What are feminists fussing about?

Feminists attempts for full Citizenship

Bachelor thesis within Political Science

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Abstract

Is citizenship gendered? The answer to this question for most feminist theorists has to be a resounding ‘yes’. For them citizenship has always been gendered in the sense that women and men have stood in different relationship to it, to the disadvantage of women. In recent years citizenship has been combined to gender by a number of feminists. Their work is all about the importance to reconstruct citizenship because they believe it fails to engage or to include women. This thesis examines the limitations of citizenship as it is in its current construction. The discussion clearly indicates the need to use gender and difference as categories of analysis in the creation of an inclusive conception of citizenship. The thesis will focus on the theoretical project and particularly on three debates around the ‘engendering of citizenship’. Discourse analysis is used as textual analysis in order to compare these three alternative models to citizenship. The aim is to investigate what solutions they find to include women into public life. One can appreciate that citizenship is a complex problem and so are the debates concerning it. It is important that feminists discuss this question carefully so that citizenship does not loose its meaning.
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Bibliography
1. Introduction

1.1 Background

Historically and traditionally theories of citizenship have been grounded in a subject that focuses on a white, able, male body. Feminists believe that the conception of citizenship we have used has offered very little to women and also to people with disabilities. While liberal citizenship highlights individualism and rights, civic-republicanism stress obligations, participation and community. These traditions of citizenship have offered a dichotomy of rights versus participation with space only for the male citizen. In response, feminist theories have presented a variety of alternative models of citizenship where they cope with themes such as private versus public, inclusion versus exclusion etc. The fact that citizenship is not an inclusive conception is of immediate interest. This is proved by number of books, articles and debates about citizenship and women. Earlier research in this subject is made by Seyla Benhabib who is one of the pioneers in feminist political theorizing. Two other feminists are Ruth Lister and Rian Voet who both have published a range of books and articles concerning women and citizenship. Some of their work will be used as supplementary texts in this thesis. The main focus in this thesis will be on three feminists, Carol Pateman, Iris Marion Young and Chantal Mouffe. Pateman’s and Young’s contributions have had and still have strong influence on feminist theorizing today.

1.2 Purpose

Citizenship is a problematic concept, a number of feminists believe citizenship fails to accommodate women and therefore needs to be reconstructed. They call it the ‘engendering of citizenship’. They argue that the concept of citizenship that we use today is highly problematic because it excludes certain groups in society such as women, the gay, lesbian and different kinds of religious minorities etc. This thesis will focus on three different theories presented by Pateman, Young and Mouffe. They all have different approaches to citizenship and they each present an alternative model which can be a possible solution to include participation for all groups within society, with focus on women. The questions that will be analyzed are:

- Where do these feminist see the problems of citizenship?
- What solutions do these feminists have for women to reach full citizenship?

To analyze this question, their approaches to citizenship will be investigated. To understand why these feminists believe that a reconstruction of citizenship is necessary, one has to look at the problems they believe cause the exclusion of women. Generally, they relate solutions to different dimensions which are connected with issues such as male/female, public/private, inclusion/exclusion, universal/pluralistic, common/differentiated, identities/lack of identities, recognition/lack of recognition, old norms/modern norms etc. The problem of citizenship for these feminists also lies either in the relationship between the individual and the state or between individuals themselves. To simplify, the relationship between the state and the individual will be referred to the vertical relationship while the relationship between individual themselves will be referred to the horizontal relationship. These different dimensions and the horizontal/vertical relationship of citizenship will be analyzed because it allows us to easier understand what kind of alternative models of citizenship they consider is needed for it to be an all inclusive concept. So, the primary aim with this thesis is to investigate where these feminists believe the problem of citizenship lies. Weather they believe it lays in the horizontal or the vertical relationship. The
secondary aim is to analyze what kind of solutions they have to include woman into public life. It is interesting to analyze this aspect because it is not common in other already published material.

1.3 Method and Material

This thesis will use a method of discourse analysis as described by Bergström. The term discourse has different meanings, in a broader sense it refers to systematic studies of discourses. In a narrower sense it refers to samples of a spoken dialogue, in contrast with written texts. But this definition is used in linguistic contexts, thus is not well-situated in this thesis. The broader sense of discourse analysis is explained by Norman Fairclough who calls it ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ and he sees it as a social practice. According to Fairclough ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ is the way to study texts which views language as a form of social practice and attempts to investigate underpinnings of discourse that have become so neutralized over time that we have started treat them as common and acceptable. Discourse is socially framed, it constitute situations, objects, knowledge and the social identities between people and groups of people. (Bergström 2000: 224).

Discourse analysis is suitable for this thesis as it allows focusing on the content of the text. It is also commonly used when analyzing problems that have to do with different identities, such as gender. It also handles questions about power by studying different kinds of orders, hegemony or gender power. Studies of identity constructions often integrate questions such as: Why are certain groups marginalized? This alignment is used when one investigates texts of social problems and how they can be solved. Discourse analysis can also be used to study debates and their discursive conditions. The alignment can be used to see common interests or oppositions. (Bergström 2000: 265-266).

In order to perform a discourse analysis on texts one first point out the problem, then what causes the problem and present possible solutions of those problems. Negative with discourse analysis is that it cannot explain phenomenon in terms of cause and consequence. (Bergström 2000: 240).

The major difference between discourse analysis and idea/ideological analysis is that discourse analysis has a wider start point. If idea analysis wants to analyze certain kinds of ideologies, discourse analysis is rather a search for the ‘view on’, ‘approach to’ or the ‘image of’ certain problems within political life. Discourse analysis is also more suitable for analyzing problems that have to do with different identities. (Bergström 2000: 237).

I will present some models in this thesis that will illustrate citizenship and its relation between individuals and the state and between individuals themselves. Other models have been constructed to highlight and compare the views of Pateman, Young and Mouffe on the problem of citizenship. The models will help to understand the logic of the thesis.

1.4 Disposition of the thesis

The second chapter is called Citizenship: A contested concept. It will start by explaining gendered citizenship from an historical point of view. Followed by a part that combines civil-society to citizenship, which is necessarily to understand the horizontal and vertical relationship of citizenship. An overview of T.H. Marshall’s post-war conception of citizenship will also be presented. Finally, this chapter will draw attention to some of citizenship’s different meanings. The main material that will be
used in this chapter is *Class, Citizenship and Social Development* (1964) by Marshall. To combine citizenship and civil-society a book called *Citizenship and civil society: A framework of rights and obligations in liberal, traditional and social democratic regimes* (1998) by Janoski will be used.

The third chapter is called *Citizenship: A gendered character*. First, this chapter will give a brief history of feminism before the ‘engendering of citizenship’ will be analyzed. This part will cover the relationship between citizenship and gender, the separation between the public and private sphere and the different dimensions concerning identity issues. The major aim in this chapter is to explain why feminists comprehend the concept of citizenship that we experience today as a problem. The main material that will be used in this chapter is a book called *Feminism and Citizenship* (1998) by Voet and *Feminism, Citizenship and the Media* (2000) by Camauër.

The three following chapters will present Pateman’s, Young’s and Mouffe’s alternative models of citizenship and what solutions they find to make it inclusive for women. To make it easy to follow the discourse analysis, the subheadings for each theorist will be named; *the problem of citizenship, the cause of the problem and solutions to the problem*. The main materials that will be used in these chapters are three books, Pateman’s *The Disorder of women* (1989), Young’s *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (1990) and Mouffe’s *The Return of the Politics* (2005). Supplementary texts will be used where it is necessarily.

Chapter seven will be about criticism. This chapter will emphasize why Mouffe finds Young’s and Pateman’s solutions insufficient. So far neither Pateman nor Young have published any material where they responded to Mouffe’s critique. However, it must be clear that the debate do not stop with Mouffe’s arguments. Susan Hekman has published an article where she criticizes Mouffe’s arguments for being unsuccessful and complex. It is well-situated to mention some of this critique to better comprehend Mouffe’s arguments.

After each chapter, there will be a short summary with important points from each chapter. These summaries will connect each chapter which in turn makes the thesis easier to follow.

The conclusion of the thesis will sum up the most interesting aspects in this debate. This chapter will also sum up what has been concluded about Pateman, Young and Mouffe’s approaches to citizenship. In the analysis there will be some personal opinions on this matter. I will also mention some thoughts of how I comprehend women’s position in our society today. The bibliography is attached at the end.
2. Citizenship: A contested concept

Citizenship is a complex concept; there is nothing that could be described as a theory of citizenship which makes it even harder to define it. The term has and has had different meanings in various historical periods, traditions, ideologies, theories and languages. In recent years a lot has been written about citizenship and its connection to women, gender and feminism. As a result, a range of different perspectives have emerged. It is not possible to define citizenship at a universal and abstract level. In the broader theoretical discourse on citizenship we distinguish both meanings and dimensions of citizenship as belongingness, recognition and identity. (Hellsten 2006: 37). Next chapter outlines a framework that combines these different themes which have served to exclude women and minority groups from full citizenship. This chapter will focus on the different meanings of citizenship from the liberal point of view that constitute the theoretical starting point of this thesis. It will cover themes of citizenship and civil society and citizenship as involving rights, obligations, participation and responsibilities.

2.1 Gendered citizenship: A historical approach

Historically, citizenship is a term that has been created by men and in the beginning only included men. Many states limited citizenship to only a proportion of their nationals. This created a citizen class with political rights superior to other classes but within the class they were still equal with each other, as can be seen in ancient Athens where citizenship has its origin. In Athens citizenship referred to participation in a direct democracy. Only male Athenian citizens who had completed military service and were at least twenty years old were given granted citizenship. Therefore, a whole majority were excluded from society, among these women, slaves and resident foreigners. One reason why women were excluded was that they were said to be unable to carry out one of the major duties of citizenship, to fight for their city. Aristotle was already under the antique a respected authority; therefore his philosophy remained influential a couple of centuries after the Middle Ages. Aristotle linked citizenship to participation in the public arena; particularly he articulated an understanding of citizenship in relation to involvement in politics. He argued that acts of citizenship required rationality which marks the creation of the first dichotomies surrounding citizenship. The capability of rational thinking was highly ineffective among women as they were only created in order to serve the man. Instead he associated rationality with men and that was valued over emotion and passion, associated with women. Political activities existed in public spaces and were ascribed to men only. Women and slaves were to engage in activity in the private familial realm, granting men the flexibility to take part in political activity, relieved of all other burdens. Thus, formal citizenship was lived in exclusive, homogenized spaces by white bourgeois men, and relationships between public and private were mediated by class, race, and gender.

Another classical example apart from Athens can be found in Rome. It is difficult to give generalities about citizenship over the whole Roman period. However, the fact that citizenship status was given to certain individuals with respect to laws, property and governance are few similarities. When it comes to women, their status in Rome society varied tremendously over this time. Women with roman citizenship enjoyed many rights accorded to men but with limitations. They were subjects to complete power of their paterfamilias. Later Rousseau showed a classical example of the woman status in his work Émile, namely that the woman is inferior to the man. (Almgren 1996: 345- 348).
2.2 Relationship between citizenship, civil society and state

Citizenship concerns the relationship between the state and the citizen, especially in regard to rights and obligations. This relationship is outlined in theories on of civil society. By using Habermas’s view of the public sphere and Cohen and Arato’s reconstruction of civil society, society can be divided into four spheres that may interact in distinctive ways. The four spheres are the private, the public, the market and the state sphere. Like citizenship, civil society has not been adequately accounted for in the social sciences. Social scientists provide following definition of civil society:

‘Civil society represents a sphere of dynamic and responsive public discourse between the state, the public sphere consisting of voluntary organizations, and the market sphere concerning private firms and unions’ (Janoski 1998: 12).

This conception of civil society can be applied to those countries that have private organizations between the state and the family. Similar, to Habermas’s approach, this divides society into four spheres; the state sphere, the private sphere, the market sphere and the public sphere. There are overlaps among these four spheres, in contrast to Habermas’ view who think of them as being separated. The state sphere involves law-making, law-implementing and law and constitution organizations. The private sphere consists of family life, network of friends and disposition of personal property.

The existence of the private sphere relies on the right to privacy. However, in modern times the state, the market and the public sphere have invaded the private sphere. This phenomenon is what Habermas’s refers to ‘colonization of the life world’. Social movements and debates in the public directly affect families and individual citizens. The market sphere consists of private and public organizations that operate in goods and service industry in order to provide income and wealth. It also includes stock markets, employment federations, consumer groups and trade unions etc. The public sphere is a difficult one to classify since it involves a wide range of organizations. There are at least five kinds of voluntary groups in the public sphere. First, political parties that are related to the state sphere, but their activity are rooted in public discourse. Second, interest groups that operate in similar way as parties but their main aim is to influence society and legislation that are connected to their groups’ position in society. Third, welfare associations that provides funds to aid public welfare and self-help groups. Fourth, social movements that are less organized than other groups. They use information techniques like demonstrations, boycotts and protests.

The public sphere also consists of some private organizations. These organizations enter the public sphere voluntarily in order to influence, raise public opinion and to gain legitimacy, approval. Examples are organizations that handle questions of gender and racial equality. They enter the public sphere voluntarily addressing harassment and discrimination claims. The media as private organizations or public agencies is also overwhelmingly present in the public sphere. The boundary between the private and public sphere is always a contentious issue.

So, groups differ in their willingness to protect democracy and this is related to the public and private of the various spheres. Both the public and private are distributed among the four spheres. Market organizations are largely based on private property and parts of the state are private such as the secret police, military, voluntary associations and churches. The overlaps between the four spheres are important because they help to produce important aspects of a developing theory of civil society. The
extent and size of each sphere gives a framework for comparing civil societies in pluralist, traditional and corporatist countries. In turn, this framework assesses what difference these spheres makes for rights and obligations and the participation of citizens in their polity.

This leads us to an important point, differentiating citizenship rights and claims. Citizenship refers to state-enforced rights and obligations while civil society focuses on groups in concert or opposition so they are quite different. However, they are empirically contingent. Civil society creates the groups and pressures for political choice and state legislation and many ideas of citizenship have its roots in civil society rather than in the state. As a consequence, strong civil societies produce particular institutional structures that bolster citizenship, and civil society constructs much of the citizen-society discourse in terms of rights and obligations. However, civil society theory is not a theory of citizenship even though theories of civil society are similar to those of citizenship on a number of issues. Civil society consists of the public sphere of associations and organizations engaged in debate and discussion. It is not the state sphere and cannot be the home of citizenship rights. The state may act as an advocate for some citizenship claims such as disability, gender and racial. However, most claims for and defenses of citizenship are made in civil society through the motivating interests of class and status based groups. So, civil society provides many of the independent variables that explain citizenship.

By linking citizenship to membership of a community rather than to the state, as liberal definition of citizenship do. Marshall’s definition enable us to discuss citizenship as a construction that applies to people’s membership in a variety of collectivises, local, ethnic, national and transnational. It also enables us to discuss the question of the relationship between ‘the community’ and the state and how this affects people’s citizenship. Studying citizenship from this point of view can highlight some of the major issues which are involved in the relationship between individuals themselves and between the individual and the state. It is also useful when studying the ways gender relations affect and are affected by them. (Janoski 1998: 12-17).

2.3 The liberal theory of Citizenship

Theoretically, normatively and at every level from its very meaning to its political application citizenship is a contested concept. In this classical exposition, citizenship is a very valuable political tool and also the main focus of contestation of feminist and critical citizenship theory. According to the liberal perspective, citizenship should be universal and equal, it should encompass all adults within the territory of a state and it should be equal in the sense that it guarantees equal civil, political and social rights in return for equal duties. In order for individuals to exercise their rights and to develop their personalities they should have as much liberty as possible. Therefore, individuals should have as little interference as possible from the state and from their co-citizens. (Lister: 2003)

Contemporary theories of liberal citizenship often begin with an analysis of T. H. Marshall’s post-war conception of citizenship which focuses on a number of citizenship rights. For Marshall, citizenship is about ensuring that everyone is treated as a full and equal member of society. Marshall divide citizenship into three elements along the lines of civil, political and social, and is concerned with notions of liberty and equality, achievable through civil and political rights which grant full and equal membership. (Marshall 1964: 85-87). According to Marshall, citizenship is defined as:
‘A status bestowed to those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed. There is no universal principle that determines what those rights and duties shall be, but societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizen against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed.’ (Marshall 1964: 87).

Key elements here are membership of a community, the rights and obligations which follows from that membership and equality. We are talking about a set of legal rules governing the relationship between the individuals and the state in which they live. We are also talking about a set of social relationships between individuals and the state and between individual citizens. (Marshall 1964: 87).

2.4 The meanings of citizenship

The contested nature of citizenship lies partly in the roots of the political traditions of liberalism and civic-republicanism. The former discuss citizenship as a status involving primarily rights accorded by state to individuals. The latter discuss citizenship as a practice involving responsibilities to the wider society. Under classic liberalism, rights were concentrated to the civil and political spheres. Under the twentieth century we have seen their extension to the social sphere. More recently we see their embrace of new categories such as reproductive and cultural rights, demanded by social movements. What is then meant by the term ‘citizenship’ in a general sense? The key elements of citizenship are membership of a community where all members share the same rights and obligations. It includes three major areas, individual rights, political rights and socioeconomic rights. Citizenship is used both when we talk about the relationships between a state and an individual citizen and the political relationships between citizens themselves. (Lister 1993: 3). Lister suggests that citizenship is:

"membership of a community and the relationship between individuals and the state and between individual citizens within that community." (Lister 1993: 3).

It does not only just refer to rights; it also refers to the responsibilities, duties, actions, virtues and opinions that follow from the above mentioned relationships. (Voet 1998: 1). Voet suggests that liberal theories of citizenship:

"...tells us that equal and full citizenship for all adults born within the territory of the state already exists. It tells us that with the disappearance of feudalism and slavery, and the inclusion of all adults in suffrage, political inequality has also been eliminated. After all, as far as public life is concerned, all members of western societies have an equal status and possess equal rights”. (Voet 1998: 1).

However, Voet is critical of liberal theories of citizenship because while citizenship may be universal in theory, it has not been universal in practice. This is especially true for women and members of minority groups throughout history who have been 'created' as marginalized members of a nation governed by a state and prevented from full membership in communities. (Voet 1998: 9-11).

At present, citizenship has two dimensions - rights and duties. Rights are however more connected with the male and duties are connected with the female. This can be illustrated by the model below. The model also shows the fact that citizenship is universal and equal in theory but not in practice. The model
also shows that men as well have certain duties and women have some rights. However, it is not so outspoken.

![Diagram of State 'de jure', 'de facto' Community, Public/Rights, Private/Duties, Male, Female with strong and weak linkage]

2.4.1 Citizenship rights

Marshall’s tripartite formulation of the civil, political and social is usually taken as a starting point for any discussion of citizenship rights. There are two major elements for social rights. First, they help to promote the effective exercise of civil and political rights by groups who are disadvantaged in terms of power and resources. Second, they are essential to the promotion of individual autonomy. According to Doyal and Gough’s theory of human needs, these two elements must be satisfied to some degree before actors can effectively participate in their form of life to achieve any other valued goals. Moreover, they maintain that their theory of human needs gives a justification not only for civil and political rights but also for social rights of citizenship as critical to autonomy. They have recognized that autonomy cannot be discussed in purely individualistic terms, since it also has a social dimension. This issue of autonomy has been important for many women in the light of the economic dependency which has undermined their citizenship for years. Women have struggled to achieve equal rights with men in the civil, political and social spheres as crucial to their achievement of full citizenship.

There have been two essential feminist challenges to a right-based citizenship. The first one is about political participation and the second is about introducing care as a citizenship responsibility. According to the present model of citizenship unpaid work as care is not a job with public value, nor does it give
the same access to social rights. It is regarded as a job with no contribution to the public life. As a result, some feminist have argued for a citizenship based on duties.

Other feminists have been skeptical to this traditional formulation of citizenship rights and their struggle has been about extend those formulations to embrace new categories required for social movements. Marshall extended the liberal conception of civic and political rights to accommodate also the social rights. He also attempted to embrace reproductive rights which have been demanded by social movements. According to Marshall, citizenship needs a liberal democratic welfare state so that civil, political and social rights can be given to all. Social rights for Marshall range from:

‘the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society’ (Marshall 1963:74).

It was important for Marshall that all members of a society feel like full members and are able to participate in public life. If any of these rights should be violated people will be marginalized and unable to participate. (Marshall 1964: 74).

2.5 Summary

This chapter explained that citizenship has its roots in the male image and it is hard to define because of its many different meanings in historical periods, languages and theories. The thesis has covered the basic meanings of citizenship and discussed citizenship from the theoretical point of view. T. H. Marshall defined citizenship as full membership in a community. From his perspective, citizenship is a universal construct in which difference is rendered invisible. Marshall's understanding of citizenship as universal is supported by liberal theories of citizenship which reduce it to merely legal status through identification of the rights that an individual holds within the state. Theoretically, all individuals have universal access to these rights by virtue of their membership in a state. Rights were confined to the civil and political spheres under classic liberalism. In the twentieth century rights were extended to embrace the social sphere demanded by social movements.

Next chapter will discuss citizenship and its relation to feminism and gender. At first, a short summary of feminist history will be presented. A more careful definition of citizenship will be given in order to understand why women have become marginalized. The chapter will focus on the different dimensions, dichotomies and identity issues surrounding citizenship.
3. Citizenship: A gendered character

This chapter will consider citizenship’s exclusionary tensions which have served to exclude women from full citizenship. In doing so, this chapter will examine the so called ‘engendering of citizenship’, the separation made between the public and private sphere and at last, look at citizenship as a set of dichotomies. To begin with, the meanings behind the, so called, feminist waves of citizenship will be briefly mentioned. These feminist waves bring together and illustrate the relationship between feminist theories and movements for social and political change.

3.1 Brief history of feminism

The first wave of feminism was originated in the late eighteen century and found its inspiration from the writings of Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797). Mary Wollstonecraft was one of the pioneers to argue for women’s nature, rationality and the right to education. She proclaimed that until women could assess reason, morals and experience on same condition as men, neither gender would achieve its full potential. According to Wollstonecraft, sexism is debilitating to men because it allows them to gain more from oppression than their own efforts.

The first-wave feminists used the liberal conception of citizenship as a primary intellectual weapon in their struggle for equality, individual rights and freedoms. Eventually, it ended up in extended voting rights for women and the extension of the rights of citizenship. They took on liberal notions of universalism and formal equality to claim that gender differences should be irrelevant and that woman should not be excluded from citizenship.

However, the liberal notion of citizenship did not transform the lives for many women to that degree as many feminists had hoped. Therefore many second-wave feminists have questioned the adequacy of the liberal democratic conception of citizenship. These modern feminists mean that the liberal conception of citizenship fails to acknowledge the significance of difference which gives rise to a discourse, which constitutes an individual person.

The border between the first-and second wave feminism came with the publication of Simone de Beauvoir’s *The Second Sex* (1953). Attention was now called to classical liberal beliefs of humanism, equality and reason. The main feature of second-wave feminism was the recognition that power is found in private as well as in public life. The fact that women’s activity could only be found in the private was harming them the most. In the liberation years of 1960s and 1970s feminist questions regarding politics and the separation between the public and private sphere was raised even more. *The personal is Political* reflects the many ways feminists’ attempted to overcome the oppression in the private sphere. This second activism also focused on abortion rights, legislation, litigation and affirmative action.

Third wave feminism is a contemporary phenomenon. It rejects the practice of categorizing feminism as reflections of existing western political theories. Third wave activism makes room for a number of voices, they argue from post-modern theories as well as the authenticity of differing personal experiences. As a result, these contemporary aspects offer a rich source of new thinking of liberation. While social movements emerged, one expected that third wave feminism would be based on more than gender. They will combine and reflect complex realities of ethnical, sexual and class differences. (Hoover 2001: 155-160).
3.2 Engendering citizenship

Within the feminist movements the claim to participation has gone hand in hand with claims to citizenship. Constitutional change, the establishment of supportive organizations for women and debates concerning citizenship are areas where the activistisms of women’s movements have opened up new grounds for discussions concerning gender equality. Legal reforms established in many countries have also led to theoretical and strategic debates on women’s interest and their claim to citizenship. Feminist scholars have written about citizenship, arguing that it is important as well as a contested concept. Before the development of the new ideas and literature there were a lot of philosophical exchanges between feminists and citizenship theorists, however they were developed separately. For example, both feminists and citizenship theorists wrote about the state, the welfare system, law and democracy. Same questions were discussed as ‘How do we combine the common good with respect for group differences?’ and ‘How can we reach universality and plurality?’ (Hellsten 2006: 16). A lot of them shared same ideals and believes. Citizenship and feminism were surely connected with concepts of freedom, political equality, justice and democracy.

When we talk about this, it is interesting to mention that when feminism first originated it was connected with women’s citizenship. When the gendered character of citizenship was identified, feminist developed many different approaches towards what is called the ‘engendering of citizenship’. These can be put into three broader categories which have been presented by Ruth Lister. Simplified they are, the gender-neutral citizen, the gender-differentiated citizen and the gender-pluralist citizen. (Hellsten 2006: 16-19).

3.2.1 The gendered construction of citizenship

The relationship between citizenship and gender is a historical one. Both as a theory and a practice citizenship works simultaneously as a force for both inclusion and exclusion. Women have historically and in modern times been denied the effective title of citizenship. The twentieth century’s theorists have tended to ignore the way in which women’s actions and achievements of civil, political and social rights usually followed a different pattern from men’s. On the other hand, feminist scholars have revealed how both in practice and theory citizenship has been grounded on male images. The public-private dichotomy and the male-female qualities associated with it are the core stones in gendered citizenship relationships.

A number of feminist scholars have argued that citizenship is a gendered concept, among these Pateman. Lister believes that the theoretical disembodied individual and the public-private divide are fundamental for women’s past and continued exclusion from full citizenship status. She argues that citizenship has been defined according to a male image. Abstract individual citizenship has been created around gendered notions of what a man should be, while women and any activity deemed to be incompatible with the public exercise of citizenship, have typically been relegated to a secondary private sphere. The author is arguing that the characteristics seen as synonymous with being a citizen are essentially those that have come to be regarded as masculine. She stresses the need to see individuals as embedded within particular historical, social and gendered locations. Lister argues that the public-private dichotomy is a theoretical and practical barrier to women’s citizenship and that the private duties characteristically assigned to woman have a negative impact on women’s ability to be active in the public arena. She notes
that a key issue for feminists is how informal care is viewed in relation to the obligations that citizenship entails.

In a similar way, Vogel argues that citizenship has been seen as the masculine area. She argues that the exclusion of women should be seen as one example of the tendency for citizenship to exclude individuals who deviate from the institutionalized male ideal of the citizen. Although she sees T.H. Marshall’s approach as generally advantageous in that it places social rights as its core, she argues that in outlining the theoretical construction of the post-war welfare state, Marshall condemned women to a marginalized second-class citizen. Central to this marginalization was the taken for granted supposition that women, especially married women, would naturally take on the unpaid care role in the family while the male would provide for the family through paid employment. (Dwyer 2004: 95-97).

From the literature used in this thesis, one can conclude that there are many dichotomies. Some of them are presented below:

<table>
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<th>The male:</th>
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Like Lister, Walby, argues that the public-private dichotomy is significant for understanding women’s citizenship status and facilitates a differential access to citizenship rights for women in comparison to men. It is not simply a case of women being slower to gain the rights that male citizens enjoy, but that they have a different relationship to citizenship. A central issue for many women is that access to full social citizenship rights is usually dependent on individuals being full-time workers. Social citizenship
rights are, for example, pension. Drawing from the work of Lister, Walby stress a fundamental tension at the heart of many feminists’ critiques of mainstream citizenship theory. Women could either:

- *a) look to enter the public sphere of paid work as a way of ending their status as second class citizens;* or
- *b) seek to change the dominant male notion of citizenship and look to have their contribution as informal carers positively recognized within an altered notion of citizenship.* (Dwyer 2004: 99).

Option (a) requires women to act like men and take off male patterns of paid employment. If option (b) is taken instead, the dilemma is that women may then possibly be reinforcing their own disadvantage as their informal caring role has undermined their status as citizens in the past. Women’s greater commitment to caring is simultaneously positively valued and a source of disadvantage to women. (Dwyer 2004: 98-99).

### 3.2.2 The separation between the public and private sphere

The contemporary feminists have been critical to the liberal views, both when it comes to the individual level and the democratic level of citizenship. In the centre of this critic lies a reevaluation of the role of difference which had risen from the failure of woman’s enfranchisement to produce the radical transformation of woman’s lives anticipated by many first-wave feminists. Since the vote should give woman equal and legal political right, first-wave feminists predicted it would also increase woman’s position in society. However, it did not bring any significant improvements in the position of woman. As a result, many second-wave feminists have questioned the values which the liberal notion of individual rights and the liberal conception of citizenship are built upon. While early feminists actively endorsed liberalism’s emphasis on universality and formal equality, second-wave feminists have claimed that these commitments blind liberals to the significance of difference.

From this standpoint a range of contemporary feminists have focused on the extent to which the notion of formal equality, central to the liberal conception of democratic citizenship, requires the exclusion of particularity. This exclusion is obtained by an obvious and sharp border between the public and private sphere. The public sphere is described by the general interest and the impartial rule of interest while the private sphere is described by particularity, affectivity and desire. In this, feminists have called attention not only to the fact that historically woman have been assigned to the private sphere, but also to the fact that for many centuries this genderization of the public/private distinction has built the ground for excluding woman from citizenship. Therefore, women have been placed in the private sphere characterized with nurture, love and care. As a result, they were seen as lacking in the qualities needed for public life. For second-wave feminists this public/private division did not lose its potency with the advent of woman’s suffrage. If particularity is placed to the non-political private sphere, then once woman step into the ‘male’ public sphere, the way in which they differ from men is seen as deviating from the norm. Many feminists have reacted to the failure to take effective measures to remove the social and economic disadvantages suffered by woman, while others have questioned weather the removal of differences is an acceptable political aim. This question has been in focus for some feminists in order to analyze the notion of the individual which gives rise to the liberal conception of citizenship.

Here Carol Pateman, whose theories I will revert to has discussed the manner in which liberals have attempted to abstract the individual from all social, economic and biological contingencies. As an
outcome, the individual becomes disembedded and disembodied. Pateman notices, that liberal views invites to view one another as abstract and autonomous beings, meaning viewing one another morally. In order to act morally we all must follow the norm of formal equality which is described in a system of justice based on a network of formal right and duties. However, for many feminists such an account of the individual does not include the extent to which our identity is irrevocably shaped by the particularities and contingencies of our existence. From this standpoint feminists have focused on the impact the physical being has on our identity.

Pateman state that if the individual is to be a universal figure, liberalism must exclude the fact that ‘humankind’ has two bodies, female and male’. Above all, she argues that if woman are to gain genuine political equality, the political significance of women’s bodies must be recognized. Feminists claim that liberalism fails to acknowledge the significance of these differences and it has resulted in a discourse on what constitutes a true individual. Moreover, the true individual is represented of men’s experiences rather than women’s; the liberal individual is connected with the image of an independent male. Due to the fact that liberalism favors universality and formal equality at the same time as it denies the significance of particularity can be seen as an expression of a deep seated male bias. In other words, experiences of one group, male adults, is taken as normative for the whole humanity. As a consequence, women’s experiences are regarded as deviant from the norm and thereby marginalized. This marginalization of women’s interests has resulted in a distortion of ethical and political life in general for many feminists. Second – wave feminists have therefore in their attempt to reclaim woman’s moral and political voice emphasized difference, particularity and contextuality. (O’Sullivan 2000: 51-53).

Lister maintains that the public-private divide is pivotal to women's longstanding exclusion from full citizenship in both theory and practice. As long as women were denied participation in public realms, they were treated as second class citizens. So citizenship for women is often about invisibility and inferiority. The public is valued to the extent that the private is not and the unpaid work of women in the home is perhaps one of the greatest tragedies of the 20th century. (Lister 1997: 6).

3.2.3 Why women are marginalized

To understand why feminist believe women are marginalized and not possesses full citizenship, one have to look at citizenship as a series of dichotomies. As mentioned, citizenship is understood as a series of dichotomies, including male/female, public/private, inclusion/exclusion, individual/community, universal/pluralistic, common/differentiated, justice/care, rights/responsibilities, to be a citizen/to act as a citizen, identities/lack of identities, recognition/lack of recognition, old norms/modern norms etc. All these dimensions create inequalities because one is always valued over the other.

One important aspect when we nowadays discuss the engendering of citizenship is the causes that have made women marginalized. It is a fact that institutional sex roles do exist and feminists combine this with the lack of recognition of women, the lack of women identities within liberal democracy etc. To investigate this relationship one has to define citizenship more specifically.

As explained in the previous chapter, citizenship derives membership of a community and in turn gives rise to the exclusion of non-members. In turn, membership also gives rise to questions of identity. For Brian S. Turner, citizenship is a set of practices which constitute individuals as competent members of a community. He distinguishes himself from citizenship as a status that determines the rights and
obligations. He rather defines citizenship as a number of social, legal, political and cultural practices which constitute the citizen. Eventually this becomes institutionalized as normative social arrangements which determine membership of a community.

Nick Crossley sees citizenship as an identity, for persons to act as citizens; subjects must have a shared sense of it. The sense of identity creates a moral imperative upon citizen participation. In this dimension citizenship is a form of social identity created through identification and action orientations.

So citizenship can also be seen as a set of practices and as identity. The identity definition of citizenship belongs to the social, cultural, psychological and political dimensions. Chantal Mouffe has noticed this dimension of citizenship. She argues that as politically and culturally democratic citizenship consists in identifying with the ethico-political principles of modern democracy.

One important aspect in engendering citizenship is that of boundaries, belonging and exclusion. Kathleen B. Jones recognizes certain dimensions of citizenship as ‘boundary projects’. For example the identity dimension, meaning those who are citizens suppose to share as well as to the construction of social bonds among those who are citizens. These bonds creates relations between the members of a community and thereby the feeling of belonging to this group and not to that group. Within social bonds identity has its exclusionary moment. By the identity marker, citizenship creates a rejection of non-citizens which are placed outside the city, nation or community. Therefore Jones argues that we should move away from citizenship as a relationship between the state and its members. Instead we should aim for a model of politics and public space with influences from some anarchist and communitarian traditions.

These themes of belonging and exclusion are in turn related to the theme of recognition. Crossley have discussed in the themes of citizenship as a status. To be a citizen implies recognition and respect this sense leads to ‘desire for recognition’ and ‘struggle for recognition’. The rights of citizenship can therefore be related to recognition, those people who will be denied the dignity of recognition will always be potentially opposed to their situation and in turn unstable. Citizenship as recognition has a formal expression in terms of rights and duties but also a substantive dimension, which is connected to the status which certain groups enjoy in the lifeworld. Lifeworld relations can negate the recognition otherwise afforded within the system therefore annulling citizenship practice. Crossly argues that the sexual objectification of women may undermine the subject – citizen status otherwise granted to them by precisely reconstituting them as objects. For citizenship to be true recognition is needed at all levels.

In response to liberal democratic conception of citizenship feminist theorists have made contributions to citizenship. They want to reconstruct the universal, male notions of citizenship in order to find alternative models to citizenship which allow all members of society to be inclusive and able to participate in public life. The thesis will now present three feminists’ alternative models in order to demonstrate that the conception of citizenship that one uses today tend to exclude women and also people with disabilities. (Camauër 2000: 36-38).

3.3 Summary

This chapter has examined the gendered character of citizenship. Mary Wollstonecraft was one of the pioneers to argue for women’s nature, rationality and the right to education. While social movements
emerged, one expected that third wave feminism would be based on more than gender. They will combine and reflect complex realities of ethnical, sexual and class differences. One has concluded that the separation made between the public and private sphere are the core stones in gendered citizenship relations. The fact that women for centuries have been assigned to the private sphere has built the ground for excluding them from full citizenship. The question is to what extent this exclusion of women will remain concentrated in the private sphere after having “de facto”, been granted formal equality in the public sphere. Still, contributions and work in the public sphere is valued more. This chapter has also deepened the definition of citizenship and discussed in terms of identity and recognition to understand the cause that lies behind the marginalization of women. Next chapter will present the three alternative models to citizenship offered by Pateman, Young and Mouffe. The aim is to explain their recommended valuations in order to reconstruct citizenship so it will be inclusive also for women. The thesis will follow the discourse analysis explained in the introduction. First, the problem of citizenship will be discussed. Second, the cause of the problem will be explained. Third, the possible solutions they proclaim for citizenship to be an all inclusive concept will be presented.
4. Pateman – The Disorder of Women

Pateman has been the feminist theorist whose theoretical reflections on citizenship have influenced many other feminist theorists, among these Young and Mouffe. Her book The Disorder of Women published 1989 is often referred to. Pateman criticizes the fact that liberal thinkers and participatory democratic theorists used a gender-neutral language which gave the impression that women were free and equal citizens, but in Pateman’s view, there were not. According to her, women should be citizens as women. For them to be autonomous and equal, democratic theory and practices need a radical transformation. She belongs to the category who proposes a gender-differentiated citizen.

4.1 The problem of citizenship

Pateman belongs to what is called the woman-centered feminists who are not proposing a gender-neutral citizenship. For these feminists such a development would be pointless, doomed to failure. Instead, they argue that we need to rethink citizenship from the viewpoint of the female citizen. Pateman connects citizenship to a patriarchal dilemma. Pateman’s discussion of the patriarchal welfare state is one of the most influential discussions of gender, welfare and citizenship. Patriarchy can be defined as the dominance of men over women, or the structures and practices through which men are able to dominate women.

Pateman believes that the welfare state creates and builds citizens in different ways depending on whether or not they are male or female and that it is needed to analyze how gendered assumptions about the respective roles of men and women affect social rights. A vital question is the connection that is made between access to full citizenship rights and participation in paid work and how this negatively impacts on the rights of women who offer unpaid familiar care. For Pateman, it is ironic that, while the public worlds of (paid) work and (state) welfare are fundamentally underpinned by the unpaid private care work of women, women are systematically disadvantaged in terms of their welfare rights by performing such care work. Male claims to welfare are regarded as legitimate because of prior activity in the paid labor market and their attendant tax and national insurance contributions. In contrast, the ongoing unwillingness of the state to recognize that the provision of informal support within a familial setting is as valid a form of social contribution as paid work serves to entrench female dependency and undermine their claims to welfare rights. Even though the welfare state offers women services that may be of real value to individuals, Pateman believes that its emergence means that many women merely exchange dependency on an individual man for dependence of a patriarchal state. The welfare state does little to challenge the structures and practices that define women as dependants rather as autonomous citizens. (Dwyer 1994: 97). As Pateman express herself:

“As participants in the market, men could be seen as making a public contribution, and were in a position to be levied by the state to make a contribution more directly, that entitled them to the benefits of the welfare state. But how could women dependents of men, whose legitimate ‘work’ is held to be in the private sphere, be citizens of the welfare state? What could, or did, women contribute? The paradoxical answer is that women contributed welfare... (Pateman 1989:137).

In her explanation of patriarchal institutions she offers a radical critique of the concept of universal citizenship in classical political theory. Her theory has been widely influential in enabling spaces within citizenship discourses to be inclusive of women. She argues that women are excluded from society due
to the separation between the private and public where citizenship is based on a male norm. Who a citizen is, what a citizen does and the arena within which he acts have been grounded in the male image. Although women now are citizens in the liberal democracies, formal citizenship has been won within a structure of patriarchal power in which women’s qualities and tasks are still devaluated. The movement for women to be integrated in the public world of citizenship faces what she called the ‘Wollstonecraft Dilemma’. She compares the demand to equality to accept the patriarchal conception of citizenship that implies that women must become like men. In the same time she insists that women’s distinctive attributes, capacities and activities should be given expression and valued as contributing to citizenship. Because such difference is precisely what patriarchal citizenship excludes. (Pateman 1989: 179-181).

4.2 The cause of the problem

Pateman sums up the difficulties which have for centuries faced women in their fight for full citizenship as "Wollstonecraft's dilemma."

She begins her explanation with an example from real life. In Britain 1942, the Beveridge Report was announced which gave official recognition to the value of women’s unpaid work. However, this report was criticized because the value of the work in bringing women into full citizenship was ignored. The equal worth of full membership and the respect of fellow citizens were still dependent on participation as paid employees. As a result, ‘citizenship’ and ‘work’ stood opposed to women and in Pateman’s view it still does.

The dilemma is that the two routes towards citizenship that women have pursued are mutually incompatible. On one hand, they have demanded that the ideal of citizenship should be extended to them, and the liberal – feminist agenda for a "gender neutral" social world is the logical conclusion of one form of this demand. However, they have also insisted as Mary Wollstonecraft that as women they amass specific capacities, talents, needs and concerns so that the expression of their citizenship will be differentiated from that of men. Their unpaid work providing welfare could be seen as Wollstonecraft. Pateman see women's tasks as mothers, as women's work as citizens, just as their husbands' paid work is central to men's citizenship. (Pateman 1989: 195-197).

The patriarchal meaning of citizenship means that the two demands are incompatible due to the fact that it only allows two alternatives:

‘either women become (like) men and so full citizen, or they continue at women’s work, which is no value for citizenship.’ (Pateman 1989: 197).

Furthermore, within a patriarchal welfare state neither demand can be achieved. The patriarchal meaning of ‘citizen’ is built upon men’s attributes, capacities and activities therefore impossible to demand that citizenship should be extended to women’s accepts, at least not in the way citizenship exists today. It would mean that citizenship can at its best be extended to women only as lesser men, and women cannot be equal citizens in that present meaning. To demand social recognition and support for women’s responsibilities within the patriarchal welfare state is to condemn women to less than full citizenship and continued lack of incorporation into public life as ‘women’. This would mean according to Pateman that women are members of another sphere who cannot earn the respect of male citizens.
Moreover from the Wollstonecraft dilemma she suggests two further related steps through the impasse she identifies. The first one is the question about the allocation of responsibility for the welfare of all citizens. The second is to problematize men’s relationship to citizenship which is grounded on their freedom from the caring responsibilities that in turn constrain women’s citizenship as a status and practice. With both steps attention is drawn from women to men, the gendered division of labour, social responsibilities for children and others in need of care. Above all, these steps question the meaning of citizenship itself and its differential value it places on ‘public’ paid work and ‘private’ unpaid caring work. (Pateman 1989: 200-202).

4.3 Solutions to the problem

Pateman proposes a ‘sexually differentiated’ conception of citizenship that would recognize women as women as a possible solution to this dilemma. When women are seen as women it would give political significance to the capacity that men lack, to create life, meaning motherhood. She strongly proclaims that motherhood should be granted equal political relevance for defining citizenship as that which is usually considered the ultimate test of citizenship, a man’s willingness (or unwillingness) to go to war and die for his country. For Pateman it is necessary for the traditional patriarchal way on posing an alternative need to be challenged by a new way of posing the question of women. With a new conception of citizenship where the specificity of womanhood and the common humanity of men and women are recognized this is possible.

The theoretical and social changes required for women and men to be full members of a free democratic society are as far-reaching as can be imagined. Civil society has been built upon the exclusion of women and all that women symbolize. In order to build a society which includes women as full citizens it is a must to deconstruct and reassemble the understanding of the body politic. This task extends from the rejection of the patriarchal separation of private and public to a transformation of our individuality and sexual identities as feminine and masculine beings. These identities now stand in contrast to the multi-faceted expression of the patriarchal dichotomy between reason and desire. (Pateman 1989: 50-53). Pateman points out:

‘The most profound and complex problem for political theory and practice is how the two bodies of humankind and feminine and masculine individuality can be fully incorporated into political life.’ (Pateman 1989: 53).

However, Pateman argues that the future of autonomous and democratic differentiation is almost impossible with the present of patriarchal domination. Pateman responds to the paradox of being included as citizens and excluded as women by saying that we should not eliminate ‘men’ and ‘women’ from our reflections on citizenship in favor of gender – neutrality. She rather argues that if both sexes are to be full citizens:

‘the meaning of sexual difference has to cease to be the difference between freedom and subordination’ (Pateman 1992: 2).
4.4 Model

According to Pateman, we should rethink citizenship from the viewpoint of the female citizen. For her, the patriarchal welfare state is the main reason why women have not been granted full citizenship. Women and female attributes are central in her discussion of gender, welfare and citizenship. She stressed the importance of access to full citizenship rights and participation and argued that unpaid care work should be valued equally as paid work. Women are excluded from society due to the separation made between the private and public because citizenship is based on a male norm. So, the problem of citizenship lies in the horizontal relationship, in the separation made between the public and private sphere. The patriarchy domination in society also affects women’s opportunities to act as members of society in the public sphere. The male has full citizenship while women are disadvantaged. In order to build a society which includes women, we need a transformation of our individuality and sexual identities as feminine and masculine beings. Sexual differences should not be a barrier for participation and citizenship status.

Pateman argued that the state does very little to change the structures in society. But, what shall the state do? First of all, acknowledge women as autonomous beings. Moreover, acknowledge the unpaid care work women undertake in their homes. She proposed a ‘sexually-differentiated’ conception of citizenship that would recognize women as women. So, the state need to give women rights in order to reach an all inclusive citizenship. Nowadays, the state has started to recognize the unpaid care work many women perform in their home. The state has approved, the so called ‘housekeeping’, as a paid work.

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State
’d de jure’

Public/Rights

Male

‘de facto’
community

Private/Duties

Female
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4.5 Summary

Pateman connects citizenship to identity issues. She strongly proclaims that women must be recognized as women. The only way for women to achieve full citizenship is to recognize individuality and sexual identities as feminine and masculine human beings.

The public/private divine and its relationship to civil society, political activity, the family and the economy etc. is the major problem for woman to reach full citizenship. Pateman relate the public sphere with political life and the private sphere to family life. She argued that the power relations in the society were patriarchy ruled, in which the man have a right to rule over their women in the private sphere. In turn, this marginalization of woman in the private affects their opportunities to act as members of a community in the public sphere. It is clear Pateman argues that the problem with citizenship lies in the horizontal relationship. For her, the problem with citizenship and how to solve it must start within families and between individual citizens.

Pateman proposed a ‘sexually differentiated’ conception of citizenship that would recognize women as women as a possible solution to the patriarchy in society. When women are seen as women it would give political significance to the capacity that men lack, to create life, meaning motherhood. She strongly proclaims that motherhood should be granted equal political relevance for defining citizenship as that which is usually considered the ultimate test of citizenship, a man’s willingness to go to war and die for his country.
5. Young – Justice and the Politics of Difference

After Pateman’s contribution to the debate concerning women and citizenship a number of feminists have been involved in this discussion whether citizenship should or not be gendered. Young’s model of a ‘heterogeneous public’ has been most influential. Young place women as a group among ethnic minorities, the poor, and the aged etc. She argues that all these different groups have been prevented from participation in the public arena due to the liberal emphasis on homogeneity, impartiality, and normative rationality.

5.1 The problem of citizenship

Young belong to those feminists who believe that alternative models of citizenship which privilege ‘female tasks’ such as caring work or motherhood exclude some women and other groups with differences or disabilities. Young sees citizenship from another perspective, for her citizenship requires the developments of a theory grounded not on the assumption of an undifferentiated humanity but rather on the assumption that there are group differences and some groups are actually or potentially disadvantaged. She argues that rights and values are universally created and are blind to differences such as culture, gender, age or disability therefore encourage rather than undermine oppression. For her this is the major problem in the liberal conception of citizenship. In Young’s view there are two key meanings attached to universal citizenship. Firstly, universality is defined according to what citizens have in common as opposed to how they differ. Secondly, universality presupposes the laws and rules apply to everyone equally and are therefore blind to individuality and group differences. (Young 1998: 262-264).

5.2 The cause of the problem

According to Young, the modern conception of the public creates a conception of citizenship which excludes from public attention most particular aspects of persons. Public life is said to be blind to sex, ethnic belongingness, age and so on and all persons are supposed to enter the public and its discussion on identical terms. As a result, this conception of the public has ended up in the exclusion of persons and aspects of persons from public life. Our society is still one which forces persons or aspects of persons into privacy. Repression of homosexuality is the most striking example. Most today’s people in United States seem to stick to the liberal view that persons have a right to be gays as long as their activities are kept private. Discussions in the public sphere of asserting gay needs and rights provoke ridicule and fear in many people.

Our society only is at its beginning to change the practice of keeping the physically and mentally disabled out of public view. ‘Respectable’ women have for almost a century had access to public spaces and public expression. However, Young argues that prevailing norms still pressure women to privatize femaleness such as pregnancy out of public speech, view and consideration. However, ‘The Personal is Political’ as mentioned, expressed the principle that neither social practices nor activities should be excluded and regarded as improper subjects for public discussion, expression or collective choice. The public has regarded many practices to be too trivial or private for public discussion. In this category falls as examples domestic violence against women, sexual assault of women and children and the sexual division of housework and so on. Challenging the traditional opposition between public and private implies a challenging conception of justice that opposes it to care. (Young 1990: 119-121).
5.3 Solutions to the problem

If, in the name of a politics of difference, we would give up all ideals of impartiality no moral justification would remain for undemocratic processes of decision making concerning collective action. Thereby we will have a real contract with real participatory structures in which all people regardless gender, ethnical, geographical differences etc. uphold their views on social matters within institutions that encourage their representation. However, Young argues that this ideal of the civic public excludes women because its rational and universal status derives only from its opposition to effectiveness, particularity and the body.

In the name of a politics of difference, Young argues that a conception of justice which challenges institutional domination and oppression should offer a vision of a heterogeneous public that acknowledges and affirms group differences. The main coherent of the public is what is open and accessible so in its principle it not exclusionary. But the public do not imply homogeneity or the adoption of some general or universal standpoint. And in an inclusive public one shall expect to encounter and hear from those who are different, and whose social perspectives and experiences are different. In order to reach a politics of inclusion, participatory democrats must promote the ideal of a heterogeneous public in which individuals have their differences acknowledged and respected. (Young, 1990: 116-120).

The model of a ‘heterogeneous public’ implies two political attributes:

‘(a) no persons, actions or aspects of a person’s life should be forced into privacy; and (b) no social institutions or practices should be excluded a priori from being a proper subject for public discussion and expression.’ (Young, 1990: 120).

For Young, participatory democracy is a condition of social justice. Contemporary participatory democracy, on the other hand, inherits from republicanism which tends to exclude some groups. This can be seen in everyday life. Jane Mansbridge’s work of the functioning of a New England town meeting government showed that it was common that women, working-class people and poor people participate less than men, middle-class professionals. Men and the middle-class professionals assume authority and are more practiced at speaking persuasively than women, mothers and aged. This is an obvious example of group differences that affect the public, even thought the public claims to be blind to the differences. By attempting once again a genuinely universal public traditional political theory and practices have responded to this evidence with no success. Young therefore proposes a principle:

‘a democratic public should provide mechanisms for the effective recognition and representation of the distinct voices and perspectives of those of its constituent groups that are oppressed or disadvantaged.’ (Young: 1990: 184).

Such a group representation would imply institutional mechanisms and public resources supporting specific representation for oppressed groups, there among women. Young actually argues that specific group representation in a democratic public supports justice much better than a ‘homogeneous public’ in many ways, both procedural and substantial.

First, Young argues that it assures procedural fairness in the public sphere. Groups that amass social and economic privileges tend to think that they have the right to speak up more than those who do not, they
also have the material, personal and organizational resources that enable them to get their voices heard. This implies that oppressed groups treat them as they have that right. As a result, policy issues are defined and solved by the priorities of the privileged. Thanks to specific representation for oppressed groups this process is interrupted because it gives voice to the assumptions and priorities of other groups.

Secondly, once the oppressed group’s interest also is heard, group representation better assures that all needs and interests in the public sphere will be recognized in democratic deliberation. Privileged people usually do not protect the interest of oppressed groups due to the fact that their social positions prevent them from understanding those interests and because to some point their privileges depends on the ongoing oppression on different groups. Different groups might share the same need but their differences usually have some special needs which the individual group themselves best can express. Democratic institutions should facilitate the public expression of the needs of those who tend to be socially marginalized by cultural imperialism if democratic decision – making is considered as a politics of need interpretations. For Young group representation in the public facilitates such expression.

Thirdly, Young claims that group representation would encourage the expression of individual and group needs and interests in term that appeals to justice. It will transform, by using Hannah Pitkin’s words, ‘I want’ to an ‘I am entitled to’. However, Young agues that publicity itself will lead to this transformation due to a condition of the public that people call one another to account. But group representation will certainly add to such accountability.

Finally, because group representation maximizes the social knowledge expressed in discussions thereby practical wisdom group representation promotes fair outcomes. Group differences are manifest both in different needs, interests as well as in different social locations and experiences. People in different groups usually are familiar with different institutions, events, practices and social relations. They also have different perceptions of the same institution, relations or events. Because of this reason people in different groups usually have more knowledge than members of others when it comes to understanding the probable consequences of implementing particular social policies. Once a public take advantage of all this social knowledge in its differentiated plurality then it makes just and wise decisions. (Young 1990: 183-188).
5.4 Model

Young placed women as a group among ethnic minorities, the poor and the aged etc. She argued that all of these groups have been prevented from full citizenship status. Instead of an undifferentiated humanity we must admit that there are group differences that make some groups disadvantaged. The public forces some groups into privacy. So, the problem of citizenship lies in the vertical relationship; since rights and values in the public are universally created they are blind to differences such as gender. The public need provide mechanisms for recognition and representation for all groups. Challenging the distinction between the public and private implies a challenge of the conception of justice.

Young called for the vision of a heterogeneous public that acknowledge and affirm group differences. Compared to Pateman, Young does not want to change the conception of citizenship. Instead, she called for group representation and participatory democracy as a condition of social justice. One important point in her discussion is to grant access to public life and participation for all groups. The female in the model, demonstrate all the excluded groups in our society that need to be given access to rights and public life.
5.5 Summary

The question of citizenship rights and social difference has been a difficult one in feminist political theory. Young suggested that representative democracy should treat people not as individuals but as members of groups. She argued that a discourse of universal citizenship which would ignore these differences would just enhance the domination of groups which are already dominant, and would silence the marginal and oppressed groups. She suggested, therefore, that special mechanisms have to be established to represent these groups as groups. For Yong citizenship requires the development of a theory grounded on the assumption that there are group differences and some groups are actually or potentially disadvantaged. So, for Young the problem with citizenship lies in the vertical relationship. She argued that in order to reach a politics of inclusion, participatory democrats must promote the ideal of a heterogeneous public in which individuals have their differences acknowledged and respected.

Young also argued that prevailing norms still pressure women to privatize femaleness such as pregnancy out of public speech, view and consideration. Homosexuality was another example that forces persons or aspects of persons into privacy. She argued for specific group representation whereas the voices of these groups had a chance to be heard in the public. This is also connected to identity issues, these groups need to be recognized in order to achieve full citizenship. So, Young is proposing democratic deliberation as a way to coop with these prevailing norms in society.
6. Mouffe – The Return of the Political

Another line in the debate follows logically from Young’s contribution; Mouffe published her book *The Return of the Political* in 1993. She argues that Young’s model of a ‘heterogeneous public’ is highly problematic and proposes a different way to handle the problems in the approach of a new form of citizenship. She discusses from a radical plural democracy point of view which she combines with feminism. Mouffe strongly argues for a gender-neutral citizenship which should focus on creating a new conception of citizenship which effectively makes sexual differences irrelevant.

6.1 The problem of citizenship

Mouffe thinks that the problems with the liberal conception of citizenship not are limited to those concerning women. Based on the assertion that all individuals are born free and equal liberalism has contributed to the formulation of the notion of ‘universal citizenship’. However, in the meantime it has reduced citizenship to a mere legal status indicating the rights the individual holds against the state. As long as their holders do not break or interfere with the rights of others the way those rights are exercised is irrelevant. Public-spiritedness, civic-activity and political participation in a community of equals are alien to most liberal thinkers. Moreover, the public realm of modern citizenship was built in a universalistic and rationalistic manner that excluded the recognition of division that relegated to the private all particularity and difference. The border between the public and private sphere was as central as it were for individual freedom, therefore the distinction between the public and private acted as a powerful principle of exclusion. Thanks to the identification between the private and the domestic it served as an important actor in the subordination of women.

(Mouffe 1993: 82-83).

6.2 The cause of the problem

Mouffe especially notices the relational nature of identity and put forward that we formulate and maintain our identity by distinguishing ourselves from the ‘other’. What Mouffe recognizes when it comes to the terms of a collective identity is that every definition of a ‘we’ always implies a ‘them’. Moreover, that definition of a ‘we’ always takes place in a context of diversity and conflict whereas the other is regarded as an enemy that threatens ‘our’ identity and values. She argues that this dimension of diversity and conflict is what defines the political and the purpose for politics is to establish a sense of order in the face of this antagonism.

Mouffe argues that this sense of order is possible if we generate a political community grounded on the recognition of a ‘common good’. For Mouffe, there are two sides of the common good functions, a ‘social imaginary’ and ‘a grammar of conduct’. The ‘social imaginary’ reflects the impossibility to achieve full representation. And the ‘grammar of conduct’ resides of a modern democratic political community decided upon a shared commitment to the values of equality and liberty for all. Mouffe sees citizenship in terms of an allegiance to the ethico-political principles that constitute modern democracies. Therefore identification needs an active citizenship with the fundamental political principles of democracy. These principles of liberty and equality serve the modern democratic political community with a sense of unity. However, these principles are open to many competing interpretations and the priority to be established between them is widely contested. Therefore, we have to realize that a fully inclusive political community never can be realized. Once it is accepted that there cannot be a ‘we’
without a ‘them’, the issue can no longer be the creation of a fully inclusive community. In turn this implies a separation between the public and the private sphere. She also recognizes how liberal values and commitments have played an important role in the formation of the type of political community characteristic of political life in the western world. (O’Sullivan 2000: 61).

6.3 Solutions to the problem

According to Mouffe, the problems with the distinction between the public and private sphere can only be solved by reformulating it in a more adequate way, not by discarding it. Furthermore, the rights for the citizens must be complemented by a more active political participation and a sense of belongingness to a community. The view of citizenship Mouffe wants to put forward is:

‘the one required by a project of radical and plural democracy is that of a form of political identity that consists of an identification with the political principles of modern pluralist democracy, that is, the assertion of liberty and equality for all.’ (Mouffe 1993: 83).

In other words, it would be a community with common political identity of persons who might operate in different enterprises and with different conceptions of the good, but who are bound to their common identification with a given interpretation of a set of ethico-political values. For liberalism, citizenship is just one identity among others and for civic-republicanism citizenship is the dominant identity that overrides all others. For Mouffe, citizenship is also an articulating principle that affects the different subject positions of the social agent, while allowing for a plurality of specific allegiances and for the respect of individual liberty. Mouffe points out the importance that if we stick to the view that the exercise of citizenship consists in identifying with the ethico-political principles of modern democracy, we must also recognize that there can be as many forms of citizenship as there are interpretations of those principles and a radical democratic interpretation is one among others. A radical democratic interpretation will undertake the range of social relations in which situations of domination exist that must be challenged if the principles of liberty and equality are to apply. It will actually indicate that different groups fighting for an extension and radicalization of democracy have a common concern. In the end this should lead to the articulation of the democratic demands found in a variety of involvements, women, workers, disabled as well as other new social movements. The main purpose here is to create a ‘we’ as radical democratic citizens. This purpose must be clearly understood so such a relation of equivalence does not eliminate difference, because it is only in this matter democratic differences are opposed to forces or discourses which negate all of them that these differences can be substituted for each other. (Mouffe 1993: 83-89).

The vision of citizenship that Mouffe presents is obviously different both from the liberal and civic-republican. It is neither a gendered nor a neutral conception of citizenship. She talks about an anti-essentialist framework according to which:

‘the social agents are constituted by an ensemble of subject positions that can never be totally fixed in a closed system of differences’ (Mouffe 1992: 28).

Mouffe’s definition of citizenship lies in a theoretical challenge, her goal is to separate liberal democracy from capitalism and liberal individualism. Mouffe asks herself how a maximum of pluralism can be maintained without destroying community. Her answer lies in a reconstruction of citizenship. When Mouffe discuss citizenship she distinguishes five headings: radical democracy, community, social
justice, identity and pluralism. Throughout, her goal is to distinguish radical plural democracy from traditional liberalism and earlier forms of pluralism. Mouffe’s conclusion is to seek for a new definition of citizenship that is appropriate to radical plural democracy. She proposes that we should combine the best aspects of the liberalist/communitarian debate.

The common political identity that Mouffe is striving for is:


When Mouffe discuss the gendered nature of citizenship she proposes that it is time to move away from "responsible citizenship" as the central organizer of political studies, objectives and outcomes. Citizenship is about occupying both public and private spaces, not just engaging in activities that contribute to the stability of the nation-state. Voting, abiding by laws and engaging in paid labour are not the only acts that contribute to community and country. There is a need to provide students access to what Mouffe calls the:

"articulation of an ensemble subject position, corresponding to the multiplicity of social relations in which it is inscribed." (Mouffe 1992: 376).

This means that when students engage in political studies, they are given a range of experiences in which the intersections of gender, race, class and culture all contribute to the experiences of citizenship. Since the way that we engage in citizenship depends upon the way in which we understand our own subjectivities, it is important for students to value acts of citizenship that transcend traditional masculine notions. While there has been a wide discussion in the feminist community about the relevance of postmodernism for feminism, there have been few discussions of radical plural democracy. Mouffe has attempted to bring radical plural democracy and feminism together through her concept of citizenship:

“I believe that what a project of radical and plural democracy needs is not a sexually differentiated model of citizenship in which the specific tasks of both men and women would be equally valued, but a truly different conception of what it is to be a citizen and to act as a member of a democratic political community." (Mouffe 1992: 377).

The concept of difference has played an important role in recent feminist theorizing. Central to this question is whether women should emphasize or downplay both the differences between women and men and those between different groups of women. Mouffe brings the anti-essentialism of radical plural democracy to bear on this question by asserting that abandoning an essentialist concept of woman, far from being an obstacle to the formation of a feminist democratic project, is instead the condition of its possibility. She argues that many different kinds of identification can form around the concept "woman" that can provide the basis for a feminist politics. (Mouffe 1992: 381-382).
6.4 Model

Mouffe argued for a ‘gender-neutral’ citizenship which should focus on creating a conception of citizenship which makes sexual differences irrelevant. Similar to Young, Mouffe also argued that the public was universally created and therefore acted as a powerful principle of exclusion. So, the problem of citizenship lies in the vertical relationship, the public is unfamiliar with participation and activity in a community of equals. However, the problem also lies in the horizontal relationship, in the recognition made between the private and public sphere. This distinction has acted as an important actor in the subordination of women. Nevertheless, the distinction between the public and private should not be removed, it should be reformulated.

Mouffe stressed that the rights for the citizens must be complemented by a more active political participation and sense of belongingness. Compared to Pateman, women and femaleness are not so unique for Mouffe. Instead, there can be many forms of citizenship and many groups in society with different identities. In each group and in each role, citizens should have the right and possibility to express themselves. Our differences should not be in focus when discussing the citizenship debate. So, the solution lies in the horizontal relationship, we need to rethink the distinction made between the private and public sphere. The solution also lies in the vertical relationship, the public and the state need to offer citizens an active and participatory democracy. However, how to reach these solution are unclear. Mouffe offers no good explanation what needs to be done and how. She discussed a lot about the democratic culture and one can conclude that the way we act and think should be changed by time. Changes in our society are also dependent on each other, both problems and solutions are fluctuating as the model illustrate.
6.5 Summary

As mentioned earlier, citizenship can be seen as a set of practices and as identity. The identity definition of citizenship belongs to the social, cultural, psychological and political dimensions. Mouffe has noticed this dimension of citizenship, she argues that as politically and culturally democratic citizenship consists in identifying with the ethico-political principles of modern democracy. The rights for the citizens must be complemented by a more active political participation and a sense of belongingness to a community. Mouffe points out the importance that if we stick to the view that the exercise of citizenship consists in identifying with the ethico-political principles of modern democracy, we must also recognize that there can be as many forms of citizenship as there are interpretations of those principles and a radical democratic interpretation is one among others. The main purpose here is to create a ‘we’ as radical democratic citizens. So, Mouffe wants a common political identity on a framework for enabling actions and representation, an equal treatment of different identities. On the other hand, Mouffe argued that we have to realize that a fully inclusive political community never can be realized. Once it is accepted that there cannot be a ‘we’ without a ‘them’, the issue can no longer be the creation of a fully inclusive community.

Mouffe argues that public-spiritedness, civic-activity and political participation in a community of equals are alien to most liberal thinkers. Moreover, the public realm of modern citizenship was built in a universalistic and rationalistic manner that excluded the recognition of division that relegated to the private all particularity and difference. The border between the public and private sphere was as central as it were for individual freedom, therefore the distinction between the public and private acted as a powerful principle of exclusion. We concluded that Mouffe sees the problem of citizenship in both the vertical and horizontal relationship.

Mouffe’s definition of citizenship lies in a theoretical challenge, her goal is to separate liberal democracy from capitalism and liberal individualism. Mouffe’s conclusion is to seek for a new definition of citizenship that is appropriate to radical plural democracy. She proposes that we should combine the best aspects of the liberalist/communitarian debate.
7. Criticism

No debate in political theory will reach an end; neither will this debate concerning women and citizenship. Therefore it is suitable to mention some criticism against these three feminists to understand that there are not any given or easy answers in the ‘engendering of citizenship’. First Mouffe’s critique of Pateman will be presented followed by her critique of Young’s argumentation. However, there must be clear that the debate does not stop with Mouffe’s argumentation, but neither Pateman nor Young have published any written material where they respond to Mouffe. But, Susan Hekman has published an article where she criticizes Mouffe’s reasoning for being hard to follow. Since Mouffe’s approach and solutions to citizenship it is quite hard to follow it is well-situated to present some critique against her arguments because it allows us to easier understand her attempt to reconceptualise citizenship.

7.1 Mouffe’s critique of Pateman

Mouffe thinks that Pateman has a lot of interesting ideas concerning the way the liberal individual has been influenced by the male image. Mouffe agrees with Pateman that the individual has been constructed in a way that relegates all particularity and difference to the private which in turn is negative for women. However, Mouffe finds her solution with a sexually differentiated citizenship insufficient. For Mouffe, this solution is trapped in the very problematic that Pateman wants to challenge. With the political value of motherhood, Pateman wants to reconstruct citizenship and overcome the separation between the public and the private. But Mouffe finds that Pateman does not deconstructs the very opposition of men/women. Therefore she proposes an inadequate conception of what should be a democratic politics informed by feminists.

While Pateman demands a new citizenship for women as mothers, talking about her gendered citizenship Mouffe argues that sexual differences in alternative citizenship models are not pertinent. Mouffe instead thinks that the absence of an essential female identity does not set aside the construction of multiple forms of unity and common action around the category ‘women’ that provide the grounds feminist identity and struggle.

Mouffe criticizes not only Pateman but all those who want to replace the traditional conception of citizenship with ‘a sexually differentiated’, ‘bi-gendered’ conception of the individual and to bring women’s so called specific tasks into the definition of citizenship. Instead of making sexual difference politically relevant to its definition, she argues for the new conception of citizenship where sexual difference shall be nonpertinent. However, this is not to be regarded as an argument for gender-neutrality. Mouffe strongly argues that it should be called a ‘radical democratic conception of citizenship’. (Mouffe 1992: 80-81, 85).

7.2 Mouffe’s critique against Young

Young as mentioned argues that the exclusion not only affects women but also other groups such as ethnics, disabled or aged and proposes her model of a ‘heterogeneous public’ as possible solution for full citizenship. Mouffe agrees with Young when it comes to also account other forms of oppressions than the one suffered by women. But she finds Young’s solution of a ‘heterogeneous public’ highly problematic.
To start with, Mouffe criticizes the notion of a group that Young identifies with comprehensive identities. Mouffe finds it highly inadequate to sum up all groups whose demands she wants to take into account as women, aged, disabled, ethnic – minorities and so on. In the end, Young has no notion of a group and this is why her view is not so different from the interest – group pluralism that she criticizes. Mouffe argues that there already are groups with given identities and interests and politics is about finding ways to satisfy the demands of the various parts in a manner acceptable for all. (Mouffe 1992: 85-86).

To conclude Young’s politics is to handling with already constituted interests and identities whereas Mouffe’s citizenship entails the creation of a new ‘we’ by the transformation of new identities. Mouffe explains her aim:

‘... a radical democratic citizenship should be the construction of a common political identity that would create the conditions for the establishment of a new hegemony articulated through new egalitarian social relation, practices and institutions. (Mouffe 1993: 86).

Mouffe agrees that Young’s ‘group differentiated citizenship’ surely can provide opportunities to dialogue among different oppressed groups, but for their demands to be articulated around the principle of democratic equivalence, new identities must be created. She also propose that feminists should instead of trying to make sexual differences politically relevant, focus on creating a new conception of citizenship which effectively makes sexual differences irrelevant. (Mouffe 1993: 82).

7.3 Hekman’s critique against Mouffe

Susan Hekman is different in her theories from all of the three feminists that have been discussed in this thesis. She favours liberal democracy as the only one that is able to accommodate the new social movements such as feminism and other identity politics.

As the modernist Hekman is, she is arguing against Mouffe’s thesis that we should combine the best aspects of the liberalism/communitarian debate in the search for a new definition of citizenship. In her article, Radical Plural Democracy: A New Theory for the Left Hekman is sceptic to Mouffe’s postmodern redefinition of citizenship. She argues that liberalism makes little sense without the modernist concept of the subject and its universal principle. She is convinced that a mix of a Marxist politics of resistance and a postmodern emphasis on difference offers fruitful possibilities for a left politics but, the incorporation of liberalism into this theoretical mix does not. According to Hekman, this is an impossible theoretical way of thinking which can best be illustrated by using Mouffe’s attempt to bring radical plural democracy together with feminism. In her approach to feminism, this theoretical mix misses aspects of liberalism. While Mouffe refers to postmodern concepts such as the multiplicity of subjects, Hekman argues that the liberal notion of the autonomous subject is completely pointless.

Moreover, this exploration of feminism, also illustrate a problem the theorists of radical plural democracy have failed to deal with successfully; politics. Feminist theory is dependent on politics; it demands a connection to political issues for concretely situated women. While feminist theorist have succeeded to bring feminist politics into analysis, those theorists who combine feminism with radical plural democracy have not. Hekman argues that they have no political program. The main problem of a politics influenced by radical plural democracy and feminism is the question of the identity of the subject. Theorists of radical plural democracy want to incorporate the postmodern deconstruction of the
modernist subject into their approach. But they give no explanation of how to do this. Hekman refers to Mouffe who is arguing that what we need is: ‘the articulation of an ensemble of subject positions ... precariously structured.’ According to Hekman, Mouffe fails to suggest how this might be realized.

Hekman argues that the political weakness of radical plural democracy is significant. The approach to bring postmodernism, liberal democracy, language theory, psychoanalysis, feminism and other identity politics together has failed. But, according to Hekman neither left nor right has accomplished this. (Hekman: www.http://pages.globetrotter.net/charro/HERMES4/hekman.htm).

7.4 Summary

As we can see the debate regarding the regendering of citizenship includes a lot of dilemmas and problems. All these alternative models to citizenship and thereby inclusion varies a lot. While Pateman stress a ‘sexually differentiated’ citizenship, Mouffe finds it problematic and argues that an essential female identity does not deconstruct the male/female opposition. Young argues for specific group representation for women, Mouffe finds it insufficient. She argues instead in terms of a ‘we’ by the transformation of new identities. This debate is only at its beginning, as long as there are groups within society who feels marginalized it will continue.
8. Conclusion

This part of the thesis will sum up what is concluded by using discourse analysis of Pateman, Young and Mouffé’s approaches to citizenship.

For Pateman the problem with citizenship begins with the fact that the liberal tradition for centuries has used a gender-neutral language. This language has rather worked for exclusion than given the expression that women were free and equal citizens. The separation between the public and private sphere is also for Pateman the forefront in gendered citizenship relations. She argues that the separation is based on a male norm this patriarchal power implies that woman qualities and tasks still are devaluated. One can conclude that Pateman believes the problem of citizenship lays in the horizontal relationship.

The cause of the problem with citizenship lies in what she calls the ‘Wollstonecraft dilemma’. This dilemma sums up all difficulties that women have faced when they have struggled for full citizenship. It refers to the two routes towards citizenship that women have pursued are mutually incompatible. At the same time as they have demanded that the ideal of citizenship should be extended to them they have also argued that as women they amass specific capabilities, so their citizenship should be different from that of men. In a patriarchal meaning of citizenship the two demands are incompatible because it only allows that women either become like men, or continue working at women’s work which is no value for citizenship.

Solution to this problem is what she calls a ‘sexually differentiated’ citizenship. This model of citizenship would recognize women as women and imply that motherhood should grant full citizenship. For this model to be possible citizenship needs to be reconsidered from the viewpoint of the female citizen. To build a society which includes women as full citizens, it is necessarily to deconstruct and reassemble the understanding of the body politic. It is obvious that Pateman finds the problem with citizenship lies in the relationship between individuals themselves, the horizontal relationship. This task is about realizing that humankind has two bodies, male and female.

Young sees citizenship and its rights and values as universally created therefore they should be blind to gender, culture and disability etc. However, this is the problem with citizenship according Young. She argues that it rather encourage than undermine oppression. It implies that all persons shall enter the public on identical terms. As a result, the public has ended up in the exclusion of persons and aspects of persons from public life.

The cause of the problem is that universality is defined according to what citizens have in common as opposed to how they differ, and presupposes the laws and rules to apply equally for everyone. This implies that rights and values ignore individuality and group differences.

For a politics to be inclusive one shall expect to take into account all demands from those who are different. Young proposes a model of a ‘heterogeneous public’ in order to reach a politics of inclusion. Once the vision of a ‘heterogeneous public’ is introduced individuals will have their differences acknowledge and respected. To come to terms with the fact that our society still forces persons or aspects of persons into privacy Young proposes specific group representation for oppressed groups. Specific group representation will favor voices and demands for marginalized groups in our society.
For Mouffe liberalism has both contributed to the formulation of universal citizenship and reduced it to a mere legal status. For her the problem of citizenship lies in the fact that it was grounded in a universalistic and rationalistic manner. This excluded the recognition of division that relegated to the private all particularity and difference. The separation between the public and private sphere was as important as it was for individual freedom therefore the distinction between the public and private acted as a principle of exclusion.

The problem with the separation between the public and private can only be solved by reformulating it in a more adequate way. The rights for the citizen must also be complemented by active political participation and the creation of a ‘we’ which will act as a sense of belongingness. However, in terms of a collective identity every definition of a ‘we’ always implies a ‘them’ therefore the issue is no longer about the vision of a fully inclusive community. She argues that citizenship needs the transformation of new identities. Her vision of citizenship is a community with common political identity of persons, who are bound to their common identification with a given interpretation of a set of ethico- political values.

To refer back to the question of what solutions these feminists have for citizenship to be inclusive, one can say that this is a complex debate. To start with citizenship as mentioned is problematic and no true definition is available. Pateman, Young and Mouffe all discuss from different perspectives and offer different models and solutions to citizenship. There are no given answers to which one of these models that should be most suitable or if they are possible in real life. All these are theoretical solutions. However, one can conclude that they want a more women-friendly and gender-inclusive citizenship. They are also agree that questions regarding power is one cause that lies behind the marginalization of women. However, the question weather citizenship needs to be reconstructed or not is a question one must coop with carefully. It is very important that we do not loose its meaning. Deliberative democracy plays an important role in this matter; through debates we can take into account all possible solutions and demands. To create a successful deliberation it is important that political liberals create a dialogue with those who does not accept their rules of the game.

To conclude citizenship can be regarded as a form of identity. In one way, the exercise of citizenship is crucial for the development of the individual citizen as someone who has political freedom and responsibility. Second, citizen-identity helps to tame the divisive passions of other identities.

A more radical version of the same type of argument is made by Young in the name of group identity. Young offers a "politics of difference" as an alternative which implies a specific institutional modification of the universalistic conception of citizenship. "Identity" is a much used word in this line of thinking.

The concept of citizenship is one that feminist and other theorists must deal with carefully. The attempts to create and realize a universal citizenship that finds the public embodying generality as opposed to particularity, commonness versus difference, will tend to exclude or put at a disadvantage some groups. As can be concluded from my thesis, this is hard even when they have formally equal citizenship status. Different social groups have different needs, cultures, histories, experiences, and perceptions of social relations which influence their interpretation of the meaning and consequences of policy proposals and influence the form of their reasoning.
9. Analysis

It has been interesting to work with this thesis. I have found answers to the question posted in the introduction. However, the answers are complicated. The discourse analysis helped to construct the thesis. By recognizing the problem, the cause of the problem and possible solutions to the problem, the thesis was easy to follow. I will present my view of Pateman, Young and Mouffe’s theories.

I strongly disagree with Carol Pateman’s ‘sexually differentiated citizenship’. Pateman is the only feminist who suggests that women should be included as citizens based upon their caring work, in this way their inclusion discourses women. This is difficult for women with disabilities. Moreover, not all women are willing to perform caring tasks or to be mothers. Central to this is the unpaid care work that many women still undertake in the home. I agree that the model of citizenship that we use today does not take into account this work nor does it carry out the same access to social rights.

In most cases it is the woman who is given the role as housekeepers in eventual maternity leave. This depends much on the fact that men earn more and/or the nature that women are more suitable for child-care. I disagree with all feminists who propose a special treatment for women to join market participation. A better way is to create conditions in which both women and men can combine paid work, political involvement and caring responsibilities. Women should be able to participate in the public arena in equal conditions with men. However, this debate is important to change the history of women as being less able than men. One should accept all individuals as able in their own right and capability.

Nevertheless, I feel sympathy for Pateman’s criticism against the patriarchal power within families. In Sweden we have a long tradition of gender equality and several laws protecting it. However, many women still live under oppression from their husbands and/or male relatives; especially women with different ethnical backgrounds. When the social, political and economic power belongs to men they also own the power in society, thereby the marginalization of women can continue. The patriarchal heritage can be changed if we start to value different dichotomies equally. For years, paid work in the public has been valued over care work performed in the private. Both the private and care are traditionally associated with the feminine, while the public and paid work are associated with the masculine. However, nowadays we see some changes in this traditional pattern.

Young argued that alternative models of citizenship which privilege caring work and motherhood exclude some women and groups with disabilities. I could not agree more. Some women can not have children; these women are therefore already excluded from full citizenship. In today’s society there are also many women who choose a career in front of family and motherhood. It is important that women have the same possibilities as men in business life. Numerous women feel that they are treated differently and face difficulties to higher employment because they are women. A citizenship that favours motherhood and caring tasks offers no good solution for women to reach full citizenship status.

Young continued her discussion and argued for a vision of a heterogeneous public that acknowledges and affirms group differences. Moreover, she argued for specific group representation. I agree with Young, we need to admit that there are groups in society that are disadvantaged. Yet, Young’s discussion concerning group representation has its pros and cons. On the one hand, specific group representation offer group justice and is a good way for disadvantaged groups to get their voices heard.
Many voices are stronger than one. On the other hand, group representation is a poor solution when it comes to individual justice and for single individuals to get their voices heard. Bottom line is we need to see people as individuals and not as groups because we are all different.

Young also called for democratic deliberation. She argued that the problem with citizenship lies in the traditional opposition between the public and private and called for democratic deliberation to change these norms. I also believe that democratic deliberation plays an important role. It is important that we admit that there are individuals in our society that are different and disadvantaged. If we never discuss about it, it tend to provoke fear in people because it is unfamiliar to us.

Mouffe is the feminist in this debate which I think offers the best solution to the citizenship dilemma. But, she is complex in her debate and sometimes it is hard to follow her discussion. Mouffe argued for a gender-neutral citizenship which should focus on creating a new conception of citizenship which effectively makes sexual differences irrelevant. She argued that the problems with the distinction between the public and private sphere can only be solved by reformulating it in a more adequate way, not by discarding it. She argued that many different kinds of identification can be formed around the concept "woman" which can provide the basis for a feminist politics.

I agree with Mouffe when it comes to this line of thinking. Instead of abandoning everything that has to do with the female and female attributes, we need to recognize it and accept it. Only then, we can start to create a new concept of citizenship that is fair and allows justice for all. When we make no differences between the two sexes, it will eventually become irrelevant. This way of thinking can provide a good basis for a feminist politics.

Furthermore, Mouffe argued that the rights for the citizens must be complemented by a more active political participation and a sense of belongingness to a community. Mouffe is the only one of these three feminist that talks about a ‘we’. The ‘we’ feeling in a community is fundamental for well-being and also to reach full citizenship status for women and disabled groups. When we are treated with respect and as equals, with our differences and sexes recognized, the ‘we’ feeling is most likely to be present.

It has been hard to find any written material in which Mouffe’s theories are criticized. Few feminists have combined radical plural democracy with feminism and maybe that is why it is hard to find any published books. But I believe she is widely criticized in session rooms around the world because she fails to explain her way of thinking well enough. I found an article by Hekman who did not discuss purely in the citizenship versus feminism debate; however it was clear that Hekman found Mouffe’s attempts insufficient. I also agree that Mouffe’s attempts were lacking, especially when it comes to explain how to reach solutions. Still, she has definitely succeeded to start discussion whether radical plural democracy can offer, at least a theoretical home, for new social movements, such as feminism.

One can conclude that society has a long way to go until it proudly can accommodate these new social movements such as feminism, multiculturalism and other identity politics that has its roots in ethnicity or sexuality. It is important to keep in mind that this debate is a sensitive one; it must be handled carefully so it does not provoke fear in people. When introducing special needs and rights for people with differences it is often criticised. Moreover, when people with differences bring their activities into the public they face violent response. Striking examples of this is homosexuality and their right to
marriage and adoption. Furthermore, class and ethnicity prejudices. I believe liberalism and liberal democracy is the final solution for all social systems. I comprehend that liberalism can offer a theoretical home for these movements and thereby give room for differences of gender, class and ethnicity. It is important that political and social studies continue to interrupt the gendered nature of citizenship. When we are taught to use alternative understandings of citizenship, we will likely move towards a richer and more productive understanding of the world.

By legislation we prevent different kinds of discriminations against woman, but I have understood that it is not enough. The hardest part is to change prejudices and delusions in society. Today, many women are exposed to violence and degradation. Still, many women have to take the major responsibility for the household and childcare, due to the fact that men earn more. Struggles for full citizenship must engage us in our homes, in our local community as well as within states and international agencies. It is quite an agenda.

Women’s movements for full citizenship need to unite in the global struggle for against poverty, inequality and injustice. This can be done by preventing liberal democracies from giving full ‘political’ authority to the invisible hand of capitalist markets. More attention should have been paid to the shrinking responsibilities of states in the care of children and the elderly, equal access to education, health care and equal opportunities to employment and political participation. Without serious attempts to integrate the different feminist discourses under the same normative and practical agenda there can be no united front in the promotion of women’s citizenship.

Before last year’s election, the so called house-maid debate was on the agenda. This debate is about the right for ordinary people to hire help with simple house work such as cleaning and washing. It was referred to the house-maid debate because it was said that most likely women will take on this kind of jobs and be underpaid. Personally, I see no problem with this kind of employment. But it faced hard critique from the left who argued that house-maids did not belong in our modern society. This is a good example of a real world problem that this thesis is all about. For centuries women have stood in front of the stove and cooked for the family. She has also been responsible for cleaning, child-care and she has not been paid for this. Fact is, someone has to do this job and in most cases it is not the man in the household. To accept house work and pay women for this would bring women a step closer to full citizenship.

There are some similarities and dissimilarities between Pateman, Young and Mouffe’s approaches to citizenship. For Pateman, it is important to change the view of the female citizen. Women and femaleness should be recognized and be valued equal to male attributes. The state should approve unpaid private work as a right for women to gain social rights. Young’s discussion is more about access and right to be different. She does not want to change the concept of citizenship to that extent Pateman wants. Mouffe’s approach is more fluctuating whereas the way we think about a woman should be changed in time.
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