention stands for the most; 70 %. The second most used is a mixed strategy; 23 %. Economical intervention stands for 7 %. The

question of how successful the interventions were is of course a vital question. Without taking into account on which side the third party intervened, Regan finds out that a mixed strategy is the most successful with a successful rate at 35 %. The second most successful was strictly military intervention with 30 % rate and economic intervention with a 23 % rate. Including the side on which the intervention took place, an intervention on behalf of the government with military interventions was proved to be the most successful with around 50 % rate (1996, p. 345-346).

So far, looking at these success rates, it is easy to claim that the goal of the intervention is far away from being achieved. To a very large extent the opposite are instead “achieved”; an increased duration of civil war.

A successful intervention can end in three ways, by termination of the civil war by a military, economic or a mixed victory, by truce² or by a peace settlement. Two scholars, DeRouen and Sobek (2004), argue that in civil wars where the UN has carried out interventions, the termination is more likely to have ended in a ceasefire or a peace agreement than in a military victory (De Rouen and Sobek, 2004, p. 304-305).

5. Civil war duration with different third-party interveners

When studying which effect third-party intervention has on the duration of civil war there are several variables which supposedly affect the outcome. Included in studies so far are the type of strategy the intervener uses, on which side the intervention takes place etc. However, also important to study is whether different types of interveners effect the duration of civil war.

Major powers and non major powers have started to be discussed and analyzed, but to little extent. Therefore, as a complement and deepening of peace making and managing knowledge, it is important to take into account the different characteristics that each type of intervener possess. This analysis will take that step and examine different types of interveners and their characteristics. However, before that, civil war and the duration of it will be analyzed.

5.1 Which variables affect the duration of civil war?

Civil wars have, compared to international wars, a much longer duration. According to Collier and Hoeffler civil wars last in general ten times as long as international wars (2005, p. 2). As many scholars point out, it is very difficult to make generalizations about the causes and the duration of civil war. Each war has its own specific characteristics with distinctive incidents. Nevertheless, some basic conditions and features can be derived.

An easy and striking explanation to why it continues is given by Collier and Hoeffler. They clarify it by; “*wars continue when the incentives for peace are weak*” (2005, p. 2). The weakness lies in structure, economics and asymmetric information. To come to an end of the civil war,

² A ceasefire without with no final peace settlement (DeRouen and Sobek, 2004).

there must exist a structure that allows it to happen. As long as there is a lack of elements that can help the combatants to come to an agreement, the possibility to have peace is indeed little. When both parties have strong financial resources, the incentive to stop fighting is small. The third weakness is a general “fault” both parties are likely to make. It is difficult to estimate each others fighting capabilities. Information about the factual military size, financial resources etc are difficult to obtain. Instead, what they have is asymmetric information (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005, p. 3-4).

However, according to Fearon’s classification about possible causes, those factors play a very small role. He argues that objects like ethnicity, ideology, level of democracy and income per capita are inferior when examining his classes. In Fearon’s *Why some civil wars last longer than others* (2004) five different classes of war are expected to have different duration. The first group is those civil wars which arise from coups and popular revolutions. According to the author those civil wars tend to have a relative short duration. Another group of civil wars which tend to have short duration is anti-colonial wars. The third group of civil wars is the one occurring at the break-ups of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Such kinds of civil wars are also characterized by short durations. The fourth group of civil wars tends to have a longer duration. Those are civil wars with a specific element called “sons of the soil”³ (Fearon, 2004, p. 277). The last class is made up of such wars where the rebels are in possession of illegal sources of finance, such as for example opium and cocaine. This last group is together with the fourth group those which tend to have a long duration (Fearon, 2004, p. 277).

Collier and Hoeffler point out that Fearon might not be false in his arguments because his focus is more on the process and problem of coming to the termination of civil war. Other scholars, such as themselves, are instead more focused on trying to explain the direct motivations of the warring parties. By taking that standpoint, Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom also include a pure economic side of civil war initiation and duration. Their findings show that low income per capita and high level of income inequality increase the duration of civil war (Collier, Hoeffler, Söderbom, 2004, p. 255, 262, 267).

Regan points out that there are three main motives behind a continued war. As much as they can be the causes of war, ethnicity, politics and religion, can also be reasons to why a war continues. Earlier research has shown that the level of ethnic fragmentation plays a vital role for the duration of civil war. Regan argues that the reason behind that is that in a highly polarized society the rebels can relatively easy find support, rally people from their ethnic group and by that the duration can be prolonged.

Usually included in the debate about possible causes of civil war are oil dependence and agricultural and primary commodities. However, these aspects have in studies shown not to

³ Sons of the soil is a conflict where two different groups, one in minority and the other government supported, fight over natural resources (Fearon, 2004).

influence the duration. On the other hand, they are still important aspects since they are connected to the initiation causes of civil war (Ross, 2003, p. 2 and 28).

In addition to those factors, other scholars such as Elbadawi, Sambanis and Regan point out that external intervention, that is to say third-party intervention, also plays an important role for the duration. The intervention by another party changes the situation of the conflict. New resources and fighting capabilities are introduced.

5.2 Different third-party interveners

The different types of third-party interveners are;

1. International organizations, like the UN and NATO.
2. Single countries;
 - Major powers
 - Minor powers

There are several reasons why this division of third-party interveners is made. The first type, international organizations, is not a new phenomena or actor. However, its importance has largely increased. The different parts of the world have become more and more integrated with each other, cooperation and memberships in different organizations are today more common than ever. Therefore, an assumption is made that one type of intervener that ought to be examined is international organizations. Two examples of which are considered to be powerful organizations are the NATO and the UN. Both of them are in many ways different from each other. Nevertheless, they are strong international organizations which regularly intervene in intrastate wars.

In slight opposition to that type of intervener, is the type where the intervener is a single state. Even if states tend to cooperate and engage in different types of organizations, the single state is still a powerful player on the world arena and should therefore also be studied.

In addition to that, it is also interesting to find out whether there is a difference between when the single state is a major or a minor power. As will be discussed later, there is a great difference in capability between a major and minor power. Therefore, this distinction is also made. How is the duration of civil war affected when single states are divided into major and minor powers? Is the duration shorter when a single state is for example a major power?

The definition of a major power is explained by many scholars. However, one explanation is more used than others and that is the definition made by Singer and Small. According to them in 1980, major powers are described as *“yet capabilities alone are not sufficient for major power status. States must behave as major powers, with global interests and reach, and must be regarded by*

the other major powers as members of the club” (2001, p. 3). Taking into account the definition given by Singer and Small there are only a few major powers existing in the world today. In the modern time and up to the World War II there has according to Singer and Small been a high level of consensus about the states can be classified as major powers. Those major powers are Austria-Hungary, Prussia⁴, Russia⁵, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Japan and the United States (2001, p. 2-3).

Today, we find almost the same states being major powers as in the early 20th century. One exception is Austria-Hungary that ceased to be a major power after its dissolution in year 1918. Both Prussia and the USSR have continued to be classified as major powers after their “transformation” to Germany and Russia.

Some scholars have raised the question of why not also including more regional major powers. For example Brazil and India are both powerful states in their respective regions and are in the position of acting as major powers in their regions (that can be described as large regions). Some researchers do include them in the “major powers’ club but a majority of the researchers do not. The main reason is that even though they have regionally great power they do not have, in comparison, the same strength as the others. In this thesis Singer and Small’s definition will be followed, thereby leaving out Brazil and India. However, another state is instead included in the “major powers’ club”. China has for a long time been a powerful state, however, it is not until recently that the state can be described as having global interests. For example, their extensive trade business with all parts of the world has made China a state with such interests. The state has always had a strong military capacity but for a larger part of the modern period the state has had no interest in global issues (2001, p. 2-3).

5.3 Characteristics of the different third-party interveners

Several factors are important when studying the causes of civil war. There are different characteristics which determine the probability of a war. For the duration of civil war the situation is the same, several factors determine how long the war will go on. One such factor is third-party interventions and how different third-party interveners influence the duration. The different interveners; international organizations, single states being major powers and single states being minor powers, have all different characteristics which influence the duration. Here in this section those different third-party interveners are viewed upon and compared. This is done by looking at the following characteristics. These variables and how they look like will give us explanations to why the duration differs.

⁴ Prussia until 1871 when it became Germany.

⁵ Russia until 1922 when it became USSR. In year 1991 it became Russia again.

These are the characteristics of the intervener which can influence the duration of the civil war they intervene in;

5.3.1 Power status

1. Power status or capabilities. This factor covers a vast area of the concept of power. Here, the power status is how powerful the intervener is in respect to economic, military and political concerns. For example the United States is by many conceived as a powerful state because of its economic and military capacity. Such capacities are favourable for interveners because of its strong ability to continue to intervene, economically, military or through a mix of these. The perception of a state's or an organization's power capability can also be determined by more historical factors. Even if a state today should be considered to have little power status, it can still in the eyes of others have a strong power status, because of its earlier strong power status. The size of the military forces is an important piece of information the intervener needs to take into account. This is important mainly because of two reasons; how much military force must be used in a military intervention and how big the chance to succeed is. Especially important is this information when the coming third-party intervention will take place on the side of the rebels. To achieve a military victory over the government's army is considered to be more difficult and more capability-demanding than to achieve a military victory over rebel groups. The expected duration of the civil war suggests that a large governmental army will win the war relatively easy and quick, while a weak such army and a strong rebel formation imply a longer lasting war (Miller, 2003, p. 14).
2. Domestic pressure. Some literature on peace making propose that having relatively large domestic pressure in general deter states to intervene forcefully, for example with military force. Similar thinking is proposed by another scholar, Gelpi (1997). He means that a leader with a low level of public support is constrained how to act in foreign policy. Both these beliefs lead to the possibility that a state will not act as forcefully as it actually would like to, and the duration of the civil war will most likely increase. However, another point, contradictory to the first one expressed, is also raised by Gelpi. He means that a leader with little support and domestic difficulties might take a chance, direct the focus on foreign issues and gain support of a possible victory (1997, p. 255-282).
3. Regime types. Democratic states in general tend not to intervene in military disputes when the state in the civil war also is a democracy (Frazier, Dixon and Ingersoll, 2001, p. 5). However, another scholar, Satana, argues the opposite. In his analysis he shows that democracies are more likely to intervene in another state if it is a democracy (Satana, 2004, p. 15).
4. Institutional constraints. Before reaching a consensus about whether or not to intervene and then how to do it, a discussion and to some degree a public debate must take place. Depending upon which type the intervener is, this process will be more or less problematical.

5.3.2 Characteristics of the state in the civil war

1. Strategic value of the state. This characteristic covers several different aspects. It means both how interesting the civil war is in the eyes of the intervener in respect to strategic value and how valuable the state is itself. If a state with civil war is considered to have a strategic value to for example its neighbouring countries this might affect the incentive to intervene and the duration of the civil war, when an intervention has taken place.
2. Regime type. A state in a civil war that is an autocracy is generally considered less constrained by the attitudes and feelings that are present in the state. The leader enjoys enough space to take any measure he or she chooses to fight the rebels. A democratic state is most likely to behave in another way. These factors contribute to determine the duration.
3. Income per capita. According to some scholars; Collier, Elbadawi and Sambanis, the level of economic development plays a role regarding the duration. A civil war taking place in a poor country is considered to last longer than a rich state's. This is mainly explained by the harsh economic situation which many of the citizens face. Thereby the incentive increases to join a rebel group. This in turn means a lower recruitment cost for the rebel group, making them able to persist the government (Collier, Elbadawi and Sambanis 2004, p. 262).
4. Population. Another variable that according to Collier (2004) affects the duration is the size of the population. A large population in association with a low income per capita generally tend to imply a long civil war (Collier, Elbadawi and Sambanis 2004, p. 263).

5.3.3 Link between the intervener and the conflict

1. Ethnic attachments. A nation state is seldom homogenous concerning ethnic grouping. Some of them are more closely connected to other similar groups because of their cultural, language, religion etc. Regardless of where these groups are situated in the world, they are still emotionally connected to each other. This fact leads us to the conclusion that there is an incentive for a state to engage itself in a civil war where such groups are present. In an intervention by a state in a civil war where there are ethnic attachments a situation of a biased goal can arise. This seems different when looking at international organizations. As an international organization mostly consists of several different states and not seldom of different ethnic groups, a connection to one specific group in a state might not be able to be that strong. Instead there might possibly exist a large mix of ethnic attachments which in turn will lead to an intervention with no hidden agenda. Ethnic closeness is in general believed to be the strongest type of attachment (Rioux, 2003, p. 15).
2. Military ties. Similarly to ethnic attachment, although not that strong, military ties imply an attachment between the involved parties. In the early period of the modern time military ties mostly existed between nation states. There were few strong military alliances as we would call it today. However, after the end of the Second World War the military attachments between states developed to more pure alli-

ances. These constellations can be different. They can take the form of a “security back-up”; when a member-state is facing a severe crisis of some sort, other member states are by the membership in the alliances obliged to intervene in the crisis in order to help. They can also take the form of a “peace and security” alliances, where member-states have set up a joined military force to intervene in conflicts. Any of these constellations imply some sort of military bond between state with the crisis and possible interveners. However, it does not mean that a member-state or an organization require already existing military ties before engaging themselves in interventions. Already existing military ties might mean that there is an interest, a strong will, to avoid having peace and security between those states (Miller M. Jordan, 2003, p. 21).

3. Political ties. This link is another relatively strong variable which can influence the duration. Different political ties can for example be to share an ideology, a political tradition or history and membership in organizations. To have such a connection might imply a stronger incentive to intervene in a civil war and to do so with a great deal of force (Miller M. Jordan, 2003, p. 21).
4. Economic ties. Both organizations and states might have economic connections to the state in the civil war. This connection can be made up trade relations and other types of economic interest. For example Aydin and Regan (2004) point out that there might be an “economic interest agenda” where natural resources and other commodities inside the state in civil war is considered desirable (2004, p. 15-16).

5.3.4 Characteristics of the conflict

This may often be difficult to define; civil wars tend to involve a mixture of characteristics. However, they can be divided into three main categories;

1. Ethnic. A civil war where the combatants are driven by ethnic motives is according to Regan the most difficult type of civil war to terminate (2001). Ethnic wars are the most common type of civil war, with a rate of 53 % (Regan, 2001, p. 13). The ethnic aspect may be derived from a long tradition or history of ethnic division in a region, however it can also be a modern invention and used as a justification to fight.
2. Religious. A religious conflict is according to Regan also difficult for a third party intervener to terminate. Religious conflicts are among these three causes the most uncommon, making up only 12 % of the conflicts (Regan, 2001, p. 13). After a civil war with ethnic causes, a civil war with religious grounds is the most difficult for a third party intervener to terminate (Regan, 2002, p. 68).
3. Ideological. When a civil war is fought over the contemporary political or economic direction, the civil war can be described as ideological. Such wars represent 35 % of civil wars in total and according to Regan civil war caused by ideological conflicts is the least difficult civil war to bring to an end (Regan, 2001, p.13).

5.3.5 Different types of intervention

1. Military. One type of intervention which is often used is a military intervention. It can be used to target the opponent side, to assist the favoured side and be used in neutral involvement. The procedure can appear very different from time to time, however, the main characteristic is that the military involvement ranges from naval attacks, to the sending of troops etc.
2. Economic. Another widely used method is economic intervention. It can also be used to either target the opponent or to assist the favoured side in a conflict. An economic intervention can take the form of, for example, economic sanctions, targeted loan and targeted aid.
3. Mixed. An intervention can naturally also be a mix of the previous mentioned types of interventions. It is not uncommon that economic intervention is used in the first stages of a more wide ranging intervention (Regan, 2002, p. 62).

5.3.6 Target of the intervention

1. Government. The target of the intervention or, in other words, the side which the intervener supports, can for example be the government. To support the government is usually considered to be the most successful side to target. The government has often a natural advantage by their control over the army, police force etc.
2. Rebels. The intervener can target the rebel side. Compared to the government the rebels have a disadvantage when it comes to the army and police. However, the strength of those committed to the rebel's cause is a huge advantage.
3. Neutral. The interveners can choose not to target any side in the civil war. Instead the interveners choose to act neutral in the conflict and by that act to terminate the war. However, previous research has showed that it takes comparatively long time and plenty of resources to terminate a war when intervening as neutral (Regan, 1996, p. 340-346).

5.4 International organizations

An international organization of any type is a group which regularly intervenes in civil wars. However, they do not intervene as often as compared to nation states. Examples of such international organisations are the NATO and the UN but there are also others that intervene.

Looking at the institutional constraints and the domestic pressure international organizations might face, several conclusions can be drawn. All kinds of international organizations consist of several member states and a great variety of ideas. One prejudice, true or false, is that with more states and ideas involved it takes some time before all parts can agree upon whether or not to intervene. Even if international organizations compared to single states do not directly have to face domestic opinion and pressure, it is necessary to reach some level of consensus between the members on how to deal with the situation. For the UN

this is very evident. To carry out an intervention there must be a consensus between all the five permanent members of the Security Council (www.un.org). This may lead to that international organizations intervene later in a war compared to single states. When in turn means that the civil war is already relative long lasting compared to others. This thinking is in line with Elbadawi and Sambanis which claim that there is a tendency that third-party interveners intervene in long wars.

However, when international organizations do intervene they are considered to be powerful, partly because that they have large resources, both financial and military since they consist of at least a few number of states. The resources can be taken from several single states, and put together the capabilities may probably exceed the party which they fight against. The power status or capability of international organizations can be described as strong in relation to single states' in general.

Nonetheless, an especially "rewarding" feature with an international organization as an intervener is usually considered to be the issue of legitimacy. This paper will not deal with the issue about whether it is considered to be politically correct to intervene in a state's own affairs or not. The topic of legitimacy might lead the reader to think so. However, the point made here about legitimacy is slightly different. When an international organization intervenes it does so with a relatively large number of different opinions and when a large number of states stand behind that intervention the pressure on the opposing party in the civil war will be strong. A large number of states intervening might not directly or not precisely correct give the intervention legitimacy but it does imply some level of it and the opposing part in the civil war faces a strong rival.

According to Regan it matters for the duration of a civil war on which side the intervention takes place. Do international organizations tend to intervene as a neutral part, on behalf of the government or the rebel? Governments are usually considered to have more advantages in a civil war compared to the rebels. They are usually in control over the police- and military-forces, they have the control of different financial institutions etc. This type of reasoning proclaims that for when an international organization intervenes on the behalf of the government, the chance to succeed is bigger compared to when the intervention takes place on the rebels' side. However, this aspect of it is complex. On the other hand, when international organizations intervene on behalf of the rebels this may be the most successful mix for rebels in general. It may also mean that when an international organization intervenes on behalf of the rebels it would imply that instead of terminating the war at once or end it earlier, it would prolong the duration of the war. However, the question in that case may perhaps not only be to terminate the war as soon as possible but also to terminate it as favourable as possible (1996, p. 345-346).

In Regan's *Third-party interventions and the duration of intrastate conflicts* a conclusion is drawn that biased interventions, regardless of which type of intervener, are more likely to end civil war earlier than compared to neutral interventions. So when the distinction between different biased interventions is not made it is more successful to intervene on behalf of some group and not as neutral (Regan, 2002, p. 71).

Since international organizations are considered to be both financially and military powerful, the type of intervention they use is not important when only considering the intervener. According to the findings in *Conditions of successful third-party intervention in intrastate conflicts* a mixed intervention, rather than a pure military or economic one, increases the probability of success (Regan, 1996, p. 345-346).

In the same study Regan concludes that an intervention in an ethnic caused civil war usually implies a longer duration of civil war compared to a civil war caused by religious or ideological reasons. Is it difficult to theoretically speculate about how much influence an international organization has on this variable. However, according to previous studies, an intervention with mixed strategies; an intervention in a civil war when the cause is either religious or ideological and when an intervention is biased, is the most successful types of its sorts. Would then international organizations as the intervener, turn out to be the most successful compared to single states; that is major or minor powers?

For an international organization the strategic value of the state in the civil war might not be of great importance. This characteristic, strategic value, implies to some extent a hidden agenda or self interest of the intervener. However, for international organizations the incentive to intervene should not be influenced by the strategic value. The main purpose of international organizations, which can be described as peace and security organizations, can not be described as taking into account the strategic value of the state when deciding whether or not to intervene. Other large international organizations with different main purposes, for example trade and environmental issues, are not able to conduct military interventions. However, such organizations are to some extent able to carry out economic policies which can have an effect on the capabilities of the warring parties.

The regime type present in the state in the civil war may influence the success of a third-party intervention. For an international organization it can sometimes be troublesome to engage in a civil war when the state in the civil war is a dictatorship. The conflict might be more difficult to solve when both the leader of the government and the leader of the rebels have very little to lose in a continued fight (www.humansecuritycentre.org).

Since international organizations often consist of a variety of states there are also several ethnic groups present. Compared to single states, it is therefore more difficult for international organizations to have strong ethnic attachment with a state or one group within the state. However, this depends on the organization.

An international organization can depend upon which type of organization has military ties. An example of the latter is NATO which is a peace and security alliance. However, as for any other type of attachment it is more difficult to have attachments for an international organisation because of its large number of memberstates.

5.5 Single states

Which characteristics of a single state can affect the duration of a war? Compared to an international organization a single state has a greater possibility to intervene faster in a civil war. The institutional constraints for a single state are not as evident as for international organizations. In this case the discussion of whether or not to intervene is limited to a smaller number of possible discussants.

Domestic pressure for a single state is different compared to an international organization. The leader in a single state has a difficult decision to make; to intervene or not. Questions concerning foreign policy are often of sensitive character for a leader. If the leader enjoys a high level of general support, the domestic pressure does not play an important role. However, as pointed out before, a leader might take the chance or risk to intervene because of possible success and thereby increase public support.

The power status or capabilities for a single state demand a further distinction. For a more correct study the division of single states into major and minor powers is necessary. A minor power has compared to an international organization fewer financial and military resources, however for a single state being a major power this is presumably not the case. The US can here serve as an example, where a single state being a major power is at least more powerful regarding financial and military resources than minor powers, and in some cases also more powerful than some international organizations. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between major and minor powers and to include that distinction in the discussion.

For a single state a possible relationship between itself and the state in the civil war plays supposedly a more important role than for an international organization. An ethnic attachment to the state in the civil war is especially a strong incentive for the other state to intervene. Even if several international organizations are driven by humanitarian beliefs and can consist of many member states with ethnic attachments, it can perhaps not be compared to the incentive that single states might have.

Throughout time states tend to commit themselves to be part of different constellations for a variety of reasons. To develop military connections with for example neighbouring countries is a common feature. When a state has such military connections to another state the incentive, which is almost "obligation", to intervene increases. However, not only the incentive to intervene increases, in addition to that the incentive to continue to fight and acceptance of the costs of a long war increases.

As for military and political ties, economic ties imply a greater incentive to intervene and continue to fight. Even though the main purpose of intervening is to terminate the war, trying to defend and preserve trade relations may be of great interest for a state.

Also for single states it is of importance which role the intervener plays. Do they tend to intervene on behalf of the government, rebels or as neutral? Which affect does that have on the duration of a civil war? When looking at whether or not the intervener was neutral or not, Regan finds out that neutral interventions were in general strongly connected with longer wars than compared to when interventions that were carried out on the behalf of the government or the rebels.

In addition to that, Regan discusses which kind of strategy third party uses, which tends to be the most successful and other hypothesis. The conclusions he draws are of importance for this thesis. His study shows that regardless of what kind of intervention; economic or military, it will significantly increase the expected civil war duration. However, a mixed strategy is the most “successful”, leading to the shortest increase in duration of civil war.

It is believed to be important how fast an intervention after the start of a civil war can be carried out. When a third-party can act and intervene relatively quickly the civil war can perhaps also be terminated quicker. This reasoning is considered to be the most valuable characteristic for a single state aiming to be successful. However, Regan’s study *Third-party interventions and the duration of intrastate conflicts* shows that this is only partly true. The question of timing is not that important for the termination of civil war. Instead, only when third-party intervenes relatively late on the behalf of the rebels, there is no significant increased duration. The other possible cases show that the impact is too small to make any difference (2002, p. 71).

6. Context for comparison

The questions presented earlier will be answered by using data on civil wars from 1945 to 1999. This data set was developed and used by Regan for his studies. He used it to analyze his hypotheses in a quantitative way and the intention stated in the beginning of this thesis was also to carry out a quantitative study. However, the data set could not be modelled in a way which could answer the intended questions and therefore a qualitative study proved to be the most appropriate method.

The data contains 153 cases of conflicts and it makes up 13 000 conflict months. 102 of those 153 conflicts are conflicts with third-party interventions. In these 102 conflicts with third-party interventions, there were around 1 400 individual third-party interventions.

Included for this thesis is the distinction between different types of intervener, the number of civil wars analysed are smaller and the method of doing so are instead qualitative. Six cases of civil wars where intervention took place are chosen to be studied. Together these six civil wars represent conflicts during a long time perspective, from the beginning of the Cold War until the modern day. During this period the world arena has altered tremendously; for example international organizations have grown both in number and in strength and the decolonization of a large part of Africa, Asia and South America. These changes can perhaps make a comparison between the different civil wars more difficult, however,

the time perspective might also be proved to be of importance when studying how different third-party interveners affect the duration.

These cases will be looked upon by first briefly describing the backgrounds to the conflicts. Secondly, the different characteristics described in the fifth chapter will be used to compare how they influence the durations in each individual case. Both questions will be answered when analyzing these six cases.

The six different cases of civil wars are;

1. Pakistan 1971.
2. Greece 1946-1949.
3. Yugoslavia 1998-1999.
4. Uganda 1981-1986.
5. Congo-Brazzaville 1997.
6. Oman 1970-1975.

6.1 Pakistan 1971

After the UK in year 1947 gave India and Pakistan self-government these states divided and became two independent states. The head of state of both states were still the monarch of the UK. However, Pakistan was not as prepared for self-government as India was. Pakistan, which formerly had a weak institutional tradition, faced difficulties with the new gained freedom and the state-building. Another issue which made the situation tense in the state was the issue of the Kashmir region. According to the Indian Independence Act of 1947, Kashmir could choose to join either India or Pakistan. However, when Kashmir favoured to join India, Pakistan was provoked and war broke out between them (www.fco.gov.uk/countryprofile/pakistan).

In January 1948 the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) was established. It was a result of resolution 39 (1948) adopted by the Security Council in order to mediate in the conflict. Three months later a second resolution, 47 (1948), was adopted by the Security Council giving UNCIP larger mandate on how to act in the conflict (www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmogip/docs).

During the war with India, one of the leading persons in Pakistan died. The so called “founding father” M Jinnah died in 1948 and his death increased the disorder in the state. The work with the state-building went slow, a new constitution after the independence was not yet finished. In year 1949, after international pressure, India and Pakistan agreed to stop the fighting over Kashmir. They both signed the Karachi Agreement which created a ceasefire line which should be controlled by the UNCIP. Two years later, in 1951, the

UNCIP mandate was ended by the resolution 91 (1951) and United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) took over the role to observe the ceasefire agreement. The new observer group had also mandate to investigate any possible complaints about that the ceasefire was not respected and pass such complaints on to the Secretary General. If violations against the ceasefire were made, the observers should do whatever they could to convince those who broke the ceasefire to respect it (www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmogip/docs).

In year 1956 the new constitution was finally finished. Pakistan was now a republic within the Commonwealth with a parliamentary system. However, two years later a military coup took place. With the coup, the newly established parliamentary system was abandoned and all political parties became prohibited. Instead the military increased their control over the society.

The military influence became even stronger after 1962 when General Ayub Khan became the new president. He declared that a new constitution was valid, which increased the power of the military.

In August 1965 a second war between India and Pakistan took place. Approximately 30 000 Pakistani soldiers crossed the Indian border in order to win a quick battle over the Kashmir Region. It is believed that the Pakistani leader believed that they were able to win because of India's defeat against China in 1962. They had right in the beginning, however, as the weeks of fighting passed it came clear that Pakistan was not able to win the war because India had enough capabilities to resist Pakistani attacks (www.fco.gov.uk/countryprofile/pakistan).

The UN had condemned the war from the start and urged both parties to terminate the fighting. This was expressed by the Security Council's resolution 29 (1965). One month after the war started both states agreed to a UN ceasefire. President Ayub Khan lost a large amount of personal prestige and the US no longer considered themselves being on friendly terms with Pakistan. Other, perhaps more important such as corruption and riots in East Pakistan, made the situation in Pakistan more troublesome. In 1969 President Ayub Khan was forced to leave his position and in 1970 elections were held in line with democratic principles. However, the result of the election resulted in new tensions. (www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-pak_1965).

In the aftermath of the election, in year 1971, civil war broke out between groups in East Pakistan and groups in West Pakistan. East Pakistan, which had a majority of the population, gained a majority of the votes in the election. However, the result was not acknowledged by the West Pakistan and the struggle for power started. This event also dragged India into the conflict which at the same time became the third war against Pakistan. From the outbreak, the Secretary General U Thant stood in close in connection to the both rulers of India and Pakistan. The Secretary General urged the parties to terminate the fighting and agree to a ceasefire. The Security Council gathered and on the 21st of December a resolution was adopted. The resolution was a condemnation of the war-situation. The Security

Council demanded an immediate ceasefire with a redraw of the forces with supervision by the UNMOGIP. The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions; Poland and the USSR (www.un.org/News/ossg/fy).

The civil war in Pakistan ended relatively soon. The eastern part, Bangladesh, was declared independent from Pakistan, but the war with India was more difficult to solve. An agreement on ceasefire was signed in 1972. The agreement also included a promise from both parties that any future conflict of interest should be solved peacefully (www.fco.gov.uk/countryprofile/pakistan).

The UN intervened as a neutral part in the civil war in Pakistan in year 1971 and they intervened with military forces to terminate the war. The UN had been present in the country by UNCIP since 1948 and by UNMOGIP since 1951. This region and recurring conflict were for the UN of vital interest. There was a pressure by many member states to finally settle a peace agreement.

When an international organization intervenes the question whether or not the state has strategic value is less important than compared to when single states intervene. An international organization like the UN ought not to favour one state's difficulties over another state's. According to some scholars like Frazier and Dixon, the regime type plays a role for a single state when it considers intervening. To intervene in a democracy is less frequent than intervening in a dictatorship (Frazier, Dixon and Ingersoll, 2001, p. 5). In this case the country was of little strategic value to the UN, as compared to what it might have had to single states.

Scholars like Collier and Hoeffler claim that a combination of a large population and low income per capita in a state in a civil war makes the conflict more difficult to solve (Collier, Elbadawi and Sambanis 2004, p. 263). Pakistan had a relatively large population and the economic situation for the larger part of the population was poor. These figures tell that the civil war should be relatively difficult to solve.

The intervener had a link to Pakistan, because of earlier involvement. The UN had been present in the country since 1948 and through its commitment to preserve peace it developed a sort of military and political tie with Pakistan. The link to a country is different when it is with an organization compared to with a single state. Important to point out is that UN was not the only party involved. Major Powers like the US and the USSR had both great interests in the outcome of the civil war. Nevertheless, the issue of terminating the war came to be treated by the Security Council.

The civil war in Pakistan was fought between two parties trying to gain power. The civil war was terminated shortly after it started, however, the result of was two independent

states; Bangladesh and Pakistan. The character of the conflict was more ideological than ethnic or religious, nevertheless, all three different types were to some extent significant.

6.2 Greece 1946-1949

The civil war in Greece between 1946 and 1949 was to a large extent a result of a previous fragile ceasefire. The first civil war in Greece (in the 20th century) took place between 1942 and 1944. It was followed by approximately one and a half year of pause from the fighting. However, in 1946 the second civil war began.

The first civil war was a fight between two parties. One side were a dominant group of conservative Greek civilians and the military forces of the Greek government. On the other side were Greek communists and members of the large anti-Nazi organization, ELAS. The first side was supported by the US and the UK and the other part was supported by the Tito communists in Yugoslavia and a somewhat strange moral support by the USSR (www.fco.gov.uk/countryprofiles/greece).

The reason of fighting during this period was to emerge as the leader of the Greek resistance.⁶ During 1944, sometimes referred as the second phase, the communist's side, now having military control of most of Greece, faced a new challenge when the previously exiled Greek government returned to the motherland. The government returning from exile in Cairo was set up by the Western Allies. In February 1945, with the support by the allies, an agreement about pressing political issues was reached. It included for example that all paramilitary groups were to be dissolved, that amnesty should be given for political offences and that a referendum about the monarchy was to be held. Even if there were no military confrontations during this period, the political parties left after the dissolvment of paramilitary groups became more and more extreme in their strategies.

The communists started to prepare for another military battle and because of the yes in the referendum about reinstalling the monarchy in September 1946, they were even keener on fighting. In March 1946 the civil war started when communists troops attacked with the assistance of guerilla soldiers. A year later the guerrilla type of warfare was abandoned for a conventional war (www.tagate.com/wars/page/greek_2.shtml)

The US and the UK had from the start been assisting the Greek conservative government with military training but mostly with financial assistance. However, in 1947 the British government announced that they no longer would be able to give financial support. The US government became the sole major Western supporter. The conservatives struck back and began to win more and more important battles. What came to determine the civil war was however not only the military battles. Equally so important was the political choice the

⁶ Greece was under German controll between 1941 and 1944 (www.fco.gov.uk/countryprofile/greece).

communists in Greece had to make. Stalin or Tito was the question and since the answer was Stalin, Tito and his allies redrew their support.

In October 1949 a ceasefire was announced and accepted by the conservatives. The Western allies saw the end of the civil war as their victory against the USSR, in the beginning of the Cold War. However, the USSR had actually never been an active supporter in this fight. The communists in Greece had relied upon Tito's assistance and not Stalin's. It is perhaps more correct to claim that Stalin was interested in finding out how far the West would go to fight the USSR (www.fco.gov.uk/countryprofiles/greece).

The US intervened on behalf of the Greek government in the civil war with large financial support and military training for their soldiers. The intervener, the US, was then a major power with a strong general power status. They had large capacity to intervene with any method chosen. The intervener did not have to face strong domestic pressure when intervening.

The state in the civil war, Greece, was conceived by the US as strategically important. It was in the early beginning of the Cold War and it was a suitable moment to demonstrate strength. Nevertheless, for the US and many other Western states it was of interest to prevent the spreading of the communist ideology. The civil war had led to hardships for the civilians. However, compared to other states in civil war it did not have a difficult level of large population and low income per capita. The size of the army fighting against the target of the intervention was much smaller, 30 000, than the army supported by the US, 90 000.

There is a link between the intervener and the state engaged in the civil war. The US had political ties to Greece. They had a strong interest in that the civil war should be terminated by a victory by the conservatives. A type of military tie also existed. Greece, having been occupied by Germany during the Second World War and liberated by the allies, had created a military engagement.

The character of the conflict can be classified as ideological. During the civil war between 1946-1949 the different parties fought over the power and which type of ideology that would organize the state.

6.3 Yugoslavia 1998-1999

After the end of the First World War, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was established under a Serbian King. In 1929 the name of the state was changed to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The union between the different regions started to become more disliked and the different regions gained some autonomy. During the Second World War the Kingdom fought against the invaders in paramilitary groups and faced a difficult time trying to

be united since they were occupied by Germany, Italy as well as Bulgaria (www.fco.gov.uk/countryprofile/serbia).

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia re-emerged as a new state after the end of the Second World War under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito. He had fought as a communist partisan during the Second World War and took now the lead in creating a socialist Yugoslavia. The different regions were divided into the republics of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. Even though the regions were now republics in a greater federation the leader Tito had strict control over them. Being part of the Communist block during the Cold War Tito still managed to conduct a fairly independent policy. In year 1968 the first larger demonstration for independence for the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo was carried out. In 1974 Kosovo gained some of what they were protesting for. Kosovo was declared as an autonomous province within Serbia (www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/kosovo80).

When Tito died in 1980 many issues and problems came to surface. The economy was in a terrible shape and the calls for autonomy grew stronger, for example in Kosovo. As the economy continued to decline the ethnic divisions continued to become more clear. One year after Tito's death, the province of Kosovo urged for be given the status of a republic. In 1989 Slobodan Milosevic became the president. One of his first actions was to restrict the autonomy of the Kosovo and Vojvodina provinces. As he was no Tito and domestic pressure grew stronger, the federation became very fragile. Reforms of the constitutions were discussed but during a conference between the different republics in January 1990 an agreement of such reforms were far away from reality. Eventually reforms continued to be discussed, however, in year 1991 Slovenia and Croatia announced their independence from the federation. Kosovo also tried to declare themselves independent but president Milosevic sent troops to the province and took away the power from the government of Kosovo. In 1992 Bosnia and Herzegovina also proclaimed their independence. President Milosevic did not accept that the republics wanted to depart from the federation. The hostilities grew strong and civil war broke out. President Milosevic justified his military attacks by declaring that he secured the interest of ethnic Serbs in Serbia and the other provinces. Because of these actions Yugoslavia was expelled from the UN (www.fco.gov.uk/countryprofile/serbia).

Ethnic cleansing took place on both sides, however, Milosevic and his Yugoslavian (mainly Serb) army committed a larger number of such crimes. Especially one event, the Srebrenica massacre in 1995, caused huge headlines. The fighting between Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia was terminated by the Dayton Peace Accords in the same year.

All the republics became independent states after the Dayton Peace Accord. One of the provinces in Serbia continued to call for independency. In 1996 a pro-independence rebel Kosovo liberation army (KLA) was started. Civil strives between the KLA and Serbian police took occasionally place.

In March 1998 the Security Council adopted resolution 1160 (1998) which stated that no member state should sell or make available any product which can be used as military merchandise. This in order to prevent further hostility in Serbia. A month later a referendum was held in Serbia, voting down the proposal of international negotiation. During the months of July and August the KLA took control over almost half of Kosovo. However, it did not take long time before President Milosevic responded and in September severe military attacks were carried out. The Security Council adopted a second resolution 1199 (1998) reminding the parties of resolution 1160 and demanded them to immediately terminate the fighting and to start peace talks. The hostilities continued to increase and in October the same year the Security Council adopted a third resolution 1203 (1998) in which they urged all parties to comply to the other resolutions (www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/kosovo80).

The weak or non-existing result from the resolutions drove NATO to act. In March 1999 they started bombing strategically important places in Serbia and Montenegro. The bombing campaign continued until June the same year. At the end of the bombing campaign both the UN and NATO placed personnel in the province of Kosovo. The UNMIK⁷ took an administrative control over Kosovo and NATO's KFOR⁸ control over the security issue in Kosovo. A year after, in 2000, President Milosevic lost the president election to Vojislav Kostunica. Milosevic did not accept the result but after massive domestic demonstrations and international pressure he admitted the defeat. Kostunica became the new president and the former president Milosevic was arrested for war crimes and was taken to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (www.fco.gov.uk/countryprofiles/serbia).

The UN intervened in the civil war in Yugoslavia in 1998. They intervened on the side of the rebels with financial instruments. Conflicts in this part of Balkan were not a novelty for the UN. However, this civil war had its own characteristics. An eventual strategic value of the state in civil war was of little interest for the UN. The question here is not if the UN should have chosen not to intervene. Instead, which parts in the actual intervention influenced the civil war's (continuing) duration. The domestic pressure was somewhat divided, there were calls for a final determination of war in the Balkans but also a kind of tired feeling of war, meaning that many did not care as much as before.

The UN had no strong ties with Yugoslavia as a single state might have had. Nevertheless, earlier involvement through UNPRFOR⁹, UNCRO¹⁰, UNTAES¹¹ and UNMOP¹² in the re-

⁷ United Nation Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp)

⁸ NATO's Kosovo Force (Ibid)

⁹ United Nation Protection Force (Ibid)

¹⁰ United Nation Confidence Restoration Operation (Ibid)

¹¹ United Nation Transnational Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (Ibid)

¹² United Nation Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (Ibid)

gion had created a political commitment aiming to finally settle conflicts in the region. The cause of the civil war was a mix of all three different possible causes. There was a fight over the political power, strengthened by ethnic and religious difficulties (www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp).

6.4 Uganda 1981-1986

After being a British colony, Uganda became independent in 1962. Ten years forward Uganda experienced democracy, however, as time passed, this democracy became weaker and weaker. The President during that period, Obote, was in 1971 expelled by his former second-commander in chief Amin. During his rulership approximately 300 000 Ugandans were killed, a majority of them belonging to the former president Obote's tribe, and the Asian-community of about 60 000 was thrown out of the country. The state of the country after several years of Amin's rule was indeed very bad. The economy depended upon massive loans from various allied Arab states and the political situation was also very tense (www.crisisgroup.org)

In the end of 1978 Uganda went to war against Tanzania. This of course resulted in an even more tense situation in the country. A year later Amin was overthrown by a group of Tanzanian soldiers and Ugandan rebels. Three presidents served before a referendum on the presidency and a new constitution was held. In year 1980 the former president Obote's party won the referendum and became Obote president again. However, one of the other candidates for the presidency, Museveni, claimed that the referendum was carried out in an inappropriate way and he began guerrilla warfare against Obote's government. Both sides carried out executions against each other's guerrilla and tribes.

In year 1985 Museveni and his troops carried out a coup which put an end to Obote's government. For a very short period General Okello ruled the state with a military council. However, Museveni later seized power in January 1986 and became the new president. Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) became with his presidency the only allowed party. The state turned from being in civil war to peace in a dictatorship. The system was described by the ruler himself as a "non-party system" but with a movement system. In 1986 peace reigned in most of the country except for some parts in northern Uganda close to the borders of neighbouring country Sudan. President Museveni tried to avoid any future clashes by involving persons from all the different groupings and tribes in the reestablishment of the government and institutions. Financial aid from several foreign states was given in order to help with the transformation of the economy. The numbers for how many have been killed from 1971 to 1986 are not totally reliable, but it is estimated that one million was killed by the war, that half a million became seriously wounded and that two millions became refugees (www.fco.gov.uk/countryprofiles/uganda).

The UK intervened in the civil war in Uganda in 1982. They intervened with military force on behalf of the government of president Obote. The UK was a major power and was considered to have a large power status with strong capabilities both, financially and mili-

tary. The UK, being a major power and the “leading” state in the Commonwealth, had more domestic pressure of intervening rather than avoiding it.

For the intervener Uganda was not seen as either economically or military strategic valuable. Uganda was at the time of the intervention a dictatorship, with a relatively large size of the military force. Much of the state budget had been spent on the military and the rebels fighting the government had also relatively large military resources. With a population deeply burdened by economical difficulties the increased military spending implied even more pressure on the poor population.

Another important variable to take into account is if the intervener has any link with the state with the civil war. In this case the UK had several different ties with Uganda. The state was a former British colony and they were both members of the Commonwealth. This means that even if Uganda was not of economical importance to the UK it had economic ties with the state because of the membership in the Commonwealth.

The civil war was a fight over power but also a fight between different ethnic groups. Perhaps the latter is the most accurate characteristic of the conflict. The different parties and movements fought over the power but they were lined up each ethnic group against the other.

6.5 Congo-Brazzaville 1997

The country was a French colony from the 1880s to 1960. The independency in year 1960 came after a referendum in 1958 favouring the dissolvment of the Middle Congo Province of French Equatorial Africa and the general decolonization strategy of France in 1960. During three years after the independence the country went through a difficult time of trying to establish democracy. The struggle for democracy ended in 1963 when a one-party system prevailed. The allowed party was the National Revolutionary Movement and Alphonse Massamba-Debat became president and Pascal Lissouba became prime minister. This government lasted five years until 1968 when a military coup took place. The coup was led by Captain Ngouabi and he continued to rule the state in a Marxist-Leninist way. A new party was founded, the Congolese Workers Party (PCT), and it became the only one allowed. Captain Ngouabi came to rule the country until 1977, when he was assassinated by the order of the former president Massamba-Debat. The former president was later executed because of his order.

The new president in 1977 was Colonel Yhombi-Opango. He in turn handed over the presidency after three years to PCT which chose Colonel Sassou-Nguesso as the next president. In the beginning of the presidency, Sassou-Nguesso's had a relatively trouble-free time. However, as time progressed the call for democracy grew stronger. In year 1990 the PCT shifted politics and abandoned the marxist-leninist way (www.fco.gov.uk/countryprofiles/congo).

In 1992 the president responded to the calls for democracy. He arranged a national conference which had the mission to create a new constitution based on democratic principles. The new constitution was voted upon in a referendum and was approved by a majority of the population. Later that year an election was held in order to choose president. The result of the election turned out in favour of a former prime minister; Pascal Lissouba (UPADS). The two other candidates were Bernard Kolelas (MDCCI) and the former president Sassou-Nguesso (PCT). This also led to a shift of power in the National Assembly and the Senate. The election proved to be the first democratic one but the result and the reactions to it led to fighting between the army supported by Sassou-Nguesso and militant rebels supported by Lissouba and Kolelas.

A ceasefire between the government and the opposition was established during 1994 and 1995. From the start of the fighting in 1992 approximately 2 000 were killed. However, the militia continued with occasional attacks. In 1997 new, even more violent, fighting broke out. Around the elections in July 1997 civil war broke out between the government and the opposition. The civil war cost thousands of lives, made a large amount of the population refugees and destroyed important infrastructure. With military assistance from Angola the opposition with Sassou-Nguesso as leader, took control over the capital city Brazzaville and an important port city, Pointe Noire. The former opposition leader Sassou-Nguesso declared himself new president and forced Lissouba and Kolelas to flee (UI, 2003, p.27-31).

The self-declared president Sassou-Nguesso chose not to hold the scheduled elections. Lissouba and Kolela could not continue their fight from abroad, but unsystematic attacks were sometimes carried out even after the termination of the civil war in 1997. It took more two years before the signing of an official peace agreement took place (www.fco.gov.uk/countryprofiles/congo).

Angola intervened in the civil war in 1997. They intervened on behalf of the opposition, with the leader Sassou-Nguesso, with military assistance. Angola was at that time a minor power and had, compared to major states, a low capability. There were no constitutional constraints at that time that could have prevented Angola from intervening. Angola was also in a troublesome situation, with short periods of democracy only to be followed by civil war. There was no real domestic pressure preventing the leader to order an intervention. Instead, the leader in Angola could act relatively free.

Angola considered Congo-Brazzaville to be strategic valuable. It was a neighbouring state and it had large potential for being a good trading partner. Congo-Brazzaville had for a long time been a dictatorship but with periods of efforts to establish democracy. The country was from the beginning very poor and the war led to excessive destruction of necessary infrastructure.

There were many different types of ties between the state in the civil war, Congo-Brazzaville, and the intervener, Angola. The opposition in Congo-Brazzaville was backed up politically by the leader in Angola. They did not share a strict identical ideological perception, however, they both supported a similar system. The political tie between them also resulted in military ties.

The civil war in Congo-Brazzaville was characterized by ideological issues. The different warring parties fought over the political power, however in order to achieve the goals they tried to use ethnic grouping by provoking people.

6.6 Oman 1970-1975

The Sa'id Dynasty was established in year 1749 and continues to this very day to rule the state of Oman. However, the dynasty faced difficulties in early times. In 1786 the monarchy became to some extent divided because of the change of capital cities. Before the change, Rostaq was the capital and afterwards, Muscat. The part of the population near the Rostaq did not support the change and started to elect their own imams. In Muscat the ruler took a nonreligious title; sultan. This came to divide the state into two parts, one strict religious with the former capital Rostaq as main city and one less religious with the capital city Muscat as the main city.

From the beginning of the 19th century and 50 years forward the UK had a large influence in the region. However, in the middle of the 19th century the economy deteriorated as a result of the decreased involvement from the British side. For the city of Muscat and the belonging region, it was especially bad since, it was the centre for the slave industry which was liquidated. The Muscat region was attacked by Rostaq but the British came to their rescue and the power balance could be re-established. Nevertheless, an official peace agreement was not signed until 1920 (www.fco.gov.uk/countryprofiles/oman).

At the beginning of 1930 the state became more and more isolated from the rest of the world. After the Second World War the UK had no more interest in the country. They left and in 1951 Oman was declared independent from the UK. In 1954 a new imam was elected and he tried to establish an independent state. This move was not accepted by the sultan, and it resulted in a civil war that continued until 1959, when the sultan seized control.

In 1970 the sultan Sa'id ibn Taimur was ousted by his son Qabous ibn Sa'id. With the son as a leader Oman took another direction. He modernized the community and opened up the country. Large sums were spent on, for example, an upgrading of the school system and the infrastructure. Nevertheless, at the same time of the ousting and modernization there were outbreaks of violence and military attacks in the southern province Dhofar. And as the son continued to improve the society and by that enlarging the involvement of the state in all regions, the rebels in Dhofar began to feel provoked. The first strategy was to invite the rebels to take part in the improvements but the rebels turned that down. After

the outbreak in November 1970 the civil war continued for several years. Jordan and other states, the UK and Iran, intervened with military force and in December 1975 the civil war ended (UI, 2003, p. 27-31).

After the end of the civil war, the development of the society continued but the sultan now faced difficulties in defending the lack of democracy. In the beginning of the 1980s the sultan established a council consisting of 45 advisers. Their task was to guide the sultan on important issues. However, the council was chosen by the sultan and therefore he continued to lead a dictatorship. Ten years later, in 1990, the sultan took the first steps towards a real democracy and he continues to do so today (www.fco.gov.uk/countryprofiles/oman).

Jordan intervened in the civil war in February 1972 on behalf of the government. The third-party intervened with military forces and financial support. Jordan was at the time of the intervention a minor power with relatively small fighting capabilities. The intervening state was a monarchy with an autocratic king. He faced few constitutional constraints and the domestic pressure of avoiding an intervention was weak.

Oman was for Jordan of relative strategic value. It was not a neighbouring country but there were other factors which were important for Jordan. Oman was at that time a very poorly developed country but on good way to improve the situation.

There were links between the intervening state and Oman, mainly political and military ties. They were both members of the Arab League and by that they shared a common agenda.

The civil war was fought over ideological issues; the struggle for political power. Religious difficulties were also involved but rather as an expression of the fight over the political power.

7. Comparison

These six different countries will here be analyzed by a comparison of the earlier discussion about characteristics of different third-party interveners and the variables which affect the duration of civil war.

When international organizations intervene, in this thesis in Yugoslavia and Pakistan, the UN faced no domestic pressure, as compared to when states intervene. Nevertheless, some sort of pressure existed and it came from the member states. With plenty of domestic pressure to intervene, the incentive is stronger and the intervention will be carried out more forcefully. This, in turn, will most likely influence the duration. When the UN intervened in Pakistan in 1971 there was a previous pressure from many member states that an intervention should take place and with a relatively forceful military intervention. The UN interven-

tion in Yugoslavia in 1998 was a result of pressure from member states, however the intervention was at a low level of intensity.

Since international organizations in general, and the UN in particular, contain a large number of memberstates, it takes some time before reaching a consensus about when and how to intervene. This type of constitutional constraint may lead to that international organizations tend to intervene when a civil war already has been going on for some period of time. Even though if Regan claims that the timing of an intervention has little influence on the duration it is still a significant aspect when differentiating between third party interveners and how they influence the duration. The intervention in Pakistan took place in the same month as the outbreak of the civil war in Pakistan, as well as in Yugoslavia.

The fighting capability for an international organization is considered to be strong. It has large resources, both financially and military, to be able to intervene forcefully, something that in turn calls for a fast termination of the civil war. When the UN intervened with military force in Pakistan it did so with relatively large amount of force. The UN intervention in Yugoslavia was less forceful, mostly only including financial sanctions.

Not only the fighting capabilities give international organization an advantage compared to single states. The issue of a “legitimate” intervention and strong political opposition is likely to influence the warring parties. Together, these issues put pressure on the opposing party in the civil war. Both Pakistan and Yugoslavia were minor powers and had troublesome international relationships. For Pakistan this especially meant that the UN was a strong opponent. In Yugoslavia the case was slightly different. The UN and its sanctions were not considered as legitimate by the Yugoslavian leader and therefore had little impact on how they acted.

Regardless of which type of intervener who acts it is important to take into account on which side the intervention takes place. In general it is claimed that an intervention on behalf of the rebel’s side imply a longer duration while an intervention on behalf of the government means a shorter duration. This can be explained by the natural advantage the government has. It possesses the control over the military and police forces. On the other hand, those fighting on the rebel’s side are often more dedicated and have more to win of a continued civil war. However, according to Regan a biased intervention is better in the sense that it will lead to a shorter duration a neutral intervention. On which side the intervention takes place is important, since together with the type of intervener this influences the duration. The intervention in Pakistan was carried out without taking any side in the conflict. In Yugoslavia the UN intervened on behalf of the rebels.

Another variable which together with different types of third party interveners affect the duration of civil war is the strategy. Consistent with the findings in Regan’s *Third Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflict* (2002, p. 71) the choice of strategy is important for the duration. The most successful intervention strategy, meaning the least increased duration, is a mixed strategy of both financial and military assistance (Regan, 2002, p. 71).

The most difficult civil war to terminate is when the conflict is ethnic. There after follows religious and ideological conflicts. The different third party interveners together with these theories enable us to draw conclusions about the duration. The civil war in Pakistan was fought over power issues, ideological matters. The civil war in Yugoslavia was however fought over a mix of causes, ideological, ethnic and religious matters.

An international organization should not to be guided by an eventual strategic value. It could to some extent have a hidden agenda, for example to increase a general influence in the region, but the main purpose for international organizations like the UN is not to strategically choose to intervene. This is due to the difficulty of having a shared opinion about strategic value when there are so many memberstates. However, it can be argued that without a strategic value the intervention can be carried out less forcefully compared to when having one. In both cases where the UN intervened they had no interest in strategic value, instead they were both guided by the goal to terminate the war as soon as possible.

Does it have any effect for international organizations what regime type the state in civil war has? This variable has probably effect when it is put together with others. Pakistan and Yugoslavia were both dictatorships at the time of their civil wars.

Having ties to the state in civil war can lead to that the intervener will act more powerful and have stronger incentive to fight for a shorter duration. However for international organizations it is more difficult to have any such ties. This because of the large number of memberstates all representing a great variety of different ideas, values and traditions. It is very difficult for an international organization to have both ethnic, political and military ties with individual states. Nevertheless, there were two kinds of ties between Pakistan and the UN. Political and military attachments had been developed. Yugoslavia and the UN had similar attachments as Pakistan had, political and military attachments which had been developed during earlier involvements.

For a single state the constitutional constraint is somewhat different compared to international organizations. The consensus for an intervention is reached by fewer parties involved. A single state should therefore logically be able to often intervene in a civil war faster than an international organization. The US intervened in Greece in April 1946, one month after the outbreak of the civil war. The UK intervened in Uganda in April in 1982, several months after the outbreak of civil war. The civil war in Congo-Brazzaville started in July 1997 and three months later Angola intervened. Jordan intervened in Oman in February 1972, two years after the outbreak of the civil war.

How to intervene and is often influenced by the domestic pressure the leader of the state faces. Without strong domestic pressure the leader can act as he or she chooses, with pressure the leader might chose to act more carefully. The US faced no domestic pressure of avoiding an intervention in Greece, instead it was a pressure to intervene in the first, as

they saw it, Cold War battle. The UK faced a domestic pressure of intervening mainly due to earlier engagement in Uganda. Angola faced low domestic support to intervene in Congo-Brazzaville, but they had on the other hand nothing that could prevent the leader from taking action. Jordan had the same prerequisite and could intervene in Oman without any large difficulties.

The fighting capabilities of single states are important for how successful the intervention will be. A major power might intervene at least as forcefully as an international organization or even more forcefully. A minor power does not have the same financial and military resources and have therefore a smaller chance of terminating a civil war fast. The UK, who intervened in Uganda, was a major power and had at the time of the intervention a strong fighting capability. Even though the power status of the UK had declined compared to pre-Second World War it was still one of the most powerful states. The intervener in Greece, the US, was also a major power and since the Second World War they were on the up rise. Angola, who intervened in Congo-Brazzaville, was a minor power with relatively weak capabilities to intervene both financially and military. Jordan was also at the time of its intervention in Oman a minor power.

It is easier for a single state to be guided by a possible strategic value and when the state with civil war has that the intervening party has an incentive to intervene more forcefully. Greece was of strategic importance to the US. It was considered by the US as the first “battle field” of the Cold War and for them it was valuable for them to make sure that the civil war was terminated and with the right side as the winner. The UK had before a strong interest in Uganda, but after the independence that interest declined. However, there was still a little interest left. Angola considered Congo-Brazzaville to be of strategic importance. It was a neighbouring state and a rising trading partner. Jordan considered Oman as of relative strategic importance.

It is more likely for a single state than for international organization to have some sort of attachment. An ethnic attachment means a strong incentive to get involved and to do so with plenty of resources in order to make the civil war duration short. Other ties, like military and political, also give the state, major or minor power, an incentive to intervene and how. In many cases such ties mean an obligation to intervene. US had political ties to Greece, they had developed after the Second World War. The UK had several ties to Uganda, however not very strong. It was a former colony and they were both members of the Commonwealth. Angola had both political and military ties with Congo-Brazzaville. Angola supported one of the parties in the civil war in Congo-Brazzaville, they shared the same political values and those led to a development of a military commitment. The political tie between Jordan and Oman was at that time developing. They were both members of the Arab League and to a large extent they shared the same political agenda.

Biased interventions have the same effect regardless of the third party being an international organization or a single state. In comparison to a neutral intervention, the duration is more likely to be shorter when the intervener acts on behalf of someone. The US supported the Greek government in the intervention. The UK also intervened on behalf of the

government when it intervened in Uganda. Angola intervened in the civil war in Congo-Brazzaville on the rebel's side, while the other minor power Jordan intervened in Oman on behalf of the government.

The type of strategy is important for the duration, however only together with another variable. The US intervened in Greece with financial assistance and the other major power UK, intervened in Uganda with military force. Angola intervened in Congo-Brazzaville with military assistance and the other minor power, Jordan, also intervened in Oman with a military strategy.

8. Conclusions

The interventions by the international organizations, major and minor powers were carried out in order to terminate the civil wars as fast as possible. However, as previous research has shown, an intervention by a third-party tends to prolong the duration of a conflict rather than end it sooner. Nevertheless, there are reasons for intervening and causes why parties tend to intervene and how forcefully. How, then, do the different third-party interveners influence the duration? Which of them leads to the smallest increase in duration?

The UN interventions in Pakistan and Yugoslavia had different strategies, the first was military and the latter financial. The UN intervened fast in both of these conflicts, the same month as the outbreaks. In Pakistan the UN intervened as a neutral party but in Yugoslavia they intervened on behalf of the rebels. The civil war in Pakistan was a result of the fight over political power while the civil war in Yugoslavia contained political causes as well as ethnic and religious.

When the civil wars broke out, the UN faced in both cases pressure from the memberstates to intervene. However, the strategy chosen for the intervention might reflect how strong the pressure really was. The UN intervened with military force in Pakistan but in Yugoslavia with an economic strategy. Regardless of which of the strategy that would be used the UN was conceived as an intervener with a large power status. The UN could deploy a large force for a military intervention and strict economic sanctions could be worked out.

The UN was present in Pakistan before the outbreak of the civil war in order to observe the peace agreement and to foster reconciliation between India and Pakistan. Through this engagement UN had already developed a sort of political tie to Pakistan. Because of the previous war in Yugoslavia the UN had during different periods stationed personnel through UNPRFOR, UNCRO, UNTAES and UNMOP in the region to observe that the Dayton Peace Accords were followed. Due to that commitment a political tie between the UN and Yugoslavia had been created.

The civil war in Pakistan ended in December 1971, four months after the outbreak and the intervention. The duration was relatively short, even compared to civil wars without external intervention. The short duration can be explained by several factors. The UN had pressure to intervene, they had previous engagement in the region, the cause of the civil war and that the strategy chosen was military.

In Yugoslavia the civil war ended in June 1999, 13 months after the outbreak and the intervention. The civil war had continued for more than a year before it was terminated. Compared to the civil war in Pakistan, the duration was much longer. The reasons behind the duration in this case can be explained by the divided domestic pressure, earlier involvement, the difficulty of solving a civil war caused by a mix of reasons and the economic strategy.

The interventions carried out by the major powers, the UK and the US, were of different kinds. The UK chose a military strategy while the US intervened with economic support. The UK intervened in Uganda five months after the outbreak while the US intervened the same month as the civil war started. The interventions by the major powers were both directed to support the governments' sides. The civil war in Greece was a fight over ideological issues and the civil war in Uganda was caused by ideological and ethnic issues.

The domestic pressure for an intervention was strong in both the UK and the US but for different kinds of reasons. The UK had pressure to intervene because of earlier involvement in the state, a former British colony. The US had instead pressure to intervene since the civil war in Greece could also be seen as the first battle between the West and the East in the Cold War. The UK chose to intervene with military force while the US chose to try to terminate the war with financial support. Since they were both major powers they had a large power status. The UK was by tradition conceived as a strong financial and military power, however, by the 1980s the military power had to some extent declined. The Second World War had been costly for the US in many aspects, nevertheless the US grew as a major power.

Uganda was a former British colony which almost automatically implied a commitment to the development of the state. After the independence, Uganda continued after the independence to be a member of the Commonwealth, making both states committed to the same agenda on some issues. Due to these engagements the UK and Uganda had political ties to each other. A political tie between the US and Greece developed during and after the Second World War.

The civil war in Uganda was terminated in January 1986, 51 months after the start of the war and 46 months after the military intervention. This war continued for quite a long period of time. It was apparently a difficult war to terminate due to, for example, the ethnic and ideological causes of the war and the harsh economic situation in the state. This despite the fact that the intervener, a major power had ties to the state and chose a military strategy.

The Greek civil war was ended in October 1949, 42 months after the outbreak and intervention. It was also a relatively long war with different stages of intensity. The reason for the outbreak was the question of power and which ideology that should reign. The intervener had a political tie to Greece and as a result of the Cold War that tie was strengthened. The economic support was extensive but could be seen as weak compared to a pure military intervention.

The intervention by the minor power in Congo-Brazzaville was of a military type. In Oman the third-party intervened with both financial support and military force. Angola intervened in Congo-Brazzaville in October 1997, four months after the outbreak. The civil war in Oman started in the beginning of 1970 and the intervention took place in February 1972, approximately 24 months after the outbreak. Angola supported the opposition in the civil war and therefore intervened on behalf of the rebels while Jordan supported the government and intervened on their side. Both civil wars were caused by ideological struggles but in Congo-Brazzaville the political cause was also followed by ethnic difficulties.

For Angola as well as Jordan the domestic pressure for an intervention did not exist, on the other hand there were no direct opposition for such actions either. Angola intervened forcefully with military support and Jordan also chose to intervene with military force. Both these states were minor powers and are therefore in general not considered to have strong power status. Jordan had small resources, both financially and military, for an intervention. Angola was also a state with little capacity. Their economic situation was not good but large sums were used to the army.

Angola was a neighbouring state to Congo-Brazzaville and had mutual political and economic interests. The states shared the same ideological opinion and had begun to develop trade patterns. Therefore, Angola can be seen as having ties to and strategically interest in the state in civil war. Jordan had weaker attachments to Oman compared to those Angola had with Congo-Brazzaville. Jordan and Oman had political ties through, for example, their membership in the Arab League.

The civil war in Congo-Brazzaville was over in December 1997, six months after the start and three months after the intervention. It was a short war, however, it was not the first civil war in the region and they had also relative short durations. Other factors which influenced the duration were that Angola intervened with military force, the intervener had ties and strategic interest.

In Oman the civil war ended in December 1975. That was around 52 months after the start of the war and 36 months after the military intervention. This meant that the civil war had been going on for little more than five years before it was terminated. It was difficult for Jordan to succeed in the intervention because Jordan was a minor power with little capabil-

ity of intervening forcefully and it was difficult to carry out a military intervention in a state that was geographically far away.

The civil wars where the interventions were carried out by the major powers had a similar duration. Both interventions were military and supported the government. These two aspects would call for a relatively short duration, however, there are reasons to why the civil wars continued as long as they did. The harsh economic situation and the ethnic cause of the civil war in Uganda made it more difficult to terminate this war. The civil war in Greece continued longer than “expected”. The intervener supported the government, however the strategy chosen was financial and it was considered to be the first battle in the Cold War.

In the civil wars where minor powers intervened the duration differed. The civil war in Congo-Brazzaville had a much shorter duration than in Oman. That can be explained by the fact that the intervening party in Oman, Jordan, was even for a minor power a state with a little fighting capability. Related to the little fighting capability is the geographic aspect of the intervention. With already a small military force it was difficult to carry out a forceful intervention in a state far away. Jordan also intervened on behalf of the rebels while Uganda intervened on behalf of the government in Congo-Brazzaville.

The civil wars in Pakistan and Yugoslavia where international organisations intervened had both a relatively short duration. The interventions were of different types, in Pakistan as neutral and with military force, while in Yugoslavia with economic sanctions and on behalf of the rebels. The civil war in Pakistan did not continue for long, mainly because that the intervening part was already present in the region and that it used a military strategy. The civil war in Yugoslavia was a more complex and difficult war than the civil war in Pakistan. The economic sanctions carried out by the UN did not have enough impact to terminate the war, instead other interventions carried out by NATO led to the end of the civil war.

Looking at the different types of interveners and the civil wars which they intervened in it is possible to see that where major powers intervened and in one of the civil wars where a minor power intervened had the longest duration with a range between 42 months and 52 months. Shortest duration had the civil wars where international organisations and in one case where a minor power intervened. However, by looking more closely at those cases it is easy to see the reasons behind the long durations. In Uganda, where the UK intervened, the civil war was caused by ethnic difficulties. In Greece, where the US intervened, the strategy chosen was economic and it occurred during the beginning of the Cold War. In Oman, where Jordan intervened, it was difficult for the intervener to carry out an intervention because of the weak power status.

Those civil wars with shortest duration had interventions carried out in two cases by international organisation and in one case by a minor power. The shortest duration was only four months and the longest 13 months. Important reasons behind those short durations differ from war to war. In the civil war in Pakistan an important reason behind the fast

termination concern earlier engagement and already stationed personnel in the region. The Yugoslavian civil war was terminated relatively quickly but not as a result of that intervention. The short duration in the civil war in Congo-Brazzaville was much influenced by that the intervener was a neighbouring state. Thereby making it more easy to be successful.

What seems to matter the most is how forceful the intervention is. That can for example have to do with the characteristic of the intervener, which side the intervener supports or which strategy it chooses. For some of the interveners it is easier to carry out a forceful intervention. International organizations and major powers have strong fighting capabilities and together with an effective intervention strategy they, seem to be able to influence a shorter duration, than compared to minor powers.

9. Discussion

As I find these issues about conflict prevention and peace management very important, I find it very surprising that so little research has been made about third party interventions and their influence on war duration. I believe that it should interest so many more parties to have a better knowledge when carrying out interventions. However, that is perhaps a re-occurring dilemma; the researcher wants more interest in his or her work.

All the same, the findings are interesting and useful. To terminate a civil war as fast as possible a third party intervention it should be carried out forcefully by an international organization or a major power and on behalf of some of the warring parties, preferable the government.

Other interesting aspects turned up besides the conclusions drawn. The conclusions led me to think about what could follow after the termination. Even if the intervener was successful with the termination, was it a long term termination? This is naturally of vital interest since the aim of intervention was to stop the fighting. However, there are many explanations to why a state previously in civil war tends to turn up in civil war again. The post-war economy, instable political situation, destroyed infrastructure, refugees etc are strong reasons for a reoccurring civil war.

To continue on that line of thinking brings me to next questions? How much involvement of the third party intervener was there after the end of the war? Did they contribute to the restoration and reconstruction of the state? Is there a correlation between how much involvement there is by the third party intervener and how long peace reign? These questions seem to be the next important step to take in order to work as successful as possible for conflict prevention and peace management. I suppose, at least hopes, that these issues are already researched and that policies are worked out in order to make war as rare as possible.

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